Survey Report

Cell phones are owned by overwhelmingly large majorities of people in most major countries around the world, and they are used for much more than just phone calls. In particular, text messaging is a global phenomenon – across the 21 countries surveyed, a median of 75% of cell phone owners say they text.

Texting is widespread in both wealthy nations and the developing world. In fact, it is most common among cell phone owners in two of the poorest nations surveyed: Indonesia and Kenya.

Many also use their mobile phones to take pictures or video. A median of 50% use their cell phones in this way in the 21 countries polled. Fully 72% of Japanese cell phone owners take pictures or video, as do roughly six-in-ten in Mexico (61%), Spain (59%) and Egypt (58%). Fewer users access the internet via cell phone, although more than four-in-ten mobile phone owners use their device to go online in Israel (47%), Japan (47%) and the United States (43%).

The survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted March 21 to May 15, also finds that social networking is popular in many nations around the globe. This is especially true in Israel (53%) and the U.S. (50%), where half or more say they use social networking websites. More than four-in-ten use these sites in Britain (43%), Russia (43%) and Spain (42%).

Social networking is generally more common in higher income nations; however, this is largely driven by the fact that wealthier countries have higher rates of internet access. People in lower income nations who have online access use social networking at rates that are as high, or higher, than those found in affluent countries.

In nearly every country, the young and the well-educated are especially likely to embrace all of these technologies. People under age 30 and college graduates tend to use their cell phones for more purposes than those in older age groups and those without a college degree, and they are also more likely to use social networking sites.

Many Use Phones for Texting, Pictures

Text messaging is highly prevalent – in 19 of 21 countries, a majority of mobile phone owners regularly send text messages.

Texting is most common among cell phone owners in Indonesia (96%), Kenya (89%), and Lebanon (87%), with eight-in-ten or more in Poland, Mexico, Japan and China also saying they regularly text.

In Western Europe, seven-in-ten or more say they send text messages on their cell phones, with the notable exception of Germany, where just 56% regularly text. Only in India and Pakistan do less than half (49% and 44%, respectively) of cell phone owners text.

The Japanese are the most likely of the publics surveyed to say they regularly take pictures or video with their cell phones, with 72% using their mobile phones for such purposes. Roughly six-in-ten cell phone owners in Mexico (61%), Spain (59%), and Egypt (58%) use their phones for snapping pictures or shooting video, while this is much less common in Lebanon (33%), Kenya (31%), Germany (27%), and India (26%). Only 9% of Pakistani cell phone owners say they use their devices for taking pictures or video.

In none of the countries surveyed do a majority use their cell phone regularly to access the internet. Still, at least 30% in six countries – Israel, Japan, the U.S., Britain, China and Poland – do go online using their phone.

Social Networking Widely Popular

In 15 of 21 countries, at least 25% of those polled use social networking sites. Israel (53%) and the U.S. (50%) top the list with the highest percentage of adults who say they use online social networking sites such as Facebook.¹

About four-in-ten of all adults in Britain (43%), Russia (43%), Spain (42%), Lithuania (39%) and Poland (39%) also say they engage in social networking. Among this group, Russia is the only country where nearly all internet users are on social networking sites. Only 6% of Russian internet users say they do not go on these sites. In Germany (35%), France (35%), and China (32%), about a third of adults do so.

Germany, France, and Japan are the only countries polled where more internet users say they do not go on social networking sites than say they do. While 35% of Germans use social networking sites, 44% go online but do not use such sites; the comparable numbers are 35% and 38% in France and 25% and 33% in Japan.

About three-in-ten are on social networking sites in Ukraine (30%), Turkey (29%), Jordan (29%), and Egypt (28%). In these four countries, as well as many others where social networking is less prevalent, the percentage of users tends to be low because majorities do not use the internet at all; however, among those who do use the internet, more are using social networking sites than not.

In most of the countries surveyed, there has been only marginal change in social networking use since 2010. Two notable exceptions are Egypt and Russia – countries where the role of social media in recent political upheaval has been the subject of considerable attention. In both nations, usage has increased by ten percentage points over the past year, from 18% in 2010 to 28% in 2011 in Egypt and from 33% to 43% in Russia.²

The percentage of adults who use social networking sites is determined in part by the prevalence of internet use, which is more broadly connected to a country’s wealth. The scatter plot below shows the positive relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) in the country and the level of social networking.

The U.S., which has the highest per capita GDP among the countries surveyed, is also among the countries with the highest percentage of adults using social networking sites, while Pakistan and India have two of the lowest per capita GDPs and the lowest levels of social networking.

Young, Educated Are More Connected

Consistently, young people are more likely to use their cell phones for functions other than phone calls and they are much more likely to become involved in social networking. For instance, in nearly all countries, people ages 18 to 29 are more likely than those 50 or older to access the internet on their mobile phone. This is especially true in Japan, where 78% of mobile phone users ages 18 to 29 regularly use their cell phones to access the internet, compared with only 20% of those 50 or older. Similarly, in the U.S., 73% of 18-29 year-olds use their cell phone for the internet, compared with 49% of 30-49 year-olds and 21% of those 50 or older. Young people are also consistently more likely to use their cell phones for texting and taking pictures or video.

Meanwhile, social networking varies considerably by age in almost all countries surveyed. In 13 of 21 countries, majorities of adults under age 30 use social networking sites. The only country in which even a quarter of those 50 or older engages in social networking is the U.S. (26%).

A gap of 50 percentage points or more between adults under age 30 and those over age 50 emerges in 11 of the countries surveyed. The gap is most striking in Lithuania, where 84% of 18-29 year-olds use social networking sites, while 43% of 30-49 year-olds and just 10% of those 50 and older do the same.

The gap on use of social networking between the oldest and youngest age groups is also large in the U.S., Western and Eastern Europe, Israel, and Japan.

There are smaller gaps between age groups in Indonesia (-26), Kenya (-19), and Jordan (-17), countries with lower internet usage rates. The age gap is smallest in the two countries with the lowest internet usage – India (-8) and Pakistan (-5) – as well as in Egypt (-9).

While younger adults are more likely to go online than older adults, the age gap in internet usage is not the sole driver of the age gap in social networking. Even among internet users, older people are consistently much less likely to engage in social networking than adults under the age of 30.

There are also notable education gaps regarding the use of these technologies. For example, 76% of Chinese cell phone owners with a college degree use the internet on their device, while just 34% of those who did not complete college use their phones in this way. Among American cell phone owners with a college degree, 53% use their phone to go online, compared with 39% of those without a college degree.

Education level is also a significant factor in social networking usage, though the importance of education varies widely by country. The largest differences between college graduates and those without a college degree are found in Egypt (+71) and China (+51). The education gap is somewhat less pronounced in the U.S. and Western Europe; and it is especially low in Germany (+4) and Britain (+2).

Compared with age and education, gender differences are less common in these measures of technology usage. Nevertheless, there are notable gender gaps in a few countries, including Spain, where 29% of male cell phone owners use their devices to access the internet, compared with 13% of females. In Germany, 26% of men who own a cell phone regularly use it for accessing the internet, while just 11% of women do so. And in Turkey, the gap is 16 percentage points between men (30%) and women (14%).

In Egypt, the gender gap is reversed, with women more likely than men to use their cell phones for texting (80% vs. 65%) and for taking pictures or video (65% vs. 53%).

There are few gender differences in social networking usage, although in Turkey 37% of men use social networking sites, compared with just 20% of women.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

On balance, publics in both Ukraine and Lithuania are favorably inclined toward Russia. However, the Ukrainian public’s embrace of its neighbor is much more enthusiastic than that found in Lithuania, where attitudes toward Russia are more mixed.

Opinions of U.S. and Russia

Majorities in all three post-Soviet nations surveyed rate the U.S. favorably. Favorable views of America are most widespread in Lithuania, where more than seven-in-ten (73%) give the U.S. positive marks. Among Ukrainians, six-in-ten view the U.S. favorably, while slightly fewer Russians (56%) are of the same opinion.

In both Ukraine and Lithuania, positive assessments of the U.S. co-exist with favorable opinions of Russia. In Ukraine, more than eight-in-ten (84%) say they have a favorable opinion of their neighbor, while a slim majority in Lithuania (53%) shares this view.

With respect to views of the U.S., younger people in all three countries tend to give the U.S. a more favorable rating than do older generations. The difference is most pronounced when comparing 18-29 year olds with those 65 years and older. In Lithuania, for example, 82% of those under age 30 hold a favorable view of the U.S., compared with 61% of those 65 years and above. Similarly, about two-thirds of younger Ukrainians (68%) and Russians (67%) give the U.S. positive marks, compared with smaller numbers of those 65 and older in each country (55% and 41%, respectively).

In Ukraine, views of Russia are consistent across age groups. Among Lithuanians, however, older age groups tend to have a more favorable opinion of Russia than do younger people. For instance, among those 65 years or older, about six-in-ten (59%) express a favorable opinion of Russia as compared with less than half (46%) among those between the ages of 18 and 29.

EU and NATO

The EU receives positive marks in all three nations surveyed. Lithuanians, in particular, hold the EU in esteem, with nearly eight-in-ten (78%) saying they have a favorable opinion of this major European institution. In Ukraine, roughly seven-in-ten (72%) also express a positive view, as do more than six-in-ten (64%) in Russia.

In Lithuania, strongly favorable views of the EU contrast with more mixed assessments of the country’s own involvement in the organization. Although nearly half (49%) say Lithuania’s membership in the EU is a good thing, about three-in-ten (31%) say it is neither good nor bad, while 8% say it is both and another 8% say it is only bad. This assessment is little changed from fall 2009, when the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked Lithuanians about belonging to the EU.

Unlike attitudes toward the EU, assessments of NATO diverge among the three post-Soviet publics. In Lithuania, which is a NATO member, a clear majority (65%) views the trans-Atlantic organization favorably. The fall 2009 survey also found favorable views in most of the other Eastern European countries surveyed. However, as was the case two years ago, opinion leans in the opposite direction in both Russia (37% favorable vs. 43% unfavorable) and Ukraine (34% favorable vs. 41% unfavorable).

The fall 2009 survey also asked about Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO. About half of Ukrainians (51%) opposed their country joining NATO, as did roughly seven-in-ten Russians (72%). By contrast, a majority of Lithuanians (58%) were in favor of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The prevailing view among other Eastern European publics was that Ukraine should join NATO; however only in Poland did a majority (64%) voice support for such a move.

In the case of both NATO and the EU, younger people in the three countries surveyed in 2011 tend to view these organizations more favorably. For example, more than four-in-ten (45%) Ukrainians younger than age 30 say they have a positive view of NATO, as compared with only 28% among those 65 years or older. Similarly, in Russia, opinion of NATO is more favorable among 18-29 year olds than among those 65 and older (44% vs. 34%).

Meanwhile, seven-in-ten Russians under age 30 see the EU in a favorable light as compared with 57% among those ages 65 or older. Similarly, 83% of younger Lithuanians give a positive evaluation to the EU as compared with 69% among those 65 years of age or older.

In Ukraine, attitudes toward NATO also vary by region. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central region (38%) as well as those in the South (21%) and East (18%) are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance. In the Western and Central regions, at least three-in-ten do not offer an opinion.

Influence of U.S., EU and Russia

On the question of whether the U.S., EU and Russia are having a positive influence on the way things are going in their country, opinion among Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians varies. In the fall 2009 survey, for example, a majority in Lithuania (62%) described the EU’s influence on their country as good, compared with only 40% of Ukrainians and 37% of Russians who said the same.

In the same survey, fewer in each country thought the U.S. was exerting a positive influence, although substantially more Lithuanians (39%) felt this way than either Ukrainians (24%) or Russians (15%). As for Russia, twice as many Ukrainians (46%) as Lithuanians (22%) said the largest of the post-Soviet states was having a good influence on how things were going in their respective countries.

Regionally, the fall 2009 survey found that Ukrainians’ and Russians’ tepid assessment of the EU’s influence was matched only in Hungary, where just 36% said the EU was favorably affecting how things were going in their country. In the other former communist countries polled in 2009, majorities saw the EU having a good influence. With regard to the U.S., only in Poland did as many as half (52%) say America was having a positive influence. Meanwhile, the prevailing view in these nations, with the exception of Bulgaria and Slovakia, was that Russia’s influence was more negative than positive.

Allies and Threats

Contrasts in opinion also surface with regard to which countries or international organizations Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians view as allies or threats to their country. In the fall 2009 survey, roughly two-in-ten Lithuanians named the EU (21%), Latvia (20%) and the U.S. (19%) as their closest allies, while 39% named Russia as their greatest threat.

Ukrainians had a very different view. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) named Russia as their most dependable ally, while roughly one-quarter (27%) saw the U.S. as the greatest threat to their country. Meanwhile, among Russians, fully 57% said the U.S. posed the largest threat, while roughly one-third (34%) named Belarus as their closest ally, followed by about a quarter (23%) who named China.

Across Eastern Europe, the U.S. was among the closest allies named by Czechs (22%), Poles (18%), and Hungarians (15%). The U.S. was also seen as an ally by 16% of Bulgarians, although more than twice as many (38%) named Russia as a close ally.

Beyond the impact on specific groups, the prevailing view across all three countries is that the changes since 1991 have had a more negative than positive influence on society. When asked about the impact of political and economic changes on a range of issues – including national pride, ethnic relations and social values, fewer than half in each country say the changes have had a good influence in any area. In fact, majorities in all three countries say the changes since 1991 have had a deleterious effect on such things as living standards, public morality, how much people care about others, and law and order.

Lithuanians today are considerably less enthusiastic about the impact of political and economic change compared with 1991, when publics in the three nations were first asked about the dramatic transformations under way in their countries. However, criticism in Lithuania tends to be less harsh than in Ukraine or Russia, where negative assessments concerning two decades of change are both more pervasive and more intense.

Who Has Benefited?

In each of the countries surveyed, most believe ordinary citizens have benefited little, if at all, from the political and economic changes ushered in by the demise of the Soviet Union. Only about a quarter of Russians (26%) say average citizens have gained from two decades of change, while even fewer Lithuanians (20%) and Ukrainians (11%) agree. Across the three nations, roughly seven-in-ten or more say ordinary citizens have benefited not too much or not at all.

In sharp contrast, publics in each of the three countries are widely convinced that people who own businesses have benefited a fair amount or a great deal from the political and economic changes of the past two decades. Super-majorities in Russia (80%), Lithuania (78%) and Ukraine (76%) all hold this view.

Overwhelming numbers in each nation also believe politicians have gained from the changes since 1991. More than nine-in-ten Ukrainians (95%) and Lithuanians (91%) feel this is the case, while slightly fewer Russians (82%) think politicians have benefited from the changes.

Russian and Ukrainian assessments about who has gained the most from two decades of political and economic change have shifted only slightly since a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey first asked the same questions.

Publics in five other former communist-bloc countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – were also asked in the 2009 survey about who had gained from the political and economic changes in their countries.² Clear majorities in all five nations agreed that politicians and business owners had benefited from the changes. Only in the Czech Republic did more than half (53%) say the same about ordinary people. Elsewhere, the majority view was that average citizens had generally not benefited from the changes.

Impact of Change Across Countries

Given that most people in Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine believe the revolutionary changes set in motion twenty years ago have done little to improve the lives of ordinary citizens, it is not surprising that across a range of measures – from standard of living to law and order to family values to ethnic relations – the prevailing view is that the developments of the past two decades have done more harm than good in terms of personal and social well-being.

While disenchantment is evident in all three countries, Ukrainians and Russians tend to be more negative about the impact of political and economic change than Lithuanians. That said, compared with 1991, Ukrainian and Russian reactions to change have softened somewhat, while Lithuanians have grown generally more critical.

Influence of Changes: Ukraine

Ukrainians offer some of the harshest assessments of how two decades of change have impacted society. Roughly eight-in-ten, for instance, believe the political and economic transformations since 1991 have had a bad or very bad influence on the standard of living (82%), how much people care about others (82%) and law and order (79%). About two-thirds or more also point to negative impacts in terms of public morality (72%) and how hard people work (66%).

Roughly half of Ukrainians are critical of how the changes since 1991 have affected family values (53%) and spiritual values (49%). In the case of the former, only about a fifth (21%) believe the political and economic changes have had a positive effect on family values, while slightly more (31%) say spiritual values have improved.

When it comes to how different ethnic groups get along with one another, just over a third of Ukrainians (36%) believe two decades of change have hurt inter-ethnic relations. By comparison, about a quarter say political and economic changes have had either no influence (25%) or a positive influence (23%) on relations between ethnic groups.

Ukrainians are divided as to what the changes since 1991 have meant for their own outlook on life. About three-in-ten (28%) say the impact on how they think about things has been negative, while nearly the same percentage say the effect has been either non-existent (29%) or positive (28%).

Compared with twenty years ago, Ukrainian criticism of political and economic change has tended to soften. The largest shift has occurred with respect to inter-ethnic relations. Two decades ago, roughly three-quarters of Ukrainians (76%) thought the changes underway were having a bad influence on relations between ethnic groups; today, the number who hold this view is down 40 percentage points. Meanwhile, the proportion of Ukrainians who think political and economic changes are adversely affecting how people get along with one another has dropped 22 percentage points.

On other measures, Ukrainian opinion has shifted less dramatically. For example, the percentage of Ukrainians saying the political and economic transformations in their country have had a deleterious effect on how hard people work, living standards and national pride has declined 12 percentage points in each case since 1991.

There have also been slight declines in the number of Ukrainians who believe political and economic changes have had a bad influence on spiritual values (-7 percentage points), law and order (-7 points), family values (-6 points) and public morality (-5 points).

Influence of Changes: Russia

Although not as harsh as Ukrainians in judging particular societal impacts, Russians are nonetheless broadly critical of how twenty years of political and economic changes have affected their country. In fact, in all but one of the 11 areas measured by the survey, majorities in Russia say the changes have had a negative influence. This includes six-in-ten or more who believe that the past twenty years have brought deterioration in public morality (68%), the degree to which people care about others (65%), how well people get along with one another (63%), law and order (61%), standard of living (61%) and relations between ethnic groups (60%).

Smaller majorities in Russia believe the political and economic changes have adversely affected family values (57%), national pride (56%), spiritual values (53%) and how hard people work (52%).

Similar to Ukrainians, the one area where Russians are less certain about the impact of the past two decades is personal outlook. Three-in-ten say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on how they think about things, compared with the same percentage who say the changes have had a good influence. A fifth (20%) say the changes have not impacted their personal outlook.

In 1991, Russians tended to be even more critical of the political and economic transformations under way in their country. Since then, negative reactions have generally eased. The most dramatic shift in Russian views has occurred with respect to living standards. In 1991, fully nine-in-ten stated that political and economic changes were undercutting living standards; today, the percentage holding this view is 29 percentage points lower.

Russian criticism has also softened on other measures of social and personal well-being. For instance, over the past twenty years, there has been a sizable drop in the number of Russians who believe the changes have had a negative impact on how well people get along with one another (-20 percentage points), law and order (-19 points), inter-ethnic relations (-19 points) and how hard people work (-18 points).

Smaller shifts have occurred with respect to the percentage of Russians who see negative consequences for national pride (-13 percentage points) and public morality (-8 points).

Areas in which public opinion has remained basically unchanged compared with 20 years ago include personal outlook, family and spiritual values and how much people care about one another.

Influence of Changes: Lithuania

Like their post-Soviet counterparts, Lithuanians are critical of how the political and economic changes of the past twenty years have affected social and personal well-being in their country. As in Russia and Ukraine, majorities say the changes have had a negative influence on how much people care about others (60%), standard of living (56%), law and order (55%) and public morality (55%).

Roughly half also point to negative consequences for family values (50%) and how people get along with one another (48%). And more, on balance, believe the changes since 1991 have had a negative rather than positive influence on relations among people who live in their country (45% vs. 27%) and spiritual values (40% vs. 33%).

Unlike Ukrainians and Russians, however, Lithuanians allow that the past two decades have actually done more good than harm in a few areas. About half (49%), for instance, say that the political and economic changes have had a positive impact on national pride, compared with 30% who disagree. In addition, more say the last twenty years have had a good (39%) rather than bad (28%) influence on their personal outlook, and just over a third (36%) think that the changes since 1991 have positively influenced how hard people work, compared with 30% who hold the opposite view.

Twenty years ago, positive assessments of change were much more common in Lithuania. Indeed, since 1991, negative reactions have intensified on a number of fronts. Some of the biggest shifts in public opinion have occurred with respect to family and spiritual values, as well as national pride. Two decades ago, just 23% of Lithuanians thought the political and economic changes were having a bad influence on family values; today, 50% hold that view.

Meanwhile, opinion about the impact on spiritual values has moved in the same direction, with the percentage of Lithuanians seeing a negative impact increasing 24 percentage points between 1991 and 2011. Similarly, the proportion saying the changes have had a negative influence on national pride has risen 23 percentage points between 1991 and 2011.

Compared with twenty years ago, Lithuanians are also now more inclined to believe that political and economic changes have had a bad influence on how much people care about others (+19 percentage points) and public morality (+18 percentage points). More modest increases have occurred with respect to the number of Lithuanians who see negative consequences for how well people get along with one another and personal outlook (+8 and +5 percentage points, respectively).

Yet, there are exceptions to this pattern. On several measures, fewer, not more Lithuanians are downbeat about the impact of political and economic change. For example, the number worried that the political and economic changes have had a negative influence on the standard of living has declined 31 percentage points. Concerns about the impact of changes on relations between people have also eased, with the number seeing negative consequences falling 12 percentage points.

In addition, the proportion of Lithuanians who believe the political and economic changes have adversely affected how hard people work or harmed law and order has declined slightly (-7 percentage points in each case).

Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Russians remain dissatisfied with national conditions; solid majorities in the three countries, especially in Ukraine and Lithuania, express discontent with the way things are going in their country and describe current economic conditions as poor. And few expect the economy to improve in the coming year.

Less Support for Move to Capitalism

Fewer than half in the three former Soviet republics surveyed approve of their country’s move from a state-controlled to a market economy. In Lithuania, somewhat more approve (45%) than disapprove (35%) of the changes, while Russians are nearly evenly divided (42% approve and 45% disapprove) and Ukrainians offer mostly negative assessments (34% approve vs. 51% disapprove).

Support for the move to a market economy has declined markedly since 1991, and this is especially the case in Lithuania and Ukraine. Two decades ago, about three-quarters (76%) of Lithuanians and a narrower majority of Ukrainians (52%) and Russians (54%) approved of the move to capitalism. In Lithuania and Russia, opinions about the change to a market economy are somewhat more negative than they were just two years ago, when half in each country approved of the move to capitalism.

Negative assessments of the move from a state-controlled to a market economy reflect, at least in part, the perception that most people are worse off financially than they were under communism. A fall 2009 survey found that a majority of Ukrainians (62%) and pluralities in Lithuania (48%) and Russia (45%) shared this view.

The fall 2009 survey also found that Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians are less enthusiastic about the economic changes than are publics in many Eastern European countries; in that survey, at least two-thirds in the former East Germany (82%), Czech Republic (79%), Poland (71%) and Slovakia (66%) said they approved of the move to a market economy.

As in the case of attitudes toward the move toward democracy, in the three former Soviet republics surveyed, opinions about the move to capitalism vary across age groups, with those younger than age 50 expressing far more enthusiasm than older generations. This gap is especially pronounced in Ukraine, where roughly half of those younger than 30 (49%) and 41% of those ages 30 to 49 approve of the changes, compared with 23% of 50-to-64 year-olds and just 15% of those ages 65 and older. A similar pattern is evident in Russia and Lithuania.

Views of economic changes also vary somewhat by educational attainment; in the three countries, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to approve of the move to capitalism. This gap is most notable in Russia, where a narrow majority (52%) of college graduates approves of the changes, compared with 39% of those who did not graduate from college.

In Lithuania, men are more enthusiastic than women about the move from a state-controlled to a market economy; 49% of men and 41% of women approve. No notable gender differences emerge in Russia or Ukraine.

Widespread Dissatisfaction

As has been the case in recent years, majorities in the former Soviet republics are unhappy with their country’s direction. At least eight-in-ten Ukrainians (87%) and Lithuanians (81%) are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country; six-in-ten Russians also express discontent.

Similarly, about nine-in-ten in Ukraine (92%) and Lithuania (90%), and 65% in Russia, describe the current economic conditions in their country as poor, virtually unchanged from recent years.

Looking ahead, Ukrainians are the most pessimistic about their country’s economic prospects; 44% believe the economy will worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% think it will remain the same and just 15% say it will improve. In Russia and Lithuania, pluralities expect economic conditions to remain the same in the coming year (46% and 43%, respectively); but while more in Russia believe things will improve (28%) than say they will worsen (18%), the opposite is true in Lithuania, where 31% expect their country’s economy to worsen and 21% say it will improve.

Moreover, most Lithuanians blame individual failure on personal shortcomings, while Ukrainians and Russians are more divided on whether to blame society or the individual. However, there is overwhelming agreement across these three former Soviet republics that the state should play an active role in society so that nobody is in need.

Reasons for Success

A majority of Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition than other people, while 41% say people who get ahead do so mainly at the expense of others. In contrast, fewer than four-in-ten in Russia (38%) and Ukraine (32%) say people succeed because of their own ability.

Ukrainians and Russians are more likely than they were two decades ago to say that people get ahead at other people’s expense. This is especially the case in Ukraine, where 44% shared this view in 1991. The change has been more modest in Russia; 46% said that people got ahead at the expense of others in 1991. Opinions in Lithuania have remained generally steady since the early 1990’s.

Younger people, who grew up in post-communist societies, are less likely than older generations to say that people who get ahead do so at the expense of others; rather, young people tend to credit ability and ambition. For example, just 37% of Russians younger than 30 believe that people get ahead at the expense of others, compared with majorities of those ages 30 to 49 (56%), 50 to 65 (60%) and ages 65 or older (66%). A similar pattern is evident in Ukraine, but not as clear among Lithuanians.

Reasons for Failure

Nearly six-in-ten (58%) in Lithuania say that people who don’t succeed in life fail as the result of their own shortcomings, while only about a third (34%) blame society at large. A plurality (47%) in Russia also points to personal shortcomings, but only somewhat fewer (40%) say society is to blame for individual failures.

Ukrainians, however, have the opposite view, with only 40% saying that people who don’t succeed do so because of their own personal failures; about half (49%) say that people who don’t succeed in life fail because of society’s faults. In all three countries, views on what is to blame for one’s lack of success have remained stable since the question was last asked in 1991.

For the most part, views on personal failure do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Russia, however, those who are 65 or older tend to place more blame on society than do those in younger generations. This gap is particularly notable between the older generation and those who are younger than 30. Half of Russians ages 65 or older say people who don’t succeed have society to blame, while 30% say personal shortcomings are responsible for individual failure; among the younger group, 55% blame individuals themselves, while 36% hold society responsible.

Role of the State

When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” overwhelming majorities in all three countries favor a stronger role for the state. At least two-thirds of Russians (68%), Ukrainians (75%), and Lithuanians (76%) prefer that the state ensures that nobody is in need within their society. Few in each country prioritize freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference.

Opinions in these three former Soviet republics are consistent with those of other Eastern and Western European publics. In a 2009 survey, opinions from the rest of Europe generally conformed to this pattern. Majorities or pluralities in all European countries in fall 2009 said that it is more important that the state ensure that no one is in need. (For more information on European views on this issue, see “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

People in the three former Soviet republics surveyed now consider freedom from state interference much less of a priority than they did 20 years ago. The steepest decline has occurred in Ukraine, where the percentage saying that they should be able to pursue life’s goals unhindered has dropped by 33 percentage points, from 54% in 1991. Comparable declines have also occurred in Russia (-27 percentage points) and Lithuania (-20 percentage points).

In the three countries, those younger than 30 are about twice as likely as those ages 65 and older to prefer a society where everyone is free to pursue life’s goals; still, solid majorities across all age groups say ensuring nobody is in need should be the state’s priority.

When asked their opinions of two key ethnic minorities in their country, however, Russians continue to express positive views of Ukrainians and Lithuanians. Similarly, Ukrainians view Russians, Poles and Lithuanians in their country favorably, and Lithuanians offer positive opinions of Russians, Ukrainians and Poles in their country.

Russian Nostalgia for Soviet Era

Russians remain largely nostalgic for the Soviet era, although this sentiment has abated somewhat over the past two years. Half of Russians now agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, while 36% disagree; in 2009, nearly six-in-ten (58%) lamented the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while 38% did not share this view.

The drop in the percentage expressing regret about the demise of the Soviet Union has been especially notable among older Russians, although most in these groups remain nostalgic.

Currently, about six-in-ten of those 65 and older (63%) and those ages 50 to 64 (61%) agree that it is a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, compared with 45% of those ages 30 to 49 and even fewer among those younger than 30 (36%).

In 2009, more than eight-in-five (85%) Russians in the oldest age group and 71% of those ages 50 to 64 expressed regret that the Soviet Union no longer exists; 51% of those ages 30 to 49 and 38% of those younger than 30 shared this view.

Nationalism on the Rise

About half of Russians (48%) agree that it is natural for their country to have an empire,
while one third disagree with this notion. Although virtually unchanged from when the question was last asked in 2009, this represents a considerable shift from Russian sentiment as the Soviet Union was collapsing. In 1991, 37% of Russians said it was natural for their country to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Similarly, the 2009 survey found that Russians were far more likely than they were two decades ago to agree that “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us;” about six-in-ten (58%) said this was the case two years ago, compared with just 22% in 1991. Moreover, about twice as many Russians agreed that Russia should be for Russians in 2009 as did so in 1991 (54% vs. 26%).

Ukrainians are as likely as Russians to say it is natural for Russia to have an empire; 46% agree with this statement, while 34% disagree. In 1991, only about one-in-five (22%) shared the view that an empire was natural for Russia; a majority of Ukrainians (55%) disagreed with this sentiment.

Views of Ethnic Minorities

As was the case two decades ago, publics in the three former Soviet republics surveyed hold favorable views of some key ethnic minorities in their countries. That is especially the case in Ukraine, where about nine-in-ten express positive opinions of Russians (93%), Poles (88%) and Lithuanians (87%).

At least seven-in-ten Lithuanians have favorable views of Russians (77%) and Ukrainians (73%); a narrower majority (57%) expresses similar views of Poles. And in Russia, 80% give ethnic Ukrainians positive marks, while 62% say the same about Lithuanians in their country.

Results for the survey are based on face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see below.

The descriptions below show the margin of sampling error based on all interviews conducted in that country. For results based on the full sample in a given country, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus the margin of error. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Assessments of the current state of democracy are overwhelmingly negative, with majorities in the three former Soviet republics surveyed saying they are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This discontent stems at least in part from a perception that elected officials do not care what they think and that the state is not run for the benefit of all people, as indicated in a Pew Global Attitudes fall 2009 survey.

Moreover, few in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania believe key principles and institutions of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, free speech and civilian control of the military describe their country very well, although many place high value on these elements of democracy.

When asked whether a democratic government or a strong leader can best solve their country’s problems, most Russians and Ukrainians prioritize strong leadership, while more in Lithuania choose democracy. Given the choice between a good democracy and a strong economy, however, solid majorities in all three countries opt for economic prosperity.

Less Support for a Multiparty System

Enthusiasm for the switch from one-party to multiparty systems has waned considerably since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Currently, about half in Lithuania (52%) and Russia (50%) and just 35% in Ukraine approve of the changes; in 1991, solid majorities in these three former Soviet republics endorsed efforts to establish a multiparty system (75% in Lithuania, 72% in Ukraine and 61% in Russia).

By comparison, the 2009 survey found that support for a multiparty system among other Eastern Europeans remained high 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In particular, at least seven-in-ten in the former East Germany (85%), Czech Republic (80%), Slovakia (71%) and Poland (70%) expressed approval of the changes, virtually unchanged from 1991.

As was the case 20 years ago, support for the change to a multiparty democracy is more prevalent among younger respondents, the well-educated and urban dwellers; in Russia, gender differences are also evident, with more men than women expressing support for democracy (55% vs. 46%).

About six-in-ten Russians younger than age 50 approve of their country’s switch to a multiparty system (58% of those ages 18 to 29 and 60% of those ages 30 to 49). In contrast, Russians ages 50 to 64 are evenly divided (40% approve and 40% disapprove), while far more among those 65 and older disapprove than approve of the changes in their country (50% vs. 31%).

Similarly, majorities of Lithuanians younger than 50 embrace the change to democracy; 60% of those younger than 30 and 56% of those ages 30 to 49 approve. Opinions are more mixed among older Lithuanians.

And while fewer than half across age groups in Ukraine approve of the switch to a multiparty democracy, opinions are more positive among those younger than 50 (43% approve) than among older Ukrainians (25% of those ages 50 to 64 and 23% of those 65 or older approve).

In all three of the former Soviet republics surveyed, college graduates are far more likely than those with less education to approve of the changes in their countries. This gap is especially pronounced in Lithuania, where 71% of those who have graduated from college support the change to a multiparty system, compared with just 48% of those who do not have a college degree. Smaller but considerable differences are also present in Ukraine and Russia (13 percentage points and 10 percentage points, respectively).

In Lithuania (57%) and Russia (53%), more than half of urban dwellers endorse efforts to establish a multiparty system in their countries; 42% of those living in rural areas in each of these countries share this view. In Ukraine, more in both groups disapprove than approve of the change, but support is more common among those in urban areas (38%) than among the rural population (29%).

Widespread Dissatisfaction With Democracy

When asked to assess the current state of democracy, few in the former Soviet republics surveyed say they are satisfied with the way it is working in their country. In Ukraine, just 13% offer a positive assessment, while 81% are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. About a quarter in Russia (27%) and Lithuania (25%) are satisfied, while 63% and 72%, respectively, express discontent.

Compared with two years ago, when negative views of democracy were already widespread, even fewer now say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. For example, in Lithuania, the percentage expressing satisfaction has declined by 10 percentage points, from 35% in 2009.

Discontent with the way democracy is working reflects, at least in part, feelings of low political efficacy. In 2009, about a quarter of Russians (26%) and Ukrainians (23%), and even fewer Lithuanians (15%), agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” Moreover, few believed that, generally, the state is run for the benefit of all people; 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania and 20% in Ukraine said this was the case in 2009.

And while the view that voting gives people some say about how the government runs things was somewhat more common, only a slim majority in Lithuania (52%) and fewer than half in Ukraine (46%) and Russia (44%) held this opinion. In Lithuania, the percentage who agreed with the statement “voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things” has declined considerably over the past two decades; in 1991, 74% of Lithuanians agreed.

Democracy vs. Strong Leader and Strong Economy

About six-in-ten Ukrainians (60%) and Russians (57%) say a strong leader, rather than a democratic government, can best solve their country’s problems; just 30% and 32%, respectively, say their country should rely on a democratic government.

Support for democracy over a strong leader is more common in Lithuania, where a slim majority (52%) says a democratic government is preferable. Still, a sizeable minority (40%) of Lithuanians say their country should rely on a strong leader.

Confidence in democracy has waned considerably in these three countries over the past two decades. In 1991, about eight-in-ten Lithuanians (79%), 57% of Ukrainians and 51% of Russians said a democratic government, rather than a strong leader, could best solve their country’s problems.

When asked to choose between a good democracy and a strong economy, at least seven-in-ten in each of the three countries say a strong economy is more important; 77% in Ukraine, 73% in Russia and 71% in Lithuania prioritize economic prosperity.

The Democracy Gap

While Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians express discontent with the way democracy is working in their countries, the 2009 survey suggests that dissatisfaction reflects frustration about the lack of democratic institutions and freedoms rather than a repudiation of democratic values.

In that survey, majorities in Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine said it was important to live in a country with a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military; and many believed it was very important to live in a country where these key features of democracy were present.

However, fewer than a quarter of Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians said a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, free speech and civilian control of the military described their countries very well. Of the principles tested, freedom of religion was the one that people in these countries were most likely to say applied to their country; 44% in Lithuania, 43% in Russia and 31% in Ukraine said this was the case.

Taking the median percentage saying each of the democratic values tested were very important in each country and comparing it with the median percentage saying these values described their country very well, it is clear that there is a wide gap between what Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Russians want from democracy and the level of democracy they believe their countries have achieved. This gap was especially pronounced in Ukraine, where, in 2009, a median of 50% across the six elements of democracy tested said these features were very important, but just 12% said they described their country very well. Looking at the eight former communist countries surveyed in 2009, only in Hungary and Bulgaria was the democracy gap wider than in Ukraine (49 percentage points and 45 percentage points, respectively).