Still, Americans do not rank China’s emergence as a world power as the greatest threat to the U.S. More describe global issues such as Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs, Islamic extremist groups, international financial instability and drug-related violence in Mexico as major threats to the U.S. than describe the challenges posed by China this way.

When asked which countries in particular represent the greatest danger to the U.S., about a quarter of the public names China, more than cite any other country; 16% mention Iran and 13% volunteer that North Korea poses the greatest danger.

Like the general public, more retired military officers name China than name any other nation as the country that represents the greatest danger to the U.S. In contrast, Iran is cited more frequently than any other country by government officials, business and trade leaders and members of the news media. Scholars are evenly divided, with the same number volunteering China and Iran as the country that poses the greatest danger.

The experts surveyed generally express less concern than the public about China’s emergence as a world power. International financial instability tops the list of major threats across the five groups, but majorities in all of the groups also consider Islamic extremism and political instability in Pakistan a major threat to the U.S.

Global Threats

About half of Americans (52%) consider China’s emergence as a world power a major threat to the well-being of the United States, while 35% say it is a minor threat and 9% say it is not a threat. Compared with other possible international threats, however, China’s ascent does not rank among the public’s top concerns; at least six-in-ten see Iran’s nuclear program (70%), Islamic extremist groups (70%), North Korea’s nuclear program (69%), international financial instability (65%) and drug-related violence in Mexico (61%) as major threats to the U.S.

Older Americans and Republicans are especially concerned about China’s emergence as a world power. About six-in-ten people ages 50 to 64 (62%) and 65 or older (59%) consider this a major threat to the U.S., compared with 48% of 30- to 49-year-olds and 43% of people younger than 30. Similarly, 60% of Republicans consider the rise of China as a world power a major threat, while 48% of Democrats share this view.

With the exception of retired military officers, few among the expert groups surveyed consider China’s emergence as a world power a major threat. Fewer than a third of government officials, business and trade leaders, scholars and members of the news media see this as a threat, while 46% of former military officers express this view.

Across the five groups, international financial instability tops the list of concerns, with at least eight-in-ten saying this is a major threat to the U.S. Experts are also generally more concerned than the public about political instability in Pakistan, while drug-related violence in Mexico and North Korea’s nuclear program rank considerably lower as major threats among foreign affairs experts than among the general public.

China Seen as Country that Poses Greatest Danger

When asked which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more Americans volunteer China (26%) than name any other country. Iran, the country that receives the second-most mentions, is viewed as the greatest danger by 16% of the public, while 13% name North Korea.

In a January 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, more volunteered Iran than any other nation as the country that posed the greatest danger to the U.S.; 28% cited Iran, while 22% named China (see “Public Priorities: Deficit Rising, Terrorism Slipping,” released January 23, 2012, by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press).

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to name China as the greatest danger. About three-in-ten Republicans (31%) name China, compared with 21% of Democrats; 28% of independents offer this view. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats and independents to cite Iran as the country that poses the greatest danger to the U.S. (26% vs. 13% and 16%, respectively).

Opinions about which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S. vary across the five expert groups surveyed. Retired military officers are more likely than any other group to volunteer China; half do so, compared with fewer than three-in-ten among the other four groups; 38% of retired military officers cite Iran. Among scholars, the same number names China as cites Iran, while about twice as many business and trade leaders and members of the news media name Iran over China as the most dangerous nation. More in government also name Iran than any other country.

China’s Economic Strength

The public views China primarily as an economic threat rather than a military one; 59% are more troubled by China’s economic strength, while 28% say the country’s military strength is a greater concern.

College graduates are four times more likely to express concern about China’s economic strength than its military strength (70% vs. 16%), and those with some college experience are more than twice as likely to view China as an economic rather than a military threat (63% vs. 26%). Opinions are more divided among those with no more than a high school education; 49% are more concerned about China’s economy, while 38% see that country’s military strength as a greater threat.

Despite the public’s concern about China’s economic strength, majorities across the five expert groups see a positive outcome to the Asian nation’s growing economy. Majorities in all five groups believe China will become more democratic as a result of economic growth.

Debt, Trade Deficit and Loss of Jobs Top Concerns

Nearly eight-in-ten people (78%) say the large amount of American debt that is held by China is a very serious problem for the U.S.; majorities also consider the loss of U.S. jobs to China (71%) and the U.S. trade deficit with China (61%) to be very serious problems for their country.

Beyond these economic concerns, about half also see China’s impact on the global environment (50%), cyber attacks from China (50%), China’s growing military power (49%) and China’s policies on human rights (48%) as major problems. Just 27% express similar concern about tensions between China and Taiwan.

Republicans and independents are more concerned than Democrats about economic issues related to China. For example, while 71% of Republicans and 66% of independents say the U.S. trade deficit with China is a very serious problem, just over half of Democrats (54%) express similar concern. And while solid majorities across partisan groups see the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the large amount of American debt held by China as very serious, somewhat fewer Democrats say this is the case.

In contrast, Democrats and independents are considerably more likely than Republicans to say China’s impact on the global environment is a major problem; 54% of Democrats and 53% of independents share this view, compared with just 41% of Republicans.

For the most part, foreign affairs experts are far less concerned than the general public about issues related to China. For example, fewer than four-in-ten in each group say the loss of U.S. jobs to China, the U.S. trade deficit with China, China’s growing military power and China’s policies on human rights are very serious problems for the U.S.

Of the 11 issues tested, including three that were asked of the experts but not of the general public – China’s intellectual property infringement, territorial disputes over the South China Sea, and China’s exchange rate policy – only cyber attacks from China are considered a very serious problem by at least half across all five groups. Retired military officers are especially concerned about this, with nearly nine-in-ten saying it is a very serious problem. Majorities of retired military officers and business and trade leaders and half of government officials also see China’s intellectual property infringement as a major problem for the U.S.; about four-in-ten scholars and members of the news media express similar concern.

The speed at which pro-democracy movements have redefined the political landscape in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt is impressive. It harkens back to an equally dramatic wave of democratization that took place two decades ago with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire and its satellites. While the parallels between former Soviet bloc countries and Middle Eastern nations should not be overdrawn, the experience of Eastern Europe is a useful reminder that public enthusiasm for democracy is not guaranteed as political change extends over years and decades.

The Democratic Moment

When the Times Mirror Center (the predecessor to the Pew Research Center) conducted its first “Pulse of Europe” survey in the spring of 1991, Eastern European publics were widely enthusiastic about democracy. Across the region, sizable majorities approved of the change to a multiparty system of government. Two-thirds or more in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Ukraine backed the end of one-party rule. In Poland and Russia slightly smaller majorities shared this view.

Eastern Europeans looked forward to a day when democracy would make governments more accountable to the people. As of 1991, only a third or fewer believed that most elected officials cared about the opinion of people like themselves. Confidence that voting would make a difference was also far from universal. Only in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania did majorities feel that voting gave them a say in how government ran things.

Today, Egyptians and others in the Middle East appear to embrace the view that democracy can rescue the voice of the people and deliver government accountability. In a spring 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 60% or more among Egyptians, Jordanians and Lebanese said democracy was preferable to other forms of government.

Three years earlier, large majorities in these countries said it was important to live in a country characterized by competitive elections, an impartial judiciary, uncensored media and the freedom to openly criticize the government.

Now that Mubarak has resigned, activists continue to rally in the Egyptian capital. Some appear dedicated to keeping up public pressure so that political reforms are actually put in place. Whether the broader public shares this level of commitment to political change remains to be seen.

The Long Road to Political Reform

For many East Europeans, the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union also ushered in a time of promise and hope. In subsequent years, however, euphoria over democratization gave way to more circumspect opinions about political reform. In part this reflected the difficult, and destabilizing, adjustments imposed by the shift to market economies as well as multiparty systems.

In 1991, majorities of Russians and Ukrainians clearly favored democracy, rather than a strong leader, as the best way to address their country’s problems. By 2002 opinion had reversed, with two-thirds or more in each country saying they preferred a strong leader. In Poland and Bulgaria views were mixed on the issue, while publics in the Czech Republic and Slovakia continued to strongly support democracy.

Seven years on, doubts about democracy persisted. The fall 2009 Global Attitudes survey found Russians and Ukrainians still believing that a strong leader was the best means of solving their country’s problems. Bulgarians now shared this view. In most countries half or more approved of the shift to a multi-party system. But the level of support declined between 1991 and 2009 in all but Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Ukraine, a majority actually disapproved of the change to multiple parties.

These findings do not mean that East Europeans were inclined to abandon democracy. Publics across the region broadly endorsed the demise of communism. Rather these opinions point to the gap between what East Europeans hoped for and what they perceived in terms of political change. On one hand, East Europeans generally agreed that two decades of political and economic change had disproportionately benefited business owners and politicians, rather than ordinary people. On the other, many East Europeans felt democratization had yet to match expectations. In 2009, the median percentage in each country who said a fair judiciary, multiparty elections, uncensored media, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and civilian control of the military were very important significantly exceeded the median percentage who claimed these institutions described their country very well.

That many East Europeans today still see an unfinished political transition suggests that the sprint toward democracy in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere in the Middle East is the first leg of a much longer endurance test. Activists and new leaders in countries such as Egypt will inevitably face the challenge of managing public expectations when it comes to the pace and extent of political reform. The experience of Eastern Europe indicates that even when the idea of democracy is broadly embraced, public enthusiasm for political change can be difficult to sustain.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

America’s image abroad remains negative in most nations, though it has improved somewhat in Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Vast majorities in predominantly Muslim countries continue to hold unfavorable opinions of the U.S, though the intensity of anti-American views has moderated.

Opinion of the U.S. in Russia is now about evenly divided, with 47% favorable and 44% unfavorable. Positive views of the U.S. in Russia have risen 11 points in the past year. But U.S. favorability ratings in France and Germany are somewhat lower than last year and there has been a larger decline in Great Britain (58% now, 70% last year). Young people in Great Britain, France, and Germany have more negative views of America than do people in other age groups.

Majorities in the Muslim nations surveyed hold negative views of the United States, though opinion has softened. In all four of these nations, fewer respondents hold very unfavorable opinions of the U.S. now than did so last year. For example, 45% in Turkey now hold a very unfavorable opinion of the U.S., down from 68% last May. There have been comparable declines in intense dislike of the U.S. in Pakistan and Jordan. Strong dislike of the U.S. moderated in Morocco as well, though not as much as in the other Muslim nations surveyed.

An important factor in world opinion about America is the perception that the U.S. acts internationally without taking account of the interests of other nations. Large majorities in every nation surveyed (except the U.S.) believe that America pays little or no attention to their country’s interests in making its foreign policy decisions. This opinion is most prevalent in France (84%), Turkey (79%) and Jordan (77%), but even in Great Britain 61% say the U.S. pays little or no attention to British interests.

In every country except Jordan, there is a strong association between the belief that the U.S. ignores their country in making foreign policy decisions and one’s overall opinion of the U.S. (opinions in Jordan are uniformly negative).

By contrast, 70% of Americans think the U.S. takes other nations’ interests into account a great deal (34%) or a fair amount (36%); just 27% think the U.S. is mostly unconcerned with other nations. Republicans are nearly unanimous (85%) in the view that American foreign policy takes other nations into account, while a much smaller majority of Democrats agree (56%).

Europeans’ Favorable View of American People

European publics draw a clear distinction between the U.S. as a nation and the American people. Opinion about Americans remains quite favorable in Great Britain, Germany and Russia. A majority of French also have a positive opinion of Americans (53%), but that represents a significant decline compared with two years ago (71%). In the Muslim countries surveyed, however, attitudes toward Americans are nearly as negative as views of the U.S.

In Morocco, favorable opinion of Americans has declined by 17 percentage points since last May; in Pakistan the decline was 13 points. Opinion was stable in Turkey (32% favorable) and Jordan (21%). But as recently as 2002, about half of Jordanians (53%) expressed a positive opinion of Americans.

U.S. Views of Europe

The American public’s views of France and Germany, which had turned sharply negative after those nations refused to back the war in Iraq, moderated slightly in the new poll but remain much lower than they were in 2002. U.S. opinion of Great Britain has declined somewhat over the past year, though it remains largely favorable.

A third of Americans (33%) have a favorable view of France, up slightly from 29% last May. And the percentage with a very unfavorable view of France dropped from 36% to 24% in the current survey. Nearly twice as many Democrats (42%) as Republicans (22%) have a favorable view of France. Half of Americans now have a favorable view of Germany, up from 44% last year. But this remains far below the 83% positive rating for Germany two years ago.

More than seven-in-ten Americans (73%) have a favorable opinion of Great Britain, down from 82% in May 2003. The percentage who expresses a very favorable view has also declined over that period, from 49% to 33%.

American views of the European Union are more favorable than unfavorable, though many in the U.S. have not formed an impression of the EU. Overall, 39% have a favorable impression, while 26% have an unfavorable view; 35% have no opinion. Views of the EU are largely unchanged since a poll taken in early September 2001, shortly before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

U.S.-European Partnership Questioned

Despite disagreements with many traditional U.S. allies over the war in Iraq, a majority of Americans (55%) continue to believe that the partnership between the U.S. and Western Europe should remain as close as it has been. Only 36% think the U.S. should take a more independent approach. Opinion is essentially unchanged from the survey taken in May 2003. Only about a quarter of liberal Democrats (24%) favor looser security and diplomatic ties with Europe, compared with 44% of conservative Republicans.

But most people in the European nations polled, including Great Britain, believe that Western Europe should chart a more independent course in its approach to security and diplomatic affairs. In Great Britain, just 40% favor keeping the relationship as close as in the past, down from 51% at the conclusion of the war in Iraq last year. In Germany, more than six-in-ten (63%) favor a more independent approach, up from 57% last year. And three-quarters of the French feel this way, about the same as last year. Smaller majorities in both Russia (56%) and Turkey (60%) favor a more independent approach.

Moreover, half or more of the public in each of the five European nations surveyed say it would be a good thing if the European Union becomes as powerful as the United States. This idea has nearly universal support in France (90% good thing), and is widely embraced in Germany (70%), Russia (67%) and Turkey (67%). Half of the British also believe it would be a good thing if the EU becomes as powerful as the U.S.

Among those favoring a more powerful EU, majorities in every country say they would continue to take this position even if it means that Europe would have to pay the costs of taking greater responsibility for international problems.

Just a third of Americans say it would be a good thing for the EU to become as powerful as the U.S. About the same number of Democrats (33%) and Republicans (28%) say a powerful EU would be a good thing; the greatest support for the idea is found among independents, who are evenly divided on the question (43% say it would be good, 45% say it would be bad).

The EU itself is generally well regarded in Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey, with majorities in each country expressing a positive opinion. People in Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan express more negative than positive opinions about the EU: Jordan (75% negative/17% positive), Morocco (50% to 41%), and Pakistan (33% to 19%).

Less Enthusiasm for a Bipolar World

Although many Europeans view a more powerful EU as a positive thing, there is less enthusiasm for the notion of another country becoming as powerful as the United States. Majorities or pluralities in seven nations, including the U.S., believe that the world would be a more dangerous place if there was another country that was equal in power to the U.S.

France is the only country surveyed in which a majority (54%) believes the world would be safer if another country rivaled the power of the U.S. In Great Britain, people are evenly divided on this question (42% safer place/43% more dangerous). But majorities in Morocco (65%), Pakistan (61%) and Jordan (53%) say the world would be more dangerous if a rival to the U.S. were to emerge.

Mixed Views of the U.N.

Overall opinion of the United Nations varies widely. Solid majorities in the Western European nations surveyed have a favorable view of the U.N., but Americans are somewhat less positive (55%).

But people in Muslim nations, with the exception of Turkey, have a much more negative opinion of the United Nations. More than seven-in-ten Jordanians (73%) and nearly as many Moroccans (65%) express an unfavorable opinion of the U.N. In Pakistan, opinion of the U.N. in Pakistan is less negative (27%), but 38% did not offer an opinion.

Majorities in Great Britain, France, and Germany say that their nation should obtain U.N. approval before using military force to deal with an international threat, but opinion is divided in the other countries surveyed. Eight-in-ten Germans support the idea of obtaining U.N. approval, rejecting the notion that such a process would make it too difficult for their nation to deal with international threats. Large majorities in Great Britain (64%) and France (63%) also express this view.

But the publics in the other nations in the poll are more skeptical about such a role for the U.N. Views are almost equally divided in Russia (37% favor the idea of U.N. approval, 41% oppose it), Turkey (45%-44%), Morocco (42%-42%), and Pakistan (38%-34%). Though not a majority, more in Jordan favor getting U.N. approval (47%) than oppose it (38%).

In the United States, a 48% plurality believes that getting U.N. approval for the use of force would make it too difficult to respond to international threats, while 41% believe such approval should be obtained. The public divides sharply along political lines on this question; a majority of Democrats (57%) support getting U.N. approval for the use of military force, while most Republicans (70%) are opposed.

America Still the Land of Opportunity?

Americans strongly believe that their country remains a place where people seeking a better life can find one, but people elsewhere are not convinced of this. The U.S. public is nearly unanimous (88%) in its belief that people who move to the U.S. from other countries have a better life here. About half of Russians (53%) agree that people who move from Russia to the U.S. have a better life. In Great Britain, 41% think those who have left for the U.S. lead a better life there (only 6% think they are worse off), but just 24% in France and 14% in Germany agree.

By more than two-to-one, people in Turkey say those who have moved from their country to the U.S. have a better life (50%-19%). Moroccans, on balance, share this view. But respondents in Jordan and Pakistan are divided over whether people in their country who move to the U.S. have a better or worse life.

In each of the countries surveyed, people’s satisfaction with their own nation is unrelated to how they feel about America as a destination for immigrants. People who are satisfied with the way things are going at home, and those who are unsatisfied, have similar views on the lives of their fellow citizens who move to the U.S.

British Support for Iraq War Falls

For the most part, people in the nine countries surveyed continue to support their government’s decision regarding the Iraq war, and this is especially the case in countries that did not participate in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.

But there has been a striking change in opinion on this issue in Great Britain, the most important U.S. ally in the conflict. Just 43% of the British believe their country made the right decision to use military force against Iraq, down sharply from 61% last May.

In the United States, support for the war also has fallen 14 points in that period (from 74% to 60%), but the American public has consistently been more supportive of military action in Iraq than have the British. In the U.S., support for the war declined last summer and has remained in the low-60% range since then, aside from an uptick following the capture of Saddam Hussein.

As in past surveys, American attitudes on the war in Iraq are split along partisan lines. Republicans continue to overwhelmingly believe the war was the right decision (86%-9%). Half of Democrats think the war was the wrong decision, while 40% believe it was the right decision. Independents support the decision to go to war (60%-35%).

Westerners See Iraqis As Better Off

Publics in the surveyed countries have a mixed picture of progress in Iraq. Solid majorities in the U.S. and Western Europe – and a growing minority in Morocco – believe that the Iraqi people will be better off in the long run with Saddam Hussein removed from power. But there also is broad agreement that it will not be possible to establish a stable government in Iraq in the next 12 months.

By roughly eight-to-one, Americans and British believe the Iraqi people will be better off, not worse off, now that Hussein has departed from the scene. And by more than two-to-one, publics in Germany and France – who overwhelmingly back their governments’ stance in opposing the war – believe the Iraqi people will benefit in the long run with Hussein gone. In Russia, by contrast, just 31% feel the Iraqi people will be better off. (See overview)

On balance, publics in the four predominantly Muslim countries surveyed think the Iraqi people will be worse off now that Hussein has gone. But there has been a notable shift on this issue in Morocco, and somewhat smaller changes in Jordan and Turkey.

Last year, only about one-in-four Moroccans (24%) felt Iraqis would be better off with Hussein out of power; today, 37% express that view. Somewhat more Jordanians and Turks also say this than did so last year, although majorities in both countries feel the Iraqi people will be worse off with Hussein removed from power.

In all nine countries surveyed, there is little optimism that a stable government can be formed in Iraq in the next 12 months. Just 13% of Americans say this will occur, compared with 83% who believe the task will take longer than a year. Even fewer French (6%), Germans (6%) and Britons (8%) think a stable government in Iraq can be formed in a year or less. Among surveyed nations, only in Jordan does a substantial minority (33%) believe that a stable government can be formed in Iraq in the next 12 months.

More broadly, people in the surveyed countries are skeptical that the war and Hussein’s removal will foster the spread of democracy in the Middle East. Americans are relatively optimistic in this regard – 50% think the region will become somewhat more democratic while 9% say it will become much more democratic. But that view is not shared widely elsewhere, and in several countries there has been a significant decrease in the percentage saying the region will become more democratic. Fewer than half of Germans (48%) say the region will become even somewhat more democratic, down from 67% last May. Declines are comparable in France (15 points) and Great Britain (13 points).

U.N. Role in Iraq Favored

The prevailing view in six of the nine countries surveyed is that the United Nations, not the U.S. and its allies, would do the best job in helping the Iraqi people form a stable government. Roughly eight-in-ten in Germany (84%), France (82%) and Great Britain (82%) express this view.

Fewer than one-in-five in any of the Muslim countries surveyed feel the U.S. and its allies are best able to help establish a stable government in Iraq. But in Jordan and Morocco, pluralities volunteer that neither the U.S. and its allies nor the U.N. can do best in helping Iraqis form a stable government (49% Jordan, 34% Morocco). This is consistent with the low regard people in both countries have for the U.N: 73% of Jordanians and 65% of Moroccans have an unfavorable opinion of the United Nations.

The American public is split along partisan lines over this question. Overall, 46% believe the U.N. can do the best job of establishing a stable government in Iraq, while 42% say the U.S. and its allies. Republicans, by more than two-to-one (66%-29%) think the U.S. and its allies can do best in helping the Iraqis establish a stable government. By nearly as wide a margin (59%-24%), Democrats feel the United Nations can do best in this task.

Rebuilding Efforts Poorly Rated

Outside of the United States, people in the surveyed countries give the U.S. and its allies poor marks for addressing the needs of the Iraqi people as they rebuild the country. Even among Americans, there has been a decline in the percentage who rates those efforts as excellent or good (50% now, 59% in May 2003).

Fewer people in Great Britain and France also give the allies a positive rating for addressing the needs of the Iraqi people as they rebuild the country. In Great Britain, just 30% rate those efforts as excellent or good, down from 41% last year; there has been a comparable decline in France (35% now, 45% last year).

There has been a modest rise in the number of Jordanians who say the U.S. and the allies have done at least a good job in this regard; 27% express that view now, compared with 17% a year ago. Still, most Jordanians (65%) say the allies have done a fair or poor job in addressing the needs of Iraqis in the rebuilding effort. Fewer than one-in-five in the other Muslim nations surveyed – Turkey (16%), Morocco (16%) and Pakistan (10%) – believe the U.S. and its allies have done a good job in meeting the needs of the Iraqi people.

War Hurt Terrorism Fight

In every country except the United States more people say the war in Iraq has hurt the fight against terrorism than say it has helped.² Fully two-thirds of Moroccans (67%) say military action in Iraq has done more harm than good in this regard, as do solid majorities in Germany (58%), Pakistan (57%), Turkey (56%) and France (55%).

Even in Great Britain, 50% say the war in Iraq hurt the broader struggle against terrorism while just 36% say it helped the war on terrorism. As on other questions related to Iraq, Americans take a very different view. By more than two-to-one (62%-28%), Americans say the war in Iraq helped, not hurt the war on terror.

Republicans overwhelmingly believe the war in Iraq helped the war on terrorism (82%) as do most independents (62%). Democrats are divided on this issue: 46% say the war helped in the overall fight against terrorism while 42% disagree.

Confidence in U.S. Undermined

At least half the people in countries other than the U.S. say as a result of the war in Iraq they have less confidence that the United States is trustworthy. Similarly, majorities in all eight of these countries say they have less confidence that the U.S. wants to promote democracy globally.

The erosion of confidence in the U.S. – in its trustworthiness and its commitment to promote democracy – is particularly apparent in Germany and France. Compared with the other countries surveyed, more people in Germany and France say as a consequence of the war they have less confidence that the U.S. is trustworthy (82% Germany, 78% France).

And nearly eight-in-ten French respondents (78%) – a higher percentage than any other country surveyed – say that because of the war they have less confidence that the U.S. is intent on promoting democracy around the world. Seven-in-ten Germans agree.

The British express more confidence in the United States on these issues than do people in other nations, with about four-in-ten (41%) saying that as a consequence of the war they have more confidence that the U.S. wants to promote democracy globally; slightly more British (45%) say they have less confidence that the U.S. is intent on promoting democracy. But the British take a far more negative view of U.S. trustworthiness. Just 24% say they have more confidence that the U.S. is trustworthy as a result of the war while 58% say they have less confidence.

WMD Claims…

In that regard, solid majorities in six of the nine countries surveyed say that U.S. and British leaders’ prewar assertions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were made mostly because the leaders “lied to provide a reason for invading Iraq,” rather than because the leaders “were themselves misinformed by bad intelligence.”

This view is most pervasive in France – more than eight-in-ten respondents (82%) say U.S. and British leaders mostly lied in claiming Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Yet it also is widely held in Germany (69%), Jordan (69%), Turkey (66%) and Russia (61%). And even in Great Britain, roughly four-in-ten (41%) express the opinion that the leaders mostly lied, while somewhat more (48%) say they were mostly misinformed by bad intelligence.

Moreover, the dominant view among respondents who believe that U.S. and British leaders lied in their prewar weapons claims is that the leaders knew Iraq had no weapons, rather than that they chose to believe only the intelligence that bolstered their case for war. Half of all respondents in France say that the U.S. knew that Iraq had no weapons, and roughly four-in-ten in Turkey (44%), Pakistan (43%) and Russia (40%) also believe that U.S. and British leaders knew that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction.

Americans, by contrast, are much more inclined to give leaders of the two countries the benefit of the doubt in the WMD controversy. About half (49%) attribute the erroneous claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction to bad intelligence, while 31% say it was mostly because the U.S. and British leaders lied. Relatively few Americans (9%) say U.S. and British leaders knew that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction prior to the war.

As might be expected, this issue is politically divisive: most Republicans (65%) say U.S. and British leaders were mostly misinformed by bad intelligence while a plurality of Democrats (48%) thinks the leaders mostly lied to provide a rationale for the war.

Little ‘Shock and Awe’

In the United States, people overwhelmingly believe the war in Iraq showed the American military to be stronger than they expected. But that view is not widely shared elsewhere – majorities in Germany (61%), Turkey (56%) and France (53%) say that the war in Iraq showed the U.S. to be weaker than they expected.

However, nearly half of those in Morocco and Jordan (48%, 47%) say the U.S. military showed itself to be stronger as a result of the war. A plurality in Great Britain (46%) also views the U.S. military as stronger as a consequence of the war. Even so, about a third of British respondents (32%) say the U.S. military was weaker than they anticipated.

Flagging Support for Terrorism War

While support for the war on terrorism remains firm in America, opposition to U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism are significant in many of the European and Muslim nations surveyed.

In France, nearly as many say they oppose the US-led war on terrorism (47%) as favor it (50%), while 55% in Germany support the war on terrorism. In both France and Germany, this reflects a continuing decline in public support for the war on terrorism over the past two years. Among the French, support for U.S. terrorism policies dropped from 75% in the summer of 2002 to 60% following the war in Iraq to 50% today. The pattern in Germany is similar (from 70% to 60% to 55% over the same time period).

Clear majorities in Jordan (78%), Morocco (66%), Pakistan (60%) and Turkey (56%) oppose America’s war on terrorism. Opposition to the anti-terrorism campaign in these countries is not as universal as it was last year, but remains widespread. For example, in Jordan, fully 97% opposed the war on terrorism immediately after the war last May, with just 2% in favor. Today, 78% still oppose the U.S. on this front, but 12% are in favor.

Aside from the United States, support for the war on terrorism is strongest in Great Britain and Russia. The British favor the war on terrorism by a 63% to 30% margin, and the Russians by an even stronger 73% to 20% margin, nearly as high as the 81% support for the war on terrorism in the U.S. In contrast with France and Germany, British support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism has remained relatively stable over the past two years. In Russia, support for the American war on terrorism dropped significantly immediately following the war, but support has surged 22 points over the past year.

U.S. Overreacting

Public support and opposition to U.S. anti-terrorism policies are closely linked to evaluations of the seriousness of the terrorist threat. In the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia, where majorities favor the war on terrorism, most people believe the U.S. is right to be so concerned about the threat of international terrorism. In Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and Morocco, where most oppose the war on terrorism, the prevailing view is that the U.S. is overreacting to the terrorist threat.

In France and Germany, there has been a sharp rise in the number of people who say the U.S. is overreacting to the threat of terrorism, which is consistent with the decline in support for the war on terrorism. The percentage of French respondents who believe the U.S. has reacted excessively to the terrorist threat has nearly doubled since April 2002 (from 30% to 57%). The shift among Germans has been less pronounced, though substantial (from 33% to 49%). Even in Great Britain, the proportion saying the U.S. has overreacted has risen from 20% to 33% over the past two years.

U.S. Motives Questioned

Majorities in six of the nine countries surveyed do not believe that the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. And even in Russia and Great Britain, where there is strong support for the fight against terrorism, many people are skeptical of U.S. motives.

By more than two-to-one (65%-29%), Germans doubt the sincerity of the U.S.-led war on terrorism; the margin is nearly as large in France (61%-35%). There is even more skepticism of the motives for the war on terrorism in predominantly Muslim countries. By wide margins, the publics of Turkey, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan question America’s sincerity in this effort. In Pakistan, just 6% see the effort as a genuine attempt to reduce international terrorism, while 58% say it is not.

A narrow majority of British respondents (51%) say the war on terrorism is a sincere effort by the U.S. to counter international terrorism while 41% disagree. Most Russians support the war on terrorism, but nearly half of Russians (48%) say it is not a sincere attempt to reduce international terrorism.

Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe the war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce the threat while 25% disagree. By about ten-to-one (88%-9%), Republicans view the war on terrorism as a genuine attempt to reduce terrorism, but Democrats are somewhat divided – 52% say it is a sincere anti-terrorism effort, 38% disagree.

It’s About Oil

When people who express doubts about U.S. sincerity in the terrorism effort are asked about other possible reasons for the war on terrorism, oil is mentioned most often as a U.S. motive for the policy. Majorities in seven of the nine nations surveyed believe that controlling Mideast oil supplies is an important reason why the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism. This view is not only widespread in Jordan (71%), Morocco (63%) and Pakistan (54%), but also in Turkey (64%), Germany (60%) and France (58%).

While Russians strongly back the war on terrorism, half of Russians (51%) say controlling oil is an important U.S. motivation. Great Britain and the U.S., where relatively few doubt America’s sincerity in the first place, are the only countries where relatively small minorities hold this opinion (33% in Great Britain, 18% in U.S.).

Majorities in five of the nine countries surveyed say that the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism in order to dominate the world. This view is particularly widespread in Jordan (61%), Turkey (61%) and Morocco (60%). But roughly half of the French (53%) and Germans (47%) also believe that world domination is an important factor in the U.S. fight against terrorism.

Large percentages of people in predominantly Muslim countries also believe the anti-terrorism effort is driven by the desire of the U.S. to protect Israel. Seven-in-ten Jordanians hold this view, about as many as see the war as an attempt by the United States to control oil in the Middle East (71%). A majority of people in Morocco (54%) and slightly fewer in Turkey (45%) and Pakistan (44%) also see protecting Israel as an important reason for America’s actions.

About half of respondents in the four Muslim countries surveyed – and roughly four-in-ten in France and Germany – also say the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism to target unfriendly Muslim governments and groups. For the most part, however, this is not mentioned as frequently by Muslim publics as other possible U.S. motives. In Jordan, for example, 53% say the U.S. is waging the war to target unfriendly Muslim governments; significantly more Jordanians see the anti-terrorism campaign driven by America’s desire to control oil supplies in the Middle East and to protect Israel.

Mideast Sympathies

The nine countries surveyed fall into three main groups when it comes to opinion about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. In the United States, there is significantly more sympathy for Israel than for the Palestinians – by a margin of roughly four-to-one (46% vs. 12%). This has been the case fairly consistently over the past decade.

In Russia, Germany, Great Britain and France, public opinion is much more divided, with a large proportion sympathizing with neither side. In Russia, 23% side with Israel, 14% with the Palestinians and a plurality of 34% say they sympathize with neither side. Sympathy for the Palestinian position has declined somewhat among the French. Two years ago, 36% sided with the Palestinians in the conflict. Today 28% do, while support for Israel has remained unchanged. German and British attitudes on the conflict have remained largely unchanged from two years ago.

In the predominantly Muslim nations surveyed, people side with the Palestinians over Israel by lop-sided margins. In Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco, virtually no one sides with Israel. Opinion in Turkey is somewhat less uniform, though people sympathize with the Palestinians by about ten-to-one (63%-6%); 16% of Turks say they sympathize with neither side in the conflict.

Justifying Suicide Bombings

Generally, people in the largely Muslim nations surveyed are divided over whether suicide bombings and other violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam against its enemies. Fully three-quarters of those interviewed in Turkey (76%) say such attacks are rarely or never justified. But more people in Pakistan and Morocco say suicide attacks in the defense of Islam are justifiable: roughly four-in-ten in each country say these attacks are often or sometimes justified (41% Pakistan, 40% Morocco).

There is broader agreement that suicide attacks in specific circumstances – against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq, and by Palestinians against Israeli citizens – are justified. Large majorities in Jordan (70%) and Morocco (66%) believe suicide bombings carried out against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Nearly half of those in Pakistan agree (46%), while 36% say such attacks are not justifiable. In Turkey, most respondents (59%) feel attacks against Americans in Iraq are not justified, but about three-in-ten (31%) say that they are.

A similar pattern is evident in opinion on the question of whether suicide bombings by Palestinians against Israelis are justified. Support for this idea is especially widespread in Jordan and Morocco, where 86% and 74%, respectively, condone Palestinian suicide attacks. As with attacks against Americans in Iraq, Pakistanis are more divided, with 47% saying Palestinian bombings are justifiable, and 36% saying they are not. In Turkey, the weight of public opinion is against Palestinian violence – 24% say Palestinian suicide bombings are justifiable, while two-thirds say they are not.

There is little evidence of a generational divide among Muslims in opinion about the U.S. or the use of violence against Americans. In Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco, older people are just as likely as the young to view America unfavorably, and are just as likely to say that suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. In Pakistan, people age 50 and older express somewhat greater hostility toward American than those under age 50. Six-in-ten older Pakistanis say suicide attacks against Americans in Iraq are justifiable, compared with just 44% of those who are younger.

In Turkey and Pakistan, there is a significant gender gap in attitudes toward suicide attacks. In both countries, men are roughly twice as likely as women to say such violence against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq is justifiable. Four-in-ten Turkish men take this view, compared with 22% of Turkish women, and 61% of Pakistani men vs. 29% of Pakistani women. But in Jordan and Morocco, both men and women agree, in equal parts, that suicide bombing is justifiable.

Bin Laden Popular in Pakistan

Osama bin Laden is viewed with almost universal disdain throughout the European nations surveyed as well as in Turkey. But bin Laden is regarded favorably by 65% of Pakistanis and by 55% of Jordanians. Moroccans are divided in their views, with 45% favorable and 42% unfavorable.

Polarized Views of World Leaders

Majorities in every country surveyed except the U.S. have an unfavorable opinion of President Bush, with negative ratings ranging from 57% in Great Britain (with 39% favorable) to 85% negative in both France and Germany. Six-in-ten have an unfavorable view of Bush in Russia, and two-thirds (67%) feel this way in Turkey. Feelings about Bush are nearly unanimously negative in Jordan (96% unfavorable) and Morocco (90%), and are nearly as low in Pakistan (67% unfavorably, 7% favorable, 25% no opinion).

Opinion of Prime Minister Tony Blair is divided in his own country, with 51% of the British giving Blair a favorable rating and 47% rating him unfavorably. Americans, even many who disapprove of Bush, view Blair in a positive light. Although Blair has faced considerable criticism at home, American impressions of the British prime minister have only improved. Three-quarters of Americans have a favorable impression of Blair, up from 68% last April.

In other countries, Blair’s image is only somewhat more positive than Bush’s. Solid majorities in France, Germany and Turkey rate Blair unfavorably, and, as with Bush, tiny minorities in Jordan, Pakistan, or Morocco view him favorably. Russian opinion about the British leader is evenly divided (36% positive, 37% negative).

French President Jacques Chirac is well regarded in his own country (60% favorable, 40% unfavorable), and gets even better ratings in Germany (70% favorable), as well as Russia and Morocco (63% favorable). But just as the French generally view Bush and Blair unfavorably, just a quarter of Americans and 37% of the British have a favorable opinion of Chirac.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is widely unknown, with a third or more in every country except Pakistan giving no opinion. Pakistanis expressed highly favorable opinions of their president; 86% rate him favorably, and 60% view him very favorably, by far the highest rating of any leader in the survey. Views of Musharraf are more positive than negative in Turkey, and are about evenly divided in Britain, the U.S., Russia, and Jordan. Negative opinion of Musharraf is strongest in France, Germany, and Morocco.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan is well regarded in most of the nations surveyed, with majorities expressing a favorable opinion of Annan in France (79%), Germany (74%), Great Britain (65%), and Russia (53%). Opinion is more positive than negative in the U.S. (42% favorable to 23% unfavorable), Turkey (43% to 36%), and Pakistan (29% to 21%), though many have no opinion about the U.N. leader in these nations. But these favorable reviews are not universal. Majorities rate the U.N. leader unfavorably in both Jordan (54%) and Morocco (78%).

In Latin America and Asia, many countries have moved to freely elected governments only in the past 20 years. Democratization in Africa has taken hold even more slowly, hindered by authoritarian regimes, wars and enormous social problems. And it has yet to fully emerge in most of the Middle East.

What unites the people of these regions is that, for the most part, they highly value political rights and civil liberties. But there is a definite disconnect between their democratic aspirations and their perceptions of day-to-day reality. While people everywhere want honest elections, a fair judiciary and a free press, they often complain that their own country lacks these building blocks of democracy.

However, global attitudes on democracy and civil liberties are hardly uniform. Majorities in most countries say it is very important to live in a country that has honest multiparty elections. But there are several notable exceptions, including Russia, South Korea and Indonesia. And in general, people around the world value an impartial judiciary above honest elections or other aspects of democracy.³

In Eastern Europe, there is clear evidence that the political mindset formed during decades of communist rule has yet to completely dissipate. Significant percentages in Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, in particular, continue to disapprove of the political changes that have taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Solid majorities in every Eastern European country surveyed, with the exception of the Czech Republic, believe a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. In other economically struggling regions such as Latin America and Africa, people are much more likely to view a good democracy as more important than a strong economy.

The analysis in this section proceeds through 35 democratizing countries in four regions – Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. The Middle East/Conflict Area is covered in the chapter entitled “Muslim Opinion on Government and Social Issues”. The Pew Global Attitudes Project pays particular attention to issues in Eastern Europe because of the dramatic changes there over the past 15 years, and the benchmark Pulse of Europe survey that Pew conducted in the region in 1991. To allow for trend comparisons, the German survey updates attitudes on democracy in former East Germany and former West Germany.

I: Eastern Europe

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later, Eastern Europeans began a rocky transition from one-party rule and a command economy to democracy and a free market system. More than a decade later, support for this transformation remains uneven.

Barely half of those in Ukraine (50%), Bulgaria (49%), and Russia (47%) say they approve of the political changes in their country since the fall of communism. While modest, this represents significant growth in support for political change in Russia and Ukraine since 1991 when, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, only about a third in each country endorsed the move toward democratic rule. But in Bulgaria, the number endorsing these political changes has fallen significantly over the past 11 years (from 60% to 49%).

By contrast, solid majorities in the Czech Republic (83%), the Slovak Republic (69%) and Poland (62%) welcome the political changes of the post-communist era, as they have from the beginning. In 1991, majorities in the Czech Republic (74%) and Poland (64%) and half of those surveyed in the Slovak Republic (48%) said that they approved of the political changes that were then just underway.

To the extent that there is still dissatisfaction with changes since 1989, it is rooted in the economic hardship of the transition. The Pew Global Attitudes survey reveals that most Eastern Europeans say the gap between rich and poor in their country has gotten worse, not better, over the last five years. More than eight-in-ten in every country except Ukraine say inequality has grown in their country.

Economic concerns appear to be fueling political dissatisfaction. In every Eastern European country, those with high incomes are more likely than those with low incomes to approve of recent political changes. In Bulgaria, for example, less than a third (31%) of those with the lowest incomes approve of the recent political changes, compared with 83% of those in the high-income bracket.

Young Favor Changes More

Disapproval of political change in Eastern Europe is greater among older Eastern Europeans and those with less education. In Russia, about six-in-ten (59%) of those age 60 or older disapprove of the changes since 1991, compared with just a third (35%) of those aged 18 to 34. In Bulgaria, 62% of those age 60 and older disapprove of the changes since then, compared with 35% of those under age 35. This generation gap exists in every Eastern European country except the Czech Republic, where approval of recent political change is extraordinarily high among both old and young.

In addition, respondents with a primary school education or lower are much more likely to disapprove of political changes than those who have attended some college. This relationship is true in every country except Ukraine.

Civil Liberties Backed, Less So in Russia

Eastern Europeans embrace political rights and civil liberties, yet they generally place a lower value on such democratic ideals than do people in other nascent democracies or well-established Western democracies. Russians, in particular, give low priority to political rights and liberties. Overall, Russians are less likely than other Eastern Europeans to say that it is very important to live in a society that affords freedom of speech, honest multiparty elections, religious freedom, a free press, and a fair judiciary.

Half or more respondents in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, the Slovak Republic, former East Germany and Ukraine say that it is very important to them that “honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties.” Far fewer people in Russia take the same position (37%), although most Russians say it is at least somewhat important that they live in a country with honest multiparty elections (40% somewhat important).

When Eastern European attitudes are compared to the views of people in former West Germany, an East-West political-values gap emerges. Russians give lowest priority to democratic ideals, former West Germans the highest, with other Eastern Europeans in between.

More than eight-in-ten people in former West Germany (83%) say that honest multiparty elections are very important to them. In Eastern Europe, Slovaks and Czechs place the greatest emphasis on free elections. Aside from Russians, Poles and Bulgarians are least likely to say honest multiparty elections are important to them.

Impartial Judiciary Favored

Eastern Europeans place the greatest value on a fair judicial system. Solid majorities in every country in the region say that it is very important that they live in a society with a judicial system that treats everyone the same. This sentiment is particularly strong among Czechs (84%), former East Germans (84%), Bulgarians (79%) and Ukrainians (82%).

Even here, however, there is a modest gap between East and West. Former West Germans (87%) still place a higher value on a fair judiciary than do Russians, Poles, Bulgarians, Ukrainians or Slovaks. Only the Czechs and former East Germans share the former West Germans’ level of concern for honest judges.

But there is broad agreement across the region that the goal of an independent judiciary is not being achieved. Majorities in every eastern European country – with the notable exception of former East Germany – say the phrase “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” does not describe their country well. Just 5% in Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics say this describes their country very well.

Religious and Press Freedom Backed

Religious freedom is viewed as most important in Eastern European countries where the Catholic and Orthodox Churches have a strong presence: Poland (62% very important), the Slovak Republic (60%) and Ukraine (55%). In Russia, where atheism was official doctrine under communism, notably fewer respondents (35%) say religious freedom is very important to them.

The Global Attitudes survey also asks whether religion is a matter of personal faith that should be kept separate from government policy. In every country in Eastern Europe, regardless of their religious tradition, large majorities agree that religion is a purely private matter.

But Eastern Europeans differ over the importance of freedom of the press. A free press is as highly valued by Czechs (71% very important), Slovaks (66%) and Ukrainians (64%) as by former West Germans (65%). Solid majorities in each of these countries say it is very important that they live in a country where the media can report the news without government censorship. But that ideal wins far less support in Russia (31% very important), where the media is still struggling to freely report the news.

Throughout Eastern Europe, large majorities of the public say they value freedom of speech. But most do not place high value on it. Just three-in-ten Russians, about half of Bulgarians (48%), and majorities in Poland (55%), the Slovak Republic (58%) and Ukraine (59%) say it is very important that they live in a society where they can openly say what they think and can criticize the government. More people in the Czech Republic (65%) and in former East Germany (70%) claim that freedom of speech is very important, but significantly more West Germans hold that view (84%).

In Eastern Europe, and throughout the other regions surveyed, more highly educated people consistently place greater importance on freedom of speech, the press and religion, and honest elections than do those with less education. Higher income respondents are also most likely to value these rights, but the relationship is much less consistent. There is no consistent difference in attitudes across age groups.

Civilian Control Not a Priority

Civilian control of the military is a democratic principle that finds relatively little favor among Eastern Europeans – not even in Poland where the army seized control and declared martial law in 1981. In every country except former East Germany, fewer than four-in-ten say it is very important to them that they live in a society where the military reports to the civilian leadership. Just 29% in Poland, 21% in Bulgaria and 20% in Russia believe this principle is very important.

In part, such sentiment reflects widespread trust of the military. Majorities everywhere except Ukraine say the armed forces have a good influence on how things are going in their country. Only in Ukraine does a plurality (44%) believe that the military has a bad influence. Even there, however, fewer than four-in-ten (38%) give high priority to the principle of civilian control.

Eastern Europeans generally feel their countries fall short of meeting their expectations on democratic ideals. Whether it is freedom of speech, honest multiparty elections, press freedom or a fair judicial system, substantially fewer than half of those surveyed say these democratic ideals describe their countries very well.

Rather, majorities say these ideals somewhat or very well describe their countries. And less than half the public in Bulgaria (43%), Russia (42%) and Ukraine (45%) believes civilians are in control the military in their country. Between 20% and 40% in each country, on average, say these ideals do not describe their country well.

Progress In Last Decade

Nonetheless, when asked about the pace of progress in specific areas over the last decade, solid majorities say they now have more freedom to say what they think, to join any political organization they want, and to choose whom to vote for without feeling any pressure. Among the six countries surveyed on these issues – the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and Russia – more than two-thirds in every country say that today they have more freedom to say what they think.

Similarly large percentages among all six publics say they have more freedom to join any political organization they choose. And with the exception of Russia, solid majorities say they have more freedom to decide whom to vote for, compared with 10 years ago. About half of Russians feel that way (51%), while 24% report no change and 18% say they have less latitude in deciding their vote than they did a decade ago.

But in another area – personal safety – Eastern Europeans agree that things have deteriorated over the past decade. No fewer than six-in-ten in all six countries yes – it is surveyed say there is less safety from crime and violence now than a decade ago.

Economic Concerns Drive Age Gap

Older people in Eastern Europe are more likely to disapprove of the changes in the last 10 years than are younger people. At the same time, when asked how well various political rights and civil liberties describe their country, older people are as positive or even more positive than the younger generation.

It is only when asked generally about post-communist political changes that older Eastern Europeans voice more concern than the younger generation. This concern has a strong economic component, as the region‘s political evolution has been accompanied by a dramatic shift to a free market economy. Older Eastern Europeans are less likely than younger people to think they are better off in a free market economy, and the older generation is more likely to be dissatisfied with their household income.

Bribery – Occasionally Necessary

Most Eastern Europeans say they seldom if ever need to give gifts, perform favors or pay bribes to government officials to secure services or documents the government is supposed to provide, but the practice does occur. Four-in-ten Ukrainians (41%) say that in the last year they have engaged in the practice, although relatively few say it happens frequently (4% very often/11% somewhat often).

A third of Russians say they have had to bribe government officials in the past year, as have 27% in the Slovak Republic, 24% in Poland and 20% in Bulgaria. Bribery is reported least often in the Czech Republic – fewer than one-in-ten (9%) say they have had to bribe a government official to get services or documents.

Young people are more likely than older respondents to say they have paid bribes. For example, in Ukraine, nearly half of those ages 18 to 34 (47%) say they have offered a bribe in the past year, compared with a quarter (27%) of those ages 60 or older. A similar difference between the old and the young exists in Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic. In Russia, people with some college education were also more likely to report offering a bribe, and in Bulgaria, Russia and the Ukraine, the wealthy were more likely than those in lower-income brackets to report they have had to pay a bribe to a government official.

Strong Economy Trumps Good Democracy

With the exception of the Czech Republic, at least six-in-ten respondents in every Eastern European country say they believe a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. Overwhelming majorities in Russia (81%), Ukraine (81%) and Bulgaria (74%) opt for a strong economy. Only in the Czech Republic does a majority (59%) choose democracy over economic growth. But even there, four-in-ten (38%) people prefer a strong economy to a good democracy.

Public opinion on this question is linked to people‘s own financial situations. In four Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia and the Slovak Republic – higher income respondents are more likely to favor a good democracy over a strong economy. In the Slovak Republic, for example, almost half (49%) of those in the highest income bracket choose a good democracy compared with three-in-ten (30%) of those in the lowest income bracket.

Education also is a factor in these attitudes. In the Czech Republic, three-quarters of those with at least some college (75%) prefer a good democracy compared to just over half (55%) of those with a primary school education or less. In the Slovak Republic, younger people are more likely to choose a good democracy over a strong economy. Half of those ages 18 to 34 (50%) choose a good democracy compared to a third (32%) of those ages 60 and older.

Prosperity Very Important

Consistent with these attitudes, overwhelming majorities in nearly every Eastern European country rate economic prosperity as a very important objective. The only exception is former East Germany, where a slim majority says economic prosperity is very important. In three nations – Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria – more people cite prosperity as a top goal than say that about any aspect of democracy.

This desire for national economic success contrasts with reality. Majorities throughout the region – except in former East Germany and the Czech Republic – say their countries are not prosperous. Fully 83% in Bulgaria say their country is not enjoying prosperity – one of the highest percentages of any country surveyed. Nearly as many Slovaks and Poles hold that view as well (76%, 74%). By comparison, people in former East Germany and the Czech Republic are much more upbeat about economic conditions. Roughly two-thirds (68%) of those in former East Germany say economic prosperity describes their country well, and 55% of Czechs agree.

Many Prefer Strong Leader

Many Eastern Europeans also say that to solve their countries‘ problems they prefer a strong leader rather than a democratic form of government. Solid majorities in Russia (70%) and Ukraine (67%) opt for a strong hand in government leadership. This is a reversal of 1991 sentiment when most people in Russia (51%) and Ukraine (57%) favored a democratic government to solve problems.

In Poland and Bulgaria, opinion is divided on this issue, with as many people favoring a strong leader as a democratic form of government. The Czech and Slovak Republics stand out with overwhelming majorities favoring a democratic form of government (91%, 86%).

In every country in the region, those in the highest income bracket are more likely to choose a democratic form of government over a strong leader than those in lower income brackets. For example, in Bulgaria more than seven-in-ten (72%) of the rich chose a democratic form of government, compared with a quarter of the poor. Conversely, people with lower incomes favor a strong leader. In Poland, 59% of those with low incomes choose a strong leader to solve national problems, compared with 23% of those with high incomes.

II: Latin America

Until recently, free and fair elections have had an inconsistent history in Latin America. Most of the countries in the region have only achieved elected civilian rule within the last two decades.

Despite that history, majorities in six of the eight Latin American countries surveyed favor a democratic government over a strong leader to solve their nation‘s problems. In Mexico and Venezuela, democratic government is favored by better than three-to-one. Only in Honduras and Brazil do majorities dissent from this view.

In contrast with most countries in Eastern Europe, recent economic hardships have not led Latin Americans to favor a strong economy over a good democracy. Majorities in economically devastated Argentina, as well as in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico, say they prefer democratic freedoms to a strong economy.

This preference for democracy is particularly significant given the widespread economic pessimism in the region. Solid majorities in every Latin American country surveyed consider economic prosperity as a very important objective, but there is little sense that the goal is being fulfilled. In Argentina, fully 86% say the country is not experiencing prosperity – among the highest percentages of all countries surveyed.

Most Say Military Not Under Civilian Control

Despite the steps taken toward democracy in several Latin American countries, there is a widespread perception that the military is not under the control of civilian leaders. Almost six-in-ten in Brazil (58%), Venezuela (58%) and Guatemala (57%) say civilian control of the military does not describe their country well.⁴ Only in Mexico is there a clear perception that the military is under civilian control; even so, just 30% of Mexicans say it describes the situation in their country very well.

Most Latin Americans, however, do not regard civilian control of the military as a very important priority. Guatemala, which has a long history of military dominance, is the only country in which even a narrow majority (52%) says it is very important to live in a country where the military is under the control of civilian leaders.

Public support for other freedoms is more extensive. Solid majorities in nearly every Latin American country say that it is very important to them that honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political candidates. The only exception is Bolivia, where 49% give multiparty elections high priority.

But far fewer say their country has honest multiparty elections. No more than four-in-ten in any country say it describes their country very well. People in Argentina take an especially negative view of their country‘s elections. Just a quarter of Argentines give their elections a passing grade, and only 9% give the nation high marks for honest elections. (This survey was conducted before the May 2003 presidential election in Argentina, and the October 2002 presidential election in Brazil).

Overall, Argentines are much more negative about their country‘s success in ensuring political rights and civil liberties than are other Latin Americans. These attitudes are associated with negative views of the government. Argentines who think the government has a bad influence on the way things are going are generally more likely to say that Argentina does not ensure people’s rights and liberties.

Differing Views of Political Changes

As in Eastern Europe, opinion on recent political changes in Latin America varies widely from country to country, reflecting different experiences with democracy. In Mexico, for example, the election of President Vincente Fox in 2000 was judged by many international observers as perhaps the first fair presidential election in Mexico‘s history. This milestone helps explain why a solid majority of Mexicans (62%) say they approve of the political changes that have taken place in the last five years.

Fewer respondents in Venezuela (47%) and Peru (40%) have such positive views. In Peru, the political landscape improved with the presidential election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001. But the government evidently has yet to regain public confidence after the chaotic departure of Alberto Fujimori, the autocratic former president. Since Victor Hugo Chavez was elected president in Venezuela in 1998, the political situation has spiraled downward, with an attempted coup and national strikes that have caused major economic disruption and significant opposition to many of the political and economic changes implemented by Chavez.

In Mexico, Venezuela and Peru, approval of recent political changes is tied to opinion about the president and the government. Those who say that the president has a good influence on how things are going in the country are more likely to approve of the political changes over the last five years than those who think the president has a bad influence. Similarly, those who approve of the government‘s influence also support how things are going politically in the country. (Approval of political change was asked only in Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.)

Low Confidence in Judiciary

As is the case globally, Latin Americans place high importance on a judicial system that treats everyone the same. Solid majorities in all eight Latin American countries surveyed say it is very important that they live in a country that has a fair judicial system. But people in several of these countries – especially Argentina and Brazil – have highly negative opinions of their current judicial systems.

More than eight-in-ten Argentines (85%) say that the statement “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” does not describe their country well; fully two-thirds say it does not characterize the country “at all” – by far the most negative rating in the world. Just one-in-twenty (5%) Argentines say an impartial judicial system describes their country very well.

Brazilians also judge their country‘s judicial system quite critically. Seven-in-ten (72%) think it is not fair and nearly half (47%) say an impartial system does not at all describe their country‘s judiciary. This view is shared, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the region. Honduras is the only nation in the region where a majority of respondents (60%) say the judicial system treats everyone at least somewhat fairly, although a sizable minority (39%) disagrees.

Other Freedoms Valued

The ability to practice one‘s religion, freedom of speech and a free press also win broad support in Latin America. Freedom of religion is seen as especially important. More than seven-in-ten in every country except Bolivia say it is very important to live in a country where you can freely practice your religion. Just half of Bolivians agree, and support for other freedoms is also weaker in Bolivia than in other countries in the region.

Large majorities in every Latin American nation surveyed say that religion is a personal matter and should be kept separate from government policy. And, for the most part, people in these predominantly Catholic countries feel they are able to practice their religion without interference. In Mexico and Honduras, six-in-ten (61% in each) say that religious freedom describes conditions in their country very well.

Latin Americans take a less favorable view of the extent to which freedom of the press and freedom of speech are permitted. While majorities in every Latin American country surveyed say the media can report the news without government censorship to some extent, well under half in each say that statement describes their country “very well”. More than a third in Argentina (38%), Peru (37%), Guatemala, (36%), Venezuela (34%) and Brazil (34%) say that statement does not accurately reflect conditions in their countries.

Sizable minorities in several countries say the phrase “you can openly say what you think and can criticize the government” does not accurately describe their country. Nearly half of Guatemalans (48%) say that statement does not reflect conditions in their country, and more than a third of Peruvians (38%), Brazilians (35%), Argentines (34%) and Bolivians (34%) agree.

Reports of Bribery Vary Greatly

The extent to which Latin Americans say they have had to bribe government officials in the past year varies greatly from country to country. Argentines are the least likely to report paying bribes. Just 6% say the practice has occurred at least somewhat often in the past year, while 89% say they have not had a reason to pay a bribe or do a favor to obtain government services or documents.

In Venezuela, by contrast, 36% report that they have had to pay a bribe at least somewhat often in the past year. Fewer respondents in other countries say they have had to pay bribes in the past year. Roughly a quarter of those surveyed in Peru (24%), Mexico (24%) and Bolivia (23%) say they have had to pay a bribe or do a favor at least somewhat often in the past year to obtain government services or documents.

III: Asia

Asian respondents surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project generally attach great importance to religious freedom and an impartial judiciary. But other aspects of democracy are less broadly supported – notably honest elections and freedom of the press.

Large majorities in the Philippines (77%), Bangladesh (71%) and India (64%) say that it is very important to live in a country that has honest multiparty elections. But only about four-in-ten in Indonesia (40%) and South Korea (43%) concur. Those are among the lowest marks of the 35 countries surveyed on democracy and civil liberties. (This survey was conducted before South Korea‘s presidential election in December 2002).⁵

For the most part, Asians do not express a high degree of confidence in their countries‘ elections. No more than four-in-ten in any country say that honest, multiparty elections characterize their country very well. Indonesians are the most negative in this regard – just 10% say it describes their country very well, and half say their country is lacking in this regard. Respondents in Bangladesh, in particular, place much greater value on free and fair elections than they believe their country delivers. (Questions on elections were not permitted in Vietnam; none of the questions on democracy were permitted in China).

Press Freedom Not Widely Valued

Freedom of the press is also not widely valued by people in the six Asian nations where this question was asked. (It was not permitted in Vietnam). Only in Bangladesh does a majority (64%) say that it is very important that the media can report the news without censorship in their country. In other countries, less than half the public agrees.

Most people give their countries, at best, middling ratings for press freedom. Only in India do as many as a third (32%) think the statement, “the media can report the news without government censorship”, describes their country very well. In South Korea, which recently enacted a criminal libel law allowing the government to jail journalists who express criticism, just 7% hold that view.⁶ More than four-in-ten in South Korea (43%) also say that a free, uncensored media does not describe the country accurately. Nearly a third in Bangladesh (31%) agree. In Bangladesh, violence and intimidation of journalists who are critical of the government has increased over the last few years.

Attitudes on the importance of civilian control of the military also vary widely in Asia. Fully six-in-ten Vietnamese rate this as very important, by far the highest percentage in the region. But only about one-in-five respondents in Indonesia (22%) and South Korea (18%) attach great importance to this ideal. Fully a third in Indonesia and nearly as many in South Korea (27%) and the Philippines (24%) say civilian control of the military is not too important or not important at all.

Religious Freedom, Fair Judiciary Very Important

Majorities in every Asian country surveyed say that religious freedom is very important to them. There is overwhelming support for religious freedom in predominantly Muslim Bangladesh (93%) and Indonesia (88%) as well as in religiously diverse India (81%).

There is general agreement among Asian respondents that they are able to freely practice their religion. As many as eight-in-ten in India (78%) give the country high marks for being able to practice their religion freely; 68% in Indonesia agree. This perception is not shared as widely in other countries; still, about half of respondents across Asia say religious freedom describes their country very well.

Like respondents in other regions, Asians also place a high value on an impartial judiciary. Solid majorities in every country in the region say this is very important, ranging from a high of 89% in Bangladesh to a low of 59% in South Korea. But at most, only about half – in Vietnam (50%) and India (45%) – think their country is doing very well in this regard.

People are particularly critical in South Korea and Bangladesh, where the U.S. State Department says the judicial systems are corrupt, slow and reluctant to challenge government decisions.⁷ Just 6% of Bangladeshis say an impartial judiciary describes their country very well, while 72% say it does not accurately describe conditions in their country. Only one-in-ten South Koreans (9%) give the judicial system high marks, while half say a fair judiciary does not characterize the current system.

The same pattern is apparent in Asian attitudes toward freedom of speech. Majorities in every country view the freedom to criticize the government as very important, but Indians are the only group in which most (57%) think the country is doing “very well” in ensuring freedom of speech. Again, the Bangladeshi public stands out with eight-in-ten (81%) saying that freedom of speech is very important but just two-in-ten (19%) saying it describes their country very well.

South Koreans, Indonesians Choose ‘Strong Economy’

On several measures, South Koreans and Indonesians stand out for the relatively low importance they give to democracy. When asked to choose between a strong economy and a good democracy, Indonesians overwhelmingly opt for a strong economy (69%-30%), while South Koreans are divided (49% strong economy/47% good democracy). In the other countries surveyed, solid majorities favor a good democracy over a strong economy.

In South Korea at least, this opinion may reflect frustration with the country‘s recent political history rather than a reaction to economic hard times. Most South Koreans (55%) view economic prosperity as very important, but that is far less than the number who hold that view in Indonesia (92%), Vietnam (84%), Bangladesh (82%) or the Philippines (75%). For the most part, the South Korean public believes that their country is economically prosperous (65%).

But South Koreans also disapprove of the political changes that have taken place over the last five years, a period marked by corruption scandals, economic problems and rising tensions with North Korea. Fewer than four-in-ten South Koreans (37%) approve of recent political changes, while a majority (56%) disapproves. (South Korea was the only Asian country where this question was asked).

But Not ‘Strong Leader’

Nonetheless, solid majorities in South Korea (61%) and four other Asian nations favor a democratic government, rather than a strong leader, to solve national problems. This opinion is broadly shared in Bangladesh (70%), Indonesia (65%) and to a lesser extent in India (54%). (This question was not permitted in Vietnam).

The exception is the Philippines, which became a symbol of democratic revolution in the mid-1980s when Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown and Corazon Aquino was elected president. Most people in the Philippines (55%) believe it is better to rely on a strong leader to solve national problems, while 41% favor a democratic government. As a point of comparison, only in Russia and the Ukraine is there greater support for a strong leader than in the Philippines (70% Russia, 67% Ukraine).

Bribery a Reality in Bangladesh

Most Asians report they have seldom if ever found it necessary in the past year to pay bribes to government officials. But Bangladesh is a notable exception – fully 44% of respondents there say they have had to engage in the practice very (20%) or somewhat often (24%).

Solid majorities in every other country say they either never have to bribe government officials or say it occurs “not at all” often. In every country, those who have attended college are more likely to have felt it necessary to offer a bribe than those with less education.

IV: Africa

By virtually any standard, support for democracy in Africa is broad and deep. Africans generally dismiss the idea that a leader with a strong hand is needed to solve their country‘s problems. Solid majorities in all African countries, with the exceptions of Mali and South Africa, believe their nations should rely on a democratic government, not a strong leader, to solve problems. This is particularly the case in Senegal (90%), Ivory Coast (84%), Kenya (77%) and Tanzania (70%).

Moreover, Africans overwhelmingly reject the idea that democracy is a “Western” form of government that would not succeed in their countries. By margins of at least three-to-one, people in all seven nations in which the question was asked instead agree with the statement: “Democracy is not just for the West and can work well here.” (This question was asked in selected countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia).

In spite of the continent‘s grinding poverty, half or more in six of the ten African countries surveyed say they favor a good democracy over a strong economy. This view is particularly prevalent in the Ivory Coast (77% good democracy), Nigeria (63%) and Ghana (60%).

This survey was conducted prior to presidential elections in Kenya, in December 2002, and in Nigeria, in April 2003. Also, it was conducted before the outbreak of civil war in the Ivory Coast.

Elections Viewed Negatively in Kenya, Nigeria

Majorities in every African country say it is very important to live in a country with fair multiparty elections. Roughly nine-in-ten respondents in Senegal (87%) hold this view, and nearly as many in Kenya (85%), the Ivory Coast (84%), Mali (82%) and Uganda (79%) agree. In every country except Kenya and Nigeria, majorities say that honest, multiparty elections describe their countries at least somewhat well, although far fewer take a very positive view of the elections.

But Kenyans and Nigerians are negative about their countries‘ elections. In Kenya, a 58% majority feels that free elections do not describe conditions in their country. That was before the presidential election in December, which was judged free and fair by European Union observers. Similarly, about half of Nigerians (52%) expressed a negative view of their country‘s elections, prior to the recent round of presidential balloting.

Despite the criticisms of elections, people in Kenya and Nigeria are upbeat about the recent political changes in those countries. Seven-in-ten people in Kenya and nearly eight-in-ten in Nigeria (78%) say they approve of the political changes that have taken place in their countries over the last five years. Among all of the nations surveyed, only in Uzbekistan (85%) and the Czech Republic (83%) is there as much support for recent political changes.

Most Feel They Have Religious Freedom

As is the case with people in other regions, Africans view religious freedom and an impartial judiciary as highly important. Large majorities in every African country surveyed, with the exception of Angola, say it is very important that they live in a society that permits freedom of religion. This strong support for religious freedom prevails in both largely Muslim countries – Mali, Senegal and Nigeria – and largely non-Muslim countries – South Africa and Kenya.

There is broad agreement among Africans that they currently have religious freedom. This is especially the case in Senegal (89%), the Ivory Coast (80%) and Mali (77%), nations that also placed the highest importance on religious liberty. Nigeria, which has a long history of religious violence, is the only country in which a significant minority (25%) says that religious freedom does not describe the country well. Muslims in Nigeria (30%) are slightly more likely than Christians (22%) to perceive a lack of religious freedom. But even in Nigeria, 74% give the country a positive rating for religious freedom.

In nearly every African country, about seven-in-ten respondents view an impartial judiciary as very important; the only exception is Angola, where only half (51%) of the public says this is very important. But relatively few Africans say that an impartial judiciary describes their countries very well.

Solid majorities in three African countries – Kenya (64%), Mali (62%) and Nigeria (59%) – give their countries‘ judicial systems negative ratings. In Nigeria, majorities of both Christians and Muslims say an impartial judiciary does not describe the country well. Substantial minorities in other African countries – at least three-in-ten – also feel they lack a fair judiciary.

Free Speech: Ideal vs. Reality

Like other civil liberties, freedom of speech is broadly supported in Africa. Majorities in every country view the freedom to openly criticize the government as very important. But perceptions of whether this freedom exists vary widely from country to country.

Fewer than one-in-ten Kenyans (8%) say that free speech describes Kenya very well, while two-thirds (66%) give the country a negative rating. Fewer than three-in-ten Nigerians (27%) believe their country performs very well in this area, while 44% say freedom of speech does not describe their country. At the other extreme, most of those in the Ivory Coast (55%) feel the country has freedom of speech, but that was prior to the outbreak of violence last year.

Freedom of the press also is highly valued in Africa. Majorities in nine of ten nations surveyed – all except Tanzania – say that living in a country with a free press is very important to them. Again, there is a gap between its perceived importance and whether the media is currently permitted to report the news free of censorship.

Most Africans feel their countries‘ media can operate freely to some extent, although relatively few give their countries very high ratings for press freedom. Kenyans and Tanzanians are the most negative in this regard. Just 14% in Kenya give their country high marks for press freedom, though nearly half (48%) believe the statement “the media can report the news without government censorship” describes their country at least somewhat well. In Tanzania, 22% say press freedom characterizes their country very well and 37% have a negative view of their country on this issue.

Majorities in seven of ten African countries surveyed say it is very important that the military be under the control of civilian leaders. Angola is a notable exception – 51% in that country say civilian control is not important.

But in every nation except Senegal and the Ivory Coast, substantially less than half the public says that civilian control of the military describes conditions in their country very well. Majorities in Uganda (58%) and Angola (56%), which have been devastated by civil wars, say the military forces in their countries are not under civilian control.

Corruption Widespread

More than in any other region of the world, official corruption is seen as widespread in many African countries. Fully 68% of respondents in Nigeria and 65% in Kenya say they have had to do a favor, give a gift or pay a bribe to a government official in the past year to get a service or document the government is supposed to provide. In Nigeria, 56% report this has occurred at least somewhat often, while 40% say that in Kenya.

Half of those in Angola (52%) and more than four-in-ten in Mali (44%), Tanzania (42%) and Uganda (40%) say they have had to offer a bribe to a government official at some point in the past year. Bribery is much less common in South Africa and Senegal; three-quarters of South Africans (76%) say they have not had to pay a bribe in the past year, as do 70% of Senegalese.

The speed of the war in Iraq and the prevailing belief that the Iraqi people are better off as a result have modestly improved the image of America. But in most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era — the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance.

These are the principal findings from the latest survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted over the past month in 20 countries and the Palestinian Authority. It is being released together with a broader survey of 44 nations conducted in 2002, which covers attitudes on globalization, democratization and the role of Islam in governance and society.

While the postwar poll paints a mostly negative picture of the image of America, its people and policies, the broader Pew Global Attitudes survey shows wide support for the fundamental economic and political values that the U.S. has long promoted. Globalization, the free market model and democratic ideals are accepted in all corners of the world. Most notably, the 44-nation survey found strong democratic aspirations in most of the Muslim publics surveyed. The postwar update confirms that these aspirations remain intact despite the war and its attendant controversies.

The new survey shows, however, that public confidence in the United Nations is a major victim of the conflict in Iraq. Positive ratings for the world body have tumbled in nearly every country for which benchmark measures are available. Majorities or pluralities in most countries believe that the war in Iraq showed the U.N. to be not so important any more. The idea that the U.N. is less relevant is much more prevalent now than it was just before the war, and is shared by people in countries that backed the war, the U.S. and Great Britain, as well as in nations that opposed it, notably France and Germany.

In addition, majorities in five of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the U.S. on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76%), and solid majorities in Turkey (62%), Spain (62%), Italy (61%) and Germany (57%) believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past.¹

The British and Americans disagree — narrow majorities in both countries want the partnership between the U.S. and Western Europe to remain as close as ever. But the percentage of Americans favoring continued close ties with Western Europe has fallen — from 62% before the war to 53% in the current survey. In fact, the American people have cooled on France and Germany as much as the French and Germans have cooled on the U.S.

In Western Europe, negative views of America have declined somewhat since just prior to the war in Iraq, when anti-war sentiment peaked. But since last summer, favorable opinions of the U.S have slipped in nearly every country for which trend measures are available. Views of the American people, while still largely favorable, have fallen as well. The belief that the U.S. pursues a unilateralist foreign policy, which had been extensive last summer, has only grown in the war’s aftermath.

In Great Britain and Italy, positive opinions of the U.S. increased considerably since just before the war (see Chapter 1). Of the 21 publics surveyed in the new poll, overall support for the United States is greatest by far in Israel, where 79% view the U.S. favorably. Israelis also express near-universal support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, with 85% favoring the fight against terrorism. Majorities in Western Europe and Australia also back the war on terrorism, but support has slipped since last summer in both France and Germany (15 points in France, 10 points in Germany).

In addition, the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread to Muslim populations in Indonesia and Nigeria. Since last summer, favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Muslims in Nigeria.

In the wake of the war, a growing percentage of Muslims see serious threats to Islam. Specifically, majorities in seven of eight Muslim populations surveyed express worries that the U.S. might become a military threat to their countries. Even in Kuwait, where people have a generally favorable view of the United States, 53% voice at least some concern that the U.S. could someday pose a threat.

Support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has fallen in most Muslim publics. Equally significant, solid majorities in the Palestinian Authority, Indonesia and Jordan — and nearly half of those in Morocco and Pakistan — say they have at least some confidence in Osama bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” Fully 71% of Palestinians say they have confidence in bin Laden in this regard.

More generally, the postwar update survey of 16,000 respondents finds, in most countries that are friendly to the United States, only modest percentages have confidence that President Bush will do the right thing in international affairs. People in most countries rate Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroeder, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair more highly than they do Bush. The president also ranks slightly behind Blair in the United States, mostly due to political partisanship. Nearly all Republicans (95%) express confidence in Bush, compared with 64% of Democrats.

War Views Entrenched

The war itself did little to change opinions about the merits of using force in Iraq. In countries where there was strong opposition to the war, people overwhelmingly believe their governments made the right decision to stay out of the conflict. In countries that backed the war, with the notable exception of Spain, publics believe their governments made the right decision. In Great Britain, support for the war has grown following its successful outcome. A majority of Turks oppose even the limited help their government offered the U.S. during the war, while Kuwaitis largely approve of their government’s support for the military effort.

Opinion about the war is strongly related to perceptions of how the U.S. and its allies conducted the war and are managing its aftermath. In countries opposed to the war, there is a widespread belief the coalition did not try hard enough to avoid civilian casualties. By contrast, solid majorities in most of the coalition countries, as well as Israel, believe the U.S. and its allies did make a serious attempt to spare civilians. Eight-in-ten Americans (82%) feel that way, the highest percentage of any population surveyed.

A somewhat different pattern is apparent in attitudes toward the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. Americans generally believe the allies are taking the needs of the Iraqi people into account. But there is less support for that point of view elsewhere, even in Great Britain, Australia and Israel. Muslim publics generally believe the United States and its allies are doing only a fair or poor job in addressing the needs of the Iraqi people in the postwar reconstruction.

There also is widespread disappointment among Muslims that Iraq did not put up more of a fight against the U.S. and its allies. Overwhelming majorities in Morocco (93%), Jordan (91%), Lebanon (82%), Turkey (82%), Indonesia (82%), and the Palestinian Authority (81%) say they are disappointed the Iraqi military put up so little resistance. Many others around the world share that view, including people in South Korea (58%), Brazil (50%) and Russia (45%).

Still, even in countries that staunchly opposed the war many people believe that Iraqis will be better off now that Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. Solid majorities in Western Europe believe the Iraqi people will be better off, as do eight-in-ten Kuwaitis and half of the Lebanese. But substantial majorities elsewhere, notably in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, say Iraqis will be worse off now that Hussein has been deposed.

The postwar update shows limited optimism for a surge of democratic reform in the Middle East. Substantial minorities of Muslims in many countries say the region will become somewhat more democratic, but only in Kuwait do as many as half predict the Middle East will become much more democratic. Expectations of major political changes in the Middle East are modest in countries that participated in the war. Just 16% in Great Britain, 14% in the U.S. and 10% in Australia think that the Middle East will become much more democratic.

U.S. Favors Israel

U.S. policies toward the Middle East come under considerable criticism in the new poll. In 20 of 21 populations surveyed — Americans are the only exception — pluralities or majorities believe the United States favors Israel over the Palestinians too much. This opinion is shared in Israel; 47% of Israelis believe that the U.S. favors Israel too much, while 38% say the policy is fair and 11% think the U.S. favors the Palestinians too much.

But Israel is the only country, aside from the U.S., in which a majority says that U.S. policies lead to more stability in the region. Most Muslim populations think U.S. policies bring less stability to the Middle East, while people elsewhere are divided in their evaluations of the impact of U.S. policies.

More broadly, the postwar survey asked people their views on the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. By wide margins, most Muslim populations doubt that a way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of the Palestinian people are met. Eight-in-ten residents of the Palestinian Authority express this opinion. But Arabs in Israel, who voice the same criticisms of U.S. policy in the Middle East as do other Muslims, generally believe that a way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that Palestinian rights and needs are addressed. In fact, Arabs in Israel are nearly as likely as Jews to hold that opinion (62% of Arabs, 68% of Jews).

Outside of the Muslim world, there is general agreement that there is a way to ensure Israel’s existence and meet the needs of Palestinians. This view is widely shared in North America and Western Europe.

As people around the world contemplate emerging security threats, countries in the Middle East — Iran and Syria — are viewed as less of a danger than North Korea. Majorities in most countries see North Korea as at least a moderate threat to Asian stability and world peace, while nearly four-in-ten in Australia (39%), the U.S. (38%) and Germany (37%) view North Korea as a great danger. However, just 28% of South Koreans agree that North Korea presents a major threat to regional stability. Israelis have a different sense of potential threats than do people elsewhere. More than half of Israelis (54%) say Iran presents a great threat to the Middle East, twice the proportion in the next closest country (U.S. at 26%).

Democracy Can Work Here

Despite soaring anti-Americanism and substantial support for Osama bin Laden, there is considerable appetite in the Muslim world for democratic freedoms. The broader, 44-nation survey shows that people in Muslim countries place a high value on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, multi-party systems and equal treatment under the law. This includes people living in kingdoms such as Jordan and Kuwait, as well as those in authoritarian states like Uzbekistan and Pakistan. In fact, many of the Muslim publics polled expressed a stronger desire for democratic freedoms than the publics in some nations of Eastern Europe, notably Russia and Bulgaria.

The postwar update finds that in most Muslim populations, large majorities continue to believe that Western-style democracy can work in their countries. This is the case in predominantly Muslim countries like Kuwait (83%) and Bangladesh (57%), but also in religiously diverse countries like Nigeria (75%). There are no substantive differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in Nigeria on this point. Only in Indonesia and Turkey do substantial percentages say democracy is a Western way of doing things that would not work in their countries (53%, 37%).

At the same time, most Muslims also support a prominent — and in some cases expanding — role for Islam and religious leaders in the political life of their countries. Yet that opinion does not diminish Muslim support for a system of governance that ensures the same civil liberties and political rights enjoyed by democracies.

In religiously diverse countries, Muslims generally favor keeping religion a private matter at the same rates as non-Muslims. In Nigeria, for example, six-in-ten Muslims and the same proportion of non-Muslims completely agree that religion should be kept separate from government policy. In Lebanon, there are only modest differences on this point between Muslims and non-Muslims.

U.S. Ideals Backed — Mostly

The broad desire for democracy in Muslim countries and elsewhere is but one indication of the global acceptance of ideas and principles espoused by the United States. The major survey also shows that the free market model has been embraced by people almost everywhere, whether in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. Majorities in 33 of the 44 nations surveyed feel that people are better off in a free-market economy, even if that leads to disparities in wealth and income. Despite the protests in recent years against globalization and America’s role in fostering it, people are surprisingly accepting of the increased interconnectedness that defines globalization.

This is not to say that they accept democracy and capitalism without qualification, or that they are not concerned about many of the problems of modern life. By and large, however, the people of the world accept the concepts and values that underlie the American approach to governance and business.

Yet there are profound differences in the way Americans and people in other countries — especially Western Europeans — view such fundamental issues as the limits of personal freedom and the role of government in helping the poor. Americans are more individualistic and favor a less compassionate government than do Europeans and others. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) believe success is not outside of their control. Except for Canadians (63%), most of the world disagrees. Among 44 nations surveyed, the U.S. has one of the highest percentages of people who think that most people who fail in life have themselves to blame, rather than society.

Accordingly, Americans care more about personal freedom than government assurances of social justice. Fully 58% of Americans say it is more important to have the freedom to pursue personal goals without government interference, while just 34% say it is more important for government to guarantee that no one is in need. In most other nations, majorities embrace the opposite view. And while most Americans support a social safety net, they are less strongly committed than other peoples to their government taking care of citizens who cannot take care of themselves.

Many Want Democracy, Fewer Have It

People everywhere are united by their desire for honest multiparty elections, freedom of speech and religion and an impartial judiciary. A fair judiciary is seen as especially important; in most countries it is more highly valued than free elections.

Yet there is a widespread sense that these democratic aspirations are not being fulfilled. In Eastern Europe, only in the Czech Republic does a majority (58%) say they have honest, multiparty elections. In Russia and Ukraine, only small minorities feel they have free elections (15% in Russia, 21% in Ukraine). Skepticism about honest elections and freedom of expression are the norm for almost all of the democratizing countries of the world, but this is especially the case in Muslim countries.

Perceptions of repression in some predominantly Muslim countries — notably Turkey and Lebanon — are as widespread as anywhere in the world. Solid majorities in both Turkey and Lebanon say their nations lack several fundamental rights: freedom of speech, a free press, fair elections and an impartial judiciary.

Soviet Hangover

In much of Eastern Europe, there is now greater acceptance of post-communist political changes compared with Pulse of Europe surveys conducted by the then-Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press in 1991, as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Even so, the legacy of communism is apparent in the attitudes of many Eastern European publics. Only about half of those in Ukraine and Russia approve of the political changes that have occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

More generally, Russians and Ukrainians, as well as most other Eastern European publics, say a leader with a “strong hand” could solve national problems better than a democratic government. Only Czechs and Slovaks favor democracy over a strong leader. In most of Latin America and Africa, there is more of a preference for democracy.

There is, however, a large generation gap on views of democracy in Eastern Europe. In most Eastern European countries surveyed, people age 60 and older are much more likely to disapprove of post-communist political changes than are people under the age of 35.

“Yes” to a Smaller World

Beyond their common desire for democracy and free markets, people in emerging nations also generally acknowledge and accept globalization. People worldwide have become aware of the impact of increasing interconnectedness on their countries and their own lives. Majorities in 41 of 44 countries surveyed say that international trade and business contacts have increased in the past 5 years.

The survey finds broad acceptance of the increasing interconnectedness of the world. Three-quarters or more of those interviewed in almost every country think children need to learn English to succeed in the world today. People generally view the growth in foreign trade, global communication and international popular culture as good for them and their families as well as their countries. For most of the world’s people, however, this approval is guarded. Increased trade and business ties and other changes are viewed as somewhat positive, not very positive.

Despite the widespread support for the globalization process, people around the world think many aspects of their lives — including some affected by globalization — are getting worse. Majorities in 34 of 44 countries surveyed say the availability of good-paying jobs has gotten worse compared with five years ago. They also see the gap between rich and poor, the affordability of health care and the ability to save for one’s old age as getting worse. But people do not blame a more interconnected world for these problems — they mostly point to domestic factors. This is especially true in economically faltering countries in Africa and Latin America, such as Kenya and Argentina.

People around the world are more inclined to credit globalization for conditions they see as improving, such as increased availability of food in stores and more modern medicines and treatments.

While anti-globalization forces have not convinced the public that globalization is the root cause of their economic struggles, the public does share the critics’ concerns about eroding national sovereignty and a loss of cultural identity. Large majorities in 42 of 44 countries believe that their traditional way of life is getting lost and most people feel that their way of life has to be protected against foreign influence. There is less agreement that consumerism and commercialism represent a threat to one’s culture. However, that point of view is prevalent in Western Europe and Latin America.

The polling finds, however, that the idea of “global” forces is something of a red flag to people around the world. “Global economy” is seen as more threatening than “trade with other countries.” People worry about the impact of global trade on themselves and their families even though they believe that global trade is probably a good thing for their country as a whole.

Globalization Foes Fail to Get Through

People around the world generally have a positive view of the symbols of globalization. Large corporations from other countries get a favorable review in much of the world, as do international organizations.

In Africa, people express highly favorable opinions of foreign corporations, while the Middle East is more divided. Dislike of foreign firms is mostly limited to people in the major advanced economies of Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada. Even in these countries, however, positive evaluations of multinationals outweigh negative assessments.

Similarly, the impact of international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organization is seen as much more positive than negative in most parts of the world. This is overwhelmingly the case in Africa. Argentina, Brazil, Jordan and Turkey stand out for their highly critical view of these institutions.

In contrast, people generally have a negative view of anti-globalization protesters. The French give higher ratings to multinational corporations than to the protesters. And in Italy, site of a major clash in 2001 between police and anti-globalization forces in Genoa, the public by nearly two-to-one (51%-27%) says the protesters are having a bad influence on the country. It should be noted that majorities in many countries declined to give an opinion of anti-globalization protesters. This is mostly the case in developing countries, but also in more advanced nations like South Korea (61%) and Japan (55%).

But “Foreign” Still a Negative

Most people in the world feel their way of life needs protection from foreign influence, and majorities in nearly every country surveyed favor tougher restrictions on people entering their countries. Overwhelming majorities in the Western European countries surveyed support tighter borders. In fact, Western Europeans expressed as much support for such restrictions as they did in the Pulse of Europe survey 12 years ago, when Europe was less unified. Eastern Europeans also have become much more wary of porous borders than when the Cold War was ending, a time when many people were more concerned with getting out of their countries than with keeping others from getting in.

In that context, Western Europeans take a much dimmer view of foreign workers from Eastern Europe, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, than they do of foreign workers from other European Union countries. This is especially the case in Germany, where 59% say Middle Easterners and North Africans who come to work in Germany are bad for the country; 53% say that about foreign workers from Eastern Europe.

This European concern about foreign influence and sovereignty also is seen in other ways. There are still sizable minorities of people in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy who think that there are parts of other countries that really belong to them. This sentiment has not diminished — and in some cases has risen dramatically — since the end of the Cold War. Fully 63% of Russians believe that “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Russia.” In 1991, just 22% agreed with that statement. Broad majorities in the Philippines, India, Lebanon, South Africa, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Korea and Turkey also feel that parts of other nations rightfully belong to their country.

As was the case in 1991, the American public has a more favorable view of ethnic and racial minorities than do Western European publics. African Americans and Hispanics are viewed much more positively in the U.S. than are Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, and Albanians in Italy.

Modern Times

People around the world are struggling with some elements of modern life, while easily accepting others. Many people say that they do not like the pace of modern life. Yet they broadly endorse the things that make life go fast, especially cell phones and the Internet.

There is significant opposition to modern commercial culture in advanced countries, where opinions about the pace of life and such modern conveniences as fast food and television are more mixed than they are in the developing world. Western Europeans and Latin Americans are most likely to express the view that commercialism represents a threat to their cultures.

Underscoring the conflicted views many people have of the modern world, people in Africa are the most likely to express the concern that their traditional way of life is being lost. Yet they also are the most enthusiastic about modern conveniences and fast food.

There also is a significant global generation gap on views of modern life. Younger and better-educated people are more comfortable with the pace of modern life. Younger people also have a better opinion of fast food and television than do their elders.

Globally, people have a broadly favorable view of birth control and family planning, with the notable exception of populations in aging industrial nations, such as Italy, Japan and Germany. Only about three-in-ten Japanese (32%) and fewer than half in Italy and Germany (41%, 47%, respectively), view birth control as a positive change. In most of the developing nations of Africa and Asia, 70% or more say birth control and family planning have changed things for the better.

Divided Over Religion, Homosexuality

Homosexuality and the centrality of religion to personal morality divide the peoples of the world. Majorities in most countries say it is necessary to believe in God to be a moral person. But Canadians and Europeans — both in the West and the East — take the secular view that it is possible to be moral without believing in God. Opinion in the United States is closer to that in most developing countries, where agreement is nearly universal that personal morality is linked to belief in God.

Acceptance of homosexuality divides the publics of the world in a similar way. People in Africa and the Middle East strongly object to societal acceptance of homosexuality. But there is far greater tolerance for homosexuality in major Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil. Opinion in Europe is split between West and East. Majorities in every Western European nation surveyed say homosexuality should be accepted by society, while most Russians, Poles and Ukrainians disagree. Americans are divided — a thin majority (51%) believes homosexuality should be accepted, while 42% disagree.

Women’s increasing role in the workplace is broadly supported around the world. Large majorities in 41 of 44 countries believe the more satisfying way of life is when both spouses work and share the burdens of childcare. Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan are the only countries in which majorities believe it is better for women to stay home and take care of the children while the husband provides for the family.