Still, significant minorities – and a majority of Pakistanis – believe a strong leader, rather than a democratic government, would be best equipped to solve their country’s problems. And across these six nations, there is no consensus on whether a good democracy or a strong economy should be the higher priority.

Democracy the Best Form of Government

The appeal of democracy is especially strong in Lebanon, where 84% say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, just 7% think there are circumstances in which a non-democratic government can be preferable, and 9% believe it doesn’t really matter what kind of government rules the country. On this point, there is broad agreement among the country’s religious groups – 90% of Sunnis, 84% of Shia, and 83% of Christians endorse democracy.

Large majorities also prefer democracy in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan. However, Jordanians have become less likely to hold this view since last year, when 72% said it was better than any other type of government.

Pakistanis express the least enthusiasm for the idea of democracy, with just 42% saying it is preferable. Still, only 17% believe other approaches are sometimes better, while 22% say it does not matter. Almost one-in-five Pakistanis (18%) do not offer an opinion.

Democracy Preferred Over Strong Leader, but Not Necessarily Over Strong Economy

Majorities in four of six nations believe they should rely on a democratic form of government to solve their country’s problems, rather than relying on a leader with a strong hand. This view is especially common in Lebanon, where eight-in-ten believe a democratic government is best equipped to deal with the nation’s problems, up sharply from 62% a year ago.

At least six-in-ten also hold this view in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia. Jordanians are somewhat less certain; 49% express confidence in democracy over a strong leader, down from 59% in 2011.

Pakistan is the clear outlier on this question – just 31% think they should rely on democracy, while 61% believe they should turn to a leader with a strong hand. The percentage of Pakistanis preferring a strong leader has increased 11 points since last year.

When respondents are asked to choose which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, results vary considerably across nations. More than half in Turkey and Lebanon choose a good democracy, and in both countries the percentage selecting democracy is up from 2011 (+10 points in Turkey; +6 in Lebanon). Egyptians are nearly evenly divided on this issue, while in Jordan, Tunisia and Pakistan, majorities believe a strong economy should be the higher priority.

In Turkey and Lebanon, young people are more likely to prioritize a good democracy over a strong economy. About two-thirds (66%) of 18-to-29 year-olds in Turkey say democracy is more important, compared with 57% of 30-to-49 year-olds and 51% of those 50 or older. In Lebanon, 61% of those in the younger group choose democracy over a strong economy, compared with 53% among those ages 30-to-49, and 42% in the oldest group.

Support for Rights, Institutions, but Prosperity, Stability also Important

Consistently, majorities in Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan say is it important that a democracy have specific rights and institutions, and large numbers say these features of a democracy are very important.³ For instance, majorities in all four nations consider free multi-party elections and freedom of religion very important, and in Lebanon, Jordan, and Pakistan, majorities say free speech is very important.

There is also considerable support for gender equality, and in Lebanon and Pakistan this is especially true among women. In Lebanon, 87% of women believe it is very important that women have equal rights, compared with 64% of men. Among Pakistani women, 66% say gender equality is very important, compared with 53% of men.

Many also say that having an uncensored press and uncensored access to the internet are very important, although these are generally considered less of a priority than other elements of democracy, particularly in Pakistan.

In all four countries, more than half say economic prosperity is a very important component of democracy. And many also say it is very important that a democracy have a small income gap between rich and poor.

In addition, political stability is clearly a priority. Majorities in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey rate political stability as a very important element of democracy; 46% in Pakistan share this view.

As with other measures of support for democracy included in the survey, the belief that specific rights, institutions, and conditions are necessary in a democracy tends to be especially strong in Lebanon and Turkey, while somewhat lower in Pakistan and Jordan.

Following a winter of discontent Russians express an increased appetite for political freedom, and at the same time strongly endorse Vladimir Putin.

Compared with just a few years ago, more Russians believe that voting gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about the country’s governance, more feel that it is important to be able to openly criticize the government, and greater numbers see freedom of the press and honest elections as very important.

Consistent with the value placed on core democratic principles, a solid majority (64%) see attending protests as an opportunity to speak out about how the government is run, and more than half (56%) specifically approve of the mass demonstrations that followed the December 2011 parliamentary vote, which was marred by fraud allegations. In that regard, while a modest 56%-majority says they are satisfied with the outcome of the March 4, 2012 presidential election, just 47% believe that election was fair.

Nonetheless, the poll finds a number of indicators of support for the status quo. Most notably, 72% of Russians voice a favorable opinion of Vladimir Putin, while almost as many hold a positive opinion of Dmitri Medvedev (67%). Putin’s popularity is being fueled more by views of the economy and perceptions of social mobility than it is being hurt by democratic aspirations. Relatively few Russians express favorable views of other prominent political figures. Roughly four-in-ten or fewer have positive opinions of presidential contenders Gennady Zyuganov (39%), Mikhail Prokhorov (36%), Sergei Mironov (36%) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (28%). Meanwhile, 54% of Russians are unfamiliar with government critic and protest organizer Alexei Navalny.

Further, as they have for most of the post-Soviet era, a majority of Russians continue to feel that relying on a leader with a strong hand in order to solve problems is more important than relying on a democratic form of government (57% vs. 32%). In addition, strong majorities say it is very important to live in a country where there is law and order (75%) and economic prosperity (71%). In fact, three-quarters say they would choose a strong economy over a good democracy.

These are among the principal findings from a nationwide survey of Russia by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,000 adults in Russia between March 19 and April 4, 2012. The poll finds that Russians are generally divided about their country’s direction as Putin begins his third term as president: 46% are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, while 45% are not. At home, the economy is a concern for many Russians, with only 32% describing the current economic situation as good. Meanwhile, in the international arena, a solid majority (73%) believe Russia deserves greater respect from other countries. The survey also finds persistent strains of ethnic nationalism among Russians, with about half (53%) saying Russia should be for Russians only, and 44% saying it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Democratic Freedoms More Valued

Against the backdrop of protests over the conduct of elections and the state of democracy in Russia, increasing numbers of Russians endorse the importance of key civic freedoms and institutions. Looking back a full ten years, five of the six measures of democratic freedom tested by the Global Attitudes Project have witnessed double-digit increases in terms of the percentage of Russians describing them as “very important.”

As they have in the past, today Russians place the greatest value on a judiciary that treats all citizens equally (71%), but compared with 2009, more now also value a civilian-controlled military (up 14 percentage points), an uncensored media (up 12 points) and honest elections (up 11 points). The importance of free speech and religious freedom has grown more modestly over the past three years (up 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively).

Although growing numbers of Russians value civic freedoms and institutions, relatively few see these as a reality in their country. Roughly one-in-five or fewer say a fair judiciary (17%), honest elections (16%), uncensored media (15%) and a civilian-controlled military (14%) describe Russia very well. Slightly more (28%) say that freedom of speech is characteristic of their country, while almost half (46%) agree that citizens are generally free to practice their religion.

Comparing the percentage of Russians who place a high value on core political freedoms with the percentage who believe the same freedoms are a fact of life in Russia, it is possible to discern a growing gap between democracy’s promise and practice.

In light of this gap, it is not surprising to find only 31% of Russians are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This sentiment is pervasive across demographic groups. And although those with a favorable view of Putin are somewhat more upbeat about the state of democracy in Russia (36% satisfied), even within this group a majority (57%) see room for improvement.

Voting, Protests Seen as Important

Despite the public’s disappointment with democratization in Russia, the number of people who say voting matters has actually risen. In 1991, when the Times Mirror Center, precursor to the Pew Research Center, first asked if voting gave people an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things, just 47% agreed. In 2009, the balance of opinion showed more doubting the power of voting. But this spring there seems to be a renewed conviction that casting one’s vote matters – a 56%-majority now believes this to be true.

Positive shifts in the value placed on voting are evident across education and income groups. Meanwhile, attitudes among older Russians appear to have “caught up” with those of younger Russians. In 2009, just over half (54%) of those ages 18-29 said that voting gave them a say about governance, but fewer among 30-49 year olds (42%) or those over 50 (38%) felt the same. Today, about the same number of 18-29 year olds think voting matters (51%), but more among the 30-49 and 50-plus cohorts now share this view, (55% and 61%, respectively).

Along with generally endorsing the importance of voting, a strong majority of Russians (64%) believe that attending protests or demonstrations is an effective way for average citizens to comment on the government’s actions. And more than half (56%) say they support the protests for fair elections that arose in the wake of the controversial parliamentary vote in December of last year.

While some in Russia have suggested that the protests for fair elections are the result of Western meddling, most Russians (58%) disagree, attributing the demonstrations instead to genuine dissatisfaction among the public.

Mixed Reaction to Presidential Vote

Protests in the wake of the December 2011 parliamentary elections brought to the fore questions about the fairness of the March 4, 2012 presidential vote. Following Putin’s first-round victory, the public offers a mixed assessment of the balloting: 47% believe the election was free from manipulation, while roughly a third (35%) disagree and 18% are uncertain.

Overall, a majority (56%) say they are satisfied with the results of the election, compared with a third (33%) who are dissatisfied. One-in-ten do not have an opinion either way.

The perceived fairness of the March 4th vote is a key factor influencing satisfaction with the outcome. Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) who think the election was “clean” say they are satisfied with the outcome. By contrast, only one-in-five who believe the vote was unfair say the same. Russians who are unsure whether the election was fair, meanwhile, tend to be satisfied (46%) with Putin’s victory.

Not surprisingly, reaction to the election results is especially positive among Russians who hold a favorable opinion of Putin (71% satisfied) and those who feel they are better off financially than they were five years ago (71% satisfied).

Putin’s Continued Appeal

While some Russians may have their doubts about the fairness of the March 4th presidential vote, Putin clearly remains popular. Roughly seven-in-ten (72%) say they have a favorable opinion of the returning president. Only about a quarter (24%) of respondents voice the opposite view.

Putin’s base of support is broad, although he is especially popular among women, Russians ages 30-49 and those with less than a college education. Overall, opinion of the newly elected president is more influenced by views of the economy and perceived social mobility. People who say the economy is good and feel they are better off than their parents are more likely to have a positive view of Putin. To the degree that democratic leanings help shape attitudes toward Putin, those who say an uncensored media is very important are less likely to have a favorable opinion of Russia’s long-time leader.

Dmitri Medvedev, who will now be stepping into the role of prime minister, is also widely popular. Two-thirds of Russians have a favorable view of Medvedev, while only 28% voice an unfavorable opinion.

In terms of public support, Putin and Medvedev clearly stand out from other figures on Russia’s political stage. Among the presidential candidates this spring, for example, Putin is the only one viewed favorably by a majority of Russians. Indeed, on balance, opinions of veteran politicians such as Communist Party head Zyuganov, A Just Russia’s Mironov and Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky are negative (52%, 51% and 66% unfavorable, respectively).

Views are similarly negative for presidential candidate Prokhorov: roughly half (48%) have an unfavorable view of the billionaire businessman. Meanwhile, among the relatively few Russians familiar with Alexei Navalny, the online activist and a prominent organizer of anti-government protests, views also tend to be more negative than positive (31% vs. 16%).

Challenges Ahead?

As Putin assumes the presidency for the third time, he faces a public with mixed views about the state of their nation. At home, opinion is nearly evenly split as to whether the country is headed in the right direction. On one hand, more today (46%) than at any point since 2008 say things are going well. But on the other, worries persist. In particular, a majority (64%) continues to describe the economy as bad.

Internationally, meanwhile, Russians show signs of insecurity. Slightly more than half (55%) believe their country is generally disliked by other countries – an increase of 8 percentage points since 2010. And fully 73% say Russia deserves to be more respected around the world than it currently is.

The desire for enhanced prestige on the world stage coexists with a persistent strain of ethnic nationalism. Roughly half (53%) of Russians say their homeland should be for Russians, while 44% think it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Moreover, economics tends to trump democracy as a top priority for most Russians. When asked to choose between a good democracy and a strong economy, three-in-four pick the latter. Economic prosperity – along with law and order – is considered a more important priority than nearly all of the democratic rights and institutions tested on the survey.

Still, Russians value many features of democracy, such as a fair judicial system, competitive elections, an uncensored media, and free expression. Indeed, today they place a higher premium on these democratic freedoms than was the case three years ago.

Few Russians, however, believe their country has the institutions and liberties they desire. As previous Pew Global Attitudes surveys have highlighted, there is a significant “democracy gap” in Russia between citizens’ democratic aspirations and the reality of their current political system.

Most Dissatisfied With Democracy

Roughly six-in-ten Russians (63%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country, unchanged from one year ago. About three-in-ten (31%) say they are satisfied and 6% offer no opinion.

Views on this question are linked to whether Russians believe they made financial progress over the last five years. Nearly half (46%) of those who say they are better off financially today than they were five years ago are satisfied with the way democracy is working, compared with just 22% of those who are worse off and 24% of Russians who say their financial situation is about the same as it was five years ago.

Democracy vs. Strong Leader

Amid widespread disillusionment about how democracy is working, 57% say “a leader with a strong hand” is better equipped to solve the country’s problems than a democratic form of government. Just 32% think a democratic government is better suited for dealing with these challenges.

This is unchanged from 2011, though the percentage expressing confidence in a strong leader is down significantly from a decade ago, when 70% held this view.

Russians have not always expressed so little faith in democracy. Two decades ago, as the Soviet Union was dissolving, a spring 1991 survey by the Times Mirror Center (the predecessor of the Pew Research Center) found 51% of Russians preferring a democratic form of government and 39% favoring a strong hand. But by the fall of 1992, that had flipped to 51% favoring a strong leader and 31% preferring democratic government.

Education is strongly correlated with views on this issue. Among Russians with a college education, opinions are closely divided: 43% favor a democratic government, while 47% endorse a strong leader. Among those with less education, only 28% choose democracy and roughly six-in-ten say the country should rely on a strong leader.

Democracy vs. Strong Economy

If forced to choose, three-in-four Russians say a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. Only 19% place a higher priority on democracy, while 7% do not have an opinion. This is basically unchanged from one year ago, when 73% said a strong economy was more important.

In fact, views on this question have been fairly stable over the past decade, although the percentage who prioritize democracy has crept up slightly from the 11% registered in 2002.

Support for Democratic Values, But Law and Order, Prosperity, Too

Law and order tops the list of national concerns among Russians: 75% say it is very important to live in a country that maintains law and order. Roughly seven-in-ten (71%) also say economic prosperity is a top priority.

At the same time, Russians rate key principles of democracy as high priorities. In particular, 71% say it is very important to have a judicial system that treats everyone the same way. Roughly four-in-ten or more rate the other rights and institutions tested as very important, and broad majorities say they are at least somewhat important.

Moreover, the percentage rating religious freedom, honest elections, free media, being able to openly criticize the government, and a civilian-controlled military as very important has increased notably since 2009, and by double digits over the last decade.

Among demographic groups, low-income Russians tend to place less importance on free speech, honest elections and civilian control of the military than do those with middle and higher incomes. High-income Russians are especially likely to say a fair judiciary (82%) and uncensored media (60%) are very important.

While Russians tend to value key elements of democracy, relatively few think their country currently has these features. Only 28% say having freedom of speech describes Russia very well, and roughly one-in-five or fewer say this about uncensored internet access, a fair judicial system, competitive elections, free media, and civilian control of the military. The exception is religious freedom – nearly half says this describes Russia very well. And unlike most of the other aspects of democracy included on the survey, more Russians now believe their country has religious freedom than was the case a decade ago.

In addition to lacking important democratic characteristics, Russians also tend to believe their country lacks law and order (only 18% say this describes Russia very well) and economic prosperity (17%).

The Democracy Gap

An analysis of the six priorities that concern fundamental aspects of democracy – a fair judiciary, honest elections, religious freedom, free press, free speech, and civilian control of the military – reveals a large chasm between what Russians want from democracy and the degree of democracy they think Russia has attained.

Comparing the percentage saying each of these rights and institutions is very important with the percentage saying they describe Russia very well, it is clear that a substantial “democracy gap” exists in Russia. This is especially true regarding a fair judiciary. The gap between the percentage saying it is very important to have a judicial system that treats everyone the same and the percentage who think this describes Russia very well is 54 points.

The gap is 36 points on honest elections, 34 points on uncensored media and 27 points on a civilian-controlled military. This gap is somewhat narrower – 16 points – on freedom of speech. Religious freedom is the one area where evaluations are nearly as positive as expectations, with 52 percent saying it is very important and 46 percent saying it describes Russia very well.

Looking at the median percentage each year who say these rights and institutions are very important and comparing it with the median percentage who believe these rights and institutions describe Russia very well, it is possible to discern a democracy gap that has widened over time as Russians consistently report the absence of democracy on the ground, even as more place a value on political freedom.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

Assessments of the current state of democracy are overwhelmingly negative, with majorities in the three former Soviet republics surveyed saying they are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This discontent stems at least in part from a perception that elected officials do not care what they think and that the state is not run for the benefit of all people, as indicated in a Pew Global Attitudes fall 2009 survey.

Moreover, few in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania believe key principles and institutions of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, free speech and civilian control of the military describe their country very well, although many place high value on these elements of democracy.

When asked whether a democratic government or a strong leader can best solve their country’s problems, most Russians and Ukrainians prioritize strong leadership, while more in Lithuania choose democracy. Given the choice between a good democracy and a strong economy, however, solid majorities in all three countries opt for economic prosperity.

Less Support for a Multiparty System

Enthusiasm for the switch from one-party to multiparty systems has waned considerably since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Currently, about half in Lithuania (52%) and Russia (50%) and just 35% in Ukraine approve of the changes; in 1991, solid majorities in these three former Soviet republics endorsed efforts to establish a multiparty system (75% in Lithuania, 72% in Ukraine and 61% in Russia).

By comparison, the 2009 survey found that support for a multiparty system among other Eastern Europeans remained high 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In particular, at least seven-in-ten in the former East Germany (85%), Czech Republic (80%), Slovakia (71%) and Poland (70%) expressed approval of the changes, virtually unchanged from 1991.

As was the case 20 years ago, support for the change to a multiparty democracy is more prevalent among younger respondents, the well-educated and urban dwellers; in Russia, gender differences are also evident, with more men than women expressing support for democracy (55% vs. 46%).

About six-in-ten Russians younger than age 50 approve of their country’s switch to a multiparty system (58% of those ages 18 to 29 and 60% of those ages 30 to 49). In contrast, Russians ages 50 to 64 are evenly divided (40% approve and 40% disapprove), while far more among those 65 and older disapprove than approve of the changes in their country (50% vs. 31%).

Similarly, majorities of Lithuanians younger than 50 embrace the change to democracy; 60% of those younger than 30 and 56% of those ages 30 to 49 approve. Opinions are more mixed among older Lithuanians.

And while fewer than half across age groups in Ukraine approve of the switch to a multiparty democracy, opinions are more positive among those younger than 50 (43% approve) than among older Ukrainians (25% of those ages 50 to 64 and 23% of those 65 or older approve).

In all three of the former Soviet republics surveyed, college graduates are far more likely than those with less education to approve of the changes in their countries. This gap is especially pronounced in Lithuania, where 71% of those who have graduated from college support the change to a multiparty system, compared with just 48% of those who do not have a college degree. Smaller but considerable differences are also present in Ukraine and Russia (13 percentage points and 10 percentage points, respectively).

In Lithuania (57%) and Russia (53%), more than half of urban dwellers endorse efforts to establish a multiparty system in their countries; 42% of those living in rural areas in each of these countries share this view. In Ukraine, more in both groups disapprove than approve of the change, but support is more common among those in urban areas (38%) than among the rural population (29%).

Widespread Dissatisfaction With Democracy

When asked to assess the current state of democracy, few in the former Soviet republics surveyed say they are satisfied with the way it is working in their country. In Ukraine, just 13% offer a positive assessment, while 81% are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. About a quarter in Russia (27%) and Lithuania (25%) are satisfied, while 63% and 72%, respectively, express discontent.

Compared with two years ago, when negative views of democracy were already widespread, even fewer now say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. For example, in Lithuania, the percentage expressing satisfaction has declined by 10 percentage points, from 35% in 2009.

Discontent with the way democracy is working reflects, at least in part, feelings of low political efficacy. In 2009, about a quarter of Russians (26%) and Ukrainians (23%), and even fewer Lithuanians (15%), agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” Moreover, few believed that, generally, the state is run for the benefit of all people; 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania and 20% in Ukraine said this was the case in 2009.

And while the view that voting gives people some say about how the government runs things was somewhat more common, only a slim majority in Lithuania (52%) and fewer than half in Ukraine (46%) and Russia (44%) held this opinion. In Lithuania, the percentage who agreed with the statement “voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things” has declined considerably over the past two decades; in 1991, 74% of Lithuanians agreed.

Democracy vs. Strong Leader and Strong Economy

About six-in-ten Ukrainians (60%) and Russians (57%) say a strong leader, rather than a democratic government, can best solve their country’s problems; just 30% and 32%, respectively, say their country should rely on a democratic government.

Support for democracy over a strong leader is more common in Lithuania, where a slim majority (52%) says a democratic government is preferable. Still, a sizeable minority (40%) of Lithuanians say their country should rely on a strong leader.

Confidence in democracy has waned considerably in these three countries over the past two decades. In 1991, about eight-in-ten Lithuanians (79%), 57% of Ukrainians and 51% of Russians said a democratic government, rather than a strong leader, could best solve their country’s problems.

When asked to choose between a good democracy and a strong economy, at least seven-in-ten in each of the three countries say a strong economy is more important; 77% in Ukraine, 73% in Russia and 71% in Lithuania prioritize economic prosperity.

The Democracy Gap

While Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians express discontent with the way democracy is working in their countries, the 2009 survey suggests that dissatisfaction reflects frustration about the lack of democratic institutions and freedoms rather than a repudiation of democratic values.

In that survey, majorities in Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine said it was important to live in a country with a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military; and many believed it was very important to live in a country where these key features of democracy were present.

However, fewer than a quarter of Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians said a fair judiciary, honest multiparty elections, freedom of the press, free speech and civilian control of the military described their countries very well. Of the principles tested, freedom of religion was the one that people in these countries were most likely to say applied to their country; 44% in Lithuania, 43% in Russia and 31% in Ukraine said this was the case.

Taking the median percentage saying each of the democratic values tested were very important in each country and comparing it with the median percentage saying these values described their country very well, it is clear that there is a wide gap between what Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Russians want from democracy and the level of democracy they believe their countries have achieved. This gap was especially pronounced in Ukraine, where, in 2009, a median of 50% across the six elements of democracy tested said these features were very important, but just 12% said they described their country very well. Looking at the eight former communist countries surveyed in 2009, only in Hungary and Bulgaria was the democracy gap wider than in Ukraine (49 percentage points and 45 percentage points, respectively).

A Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in fall 2009 finds that members of the post-communist generation, who are now between the ages of 18 and 39, offer much more positive evaluations of the political and economic changes their countries have undergone over the past two decades than do those who were adults when the Iron Curtain fell. The younger generation is also more individualistic and more likely to endorse a free market economy than are those who are age 40 or older.

Throughout 2010, the Pew Research Center will release a series of reports that explore the values, attitudes and behavior of America’s Millennial Generation, which first came of age around the time of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and played an important role in the election of President Barack Obama. The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project’s contribution to this project focuses on a somewhat different age group: the post-communist generation in the former Eastern bloc. The older members of this generation came of age as their countries began to transition away from communism toward democracy and capitalism, and its youngest members were just being born as communism was collapsing. Their political socialization has taken place under a context that is drastically different from that of their older peers, who came of age under totalitarian regimes.The former Eastern bloc publics were surveyed as part of a Pulse of Europe study that included 13 countries in Eastern and Western Europe as well as the United States.¹

The generation gap on attitudes about democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe reflects a divide between the past, present and future. Both young and old express concerns about the way things are going in their country, especially with regard to the economic situation. But while the older generation looks back longingly, often saying that people were better off financially under communism, the younger generation expresses more confidence that democracy can solve their countries’ problems. This is a hopeful sign for the future, as the post-communist generation becomes the next leaders and decision-makers in Eastern Europe.

Change to Democracy

The post-communist generation is generally more supportive than respondents age 40 and older of their countries’ move to a multiparty system. This generation gap is especially pronounced in Russia, where overall support for the political changes is lukewarm. More than six-in-ten (64%) Russians younger than age 40 approve of their country’s shift to a multiparty system; in contrast, just 45% of older Russians approve of the change to democracy.

A similar pattern is also evident in some countries where support for the change to a multiparty system is widespread. In Poland, where seven-in-ten approve of the change, there is a double-digit generation gap — 77% of those younger than age 40 support Poland’s change to democracy, compared with 66% of those age 40 or older. In the Czech Republic, 84% of those in the younger age group favor their country’s switch from a one-party system; 76% of those 40 or older agree. And in Slovakia, about three-quarters (77%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while 68% of older respondents share that view.

In Ukraine, where opinions about the change to democracy are negative among the young and the old, the post-communist generation expresses less negative views. About a quarter (26%) of Ukrainians who experienced communism as adults say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while a solid majority (64%) disapproves. Views are somewhat more balanced among the younger generation — 37% approve and 43% disapprove of Ukraine’s switch to a multiparty system; 21% do not offer an opinion.

Change to Capitalism

In every Eastern European country surveyed, the post-communist generation is much more supportive of the move away from a state-controlled economy than are those who lived as adults under communism. As is the case with opinions about the change to democracy, the generational divide is greatest in Russia; about six-in-ten (62%) Russians younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to capitalism, compared with just 40% of those in the older age group.

A double-digit gap also exists in Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland, and a smaller gap is evident in Lithuania and Hungary. In Ukraine, where the overall level of support for the change to a market economy is lower than in any other country surveyed (36% approve of the change), nearly half (47%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of the economic changes their country has undergone; just 28% of those 40 or older share that view.

How Most Have Fared Economically

The generational differences on opinions of the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe over the past two decades are reflected in views of how most people have fared under democracy and capitalism. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia, those younger than age 40 are much more likely than the older group to say the economic situation for most people in their country is now better than it was under communism.

In Poland and the Czech Republic, majorities of those younger than age 40 offer a positive assessment of how people in their country have fared economically: 53% and 54%, respectively, say most are now better off. Among those age 40 or older, however, views are more mixed. In Poland, virtually the same number in this age group say most people are better off now (42%) as say most are worse off (43%). In the Czech Republic, slightly more say the economic situation for most people is worse (45%) than say it is better (39%).

In Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary, the generational gap reflects mostly uncertainty among the younger group. While those who experienced communism as adults are significantly more likely than the post-communist generation to say that the economic situation for most people is now worse, a large share of those who are younger than 40 do not offer a response.

Have Ordinary People Benefited?

In six of the seven countries where the question was asked, fewer than half say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the fall of communism. And in five of the seven, this sentiment is shared by fewer than three-in-ten of those younger than 40 and those in the older age group. Yet, the post-communist generation offers somewhat more positive views than do their older peers.

In the Czech Republic, where a slim 53% majority says ordinary people have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, a more robust 64% majority of those younger than 40 say that is the case. In contrast, just 45% of older Czechs say average citizens have benefited from the changes that have taken place since communism collapsed.

Younger Poles are also considerably more likely than Poles who were adults when the Iron Curtain collapsed to say that ordinary people have benefited from the changes. About half (51%) of those younger than 40 say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, but just over a third (35%) of those 40 or older agree. And while few Slovaks across age groups believe that ordinary people have benefited from the changes since the end of communism, the post-communist generation is twice as likely as the older generation to have that opinion (28% vs. 14%).

Among younger and older respondents in the seven countries where this question was asked, more say that politicians and business owners have reaped benefits from the changes since the collapse of communism than say the same about ordinary people; solid majorities across age groups say the political and business elites have benefited a great deal or a fair amount.

Satisfaction With the Current State of Democracy

When asked to assess the current state of democracy in their countries, the post-communist generation expresses more positive views than does the older generation. That is especially the case in the Czech Republic and Poland, where overall satisfaction with how democracy is working is higher than in most of the eight countries where this question was asked. About six-in-ten Poles (62%) and Czechs (60%) younger than 40 say they are satisfied with the state of democracy in their country. Among those who are 40 or older, just under half in Poland (47%) and even fewer in the Czech Republic (42%) share this view.

Younger respondents in Lithuania and Russia are also more likely than those in the older age group to say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country by double-digit margins. In both countries, however, majorities among the post-communist generation express dissatisfaction. In Lithuania, 43% of respondents who were not adults or were not yet born when communism collapsed are satisfied with the state of democracy and 54% are dissatisfied; among those who were 20 or older when the Iron Curtain came down, just 29% express satisfaction, while nearly two-thirds (64%) offer a negative assessment of democracy in their country. A similar pattern is evident in Russia.

Yet, while the post-communist generation tends to offer more positive evaluations of the state of democracy in their countries, a generational gap is not evident when respondents are presented with a list of six key democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and a fair judiciary, and asked how well each describes their country.

Individualism

The post-communist generation also differs from older generations on the issue of an individual’s relationship to the state. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” those younger than 40 in all of the former Eastern bloc countries surveyed are more likely than those 40 or older to consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In Slovakia, where the public overall is much more likely to prioritize ensuring that no one is in need over individual rights, the post-communist generation is split — 48% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need and 46% say freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference is a higher priority. Those who are 40 or older are more than twice as likely to say that the state should provide a social safety net as they are to say that freedom from state interference is more important (68% vs. 27%).

Double-digit generational divides on individualism are also evident in most of the other Eastern European countries surveyed and in the former East Germany. For example, in the Czech Republic, more than half (56%) of those who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed say freedom from state interference is more important to them; 44% say guaranteeing no one is in need is a higher priority. Among Czechs who were adults in 1989, however, opinions are reversed — 56% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in guaranteeing that nobody is in need and 40% prioritize freedom from state interference.

Views of Free Markets

There is also a significant generation gap in nearly every former communist country surveyed when respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people may be rich while others are poor. In Russia, a solid majority (62%) of those who are younger than 40 agree that people are better off in a free market economy, while just 35% disagree. Among older Russians, however, 46% favor the free market approach and about the same number (49%) rejects the idea that free markets are better.

Even in some countries where both young and old have embraced the free market approach, more in the younger age group agree that people are better off in a free market economy. In the Czech Republic, for example, 68% of those younger than 40 favor the free market model, compared with 58% of those 40 or older. And in Slovakia, where a clear majority (61%) of the post-communist generation expresses support for free markets, a slim majority (52%) of those 40 or older share that view.

Support for Key Democratic Principles

When it comes to supporting democratic institutions and freedoms, however, the post-communist generation and those who are 40 or older tend to offer similar views. Looking across the six democratic values tested — freedom of speech, honest elections, a fair judiciary, a civilian-controlled military, freedom of the press and religious freedom — the generation gap in nearly all of the former communist countries polled is small. For example, a median of 54% of Czechs younger than 40 and 52% of those in the older age group rate these features of democracy as very important to them.

Only in Poland is there a significant gap in attitudes toward key democratic principles. A median of 56% of Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed consider these democratic values to be very important. By comparison, fewer than half (a median of 49%) among those who were adults when the Berlin Wall came down share that view. About the same median percentage of younger and older Poles agree that these features of democracy are at least somewhat important (93% and 90%, respectively).

Younger and older Poles are especially divided about the value of freedom of speech. More than half (56%) of Poles younger than 40 say it is very important to them to live in a country where they can openly say what they think and can criticize the government; 45% of those 40 or older agree. Younger Poles are also more like than those in the older age group to give high priority to honest multiparty elections (a gap of 8 percentage points), freedom of the press (7 points) and a civilian-controlled military (7 points).

There is also a generational split in Poland when respondents are asked whether a democratic form of government or a strong leader is better able to solve a country’s problems. More than six-in-ten (63%) Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed place more confidence in a democratic government, while 30% say a strong leader is better; among older Poles, a slim 51% majority choose a democratic government over a strong leader (39%). And while more Poles in both age groups would choose a strong economy over a good democracy, younger Poles value a good democracy more than do those who are 40 or older (41% vs. 33%).

The post-communist generation in Lithuania is also much more likely than older generations to say that a democratic government is better able than a strong leader to solve the country’s problems. About half (48%) of Lithuanians younger than 40 would choose democracy over a strong leader (43%); among older Lithuanians, 38% prefers a democratic government, while a majority (53%) say a strong leader would be more effective in solving the country’s problems.

The generational gap is somewhat less pronounced in other countries. For example, younger and older Czechs overwhelmingly prefer a democratic government over a strong leader when it comes to solving the country’s problems (84% and 79%, respectively), while strong majorities of Bulgarians younger than 40 (65%) and those 40 or older (71%) would choose a strong leader.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine helped to usher pro-Western liberal Viktor Yushchenko into the president’s office in 2005. Yushchenko promised to fight corruption, reform the economy and seek better relations with the West. Five years later, on the eve of new elections, Ukraine’s economy is in free fall, corruption is still widespread and NATO membership remains elusive. Opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych is circling with promises of a return to stability and a closer relationship with Russia.

Findings from a September 2009 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project show that Ukrainians are not only disenchanted with their current leadership and economic situation; they are also broadly dissatisfied with the democratic and capitalist systems that evolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In fact, of the former Eastern bloc publics surveyed, Ukrainians are the most unhappy with the transition to a democracy and free markets.

Dissatisfaction With General Country Direction, Economy and Leadership

Ukrainians are unhappy with the general direction of their country as well as their economic situation and national leadership. Roughly nine-in-ten (88%) Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country. A roughly equal percentage (91%) describes the current economic situation in Ukraine as somewhat or very bad, with a majority (59%) saying very bad.

Also, as of September 2009, most Ukrainians disapproved (83%) of President Yushchenko’s handling of his job, with many (41%) saying they strongly disapprove. More recent findings show that President Yushchenko remains widely unpopular. A November 2009 survey conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), found that most (83%) Ukrainians view Yushchenko negatively and few (3.5%) say they will vote for him in the first round of the presidential election in January 2010.

One key issue for the current and future administrations in Ukraine will likely be corruption — an issue Yushchenko promised to address during his successful bid for office. In fact, seven-in-ten (70%) in Ukraine consider corrupt political leaders a very big problem, up from 63% in 2002.

Corruption is far from the only issue Ukrainians consider important. Many also consider pollution (64%), crime (56%), the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases (56%), and illegal drugs (46%) to be very big problems.

Disaffection With Changes

Ukrainians are growing less enamored of the changes made to their political and economic systems since 1991. In a 1991 survey conducted just months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union,¹ a large majority (72%) of Ukrainians approved of the change to a multiparty system, whereas only 30% do now. Also, while half (52%) of Ukrainians approved of the change to a capitalist economic system in the early 1990s, only 36% do now. In fact, Ukraine is the only former Eastern bloc country surveyed where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

Men, the young and more educated are decidedly more supportive of the dramatic political and economic changes made in the early 1990s. Roughly four-in-ten Ukrainian men approve of the changes to a competitive election system (37%) and a free market economy (44%). Somewhat fewer women express the same views; 25% support the move to multiparty elections and 30% embrace capitalism.

Roughly one-third (34%) of Ukrainians ages 18-29 approve of the change to multiparty elections; only 20% of those 65 or older hold the same view. Nearly half (48%) of 18-29 year-olds in Ukraine also support the move to a free market; only 20% of people 65 or older voice the same opinion.

Ukrainians with at least some college education are also more likely to support the change to multiparty elections (41%) and capitalism (52%) than their less than educated counterparts (25% approve of multiparty system, 28% approve of free markets). By contrast, ethnic Russians in Ukraine are no less likely to approve of these changes than are their ethnic Ukrainian counterparts.

Many now believe a strong leader is better able to solve Ukraine’s problems than a democratic form of government. Slightly more than two-thirds of those in Ukraine (69%) say a strong leader is better, compared with 20% who say democratic government. In Ukraine, confidence in democracy has waned since 1991, when 57% said a democratic government could better solve the nation’s problems.

In addition, many in Ukraine sense that people were actually better off economically under communism than they are under the current system. When asked to consider whether the economic situation for most people today is better, worse or about the same as it was under communism, 62% in Ukraine say worse.

Few Think Ukraine Has Democratic Institutions

While many Ukrainians continue to embrace democratic values and institutions, few think their country has these values and institutions.

Large majorities in Ukraine consider it somewhat or very important to live in a country with a fair judiciary (90%), freedom of religion (86%), multiparty elections (85%), a free media (83%), freedom of speech (82%) and civilian control of the military (55%) with many saying very important.

More Ukrainians consider having a fair judicial system very important than any of the other democratic elements asked about. Nearly seven-in-ten (67%) consider it very important to have a judicial system that treats everyone the same way. Somewhat fewer say it is very important to have multiparty elections (53%), freedom to practice one’s religion (51%), and freedom of the media to report information without censorship (49%). Fewer highly value the freedom to speak openly and criticize the government (43%), and civilian control of the military (30%).

However, few in Ukraine feel that their country is doing a good job ensuring most of those rights and freedoms. For example, only about one-in-ten (11%) think the phrase “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” describes their country very well. Likewise, only 11% say the phrase “honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties” characterizes their country very well, while (13%) feel the same about the media’s ability to report the news without government censorship.

More Ukrainians are convinced their country can be characterized as one in which people can practice their religion freely (31%) and openly say what they think and criticize the government (22%).

Relations With Russia

Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych’s preference for closer relations between Ukraine and Russia appears consistent with public sentiment. Roughly half (46%) of the respondents in Ukraine say Russia is having a good influence on their country. Only 25% feel that this influence is bad.

Views of Russian influence in Ukraine vary by ethnicity and region. Ethnic Russians (81%) are far more likely to view Russian influence positively than ethnic Ukrainians (52%). In addition more people living in Eastern (87%) and Southern (56%) Ukraine, which are the regions in which most Ethnic Russians live, view the influence of Russia as good than do those in the West (32%).

Ukrainians also view Russia as one of their most dependable allies. When asked to name the countries they can most rely on as a dependable ally in the future, a majority of Ukrainians (58%) think of Russia. Ukrainians were also asked to name the countries and organizations that pose the greatest threat. More than one-in-four (27%) in Ukraine see the U.S. as one of their top threats.

All is not rosy in terms of Ukrainian views of Russia; just as with other former Soviet and Eastern European publics, Ukrainians are worried about being too dependent on Russia for their energy resources. More than seven-in-ten (73%) in Ukraine express these concerns and, since 2007, worries about dependence on Russian energy resources have increased significantly (+10 percentage points).

Views of NATO

While current President Viktor Yushchenko is a proponent of Ukraine joining NATO, few Ukrainians hold this view. About half in Ukraine hold unfavorable opinions of NATO (51%) and oppose joining this security organization (51%).

Ethnic Russians are far more likely to hold an unfavorable view of NATO (74%) and oppose Ukrainian membership in the security organization (74%) than are ethnic Ukrainians (37% hold a favorable view of NATO, 46% oppose NATO membership).

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

Muslims in 14 countries – ranging from Turkey, Pakistan and other predominantly Muslim countries to Uganda and Ghana where the Muslims are relatively small minority – were surveyed on a range of political, social and religious issues. In most of these countries, support for freedom and a strong Islamic presence in politics go hand in hand.²

Yet there is a pervasive belief that the desire for more freedom and openness is not being fulfilled. Among the majority Islamic countries surveyed, just two – Mali and Senegal – were rated as “free” by Freedom House in its most recent report on democracy around the world. This reality is reflected in the bleak assessments many Muslims give of political freedom in their own countries. Perceptions of repression in some predominantly Muslim countries – notably Turkey, Bangladesh and Lebanon – are greater than anywhere else in the developing world. But it is important to note that this survey was conducted before the Turkish general elections of November 2002, when the country‘s unpopular prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, was replaced by Recep Erdogan of the Islamist-based Justice and Development Party.

I. Islam and Governance

Majorities of Muslims in nine nations favor a large role for Islam in the political life of their countries. This view is common both in countries where Muslims are the overwhelming majority of the population (Pakistan, Jordan, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Mali) as well as where Muslims make up a minority (Uganda, Ivory Coast and Nigeria).

In four other nations (Lebanon, Turkey, Senegal and Uzbekistan), opinion is split over whether Islam‘s role in political life should be large or small. Only in Tanzania is there a prevailing sentiment among the Muslim minority that Islam should play a small role in politics, if any.

Attitudes on Islam‘s proper position in political life can be understood in the context of how people perceive its current role. For example, most Indonesian Muslims are satisfied with what they see as a high level of Islamic influence in politics. Fully 86% say Islam plays a very or fairly large role in the political life of their country, and 82% think it should play a substantial role. In Pakistan, Uganda, Jordan, and Bangladesh many Muslims want to see Islam play a greater role than they think it currently does.

In Pakistan, where Gen. Perez Musharraf‘s hard line against Islamic extremism has provoked a backlash among some Muslims, 56% say Islam plays a large role but far more (86%) think it should play a large role. Moreover, just 35% think Islam currently plays a very large role in their nation‘s political life today, but 75% think it should have a very large role.

Senegal, Lebanon, Uzbekistan and Tanzania are at the other end of the spectrum. Solid majorities in all three countries say Islam already plays a prominent role in their country‘s politics, but far fewer believe this should be the case. Nearly two-thirds of Senegalese think Islam plays a major role in politics, while just 42% endorse a significant political role for Islam. The gap is nearly as large in Lebanon and somewhat smaller in Uzbekistan and Tanzania.

In other parts of the Muslim world there is general satisfaction with Islam‘s political influence. Indonesians are generally satisfied with religion playing a very large role in their nation‘s politics. In Turkey, Mali and Ghana, most are happy with what they see as a more moderate Islamic influence in each nation‘s political life.

Larger Role for Religious Leaders?

The widespread Muslim support for religion playing a prominent role in political life is also seen in the large number of Muslim respondents who believe religious leaders should be more active in politics directly. Fully nine-in-ten Muslims in Nigeria (91%) and solid majorities in seven other countries endorse religious leaders playing a larger role in politics.

In several of the countries – notably Bangladesh, Jordan and Mali – support for religious leaders becoming more active in politics is associated with the view that Islam should have a bigger role in political life. In other countries, the pattern is reversed: Muslims in Tanzania, Senegal and Uzbekistan, who have more reservations about a strong role for Islam in politics, oppose a greater political role for religious leaders.

But there are some interesting contrasts in these views in other nations, suggesting that the idea of religious leaders becoming more politically active is more appealing than Islam having a greater role in politics. In Lebanon, for example, 72% of Muslims feel that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics than they currently do, even though a plurality wants Islam to play less of a role in political life than it currently does. Similarly, 91% of Nigerian Muslims favor more political participation by religious leaders even though just 61% favor a large role for Islam in politics generally.

In some other countries, it is the direct participation of religious leaders in politics that is more troubling to Muslims. For example, Pakistanis feel more favorably toward Islam playing a general role in political life (86% favor) than they do about religious leaders taking part in politics (63% favor).

Opinion Not Driven by Religious Commitment, Corruption Concerns

Muslim attitudes on the proper role of religion in politics and public life are, for the most part, unrelated to people‘s own religious commitment. Muslims who pray regularly, fast on Ramadan, and say religion plays an important role in their lives are no more or less likely to support a greater role for Islam in politics than those who are less religiously oriented. This suggests that support for religious leaders becoming more deeply involved in politics does not necessarily imply support for a more religiously oriented state or that the belief that religion should play a role in public life means believing that everyone must be religiously devout themselves.

There also is no evidence that support for religion in political and public life is driven by concerns about corruption in government. While corruption concerns are high in many of the Muslim nations surveyed (as they are across much of the developing world), people who rate corruption as a major problem in their nation are no more likely to favor a role for Islam in public life, or for religious leaders in politics, than those who are less concerned about corruption. Similarly, while majorities in most of the Muslim countries surveyed view moral decline as a major problem for their countries – Jordan is a notable exception – this opinion is not associated with support for religious leaders to take a more active role in politics

Can Democracy Work? Most say Yes

Support for a religious role in political life among Muslim publics does not necessarily carry the same implications that it might in a nation like the United States, where the separation of church and state has been codified and reinforced over the years. Most importantly, while many Muslims around the world would like to see more religion in politics, this view does not contradict widespread support for democratic ideals among these publics. In fact, in a number of countries, Muslims who support a greater role for Islam in politics place the highest regard on freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the importance of free and contested elections.

Muslim respondents are optimists about democracy. Relatively few Muslims agree that democracy is a “Western way of doing things that would not work here.” Instead, majorities in most predominantly Muslim nations believe democracy is not just for the West and can work in their country. Reservations about western-style democracy are greatest in Indonesia (53%) Turkey (37%) and the Palestinian Authority (37%). This represents significantly less support for democracy in Indonesia than in 2002, when 64% of Muslims thought a western model of democracy would work in their country and just 25% did not.

Democratic Aspirations

Majorities in most predominantly Muslim countries place a high priority on having the freedom to criticize the government. Support for this right is particularly prevalent among Muslims in Turkey (83% very important), Mali (80%), Bangladesh (79%), as well as in Nigeria (72%), Senegal (71%) and Lebanon (66%).

Similarly, majorities in most predominantly Muslim counties believe multi-party electoral systems and judicial systems that treat everyone the same are very important. Freedom of the press to report on the government without censorship is also highly valued.

In a number of predominantly Islamic nations, the extent to which these values are prized is as widespread as it is in non-Muslim countries in both the developed and developing world. In Bangladesh, Lebanon, Nigeria and Mali, the vast majority of Muslims simultaneously support religious leaders playing a greater role in politics as well as freedom of speech and electoral competition; their support the latter exceeds that for of many Eastern European and
Latin American nations.

But Muslims in several countries view these freedoms as less important. In Pakistan, Indonesia, Uzbekistan and Jordan, fewer than half of Muslims surveyed rate honest two-party elections and freedom of the press as very important, though most view these freedoms as somewhat important. In Jordan, a monarchy with a limited parliament, there is a notable lack of enthusiasm for such liberties, owing at least partly to divisions between Palestinians living in Jordan, who tend to be more supportive of democratic freedoms, and native Jordanians. Roughly a third of Palestinian Muslims (33%) give a high priority to honest elections, compared with 19% of Jordanians.

Religious Freedom Also Supported

Religious freedom also is highly valued by Muslim publics. Muslims in Senegal are nearly unanimous in their support for religious freedom (97%), and more than eight-in-ten in Lebanon (85%), Turkey (84%) and other nations agree. In religiously diverse nations, such as Lebanon and Nigeria, Muslims are as supportive as non-Muslims of the right to practice religion freely.

The lone exception to this pattern is Jordan, where just four-in-ten say it is very important that people can practice their religion freely. Three-in-ten Muslim respondents in Jordan rate freedom of religion as relatively unimportant – the highest proportion among all nations surveyed. Again, Palestinians are more likely to value religious freedom than other Jordanians, with 45% saying it is very important (compared with 32% of Jordanians).

Expressions of support for the democratic ideals of competition and freedom of expression do not conflict with opinion in favor of a role for Islam in public life and politics. In most countries, supporters of an active role for Islam are no more or less committed to these democratic ideals, and in a few predominantly Muslim nations, notably Bangladesh and Pakistan, those who are most supportive of a role for Islam in public life and politics are also the most supportive of freedom of speech and electoral competition.

A Mosque – State Divide

Despite the broad support for a greater political role for Islam, Muslim publics are generally no less supportive of keeping religion separate from government policy than are people in other countries. In countries with more secular traditions, such as Turkey, Senegal and Mali, roughly seven-in-ten completely agree that religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.

Indeed, publics in those three countries are even more supportive than Americans of keeping religion separate from government policy. Just over half of U.S. respondents (55%) completely agree that religion is a matter of personal faith, not government policy, compared with 73% of Muslims in Turkey, 71% in Mali and 67% in Senegal.

In religiously diverse countries, Muslims generally favor keeping religion a private matter at the same rates as non-Muslims. In Nigeria, for example, six-in-ten Muslims and the same proportion of non-Muslims completely agree that religion should be kept separate from government policy. In Lebanon, there are only modest differences on this point between Muslims and non-Muslims (59% non-Muslim completely agree; 53% Muslim).

But Muslims in Jordan and Pakistan are decidedly less supportive of keeping religion and government policy separate. Just a quarter of Muslims in Jordan and only about a third in Pakistan (34%) completely agree with the principle of maintaining a clear division between religion and policy – the lowest percentages among the 43 nations where this question was asked. Jordan is the only country in which a significant number of Muslims (46%) disagree with the idea of keeping religion and government policy separate.

Reality Falls Short of Ideals

Despite the widespread support for democratic ideals in most predominantly Muslim countries, the survey finds considerable discontent with political rights and civil liberties as they now exist. Majorities of Muslims in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan say that they do not have honest elections and lack the freedom to openly criticize the government. These perceptions are also widespread in Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh. Many also complain that the judicial system does not treat everyone the same and that news organizations face government censorship.

While these observations are not isolated to the nations listed above – many Latin American publics say their countries fail to live up to these ideals, and Kenyans also say their country lacks many of these basic freedoms – a pattern of support for democratic principles combined with a perception that their nation currently is lacking in these areas is characteristic of many Muslim nations. Of the Muslim nations surveyed, Mali, Senegal, and Pakistan stand out as the exceptions. Publics in these nations are generally satisfied with the electoral process and rights allowed to journalists and protestors.

Most Muslims surveyed – especially those in African countries – feel they have freedom to practice their religion. Nine-in-ten Muslims in Senegal and roughly three-quarters in Mali and Tanzania believe the statement “you can practice your religion” describes their country very well. In Nigeria, far fewer Muslims (51%) say that statement describes their country very well, but seven-in-ten believe they have at least some freedom to practice their faith. And there are only slight differences between Muslims in Nigeria and non-Muslims (56%).

Perceptions of religious freedom are not quite as prevalent in the Middle East/Conflict Area. Still, majorities of Muslims in Pakistan (63%), Bangladesh (60%) and Uzbekistan (58%) say that religious freedom describes their country very well. The most prominent exception is Turkey, where the government has limited the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women. Less than half of Muslims in Turkey say that religious freedom describes their country very (29%) or even somewhat well (16%). (This question was not asked in Jordan and Lebanon.)

Democracy Favored Over Strong Leader

Muslim publics clearly favor democratic government over a strong autocratic leader. In general, there is greater support for a democratic government in the Muslim countries surveyed than there is in much of Eastern Europe. The clear exceptions are Jordan and Uzbekistan, two countries with very strong leaders, and Nigeria.

In that regard, the preference of Muslims in Uzbekistan for a strong leader fits the pattern of publics in the former Soviet Union. Nearly six-in-ten Muslim respondents in Uzbekistan (58%) favor a strong leader over a democratic government, which is consistent with results in Russia and Ukraine, where two-thirds believe their nations should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve their nation’s problems. In Jordan, a monarchy with limited parliament, Muslims are divided, with half favoring a strong leader.

II: Social Attitudes: Tensions Over Women’s Roles

Muslims surveyed in the Global Attitudes Project have complex attitudes toward the role of Islam in daily life. These tensions are apparent in attitudes about the role of women in society.

Most Muslims express at least some support for a woman‘s right to work outside the home. But majorities in only six of 14 nations in which the question was asked completely agree that women should be permitted to work outside the home. In Pakistan, just a third completely agree that women should be free to work outside the home, and in Indonesia and Jordan even fewer strongly favor women working outside the home.

In Jordan and Pakistan, nearly four-in-ten Muslims (38%, 36%) say they oppose women holding jobs outside the home. These views are consistent with the strong sentiment in those two countries in favor of a traditional division of roles regarding work and marriage, with husbands holding a job and the wives maintaining the household. Roughly six-in-ten respondents in both of these countries believe husbands should work and wives should stay home, among the highest measures of surveyed nations.

In four of the nations surveyed – Uzbekistan, Mali, Ivory Coast and Nigeria – more than a third of Muslims completely agree that there should be restrictions on men and women working in the same place. In Uzbekistan, where 70% strongly support a women‘s right to work, nearly half of Muslim respondents strongly favor separating men and women at work (45% completely agree). And substantial minorities in Mali (38%), Ivory Coast (36%) and Nigeria (36%) completely agree that separating men and women at work is appropriate.

Gender Gap Over Women Working

In several countries, there is a significant gender gap among Muslims over whether women should be permitted to work outside the home. In Bangladesh, nearly six-in-ten women (57%) completely agree that they should be allowed to work, compared with 36% of men. The gap is nearly as wide in Pakistan, where 41% of women strongly agree with that statement, compared with roughly a quarter of men (24%). Even in countries where Muslims broadly support women‘s right to work outside the home, like Lebanon and Turkey, differences between men and women are sizable.

Indonesia and Jordan are notable exceptions to this pattern. In those countries, support for women working is equally weak among members of both sexes. Just 24% of Muslim women in Indonesia, and 20% of men, strongly agree that women should work outside the home, and support is even lower in Jordan (16%, 13%).

There is less of a gender gap over restrictions against men and women being employed in the same workplace. In most cases, women are as supportive of these restrictions as are men. While women in Bangladesh are much more likely than men to strongly favor the right of women to hold jobs, they also are more supportive of separating men and women in the workplace. More than a third of Muslim women in Bangladesh (36%) completely agree such restrictions are appropriate, compared with 20% of Muslim men.

Wearing Veils: Who Should Decide?

Generally, Muslims believe it should be up to women to decide whether or not to wear veils. Majorities of Muslims in 11 of 14 countries support the right of women to decide whether or not to wear veils, and this is the overwhelming opinion in Turkey, Lebanon, Indonesia and several other nations.

The issue of whether women should have the choice to wear veils or not is a sensitive one in many Muslim countries. In recent years, secular governments in Turkey have enforced laws prohibiting the wearing of veils, but nine-in-ten Muslims surveyed in that country (91%) say it should be for women to decide whether they wear veils or not.

In Indonesia, by contrast, there have been efforts in at least one province to require women to wear veils. But by six-to-one (86%-14%), Muslims in that country believe it should be up to women to decide whether or not to wear veils. Support for leaving it to women to decide whether to wear veils is even stronger in Lebanon, where women have long had the freedom to determine the practice for themselves.

Opinion is much more evenly divided among Muslims in Pakistan and Nigeria. Only a slim majority of Muslims in Pakistan (52%) believe women should be allowed to decide whether or not to wear veils. Fewer than half of respondents in Nigeria (45%) believe women should have that choice.

As is the case with opinion on women working outside the home, gender is a factor in Muslims‘ attitudes on veils. In Pakistan, more than six-in-ten women believe they should have the right to decide whether to wear veils; barely four-in-ten men (41%) agree. In Bangladesh, 57% of women completely agree that they should control decisions on wearing veils, compared with only about half as many men (30%).

Divisions Over Religious Education

Muslims are divided over whether schools should focus more on ”practical‘ subjects at the expense of religious instruction. Half or more of respondents in seven Muslim nations support giving greater emphasis to practical education, including 63% in Turkey. Yet publics in several other nations – notably Indonesia, Jordan and Pakistan – strongly dissent from this idea.

The dominant opinion in those three countries – as well as in Senegal and Nigeria – appears to be driven at least in part by dissatisfaction with the public education systems. This is particularly the case in Indonesia, where Muslim schools have increasingly filled a void left by the nation‘s poor public school system. Nine-in-ten Muslims in Indonesia are opposed to focusing more on practical subjects and less on religious education – and two-thirds completely reject the idea.

In Turkey and several other countries, by comparison, there is significantly more support for focusing on more practical subjects. This sentiment is particularly prevalent among Turkish respondents with a low level of personal religious commitment: 82% of this group favors placing greater emphasis on practical subjects, compared with 41% of highly observant Muslims in Turkey.

Single Interpretation of Islam Favored

For the most part, Muslim publics believe there is only one true interpretation of Islam‘s teachings. Majorities of Muslims, in 10 of the 12 nations in which this question was asked, reject the idea that Islam should tolerate diverse interpretations of its teachings.

Muslims in Senegal are most likely to express the view that there is only a single true approach to Islamic teachings (82%). But even in secular Turkey, Muslims subscribe to this sentiment by more than three-to-one (67%-20%).

Indonesia, where Muslims have long accepted diverse interpretations of Islam, is the only country in which a majority (54%) supports that approach. The other nations in which a significant share of Muslims believes Islam should tolerate diverse interpretations are Mali (48%) and Ivory Coast (47%).

This question is not a measure of Islamic fundamentalism or tolerance toward other religions and faiths. It also is important to note that this question was not permitted in Egypt and was deemed too sensitive to ask in Jordan and Lebanon. Nearly four-in-ten respondents in Pakistan (37%) declined to express an opinion. Among those who did, twice as many favored a single interpretation of Islam than diverse interpretations of the religion‘s precepts (43% vs. 20%).

Threats to Islam

The perception that Islam faces serious threats is widespread, and growing, among Muslims in many parts of the world. More than nine-in-ten Jordanian and Palestinian Muslims say their religion is threatened, and three-quarters in Lebanon agree. While this view is somewhat less universal in Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and Nigeria, the proportion concerned about threats to their religion has risen significantly in all three nations.

However, polling in 2002 found that these concerns were not all about external political, military or cultural threats. At that time, references to U.S. foreign policy, America‘s support for Israel, and the general oppression of Muslims by others were common, especially in Lebanon and Jordan. But in most places just as many Muslims referred to problems such as government interference in religion, lack of Islamic unity, disagreements between Muslims regarding issues of religious practice, and references to religious education and moral corruption. The 2003 poll, taken after the Iraq war, did not explore whether the source of the threats was perceived as internal or external.

Most Feel Greater Solidarity

Muslims in nearly all of the countries surveyed say they feel more solidarity these days with Islamic people living elsewhere. This feeling is as widespread among Muslims in Africa and Asia as it is within the Middle East/Conflict Area. Moreover, in nations in which the question was asked both in 2002 and 2003, there was no significant increase in this view. Turkey is the only country where Muslims are divided over whether they feel any greater sense of solidarity.

In Latin America and Asia, many countries have moved to freely elected governments only in the past 20 years. Democratization in Africa has taken hold even more slowly, hindered by authoritarian regimes, wars and enormous social problems. And it has yet to fully emerge in most of the Middle East.

What unites the people of these regions is that, for the most part, they highly value political rights and civil liberties. But there is a definite disconnect between their democratic aspirations and their perceptions of day-to-day reality. While people everywhere want honest elections, a fair judiciary and a free press, they often complain that their own country lacks these building blocks of democracy.

However, global attitudes on democracy and civil liberties are hardly uniform. Majorities in most countries say it is very important to live in a country that has honest multiparty elections. But there are several notable exceptions, including Russia, South Korea and Indonesia. And in general, people around the world value an impartial judiciary above honest elections or other aspects of democracy.³

In Eastern Europe, there is clear evidence that the political mindset formed during decades of communist rule has yet to completely dissipate. Significant percentages in Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, in particular, continue to disapprove of the political changes that have taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Solid majorities in every Eastern European country surveyed, with the exception of the Czech Republic, believe a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. In other economically struggling regions such as Latin America and Africa, people are much more likely to view a good democracy as more important than a strong economy.

The analysis in this section proceeds through 35 democratizing countries in four regions – Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. The Middle East/Conflict Area is covered in the chapter entitled “Muslim Opinion on Government and Social Issues”. The Pew Global Attitudes Project pays particular attention to issues in Eastern Europe because of the dramatic changes there over the past 15 years, and the benchmark Pulse of Europe survey that Pew conducted in the region in 1991. To allow for trend comparisons, the German survey updates attitudes on democracy in former East Germany and former West Germany.

I: Eastern Europe

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later, Eastern Europeans began a rocky transition from one-party rule and a command economy to democracy and a free market system. More than a decade later, support for this transformation remains uneven.

Barely half of those in Ukraine (50%), Bulgaria (49%), and Russia (47%) say they approve of the political changes in their country since the fall of communism. While modest, this represents significant growth in support for political change in Russia and Ukraine since 1991 when, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, only about a third in each country endorsed the move toward democratic rule. But in Bulgaria, the number endorsing these political changes has fallen significantly over the past 11 years (from 60% to 49%).

By contrast, solid majorities in the Czech Republic (83%), the Slovak Republic (69%) and Poland (62%) welcome the political changes of the post-communist era, as they have from the beginning. In 1991, majorities in the Czech Republic (74%) and Poland (64%) and half of those surveyed in the Slovak Republic (48%) said that they approved of the political changes that were then just underway.

To the extent that there is still dissatisfaction with changes since 1989, it is rooted in the economic hardship of the transition. The Pew Global Attitudes survey reveals that most Eastern Europeans say the gap between rich and poor in their country has gotten worse, not better, over the last five years. More than eight-in-ten in every country except Ukraine say inequality has grown in their country.

Economic concerns appear to be fueling political dissatisfaction. In every Eastern European country, those with high incomes are more likely than those with low incomes to approve of recent political changes. In Bulgaria, for example, less than a third (31%) of those with the lowest incomes approve of the recent political changes, compared with 83% of those in the high-income bracket.

Young Favor Changes More

Disapproval of political change in Eastern Europe is greater among older Eastern Europeans and those with less education. In Russia, about six-in-ten (59%) of those age 60 or older disapprove of the changes since 1991, compared with just a third (35%) of those aged 18 to 34. In Bulgaria, 62% of those age 60 and older disapprove of the changes since then, compared with 35% of those under age 35. This generation gap exists in every Eastern European country except the Czech Republic, where approval of recent political change is extraordinarily high among both old and young.

In addition, respondents with a primary school education or lower are much more likely to disapprove of political changes than those who have attended some college. This relationship is true in every country except Ukraine.

Civil Liberties Backed, Less So in Russia

Eastern Europeans embrace political rights and civil liberties, yet they generally place a lower value on such democratic ideals than do people in other nascent democracies or well-established Western democracies. Russians, in particular, give low priority to political rights and liberties. Overall, Russians are less likely than other Eastern Europeans to say that it is very important to live in a society that affords freedom of speech, honest multiparty elections, religious freedom, a free press, and a fair judiciary.

Half or more respondents in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, the Slovak Republic, former East Germany and Ukraine say that it is very important to them that “honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties.” Far fewer people in Russia take the same position (37%), although most Russians say it is at least somewhat important that they live in a country with honest multiparty elections (40% somewhat important).

When Eastern European attitudes are compared to the views of people in former West Germany, an East-West political-values gap emerges. Russians give lowest priority to democratic ideals, former West Germans the highest, with other Eastern Europeans in between.

More than eight-in-ten people in former West Germany (83%) say that honest multiparty elections are very important to them. In Eastern Europe, Slovaks and Czechs place the greatest emphasis on free elections. Aside from Russians, Poles and Bulgarians are least likely to say honest multiparty elections are important to them.

Impartial Judiciary Favored

Eastern Europeans place the greatest value on a fair judicial system. Solid majorities in every country in the region say that it is very important that they live in a society with a judicial system that treats everyone the same. This sentiment is particularly strong among Czechs (84%), former East Germans (84%), Bulgarians (79%) and Ukrainians (82%).

Even here, however, there is a modest gap between East and West. Former West Germans (87%) still place a higher value on a fair judiciary than do Russians, Poles, Bulgarians, Ukrainians or Slovaks. Only the Czechs and former East Germans share the former West Germans’ level of concern for honest judges.

But there is broad agreement across the region that the goal of an independent judiciary is not being achieved. Majorities in every eastern European country – with the notable exception of former East Germany – say the phrase “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” does not describe their country well. Just 5% in Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics say this describes their country very well.

Religious and Press Freedom Backed

Religious freedom is viewed as most important in Eastern European countries where the Catholic and Orthodox Churches have a strong presence: Poland (62% very important), the Slovak Republic (60%) and Ukraine (55%). In Russia, where atheism was official doctrine under communism, notably fewer respondents (35%) say religious freedom is very important to them.

The Global Attitudes survey also asks whether religion is a matter of personal faith that should be kept separate from government policy. In every country in Eastern Europe, regardless of their religious tradition, large majorities agree that religion is a purely private matter.

But Eastern Europeans differ over the importance of freedom of the press. A free press is as highly valued by Czechs (71% very important), Slovaks (66%) and Ukrainians (64%) as by former West Germans (65%). Solid majorities in each of these countries say it is very important that they live in a country where the media can report the news without government censorship. But that ideal wins far less support in Russia (31% very important), where the media is still struggling to freely report the news.

Throughout Eastern Europe, large majorities of the public say they value freedom of speech. But most do not place high value on it. Just three-in-ten Russians, about half of Bulgarians (48%), and majorities in Poland (55%), the Slovak Republic (58%) and Ukraine (59%) say it is very important that they live in a society where they can openly say what they think and can criticize the government. More people in the Czech Republic (65%) and in former East Germany (70%) claim that freedom of speech is very important, but significantly more West Germans hold that view (84%).

In Eastern Europe, and throughout the other regions surveyed, more highly educated people consistently place greater importance on freedom of speech, the press and religion, and honest elections than do those with less education. Higher income respondents are also most likely to value these rights, but the relationship is much less consistent. There is no consistent difference in attitudes across age groups.

Civilian Control Not a Priority

Civilian control of the military is a democratic principle that finds relatively little favor among Eastern Europeans – not even in Poland where the army seized control and declared martial law in 1981. In every country except former East Germany, fewer than four-in-ten say it is very important to them that they live in a society where the military reports to the civilian leadership. Just 29% in Poland, 21% in Bulgaria and 20% in Russia believe this principle is very important.

In part, such sentiment reflects widespread trust of the military. Majorities everywhere except Ukraine say the armed forces have a good influence on how things are going in their country. Only in Ukraine does a plurality (44%) believe that the military has a bad influence. Even there, however, fewer than four-in-ten (38%) give high priority to the principle of civilian control.

Eastern Europeans generally feel their countries fall short of meeting their expectations on democratic ideals. Whether it is freedom of speech, honest multiparty elections, press freedom or a fair judicial system, substantially fewer than half of those surveyed say these democratic ideals describe their countries very well.

Rather, majorities say these ideals somewhat or very well describe their countries. And less than half the public in Bulgaria (43%), Russia (42%) and Ukraine (45%) believes civilians are in control the military in their country. Between 20% and 40% in each country, on average, say these ideals do not describe their country well.

Progress In Last Decade

Nonetheless, when asked about the pace of progress in specific areas over the last decade, solid majorities say they now have more freedom to say what they think, to join any political organization they want, and to choose whom to vote for without feeling any pressure. Among the six countries surveyed on these issues – the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and Russia – more than two-thirds in every country say that today they have more freedom to say what they think.

Similarly large percentages among all six publics say they have more freedom to join any political organization they choose. And with the exception of Russia, solid majorities say they have more freedom to decide whom to vote for, compared with 10 years ago. About half of Russians feel that way (51%), while 24% report no change and 18% say they have less latitude in deciding their vote than they did a decade ago.

But in another area – personal safety – Eastern Europeans agree that things have deteriorated over the past decade. No fewer than six-in-ten in all six countries yes – it is surveyed say there is less safety from crime and violence now than a decade ago.

Economic Concerns Drive Age Gap

Older people in Eastern Europe are more likely to disapprove of the changes in the last 10 years than are younger people. At the same time, when asked how well various political rights and civil liberties describe their country, older people are as positive or even more positive than the younger generation.

It is only when asked generally about post-communist political changes that older Eastern Europeans voice more concern than the younger generation. This concern has a strong economic component, as the region‘s political evolution has been accompanied by a dramatic shift to a free market economy. Older Eastern Europeans are less likely than younger people to think they are better off in a free market economy, and the older generation is more likely to be dissatisfied with their household income.

Bribery – Occasionally Necessary

Most Eastern Europeans say they seldom if ever need to give gifts, perform favors or pay bribes to government officials to secure services or documents the government is supposed to provide, but the practice does occur. Four-in-ten Ukrainians (41%) say that in the last year they have engaged in the practice, although relatively few say it happens frequently (4% very often/11% somewhat often).

A third of Russians say they have had to bribe government officials in the past year, as have 27% in the Slovak Republic, 24% in Poland and 20% in Bulgaria. Bribery is reported least often in the Czech Republic – fewer than one-in-ten (9%) say they have had to bribe a government official to get services or documents.

Young people are more likely than older respondents to say they have paid bribes. For example, in Ukraine, nearly half of those ages 18 to 34 (47%) say they have offered a bribe in the past year, compared with a quarter (27%) of those ages 60 or older. A similar difference between the old and the young exists in Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic. In Russia, people with some college education were also more likely to report offering a bribe, and in Bulgaria, Russia and the Ukraine, the wealthy were more likely than those in lower-income brackets to report they have had to pay a bribe to a government official.

Strong Economy Trumps Good Democracy

With the exception of the Czech Republic, at least six-in-ten respondents in every Eastern European country say they believe a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. Overwhelming majorities in Russia (81%), Ukraine (81%) and Bulgaria (74%) opt for a strong economy. Only in the Czech Republic does a majority (59%) choose democracy over economic growth. But even there, four-in-ten (38%) people prefer a strong economy to a good democracy.

Public opinion on this question is linked to people‘s own financial situations. In four Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia and the Slovak Republic – higher income respondents are more likely to favor a good democracy over a strong economy. In the Slovak Republic, for example, almost half (49%) of those in the highest income bracket choose a good democracy compared with three-in-ten (30%) of those in the lowest income bracket.

Education also is a factor in these attitudes. In the Czech Republic, three-quarters of those with at least some college (75%) prefer a good democracy compared to just over half (55%) of those with a primary school education or less. In the Slovak Republic, younger people are more likely to choose a good democracy over a strong economy. Half of those ages 18 to 34 (50%) choose a good democracy compared to a third (32%) of those ages 60 and older.

Prosperity Very Important

Consistent with these attitudes, overwhelming majorities in nearly every Eastern European country rate economic prosperity as a very important objective. The only exception is former East Germany, where a slim majority says economic prosperity is very important. In three nations – Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria – more people cite prosperity as a top goal than say that about any aspect of democracy.

This desire for national economic success contrasts with reality. Majorities throughout the region – except in former East Germany and the Czech Republic – say their countries are not prosperous. Fully 83% in Bulgaria say their country is not enjoying prosperity – one of the highest percentages of any country surveyed. Nearly as many Slovaks and Poles hold that view as well (76%, 74%). By comparison, people in former East Germany and the Czech Republic are much more upbeat about economic conditions. Roughly two-thirds (68%) of those in former East Germany say economic prosperity describes their country well, and 55% of Czechs agree.

Many Prefer Strong Leader

Many Eastern Europeans also say that to solve their countries‘ problems they prefer a strong leader rather than a democratic form of government. Solid majorities in Russia (70%) and Ukraine (67%) opt for a strong hand in government leadership. This is a reversal of 1991 sentiment when most people in Russia (51%) and Ukraine (57%) favored a democratic government to solve problems.

In Poland and Bulgaria, opinion is divided on this issue, with as many people favoring a strong leader as a democratic form of government. The Czech and Slovak Republics stand out with overwhelming majorities favoring a democratic form of government (91%, 86%).

In every country in the region, those in the highest income bracket are more likely to choose a democratic form of government over a strong leader than those in lower income brackets. For example, in Bulgaria more than seven-in-ten (72%) of the rich chose a democratic form of government, compared with a quarter of the poor. Conversely, people with lower incomes favor a strong leader. In Poland, 59% of those with low incomes choose a strong leader to solve national problems, compared with 23% of those with high incomes.

II: Latin America

Until recently, free and fair elections have had an inconsistent history in Latin America. Most of the countries in the region have only achieved elected civilian rule within the last two decades.

Despite that history, majorities in six of the eight Latin American countries surveyed favor a democratic government over a strong leader to solve their nation‘s problems. In Mexico and Venezuela, democratic government is favored by better than three-to-one. Only in Honduras and Brazil do majorities dissent from this view.

In contrast with most countries in Eastern Europe, recent economic hardships have not led Latin Americans to favor a strong economy over a good democracy. Majorities in economically devastated Argentina, as well as in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico, say they prefer democratic freedoms to a strong economy.

This preference for democracy is particularly significant given the widespread economic pessimism in the region. Solid majorities in every Latin American country surveyed consider economic prosperity as a very important objective, but there is little sense that the goal is being fulfilled. In Argentina, fully 86% say the country is not experiencing prosperity – among the highest percentages of all countries surveyed.

Most Say Military Not Under Civilian Control

Despite the steps taken toward democracy in several Latin American countries, there is a widespread perception that the military is not under the control of civilian leaders. Almost six-in-ten in Brazil (58%), Venezuela (58%) and Guatemala (57%) say civilian control of the military does not describe their country well.⁴ Only in Mexico is there a clear perception that the military is under civilian control; even so, just 30% of Mexicans say it describes the situation in their country very well.

Most Latin Americans, however, do not regard civilian control of the military as a very important priority. Guatemala, which has a long history of military dominance, is the only country in which even a narrow majority (52%) says it is very important to live in a country where the military is under the control of civilian leaders.

Public support for other freedoms is more extensive. Solid majorities in nearly every Latin American country say that it is very important to them that honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political candidates. The only exception is Bolivia, where 49% give multiparty elections high priority.

But far fewer say their country has honest multiparty elections. No more than four-in-ten in any country say it describes their country very well. People in Argentina take an especially negative view of their country‘s elections. Just a quarter of Argentines give their elections a passing grade, and only 9% give the nation high marks for honest elections. (This survey was conducted before the May 2003 presidential election in Argentina, and the October 2002 presidential election in Brazil).

Overall, Argentines are much more negative about their country‘s success in ensuring political rights and civil liberties than are other Latin Americans. These attitudes are associated with negative views of the government. Argentines who think the government has a bad influence on the way things are going are generally more likely to say that Argentina does not ensure people’s rights and liberties.

Differing Views of Political Changes

As in Eastern Europe, opinion on recent political changes in Latin America varies widely from country to country, reflecting different experiences with democracy. In Mexico, for example, the election of President Vincente Fox in 2000 was judged by many international observers as perhaps the first fair presidential election in Mexico‘s history. This milestone helps explain why a solid majority of Mexicans (62%) say they approve of the political changes that have taken place in the last five years.

Fewer respondents in Venezuela (47%) and Peru (40%) have such positive views. In Peru, the political landscape improved with the presidential election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001. But the government evidently has yet to regain public confidence after the chaotic departure of Alberto Fujimori, the autocratic former president. Since Victor Hugo Chavez was elected president in Venezuela in 1998, the political situation has spiraled downward, with an attempted coup and national strikes that have caused major economic disruption and significant opposition to many of the political and economic changes implemented by Chavez.

In Mexico, Venezuela and Peru, approval of recent political changes is tied to opinion about the president and the government. Those who say that the president has a good influence on how things are going in the country are more likely to approve of the political changes over the last five years than those who think the president has a bad influence. Similarly, those who approve of the government‘s influence also support how things are going politically in the country. (Approval of political change was asked only in Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.)

Low Confidence in Judiciary

As is the case globally, Latin Americans place high importance on a judicial system that treats everyone the same. Solid majorities in all eight Latin American countries surveyed say it is very important that they live in a country that has a fair judicial system. But people in several of these countries – especially Argentina and Brazil – have highly negative opinions of their current judicial systems.

More than eight-in-ten Argentines (85%) say that the statement “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” does not describe their country well; fully two-thirds say it does not characterize the country “at all” – by far the most negative rating in the world. Just one-in-twenty (5%) Argentines say an impartial judicial system describes their country very well.

Brazilians also judge their country‘s judicial system quite critically. Seven-in-ten (72%) think it is not fair and nearly half (47%) say an impartial system does not at all describe their country‘s judiciary. This view is shared, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the region. Honduras is the only nation in the region where a majority of respondents (60%) say the judicial system treats everyone at least somewhat fairly, although a sizable minority (39%) disagrees.

Other Freedoms Valued

The ability to practice one‘s religion, freedom of speech and a free press also win broad support in Latin America. Freedom of religion is seen as especially important. More than seven-in-ten in every country except Bolivia say it is very important to live in a country where you can freely practice your religion. Just half of Bolivians agree, and support for other freedoms is also weaker in Bolivia than in other countries in the region.

Large majorities in every Latin American nation surveyed say that religion is a personal matter and should be kept separate from government policy. And, for the most part, people in these predominantly Catholic countries feel they are able to practice their religion without interference. In Mexico and Honduras, six-in-ten (61% in each) say that religious freedom describes conditions in their country very well.

Latin Americans take a less favorable view of the extent to which freedom of the press and freedom of speech are permitted. While majorities in every Latin American country surveyed say the media can report the news without government censorship to some extent, well under half in each say that statement describes their country “very well”. More than a third in Argentina (38%), Peru (37%), Guatemala, (36%), Venezuela (34%) and Brazil (34%) say that statement does not accurately reflect conditions in their countries.

Sizable minorities in several countries say the phrase “you can openly say what you think and can criticize the government” does not accurately describe their country. Nearly half of Guatemalans (48%) say that statement does not reflect conditions in their country, and more than a third of Peruvians (38%), Brazilians (35%), Argentines (34%) and Bolivians (34%) agree.

Reports of Bribery Vary Greatly

The extent to which Latin Americans say they have had to bribe government officials in the past year varies greatly from country to country. Argentines are the least likely to report paying bribes. Just 6% say the practice has occurred at least somewhat often in the past year, while 89% say they have not had a reason to pay a bribe or do a favor to obtain government services or documents.

In Venezuela, by contrast, 36% report that they have had to pay a bribe at least somewhat often in the past year. Fewer respondents in other countries say they have had to pay bribes in the past year. Roughly a quarter of those surveyed in Peru (24%), Mexico (24%) and Bolivia (23%) say they have had to pay a bribe or do a favor at least somewhat often in the past year to obtain government services or documents.

III: Asia

Asian respondents surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project generally attach great importance to religious freedom and an impartial judiciary. But other aspects of democracy are less broadly supported – notably honest elections and freedom of the press.

Large majorities in the Philippines (77%), Bangladesh (71%) and India (64%) say that it is very important to live in a country that has honest multiparty elections. But only about four-in-ten in Indonesia (40%) and South Korea (43%) concur. Those are among the lowest marks of the 35 countries surveyed on democracy and civil liberties. (This survey was conducted before South Korea‘s presidential election in December 2002).⁵

For the most part, Asians do not express a high degree of confidence in their countries‘ elections. No more than four-in-ten in any country say that honest, multiparty elections characterize their country very well. Indonesians are the most negative in this regard – just 10% say it describes their country very well, and half say their country is lacking in this regard. Respondents in Bangladesh, in particular, place much greater value on free and fair elections than they believe their country delivers. (Questions on elections were not permitted in Vietnam; none of the questions on democracy were permitted in China).

Press Freedom Not Widely Valued

Freedom of the press is also not widely valued by people in the six Asian nations where this question was asked. (It was not permitted in Vietnam). Only in Bangladesh does a majority (64%) say that it is very important that the media can report the news without censorship in their country. In other countries, less than half the public agrees.

Most people give their countries, at best, middling ratings for press freedom. Only in India do as many as a third (32%) think the statement, “the media can report the news without government censorship”, describes their country very well. In South Korea, which recently enacted a criminal libel law allowing the government to jail journalists who express criticism, just 7% hold that view.⁶ More than four-in-ten in South Korea (43%) also say that a free, uncensored media does not describe the country accurately. Nearly a third in Bangladesh (31%) agree. In Bangladesh, violence and intimidation of journalists who are critical of the government has increased over the last few years.

Attitudes on the importance of civilian control of the military also vary widely in Asia. Fully six-in-ten Vietnamese rate this as very important, by far the highest percentage in the region. But only about one-in-five respondents in Indonesia (22%) and South Korea (18%) attach great importance to this ideal. Fully a third in Indonesia and nearly as many in South Korea (27%) and the Philippines (24%) say civilian control of the military is not too important or not important at all.

Religious Freedom, Fair Judiciary Very Important

Majorities in every Asian country surveyed say that religious freedom is very important to them. There is overwhelming support for religious freedom in predominantly Muslim Bangladesh (93%) and Indonesia (88%) as well as in religiously diverse India (81%).

There is general agreement among Asian respondents that they are able to freely practice their religion. As many as eight-in-ten in India (78%) give the country high marks for being able to practice their religion freely; 68% in Indonesia agree. This perception is not shared as widely in other countries; still, about half of respondents across Asia say religious freedom describes their country very well.

Like respondents in other regions, Asians also place a high value on an impartial judiciary. Solid majorities in every country in the region say this is very important, ranging from a high of 89% in Bangladesh to a low of 59% in South Korea. But at most, only about half – in Vietnam (50%) and India (45%) – think their country is doing very well in this regard.

People are particularly critical in South Korea and Bangladesh, where the U.S. State Department says the judicial systems are corrupt, slow and reluctant to challenge government decisions.⁷ Just 6% of Bangladeshis say an impartial judiciary describes their country very well, while 72% say it does not accurately describe conditions in their country. Only one-in-ten South Koreans (9%) give the judicial system high marks, while half say a fair judiciary does not characterize the current system.

The same pattern is apparent in Asian attitudes toward freedom of speech. Majorities in every country view the freedom to criticize the government as very important, but Indians are the only group in which most (57%) think the country is doing “very well” in ensuring freedom of speech. Again, the Bangladeshi public stands out with eight-in-ten (81%) saying that freedom of speech is very important but just two-in-ten (19%) saying it describes their country very well.

South Koreans, Indonesians Choose ‘Strong Economy’

On several measures, South Koreans and Indonesians stand out for the relatively low importance they give to democracy. When asked to choose between a strong economy and a good democracy, Indonesians overwhelmingly opt for a strong economy (69%-30%), while South Koreans are divided (49% strong economy/47% good democracy). In the other countries surveyed, solid majorities favor a good democracy over a strong economy.

In South Korea at least, this opinion may reflect frustration with the country‘s recent political history rather than a reaction to economic hard times. Most South Koreans (55%) view economic prosperity as very important, but that is far less than the number who hold that view in Indonesia (92%), Vietnam (84%), Bangladesh (82%) or the Philippines (75%). For the most part, the South Korean public believes that their country is economically prosperous (65%).

But South Koreans also disapprove of the political changes that have taken place over the last five years, a period marked by corruption scandals, economic problems and rising tensions with North Korea. Fewer than four-in-ten South Koreans (37%) approve of recent political changes, while a majority (56%) disapproves. (South Korea was the only Asian country where this question was asked).

But Not ‘Strong Leader’

Nonetheless, solid majorities in South Korea (61%) and four other Asian nations favor a democratic government, rather than a strong leader, to solve national problems. This opinion is broadly shared in Bangladesh (70%), Indonesia (65%) and to a lesser extent in India (54%). (This question was not permitted in Vietnam).

The exception is the Philippines, which became a symbol of democratic revolution in the mid-1980s when Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown and Corazon Aquino was elected president. Most people in the Philippines (55%) believe it is better to rely on a strong leader to solve national problems, while 41% favor a democratic government. As a point of comparison, only in Russia and the Ukraine is there greater support for a strong leader than in the Philippines (70% Russia, 67% Ukraine).

Bribery a Reality in Bangladesh

Most Asians report they have seldom if ever found it necessary in the past year to pay bribes to government officials. But Bangladesh is a notable exception – fully 44% of respondents there say they have had to engage in the practice very (20%) or somewhat often (24%).

Solid majorities in every other country say they either never have to bribe government officials or say it occurs “not at all” often. In every country, those who have attended college are more likely to have felt it necessary to offer a bribe than those with less education.

IV: Africa

By virtually any standard, support for democracy in Africa is broad and deep. Africans generally dismiss the idea that a leader with a strong hand is needed to solve their country‘s problems. Solid majorities in all African countries, with the exceptions of Mali and South Africa, believe their nations should rely on a democratic government, not a strong leader, to solve problems. This is particularly the case in Senegal (90%), Ivory Coast (84%), Kenya (77%) and Tanzania (70%).

Moreover, Africans overwhelmingly reject the idea that democracy is a “Western” form of government that would not succeed in their countries. By margins of at least three-to-one, people in all seven nations in which the question was asked instead agree with the statement: “Democracy is not just for the West and can work well here.” (This question was asked in selected countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia).

In spite of the continent‘s grinding poverty, half or more in six of the ten African countries surveyed say they favor a good democracy over a strong economy. This view is particularly prevalent in the Ivory Coast (77% good democracy), Nigeria (63%) and Ghana (60%).

This survey was conducted prior to presidential elections in Kenya, in December 2002, and in Nigeria, in April 2003. Also, it was conducted before the outbreak of civil war in the Ivory Coast.

Elections Viewed Negatively in Kenya, Nigeria

Majorities in every African country say it is very important to live in a country with fair multiparty elections. Roughly nine-in-ten respondents in Senegal (87%) hold this view, and nearly as many in Kenya (85%), the Ivory Coast (84%), Mali (82%) and Uganda (79%) agree. In every country except Kenya and Nigeria, majorities say that honest, multiparty elections describe their countries at least somewhat well, although far fewer take a very positive view of the elections.

But Kenyans and Nigerians are negative about their countries‘ elections. In Kenya, a 58% majority feels that free elections do not describe conditions in their country. That was before the presidential election in December, which was judged free and fair by European Union observers. Similarly, about half of Nigerians (52%) expressed a negative view of their country‘s elections, prior to the recent round of presidential balloting.

Despite the criticisms of elections, people in Kenya and Nigeria are upbeat about the recent political changes in those countries. Seven-in-ten people in Kenya and nearly eight-in-ten in Nigeria (78%) say they approve of the political changes that have taken place in their countries over the last five years. Among all of the nations surveyed, only in Uzbekistan (85%) and the Czech Republic (83%) is there as much support for recent political changes.

Most Feel They Have Religious Freedom

As is the case with people in other regions, Africans view religious freedom and an impartial judiciary as highly important. Large majorities in every African country surveyed, with the exception of Angola, say it is very important that they live in a society that permits freedom of religion. This strong support for religious freedom prevails in both largely Muslim countries – Mali, Senegal and Nigeria – and largely non-Muslim countries – South Africa and Kenya.

There is broad agreement among Africans that they currently have religious freedom. This is especially the case in Senegal (89%), the Ivory Coast (80%) and Mali (77%), nations that also placed the highest importance on religious liberty. Nigeria, which has a long history of religious violence, is the only country in which a significant minority (25%) says that religious freedom does not describe the country well. Muslims in Nigeria (30%) are slightly more likely than Christians (22%) to perceive a lack of religious freedom. But even in Nigeria, 74% give the country a positive rating for religious freedom.

In nearly every African country, about seven-in-ten respondents view an impartial judiciary as very important; the only exception is Angola, where only half (51%) of the public says this is very important. But relatively few Africans say that an impartial judiciary describes their countries very well.

Solid majorities in three African countries – Kenya (64%), Mali (62%) and Nigeria (59%) – give their countries‘ judicial systems negative ratings. In Nigeria, majorities of both Christians and Muslims say an impartial judiciary does not describe the country well. Substantial minorities in other African countries – at least three-in-ten – also feel they lack a fair judiciary.

Free Speech: Ideal vs. Reality

Like other civil liberties, freedom of speech is broadly supported in Africa. Majorities in every country view the freedom to openly criticize the government as very important. But perceptions of whether this freedom exists vary widely from country to country.

Fewer than one-in-ten Kenyans (8%) say that free speech describes Kenya very well, while two-thirds (66%) give the country a negative rating. Fewer than three-in-ten Nigerians (27%) believe their country performs very well in this area, while 44% say freedom of speech does not describe their country. At the other extreme, most of those in the Ivory Coast (55%) feel the country has freedom of speech, but that was prior to the outbreak of violence last year.

Freedom of the press also is highly valued in Africa. Majorities in nine of ten nations surveyed – all except Tanzania – say that living in a country with a free press is very important to them. Again, there is a gap between its perceived importance and whether the media is currently permitted to report the news free of censorship.

Most Africans feel their countries‘ media can operate freely to some extent, although relatively few give their countries very high ratings for press freedom. Kenyans and Tanzanians are the most negative in this regard. Just 14% in Kenya give their country high marks for press freedom, though nearly half (48%) believe the statement “the media can report the news without government censorship” describes their country at least somewhat well. In Tanzania, 22% say press freedom characterizes their country very well and 37% have a negative view of their country on this issue.

Majorities in seven of ten African countries surveyed say it is very important that the military be under the control of civilian leaders. Angola is a notable exception – 51% in that country say civilian control is not important.

But in every nation except Senegal and the Ivory Coast, substantially less than half the public says that civilian control of the military describes conditions in their country very well. Majorities in Uganda (58%) and Angola (56%), which have been devastated by civil wars, say the military forces in their countries are not under civilian control.

Corruption Widespread

More than in any other region of the world, official corruption is seen as widespread in many African countries. Fully 68% of respondents in Nigeria and 65% in Kenya say they have had to do a favor, give a gift or pay a bribe to a government official in the past year to get a service or document the government is supposed to provide. In Nigeria, 56% report this has occurred at least somewhat often, while 40% say that in Kenya.

Half of those in Angola (52%) and more than four-in-ten in Mali (44%), Tanzania (42%) and Uganda (40%) say they have had to offer a bribe to a government official at some point in the past year. Bribery is much less common in South Africa and Senegal; three-quarters of South Africans (76%) say they have not had to pay a bribe in the past year, as do 70% of Senegalese.