Europeans generally reacted to President Obama’s re-election with a mixture of excitement and relief, just as they did four years ago. For many across the Atlantic, Obama’s 2008 victory signaled the end of the Bush-era estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies, and the emergence of an America that would see the world a lot like Europeans do. However, despite Obama’s re-election at home and continued popularity in Europe, his presidency has not closed the long-running transatlantic values gap. Instead, on issues such as the use of military force, religion, and individualism, Americans and Europeans continue to disagree.

Obama has been popular in Europe since he toured the Continent as a presidential contender. Following George W. Bush’s two terms in office, Europeans immediately embraced Obama’s presidency. A stunning 93% of Germans expressed confidence in Obama in the early months of his first term, compared with just 14% for Bush during his final year in office. In Britain, France, and Spain, the new American president also received stratospheric ratings.

The result was a dramatic “Obama effect” on attitudes toward the U.S. In France, for instance, America’s favorability rating soared from 42% in 2008 to 75% in 2009. And importantly, support for American policies grew, especially support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The enthusiasm that greeted Obama’s election has waned a bit over time, even in Europe, but vestiges of “Obamamania” remain. The 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found at least eight-in-ten expressing confidence in the U.S. president in Germany, France, and Britain.

However, while the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded, the “values gap” between Americans and Europeans is alive and well. Polls consistently find a transatlantic divide when it comes to fundamental beliefs on a variety of political and cultural issues. Americans and Europeans view each other with less hostility today, but they still don’t see the world in the same way.

Take the issue of military force. Americans remain more inclined than Europeans to say it’s necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Meanwhile, they are significantly less likely than Europeans to believe that getting UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with international threats. America’s willingness to “go it alone” in world affairs has become an ingrained piece of the country’s international image – and it hasn’t changed much in the Obama years. Majorities across Europe continue to see the U.S. as acting unilaterally, not taking into account the interests of other nations when making foreign policy.

The Obama administration’s use of drone strikes illustrates the divide over hard power. About six-in-ten Americans – including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents – approve of U.S. drone attacks against extremist leaders and organizations in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But in seven of the eight EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2012, more than half oppose these strikes, including nine-in-ten Greeks and 76% in Spain. The lone exception is the British, who are almost evenly divided on this issue.

Religion is another topic where Americans and Europeans hold very different views. In largely secular Western European nations such as Spain, Germany, Britain, and France, less than a quarter consider religion very important to their lives. Even in Poland, where Catholicism still plays an important role in public life, only 27% say religion is very important. By contrast, fully half of Americans hold this view. Similarly, solid majorities in the six EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2011 said you do not have to believe in God to be a moral person, but only 46% of Americans felt this way.

The same 2011 poll asked Christians from the U.S. and eight European nations whether they identify first with their nationality or their religion. Americans were evenly split: 46% said they think of themselves first as Americans and 46% as Christians. In seven of the eight European countries, a majority of Christians identified primarily with their nationality. Only 8% of French Christians, for example, said they thought of themselves first as Christians.

Individualism also continues to differentiate Americans and Europeans. Most Americans believe individuals largely control their own fate – just 36% agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” However, half or more in Germany, France, and Spain agree with this statement.

Europeans also believe in a very different relationship between the individual and the state. When asked which is more important, that everyone be free to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, 58% of Americans choose the former. Majorities across Western and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, say making sure no one is in need should be a bigger priority.

Of course, even on fundamental values like these, opinions can and do shift over time, and on a few key issues, the values gap is shrinking. For instance, Americans are not as convinced as they used to be about their own cultural superiority – in 2002, six-in-ten agreed with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior.” By 2011, just 49% held this view, much closer to the levels typically registered in Europe.

Public opinion on homosexuality has also shifted dramatically. The percentage of Americans saying society should accept homosexuality rose from 49% in 2007 to 60% just four years later. This is still much lower than the high levels of acceptance witnessed in Europe – more than eight-in-ten in Spain, Germany, France, and Britain believe homosexuality should be accepted – but the gap is clearly closing. The recent passage of marriage equality ballot initiatives in four U.S. states highlights how quickly public opinion on this issue is changing.

Moreover, young Americans increasingly look like their cohorts across the Atlantic on these questions. Nearly seven-in-ten Americans under age 30 say homosexuality should be accepted and only 37% think their culture is superior to others. Young people are also much more likely than older Americans to believe the government should make sure no one is in need. If these trends continue and expand to other topics, the transatlantic values gap could someday vanish. But for the foreseeable future, the divide will likely persist, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Roughly half (49%) of Indians like the pace of modern life, while 37% object to it and 13% venture no opinion. The young, people who live in cities, the better-educated, the wealthier and those who live in the western Indian states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat are particularly accepting of the 24/7 tempo of 21st-century existence.

At the same time, roughly half (52%) of Indians surveyed complain that their traditional way of life is getting lost, compared with about a third (34%) who believe it remains strong. Those most concerned about the erosion of long-established Indian traditions and mores are people living in cities and the better educated, arguably those whose life experience has most distanced them from their roots. For a plurality (43%) of Indians it is the consumerism and commercialism of the modern economy that are a threat to Indian culture. About a quarter (24%) do not agree, while a third have no view on this issue.

Indians overwhelmingly believe that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Nearly eight-in-ten (79%) want to shield their traditional culture from globalization. And half of those surveyed completely agree with such an effort. The greatest support for such cultural protectionism exists among Indians living in the western states (61% completely agree), the college-educated (59%) and those living in cities (57%).

Hard Work, Capitalism and the State

Indians strongly believe in the value of hard work. Two-in-three Indians say most people can succeed if they are willing to work hard. Such sentiment is particularly found among those with a college degree and upper-income individuals. Indian belief in the efficacy of applying oneself is comparable to that in Brazil (69%) and far exceeds that in China (45%).

Since independence, when India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a course of state-led economic development, the Indian government has played a major role in both the society and the economy. Only in the wake of an economic crisis in 1991 did Delhi begin to de-emphasize the role of the public sector through deregulation, privatization of state-owned assets and an opening of the domestic market to foreign trade and investment.

Today, the prevailing view (53%) among the Indian public is that it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without government interference rather than the state to play an active role in guaranteeing that no one is in need. Such sentiment is strong among wealthier individuals, those who live in cities and the well-educated.

Wary of the state, Indians are solidly committed to capitalism. About six-in-ten (61%) think most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some are rich and some are poor. Those with a college degree and higher-income individuals are most likely to hold such views. The least support for the free market is found in the East of India, in the states of Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Jharkhand, some of which have a long tradition of left-wing politics. Indian enthusiasm for capitalism exceeds the 20-nation median (50%), but it still trails that in the emerging economies of Brazil (75%) and China (74%).

Nevertheless, Indians think that the consequences of the current economic order are not good for the country. About eight-in-ten (81%) agree, including 57% completely, that it is true today that the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer. Such sentiment is held by men and women, across all income, age and educational groups.

Following a winter of discontent Russians express an increased appetite for political freedom, and at the same time strongly endorse Vladimir Putin.

Compared with just a few years ago, more Russians believe that voting gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about the country’s governance, more feel that it is important to be able to openly criticize the government, and greater numbers see freedom of the press and honest elections as very important.

Consistent with the value placed on core democratic principles, a solid majority (64%) see attending protests as an opportunity to speak out about how the government is run, and more than half (56%) specifically approve of the mass demonstrations that followed the December 2011 parliamentary vote, which was marred by fraud allegations. In that regard, while a modest 56%-majority says they are satisfied with the outcome of the March 4, 2012 presidential election, just 47% believe that election was fair.

Nonetheless, the poll finds a number of indicators of support for the status quo. Most notably, 72% of Russians voice a favorable opinion of Vladimir Putin, while almost as many hold a positive opinion of Dmitri Medvedev (67%). Putin’s popularity is being fueled more by views of the economy and perceptions of social mobility than it is being hurt by democratic aspirations. Relatively few Russians express favorable views of other prominent political figures. Roughly four-in-ten or fewer have positive opinions of presidential contenders Gennady Zyuganov (39%), Mikhail Prokhorov (36%), Sergei Mironov (36%) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (28%). Meanwhile, 54% of Russians are unfamiliar with government critic and protest organizer Alexei Navalny.

Further, as they have for most of the post-Soviet era, a majority of Russians continue to feel that relying on a leader with a strong hand in order to solve problems is more important than relying on a democratic form of government (57% vs. 32%). In addition, strong majorities say it is very important to live in a country where there is law and order (75%) and economic prosperity (71%). In fact, three-quarters say they would choose a strong economy over a good democracy.

These are among the principal findings from a nationwide survey of Russia by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,000 adults in Russia between March 19 and April 4, 2012. The poll finds that Russians are generally divided about their country’s direction as Putin begins his third term as president: 46% are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, while 45% are not. At home, the economy is a concern for many Russians, with only 32% describing the current economic situation as good. Meanwhile, in the international arena, a solid majority (73%) believe Russia deserves greater respect from other countries. The survey also finds persistent strains of ethnic nationalism among Russians, with about half (53%) saying Russia should be for Russians only, and 44% saying it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Democratic Freedoms More Valued

Against the backdrop of protests over the conduct of elections and the state of democracy in Russia, increasing numbers of Russians endorse the importance of key civic freedoms and institutions. Looking back a full ten years, five of the six measures of democratic freedom tested by the Global Attitudes Project have witnessed double-digit increases in terms of the percentage of Russians describing them as “very important.”

As they have in the past, today Russians place the greatest value on a judiciary that treats all citizens equally (71%), but compared with 2009, more now also value a civilian-controlled military (up 14 percentage points), an uncensored media (up 12 points) and honest elections (up 11 points). The importance of free speech and religious freedom has grown more modestly over the past three years (up 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively).

Although growing numbers of Russians value civic freedoms and institutions, relatively few see these as a reality in their country. Roughly one-in-five or fewer say a fair judiciary (17%), honest elections (16%), uncensored media (15%) and a civilian-controlled military (14%) describe Russia very well. Slightly more (28%) say that freedom of speech is characteristic of their country, while almost half (46%) agree that citizens are generally free to practice their religion.

Comparing the percentage of Russians who place a high value on core political freedoms with the percentage who believe the same freedoms are a fact of life in Russia, it is possible to discern a growing gap between democracy’s promise and practice.

In light of this gap, it is not surprising to find only 31% of Russians are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This sentiment is pervasive across demographic groups. And although those with a favorable view of Putin are somewhat more upbeat about the state of democracy in Russia (36% satisfied), even within this group a majority (57%) see room for improvement.

Voting, Protests Seen as Important

Despite the public’s disappointment with democratization in Russia, the number of people who say voting matters has actually risen. In 1991, when the Times Mirror Center, precursor to the Pew Research Center, first asked if voting gave people an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things, just 47% agreed. In 2009, the balance of opinion showed more doubting the power of voting. But this spring there seems to be a renewed conviction that casting one’s vote matters – a 56%-majority now believes this to be true.

Positive shifts in the value placed on voting are evident across education and income groups. Meanwhile, attitudes among older Russians appear to have “caught up” with those of younger Russians. In 2009, just over half (54%) of those ages 18-29 said that voting gave them a say about governance, but fewer among 30-49 year olds (42%) or those over 50 (38%) felt the same. Today, about the same number of 18-29 year olds think voting matters (51%), but more among the 30-49 and 50-plus cohorts now share this view, (55% and 61%, respectively).

Along with generally endorsing the importance of voting, a strong majority of Russians (64%) believe that attending protests or demonstrations is an effective way for average citizens to comment on the government’s actions. And more than half (56%) say they support the protests for fair elections that arose in the wake of the controversial parliamentary vote in December of last year.

While some in Russia have suggested that the protests for fair elections are the result of Western meddling, most Russians (58%) disagree, attributing the demonstrations instead to genuine dissatisfaction among the public.

Mixed Reaction to Presidential Vote

Protests in the wake of the December 2011 parliamentary elections brought to the fore questions about the fairness of the March 4, 2012 presidential vote. Following Putin’s first-round victory, the public offers a mixed assessment of the balloting: 47% believe the election was free from manipulation, while roughly a third (35%) disagree and 18% are uncertain.

Overall, a majority (56%) say they are satisfied with the results of the election, compared with a third (33%) who are dissatisfied. One-in-ten do not have an opinion either way.

The perceived fairness of the March 4th vote is a key factor influencing satisfaction with the outcome. Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) who think the election was “clean” say they are satisfied with the outcome. By contrast, only one-in-five who believe the vote was unfair say the same. Russians who are unsure whether the election was fair, meanwhile, tend to be satisfied (46%) with Putin’s victory.

Not surprisingly, reaction to the election results is especially positive among Russians who hold a favorable opinion of Putin (71% satisfied) and those who feel they are better off financially than they were five years ago (71% satisfied).

Putin’s Continued Appeal

While some Russians may have their doubts about the fairness of the March 4th presidential vote, Putin clearly remains popular. Roughly seven-in-ten (72%) say they have a favorable opinion of the returning president. Only about a quarter (24%) of respondents voice the opposite view.

Putin’s base of support is broad, although he is especially popular among women, Russians ages 30-49 and those with less than a college education. Overall, opinion of the newly elected president is more influenced by views of the economy and perceived social mobility. People who say the economy is good and feel they are better off than their parents are more likely to have a positive view of Putin. To the degree that democratic leanings help shape attitudes toward Putin, those who say an uncensored media is very important are less likely to have a favorable opinion of Russia’s long-time leader.

Dmitri Medvedev, who will now be stepping into the role of prime minister, is also widely popular. Two-thirds of Russians have a favorable view of Medvedev, while only 28% voice an unfavorable opinion.

In terms of public support, Putin and Medvedev clearly stand out from other figures on Russia’s political stage. Among the presidential candidates this spring, for example, Putin is the only one viewed favorably by a majority of Russians. Indeed, on balance, opinions of veteran politicians such as Communist Party head Zyuganov, A Just Russia’s Mironov and Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky are negative (52%, 51% and 66% unfavorable, respectively).

Views are similarly negative for presidential candidate Prokhorov: roughly half (48%) have an unfavorable view of the billionaire businessman. Meanwhile, among the relatively few Russians familiar with Alexei Navalny, the online activist and a prominent organizer of anti-government protests, views also tend to be more negative than positive (31% vs. 16%).

Challenges Ahead?

As Putin assumes the presidency for the third time, he faces a public with mixed views about the state of their nation. At home, opinion is nearly evenly split as to whether the country is headed in the right direction. On one hand, more today (46%) than at any point since 2008 say things are going well. But on the other, worries persist. In particular, a majority (64%) continues to describe the economy as bad.

Internationally, meanwhile, Russians show signs of insecurity. Slightly more than half (55%) believe their country is generally disliked by other countries – an increase of 8 percentage points since 2010. And fully 73% say Russia deserves to be more respected around the world than it currently is.

The desire for enhanced prestige on the world stage coexists with a persistent strain of ethnic nationalism. Roughly half (53%) of Russians say their homeland should be for Russians, while 44% think it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Views on the fairness of the election, however, are more mixed. Only a plurality believe the presidential election was “clean,” while a substantial minority question the integrity of the balloting, and almost one-in-five are unsure.

Overall, a clear majority of Russians endorse the notion that protests and demonstrations provide people an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things. And most – including many Putin-backers – say they support the fair-elections protests that began in the wake of the December 2011 parliamentary vote.

Interestingly, compared with a few years ago, more Russians today see their vote as a way to communicate their opinion about governance, even as many continue to doubt elected officials actually pay heed to what average citizens think.

Views on the Presidential Vote

A modest majority of Russians (56%) say they are satisfied with the results of the March 4th election, while a third say they are not. One-in-ten do not offer an opinion.

Views on the fairness of the election are more mixed. Just 47% believe balloting was free from manipulation, while roughly a third (35%) disagree and 18% are uncertain.

The perceived fairness of the March 4th vote is a key factor influencing satisfaction with the outcome. Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) who think the election was fair say they are satisfied with the outcome. By contrast, only one-in-five who believe the vote was unfair say the same. Russians who are unsure whether the election was fair, meanwhile, tend to be somewhat content with Putin’s victory (46% satisfied vs. 23% dissatisfied).

As one might expect, Russians who hold a favorable opinion of Putin generally express satisfaction with the March 4th election results: 71% in this group are pleased with the former president’s victory, while just 20% are not. The inverse is true among those who have a negative view of Putin – only 17% express satisfaction with the election outcome, compared with 72% who are dissatisfied.

Reaction to the election is also split along party lines. Nearly eight-in-ten Russians (78%) who identify with United Russia, Putin’s governing party, say they are satisfied with the March vote, while only 16% are displeased. By contrast, only 31% among those aligned with the Communist Party are satisfied with the election results, compared with nearly six-in-ten (58%) who are not. Reaction to Putin’s victory is more divided among Russians aligned with other parties (41% satisfied, 50% dissatisfied) or no party (46% satisfied, 37% dissatisfied).

Putin’s return to the presidency is clearly a positive outcome for those who feel they are better off than five years ago. Roughly seven-in-ten (71%) in this group say they are satisfied with the results of the March 4th vote, compared with 21% who are dissatisfied. Among those who say their circumstances are unchanged from five years ago, reaction to the election is mostly positive: 54% satisfied, 33% dissatisfied. Among those who feel worse off today, opinion is divided regarding Putin’s first-round triumph, with 42% expressing satisfaction and 47% saying they are dissatisfied.

Support for Protests

Russians generally endorse the value of popular protests, with 64% saying they mostly or completely agree that attending demonstrations gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about how the government runs things. Roughly a quarter (27%) disagree, while 8% don’t have a definite opinion.

Asked specifically about the protests that arose in the wake of the December parliamentary vote, a 56%-majority say they support the protests, compared with a third who oppose the demonstrations and one-in-ten who do not offer an opinion.

Only a quarter of the Russian public subscribes to the view that the protests of the last several months are the result of Western powers attempting to destabilize Russia. Rather, nearly six-in-ten (58%) believe the demonstrations emanate from genuine Russian dissatisfaction with the conduct of elections.

Support for the recent protests is somewhat higher among men than women (61% vs. 52%). People with at least a college education are more supportive than those with secondary education or less (63% vs. 49%).

Notably, Russians who have a favorable opinion of Putin are divided over the issue of the fair-election protests (48% support vs. 42% oppose), while those who view Putin unfavorably clearly back the protesters (79% support vs. 12% oppose). Similarly, those who question the integrity of the March 4th presidential vote clearly come out in favor of the demonstrators by a 74% to 17% margin. Meanwhile, those who believe the election was fair tend to object to the protests (41% support vs. 51% oppose).

Voting Matters

Against the backdrop of protests demanding “clean” elections, a majority of (56%) of Russians say that voting gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things. Just over a third (37%) disagree.

Compared with previous years, belief in the importance of voting has strengthened. In 1991, for example, when Russians were first asked if voting gave people a voice, opinion was divided: 47% said yes, while 43% said no. By 2009, the public had actually soured somewhat toward the ballot box, with 44% saying their vote mattered, but more than half (54%) saying it did not.

Today, attitudes toward voting are fairly consistent across demographic groups. In terms of change over time, however, one of the most dramatic increases has occurred among Russians age 30 and older. In 2009, just 42% of those 30-49 and 38% of those over 50 felt their vote mattered. Today, 55% and 61%, respectively, feel this is true. Among young people, meanwhile, attitudes toward voting have remained about the same: in 2009, 54% of 18-29 year olds said voting gave them a voice; today, roughly the same number (51%) still hold this view.

Despite the increased importance placed on voting, Russians are not convinced that their voices matter to those in power. Six-in-ten, for instance, doubt that elected officials care what people like themselves think, while just a third believe elected office-holders care about public opinion.

Though a minority, the number of Russians who believe elected officials care about citizens’ views is actually higher than in years past. In 2009, only about a quarter (26%) held this view, while in 1991 just 18% thought this was the case.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

Moreover, most Lithuanians blame individual failure on personal shortcomings, while Ukrainians and Russians are more divided on whether to blame society or the individual. However, there is overwhelming agreement across these three former Soviet republics that the state should play an active role in society so that nobody is in need.

Reasons for Success

A majority of Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition than other people, while 41% say people who get ahead do so mainly at the expense of others. In contrast, fewer than four-in-ten in Russia (38%) and Ukraine (32%) say people succeed because of their own ability.

Ukrainians and Russians are more likely than they were two decades ago to say that people get ahead at other people’s expense. This is especially the case in Ukraine, where 44% shared this view in 1991. The change has been more modest in Russia; 46% said that people got ahead at the expense of others in 1991. Opinions in Lithuania have remained generally steady since the early 1990’s.

Younger people, who grew up in post-communist societies, are less likely than older generations to say that people who get ahead do so at the expense of others; rather, young people tend to credit ability and ambition. For example, just 37% of Russians younger than 30 believe that people get ahead at the expense of others, compared with majorities of those ages 30 to 49 (56%), 50 to 65 (60%) and ages 65 or older (66%). A similar pattern is evident in Ukraine, but not as clear among Lithuanians.

Reasons for Failure

Nearly six-in-ten (58%) in Lithuania say that people who don’t succeed in life fail as the result of their own shortcomings, while only about a third (34%) blame society at large. A plurality (47%) in Russia also points to personal shortcomings, but only somewhat fewer (40%) say society is to blame for individual failures.

Ukrainians, however, have the opposite view, with only 40% saying that people who don’t succeed do so because of their own personal failures; about half (49%) say that people who don’t succeed in life fail because of society’s faults. In all three countries, views on what is to blame for one’s lack of success have remained stable since the question was last asked in 1991.

For the most part, views on personal failure do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Russia, however, those who are 65 or older tend to place more blame on society than do those in younger generations. This gap is particularly notable between the older generation and those who are younger than 30. Half of Russians ages 65 or older say people who don’t succeed have society to blame, while 30% say personal shortcomings are responsible for individual failure; among the younger group, 55% blame individuals themselves, while 36% hold society responsible.

Role of the State

When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” overwhelming majorities in all three countries favor a stronger role for the state. At least two-thirds of Russians (68%), Ukrainians (75%), and Lithuanians (76%) prefer that the state ensures that nobody is in need within their society. Few in each country prioritize freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference.

Opinions in these three former Soviet republics are consistent with those of other Eastern and Western European publics. In a 2009 survey, opinions from the rest of Europe generally conformed to this pattern. Majorities or pluralities in all European countries in fall 2009 said that it is more important that the state ensure that no one is in need. (For more information on European views on this issue, see “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

People in the three former Soviet republics surveyed now consider freedom from state interference much less of a priority than they did 20 years ago. The steepest decline has occurred in Ukraine, where the percentage saying that they should be able to pursue life’s goals unhindered has dropped by 33 percentage points, from 54% in 1991. Comparable declines have also occurred in Russia (-27 percentage points) and Lithuania (-20 percentage points).

In the three countries, those younger than 30 are about twice as likely as those ages 65 and older to prefer a society where everyone is free to pursue life’s goals; still, solid majorities across all age groups say ensuring nobody is in need should be the state’s priority.

Survey Report

As has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many important ways. Most notably, Americans are more individualistic and are less supportive of a strong safety net than are the publics of Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Americans are also considerably more religious than Western Europeans, and are more socially conservative with respect to homosexuality.

Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Moreover, Americans more often than their Western European allies believe that obtaining UN approval before their country uses military force would make it too difficult to deal with an international threat. And Americans are less inclined than the Western Europeans, with the exception of the French, to help other nations.

These differences between Americans and Western Europeans echo findings from previous surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. However, the current polling shows the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to that of other nations. Today, only about half of Americans believe their culture is superior to others, compared with six-in-ten in 2002. And the polling finds younger Americans less apt than their elders to hold American exceptionalist attitudes.

These are among the findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Spain from March 21 to April 14 as part of the broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011.

Use of Military Force

Three-quarters of Americans agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world; this view is shared by seven-in-ten in Britain and narrower majorities in France and Spain (62% each). Germans are evenly divided, with half saying the use of force is sometimes necessary and half saying it is not.

Germans are more supportive of the use of military force than they have been in recent years. For example, in 2007, just about four-in-ten (41%) Germans agreed that it was sometimes necessary, while 58% disagreed. Opinions have been more stable in the U.S., Britain and France.

For the most part, opinions about the use of force do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Germany and Spain, however, support for the use of military force is far more widespread among men than among women. Six-in-ten German men agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world, compared with just 40% of women. And while majorities across gender groups in Spain believe the use of force may be necessary, more Spanish men than Spanish women say this is the case (68% vs. 56%).

In Britain, France, Spain and the U.S., conservatives, or those on the political right, are more likely than liberals, or those on the left, to agree that the use of force is sometimes necessary to maintain world order. However, in the four countries, majorities across ideological groups express this view.¹

When asked whether their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with international threats, American opinion differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Americans are almost evenly divided on the question, with 45% saying that the U.S. should have UN approval while 44% say this would make it too difficult to deal with threats; in contrast, solid majorities in the four Western European nations surveyed, including about three-quarters in Spain (74%) and Germany (76%) say their country should have UN approval before it takes military action.

In Western Europe, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say their country should have UN approval before using military force, although majorities across both groups share this view. For example, in Spain, 84% of those who graduated from college say UN approval should be obtained, compared with 70% of those who do not have a college degree. Double-digit differences are also evident in Britain (15 percentage points), Germany (11 points) and France (10 points). This is not the case in the U.S., where respondents across education groups offer nearly identical views.

In Germany, gender differences are also notable; even though German men are more likely than women to say the use of military force is sometimes necessary, more men than women say their country should have UN approval before using force (83% vs. 70%).

The view that their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with threats is far more prevalent among American liberals than among conservatives. Close to six-in-ten (57%) liberals favor obtaining UN approval, while 33% say this would make it too difficult for the U.S. to deal with threats; in contrast, most conservatives (52%) say getting UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with threats, while 38% say this is an important step. Political moderates fall between the other two groups, with 49% saying the U.S. should seek the approval of the UN before using military force and 42% saying this would make it too difficult to deal with threats. The same ideological difference is generally not evident in Western Europe.

Views on International Engagement

About four-in-ten (39%) Americans say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems, while a narrow majority (52%) says the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems as best they can. In this regard, Americans are not drastically different from respondents in France, where 43% believe their country should help other countries and 57% say it should focus on its own problems.

The British are nearly evenly divided; 45% say their country should help other countries deal with their problems and about the same number (48%) believe Britain should deal with its own problems.

Compared with the U.S., France and Britain, Spain and Germany stand out as the only countries where majorities favor international engagement: 55% and 54%, respectively, say their countries should provide assistance to others, while 40% in Spain and 43% in Germany take the more isolationist view.

Opinions about international engagement have changed somewhat in the U.S., France and Spain since last year, but while publics in the two Western European countries are now more in favor of helping others than they were in 2010, more Americans currently take an isolationist position. Last year, about the same number of Americans said their country should help other countries (45%) as said it should let other countries deal with their own problems (46%). Similarly, the Spanish were nearly evenly divided, with 49% favoring engagement and 47% taking an isolationist approach. In France, where a majority continues to take an isolationist view, even more (65%) did so a year ago.

In the U.S. as well as in the four Western European countries surveyed, those with a college degree are far more likely than those with less education to offer an internationalist view. This is especially the case in Germany, where about three-quarters (73%) of those who graduated from college believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems, compared with a narrow majority (52%) of those without a college degree.

Political ideology is also a factor in Germany, France and Spain. In these three countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to take the isolationist view when it comes to international engagement. For example, while about half (48%) of left-wing French say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, about six-in-ten (59%) on the right offer this opinion.

Cultural Superiority

About half of Americans (49%) and Germans (47%) agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;” 44% in Spain share this view. In Britain and France, only about a third or fewer (32% and 27%, respectively) think their culture is better than others.

While opinions about cultural superiority have remained relatively stable over the years in the four Western European countries surveyed, Americans are now far less likely to say that their culture is better than others; six-in-ten Americans held this belief in 2002 and 55% did so in 2007. Belief in cultural superiority has declined among Americans across age, gender and education groups.

As in past surveys, older Americans remain far more inclined than younger ones to believe that their culture is better than others. Six-in-ten Americans ages 50 or older share this view, while 34% disagree; those younger than 30 hold the opposite view, with just 37% saying American culture is superior and 61% saying it is not. Opinions are more divided among those ages 30 to 49; 44% in this group see American culture as superior and 50% do not.

Similar age gaps are not as common in the Western European countries surveyed, with the exception of Spain, where majorities of older respondents, but not among younger ones, also think their culture is better than others; 55% of those ages 50 or older say this is the case, compared with 34% of those ages 30 to 49 and 39% of those younger than 30.

As is the case on other measures, opinions about cultural superiority vary considerably by educational attainment. In the four Western European countries and in the U.S., those who did not graduate from college are more likely than those who did to agree that their culture is superior, even if their people are not perfect. For example, Germans with less education are about twice as likely as those with a college degree to believe their culture is superior (49% vs. 25%); double-digit differences are also present in France (20 percentage points), Spain (18 points) and Britain (11 points), while a less pronounced gap is evident in the U.S. (9 points).

Finally, among Americans and Germans, political conservative are especially likely to believe their culture is superior to others. In the U.S., 63% of conservatives take this view, compared with 45% of moderates and just 34% of liberals. Similarly, a majority (54%) of right-wing Germans see their culture as superior, while 47% of moderates and 33% of those on the political left agree.

Individualism and the Role of the State

American opinions continue to differ considerably from those of Western Europeans when it comes to views of individualism and the role of the state. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) Americans believe it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state, while just 35% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need.

In contrast, at least six-in-ten in Spain (67%), France (64%) and Germany (62%) and 55% in Britain say the state should ensure that nobody is in need; about four-in-ten or fewer consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In the U.S., Britain, France and Germany, views of the role of the state divide significantly across ideological lines. For example, three-quarters of American conservatives say individuals should be free to pursue their goals without interference from the state, while 21% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need; among liberals in the U.S., half would like the state to play an active role to help the needy, while 42% prefer a more limited role for the state.

Those on the political right in Britain, France and Germany are also more likely than those on the left in these countries to prioritize freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference. Unlike in the U.S., however, majorities of those on the right in France (57%) and Germany (56%) favor an active role for the state, as do more than four-in-ten (45%) conservatives in Britain.

American opinions about the role of the state also vary considerably across age groups. About half (47%) of those younger than 30 prioritize the freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state and a similar percentage (46%) say it is more important for the state to ensure that nobody is in need; among older Americans, however, about six-in-ten consider being free a higher priority, with just about three-in-ten saying the state should play an active role so that nobody is in need. No such age difference is evident in the four Western European countries surveyed.

Asked if they agree that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” Americans again offer more individualistic views than those expressed by Western Europeans. Only 36% of Americans believe they have little control over their fate, compared with 50% in Spain, 57% in France and 72% in Germany; Britain is the only Western European country surveyed where fewer than half (41%) share this view.

In the U.S. and in Western Europe, those without a college degree are less individualistic than those who have graduated from college; this is especially the case in the U.S. and Germany. About three-quarters (74%) of Germans in the less educated group believe that success in life is largely determined by forces beyond one’s control, compared with 55% of college graduates. Among Americans, 41% of those without a college degree say they have little control over their fate, while just 22% of college graduates share this view.

Religion More Important to Americans

Americans also distinguish themselves from Western Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.

Moreover, Americans are far more inclined than Western Europeans to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 53% say this is the case in the U.S., compared with just one-third in Germany, 20% in Britain, 19% in Spain and 15% in France.

In the U.S., women and older respondents place more importance on religion and are more likely than men and younger people to say that faith in God is a necessary foundation for morality and good values. About six-in-ten (59%) American women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41% of men; and while a majority (56%) of Americans ages 50 and older say religion is very important to them, 48% of those ages 30 to 49 and 41% of those younger than 30 place similar importance on religion.

Similarly, while a majority of American women (58%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, men are nearly evenly divided, with 47% saying belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality and 51% saying it is not. Among Americans ages 50 and older, 58% say one must believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 50% of those ages 30 to 49 and 46% of those younger than 30 share this view.

Education also plays a role in views of religion in the U.S., to some extent. Although Americans with a college degree are about as likely as those without to say religion is very important to them (47% and 51%, respectively), the less educated are far more inclined to say that one must believe in God in order to be moral; 59% of those without a college degree say this, compared with 37% of those who have graduated from college.

Views of religion and whether belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality vary little, if at all, across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed. In Spain, however, respondents ages 50 and older place more importance on religion than do younger people, although relatively few in this age group say it is very important to them; 33% say this is the case, compared with 16% of those ages 30 to 49 and 11% of those younger than 30.

Politically, conservatives in the U.S., Spain and Germany are more likely than liberals to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, but while solid majorities of conservatives in the U.S. (66%) take this position, fewer than half of conservatives in Spain (31%) and Germany (46%) share this view. Meanwhile, just 26% of liberals in the U.S., 11% in Spain and 19% in Germany say belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality. Conservatives in the U.S. are also far more likely than liberals to consider religion very important in their lives (67% vs. 29%); in Western Europe, few across ideological groups place high importance on religion.

Religious vs. National Identity

American Christians are more likely than their Western European counterparts to think of themselves first in terms of their religion rather than their nationality; 46% of Christians in the U.S. see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In contrast, majorities of Christians in France (90%), Germany (70%), Britain (63%) and Spain (53%) identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

In Britain, France and Germany, more Christians now see themselves in terms of their nationality than did so five years ago, when national identification was already widespread in these countries. This change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

Among Christians in the U.S., white evangelicals are especially inclined to identify first with their faith; 70% in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among other American Christians, more identify with their nationality (55%) than with their religion (38%).

Homosexuality

Tolerance for homosexuality is widespread in the U.S. and Western Europe, but far more Western Europeans than Americans say homosexuality should be accepted by society; at least eight-in-ten in Spain (91%), Germany (87%), France (86%) and Britain (81%), compared with 60% in the U.S.

Acceptance of homosexuality has increased in recent years, and the shift is especially notable in the U.S., where only slightly more said it should be accepted (49%) than said it should be rejected (41%) in 2007. Today, more Americans accept homosexuality than reject it by a 27-percentage point margin.

While there are some differences in opinions of homosexuality across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed, overwhelming majorities across age, education and gender groups believe homosexuality should be accepted by society. In the U.S., however, these differences are somewhat more pronounced. For example, while 67% of American women believe homosexuality should be accepted, a much narrower majority of men (54%) share that view. Among Americans with college degrees, 71% accept homosexuality, compared with 56% of those with less education. Finally, about two-thirds (68%) of Americans younger than 30 say homosexuality should be accepted by society; 61% of those ages 30 to 40 and 55% of those ages 50 and older share this view.

In addition to demographic differences, an ideological divide on views of homosexuality is also notable in the U.S., where more than eight-in-ten (85%) liberals and 65% of moderates express tolerant views, compared with 44% of conservatives. In the four Western European countries surveyed, at least three-quarters across ideological groups say homosexuality should be accepted by society.

National Discontent Widespread

People around the world are largely dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country. But this bleak mood showed some signs of easing over the last year, with levels of dissatisfaction decreasing in ten countries, staying about the same in eight and increasing in only three.

In 19 of 22 countries surveyed majorities are unhappy with their nation’s direction. At least three-quarters of Lebanese (86%), Pakistanis (84%), Kenyans (82%), Mexicans (79%), Japanese (76%) and Spanish (76%) are discontented. Roughly six-in-ten Americans also are dissatisfied.

As might be expected, some of this discontent tracks national economic fortunes. Spanish dissatisfaction has risen 31 percentage points since spring 2007, before the economic crisis hit. Additionally, there has been a 22-point rise in unhappiness in Jordan and an 18-point increase in Egypt over that period. In that three-year time frame, Spain’s growth turned sharply negative and the Egyptian and Jordanian economies slowed dramatically. Similarly, strong majorities of the Japanese have been unhappy with their nation’s direction throughout the decade as their economy has struggled.

But dissatisfaction may reflect other concerns. For example, in France dissatisfaction is somewhat lower now than before the recession, even though the economy is underperforming.

Only the Chinese are clearly satisfied with the way things are going in their country; 87% express a positive opinion. Chinese contentment is unchanged from last year, but satisfaction has improved dramatically – 39 percentage points – since the first Pew Global Attitudes survey in 2002.

Economy Recovers But Not Enough

Economists report that the world is recovering from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. But strong majorities in most nations still give their country’s current economic situation a thumbs down.

In most nations, the portion of the public that thinks their economy is doing well is only a fraction of what it was before the recession hit. In 2007, in the United States, 50% of the public thought the economy was doing well. In 2010, only 24% thinks so. Similarly, in France (13%) and Japan (12%), the portion of the public saying their economy is good is less than half the number who felt that way just three years ago.

And almost everywhere people remain fairly glum about economic conditions. Only about one-in-eight people in France, Spain, Japan and Lebanon believe economic conditions are good. And about one-in-five British, Egyptians, Pakistanis and South Koreans concur.

Nevertheless, in nearly half the countries surveyed people gave higher marks to their national economy in 2010 than in 2009.  And the number of people saying their economy was good grew sharply in some countries, by 24 percentage points in Poland and Kenya and 16 points in Germany. Only in four nations did the assessment of the national economy go down, most notably in India, by 16 points.

The Chinese are the most positive about their domestic economic situation, by far; about nine-in-ten Chinese say times are good. By comparison, in Brazil, where ratings of the national economy are the second-highest, 62% offer this positive assessment.

Unconvinced About the Future

Despite some improvement in their assessment of their current economic situation, publics remain unconvinced about the next 12 months. In most parts of the world, there has been almost no uptick in economic optimism in the last year. The exceptions are Kenya, where confidence is up 31 percentage points, Poland, where it is up 15 points, and Nigeria, where it is up 12 points.

The most hopeful about economic conditions improving over the next year are Chinese, Nigerians and Brazilians, at least three-quarters of whom are upbeat. And one-in-three Brazilians and Nigerians think their economy will improve a lot.

Pluralities in Britain, Germany and Spain also think economic conditions will get better. France is the lone exception among Western Europeans, where a plurality of the population actually expects the economy to worsen. This general European optimism is particularly notable because the survey was conducted in the last two weeks in April as the high profile public debate over the implications of the Greek economic crisis was building.

Yet, worldwide, majorities or pluralities in only 11 of 22 nations expect conditions to improve in the short run. The least optimistic are the Japanese and the Pakistanis; half of Pakistanis actually think their economy will worsen in the next 12 months. Pessimism is particularly pronounced in the Middle East as well, where about half of Lebanese, 38% of Egyptians and 35% of Jordanians foresee a bleak economic future.

Blame and Responsibility

Most people blame their own government for their current economic problems, although the Europeans are most critical of the financial sector. Despite reason to believe that the recent economic crisis emanated from the United States, people in many parts of the world are more likely to hold themselves responsible than they are to point the finger at Uncle Sam.

In most of the countries surveyed in Asia, Africa and Latin America overwhelming majorities of those who think their economy is bad say their government is responsible. About nine-in-ten Indonesians, Kenyans, Nigerians, South Koreans, Pakistanis, Mexicans and Lebanese name the government as the principal or secondary culprit for their recent economic misfortunes.

In contrast, Europeans strongly blame banks and other financial institutions for their troubles, with Germans and British the most likely to blame those institutions.

In the wake of the financial crisis that triggered the global recession, relatively few in most of these countries blame the U.S. for the downturn. People in Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon and Nigeria, among others, are more likely to say the responsibility for their current economic problems lies with themselves and their fellow countrymen rather than with the United States.

Governments’ Poor Job

Whoever is accountable, half or more of the population in 16 of 22 countries surveyed thinks their government is doing a poor job dealing with the economy. This includes more than two-thirds of the people in Japan (84%), Korea (72%), Egypt (72%), Lebanon (71%), Spain (69%) and Argentina (68%). But only half of Americans (50%) express such dissatisfaction. And Americans are more likely to say their government is doing a good job than people in 14 of the 21 other nations polled.

Satisfaction with government’s management of the economy tracks a positive assessment of the current economy and high hopes for the future. The Chinese, Brazilians and Indians are all among the most upbeat about economic conditions, the most optimistic about the next 12 months and most likely to praise their public officials’ handling of the economy.

People in most major advanced economies would like their governments to do more, at least when it comes to regulating the financial sector. This is particularly the case in Western Europe, where overwhelming majorities – 91% in Germany, 85% in Britain, 78% in France and 72% in Spain – think it would be a good idea for the government to more strictly regulate the way large financial companies, such as banks, do business. A smaller portion of Americans (62%) agree. However, the Asians surveyed are not so sure more regulation is in order. Barely half of South Koreans (52%) and only a third of Japanese (34%) think tighter strictures are a good idea.

A Europe Divided

The economic crisis has affected attitudes in Europe, where Europeans are of two minds: They are supportive of the main institutions of a united Europe and skeptical about European economic integration.

European attitudes toward the EU remain largely positive. Strong majorities of Poles (81%), Spanish (77%), French (64%) and Germans (62%) and a plurality of the British (49%) see the EU in a favorable light, sentiment that is largely unchanged from 2009. And overall approval is stable even in France, where a quarter of the public thinks the European Union is the principal or secondary cause of France’s current economic problems.

And the financial market turbulence recently afflicting the euro has not undermined public support for the single European currency. Only about a third of French (34%), Germans (32%) and Spanish (30%) would like to return to their original national currencies.

But Europeans disagree over providing financial assistance to other EU members that face major financial problems (interviews were conducted prior to the May 9 EU decision to provide financial assistance to Greece). The British (61%) and Germans (56%) oppose such aid, while the French (53%) support it. As might be expected, those who view the EU favorably in all three nations overwhelmingly back assistance.

The bailout is clearly a partisan issue in Britain, less so in Germany and not nearly as politically divisive in France. A majority of British who identify themselves as on the left of the political spectrum support providing financial assistance to fellow EU countries in distress. Only a third of British conservatives agree. And in both Britain and Germany, it is the lukewarm backing for aid by moderates that undermines overall public support for such action.

However, with respect to Greece, the initial recipient of aid from other European Union governments, only in Germany is anti-bailout sentiment accompanied by a preponderance of negative views of that debt-strapped nation. A majority of Germans (52%) have an unfavorable view of Greece, while majorities of French (65%) and British (60%) and half the Spanish (50%) still hold favorable views.

More broadly, despite generally positive support for the European Union, nearly two-thirds of the French (63%) and more than half the British (57%) think their economy has been weakened by European integration. Germans are evenly divided on the issue. A bare majority of Spanish say their economy has been strengthened. Only the Poles (68%) credit a united Europe with strengthening their economy.

Moreover, negative views about economic integration have grown over the years in Western Europe, by 23 percentage points in Spain, 19 points in France and 19 points in Britain since 1991. And, especially in Britain, sentiment on this issue divides along ideological lines. A slim majority (52%) of people on the left of the British political spectrum think European economic integration has strengthened their country, while only 28% of centrists and 33% of those on the right agree.

Markets and Globalization

Contrary to widespread fears that the global recession would undermine public support for free markets and globalization, backing remains strong. Majorities in 19 of the 22 nations surveyed think people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some people are poor. The strongest support is in China (84%) and Nigeria (82%), where eight-in-ten people back capitalism. Only in Japan (55%) does a majority disagree that most people are better off in free markets. Overall, support for a market-based economy is up in nine nations and down in seven, with the largest improvement in Nigeria (16 percentage points) and the greatest erosion of support in Kenya (12 points).

Overwhelming majorities in most countries say growing world trade is good for their country. The weakest such backing is in Egypt and the U.S., where only about two-thirds of the public favors economic globalization. But support for trade among Americans of all political persuasions has increased since 2008. And, contrary to the widely held view that Republicans are free traders and Democrats are protectionists, 75% of self-identified Democrats say trade is good for the U.S., up four percentage points from 2009, compared with only 61% of Republicans and 63% of independents, whose support remained unchanged.

With trade held in a favorable light by a large portion of the global public, the intensity of such feelings may be a better indicator of sentiment. More than six-in-ten Pakistanis (63%), half of Turks and almost as many Indians (47%), Kenyans (46%) and Lebanese (46%) say trade is very good for their country. But Americans (17%) and Japanese (16%) are far less passionate.

In one sign of the adverse impact of the global recession on China’s exports and thus on people’s jobs, only one-in-five Chinese now think trade is very good for China, down from 38% in 2007, before the downturn in world trade.

Which Is the Leading Economic Power?

In the global marketplace, majorities or pluralities in 14 of 22 nations think the U.S. is the world’s leading economic power. This view is especially common among South Koreans (77%), Turks (69%), Kenyans (61%), and Indians (60%). The U.S. is named least often as the world’s leading economic power in Germany (18%). The greatest falloff over the last year has been in Jordan, where the percentage naming the U.S. declined from 49% to 30%, and in Japan where it dropped from 58% to 40%.

China is clearly on the rise. Majorities or pluralities in eight nations say China is the economic leader. In 2009, people in only two countries saw China in that role. Today, roughly half of Germans (51%), Jordanians (50%), Japanese (50%) and French (47%) and 44% of the British assign the top spot to China. Even in the U.S., about equal proportions of the public accord economic superpower status to America (38%) and China (41%).

Since 2009, in 13 of the 21 countries for which trends are available, the portion of the public that views China as the world’s leading economic power has grown, including increases of 29 percentage points in Japan, 23 points in Germany and 21 points in Jordan. China scored significant gains in all the nations surveyed in the European Union and in the Middle East, the two regions where people are most likely to accord China the leading economic role.

But opinions in Asia vary. The perception that China’s is the world’s economic leader is highest in Japan (50%). However, only one-in-ten Indians (11%), one-in-seven South Koreans (15%) and one-in-five Pakistanis (21%) and Indonesians (20%) agree that China is the world’s leading economic power. The Chinese themselves are actually slightly less likely to place their country in the top position today (36%) than they were a year ago (41%).

The European Union is almost nowhere seen as an equal to the U.S. or China, with perceptions of the EU’s leading role mostly in single digits. The lone exception is in India, which has an equally low regard for both China and the EU. In both the U.S. and China, only 6% see the EU as the global economic leader. European publics’ faith in the EU as an economic superpower has also been undermined. The portion of the German public that sees the Brussels-based institution as the world’s top economic power has dropped from 36% to 19% in just the last year.

As the global economy begins to rebound from the great recession, people around the world remain deeply concerned with the way things are going in their countries. Less than a third of the publics in most nations say they are satisfied with national conditions, as overwhelming numbers say their economies are in bad shape. And just about everywhere, governments are faulted for the way they are dealing with the economy.

Yet in most countries, especially in wealthier nations, President Barack Obama gets an enthusiastic thumbs up for the way he has handled the world economic crisis. The notable exception is the United States itself, where as many disapprove of their president’s approach to the global recession as approve.

This pattern is indicative of the broader picture of global opinion in 2010. President Barack Obama remains popular in most parts of the world, although his job approval rating in the U.S. has declined sharply since he first took office.¹ In turn, opinions of the U.S., which improved markedly in 2009 in response to Obama’s new presidency, also have remained far more positive than they were for much of George W. Bush’s tenure.

Ratings of America are overwhelmingly favorable in Western Europe. For example, 73% in France and 63% in Germany say they have a favorable view of the U.S. Moreover, ratings of America have improved sharply in Russia (57%), up 13 percentage points since 2009, in China (58%), up 11 points, and in Japan (66%), up 7 points. Opinions are also highly positive in other nations around the world including South Korea (79%), Poland (74%), and Brazil (62%).

The U.S. continues to receive positive marks in India, where 66% express a favorable opinion, although this is down from last year when 76% held this view. America’s overall image has also slipped slightly in Indonesia, although 59% still give the U.S. a positive rating in the world’s largest predominantly Muslim nation.

Publics of other largely Muslim countries continue to hold overwhelmingly negative views of the U.S. In both Turkey and Pakistan – where ratings for the U.S. have been consistently low in recent years – only 17% hold a positive opinion. Indeed, the new poll finds opinion of the U.S. slipping in some Muslim countries where opinion had edged up in 2009. In Egypt, America’s favorability rating dropped from 27% to 17% – the lowest percentage observed in any of the Pew Global Attitudes surveys conducted in that country since 2006.

Closer to home, a special follow-up poll found America’s favorable rating tumbling in Mexico in response to Arizona’s enactment of a law aimed at dealing with illegal immigration by giving police increased powers to stop and detain people who are suspected of being in the country illegally. Only 44% of Mexicans gave the U.S. a favorable rating following the signing of the bill, compared with 62% who did so before the bill passed.

The new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted April 7 to May 8, also finds that overall opinion of Barack Obama remains broadly positive in most non-Muslim nations. In these countries, the national median confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs is 71%, and overall approval of his policies is 64%. In particular, huge percentages in Germany (88%), France (84%), Spain (76%) and Britain (64%) say they back the president’s policies. Similarly in the two African nations polled Obama gets high marks – 89% of Kenyans and 74% of Nigerians approve of his international policies.

Muslims Grow Disillusioned About Obama

Among Muslim publics – except in Indonesia where Obama lived for several years as a child –  the modest levels of confidence and approval observed in 2009 have slipped markedly. In Egypt the percentage of Muslims expressing confidence in Obama fell from 41% to 31% and in Turkey from 33% to 23%. Last year only 13% of Pakistani Muslims expressed confidence in Obama, but this year even fewer (8%) hold this view. And while views of Obama are still more positive than were attitudes toward President Bush among most Muslim publics, significant percentages continue to worry that the U.S. could become a military threat to their country.

Obamamania Tempers

In countries outside of the Muslim world, where the president’s ratings remain generally positive, his standing is not quite as high in 2010 as it was a year ago. The new poll found fewer in many Asian and Latin American countries saying they have confidence in Obama and approve of his policies generally, and even in Europe the large majorities responding positively to his foreign policy are not quite as large as they were in 2009.

Besides declines in overall confidence in some countries, strong endorsement of Obama eroded in countries where he remains broadly popular. Notably, in Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, fewer this year say they have a lot of confidence in Obama’s judgment regarding world affairs, while more say some confidence; still there was no increase in the percentage expressing no confidence in Obama in these countries.

Even though Obama has called the Arizona immigration law “misdirected,” it is nonetheless having a negative impact on views of him in Mexico. Prior to the law’s passage, 47% of Mexicans had confidence in Obama’s international leadership, but after passage only 36% held this view. More specifically, 54% of Mexicans say they disapprove of the way Barack Obama is dealing with the new law, and as many as 75% say that about Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer.

Disagreeing While Not Disapproving

Perhaps more significant than Obama’s small declines in ratings is that a generally positive view of him and the U.S. coexists with significant concerns about the American approach to world affairs and some key policies. This was not the case in the global surveys taken during President Bush’s terms in office, when specific criticism ran hand in hand with anti-American and anti-Bush sentiment.

Then, as now, one of the most frequent criticisms of U.S. foreign policy is that in its formulation it does not take into account the interests of other countries. This is the prevailing point of view in 15 of 21 countries outside of the U.S. Somewhat fewer people in most countries level this charge than did so during the Bush era. Currently, the median number saying that the U.S. acts unilaterally is 63%; in 2007 a median of 67% expressed that view.

Mixed Reactions to American Policies

In contrast to the Bush years, there is substantial majority support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Britain, France, Spain and Germany. The new poll also found major increases in support of the American efforts in two countries that have been struggling with terrorism of late: Indonesia and Russia, where roughly seven-in-ten say they back the U.S. in this regard. Publics in India, Brazil, Kenya and Nigeria also express strong support for U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism. However, opposition to these policies is particularly strong in most Muslim countries, and it is also substantial in many nations where the U.S. is fairly well-regarded, including Japan and South Korea.

The war in Afghanistan remains largely unpopular. In Germany, which has the third largest contingent of allied troops in Afghanistan, nearly six-in-ten people favor withdrawal from that country. Opinions are more divided in NATO allies Britain, France and Poland. In most other countries surveyed, majorities or pluralities also oppose the NATO effort.

Global opinion of Barack Obama’s dealing with world trouble spots parallels general opinion of U.S. policies in these areas. With regard to Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, the polling found as many countries approving as disapproving of his handling of these issues. However, the American president gets his worst ratings for dealing with another world problem for which the U.S. is often criticized: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of 22 nations surveyed including the U.S., in only three nations do majorities approve of Obama’s handling of the dispute: France, Nigeria and Kenya.

In sharp contrast to criticisms and mixed reviews of Obama’s handling of geo-political problems, Obama not only gets good grades for the way he has handled the world economic crisis, but also for dealing with climate change. In most countries, people approve of Obama’s climate change efforts. France is a notable exception, with a 52%-majority disapproving, despite the country’s approval of his other policies.

Modest Economic Optimism

Global publics are mostly glum about the way things are going in their countries. And, despite signs of economic recovery in many parts of the world, people nearly everywhere, with the notable exception of China, India and Brazil, complain that their national economy is doing poorly. Moreover, there is little optimism about the economic future. And in the wake of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, more Europeans say integration has hurt their economies, although overall ratings for the EU remain favorable.

In 20 of 22 countries surveyed, less than half the population is satisfied with the direction of the country, including only 30% of Americans. Lebanese (11%) are the least satisfied. Only in China does an overwhelming portion of the population (87%) express satisfaction with national conditions. Overall, assessments are up in nine countries and down in only five.

Few people are happy with the current state of their national economy. In only four countries: China (91%), Brazil (62%), India (57%) and Poland (53%) do publics say economic conditions are good. All four of these nations weathered the global recession relatively well. Economic gloom is most widespread in Japan, France, Spain and Lebanon, where roughly one-in-eight believes the economy is doing well. But there are signs that an economic recovery may be taking hold. In ten of the countries surveyed, people’s assessment of the economy improved significantly from 2009 to 2010. Only in four nations did it recede.

Still, global publics are taking a wait-and-see attitude about the economic future. In only seven of 22 societies does a majority of those surveyed think economic conditions will improve over the next year. The economic bulls in the survey are the Chinese (87%), Nigerians (76%) and Brazilians (75%). The Japanese (14%) are the most bearish.

Disgruntled people generally fault their government for their country’s economic troubles, although many also blame banks and themselves; few blame the U.S. The most satisfied with their government’s economic performance are also those who have experienced some of the strongest growth in the last year. Roughly nine-in-ten Chinese (91%) say Beijing is doing a good job. Indians (85%) and Brazilians (76%) are also quite pleased with their government’s economic management.

Despite some of the worst recent economic conditions since the Depression, support for free markets remains strong, with some of the most tepid backing in Argentina (40%) and Japan (43%). And people continue to favor trade and globalization, with the weakest – but still majority – support in Turkey (64%) and the U.S. (66%).

China Ascendant

A growing number of people around the globe see China’s economy as the most powerful in the world. Looking at the 20 countries surveyed in each of the last three years, China’s economic star keeps rising. The median number naming China as the world’s leading economy has risen from 20% to 31%. Meanwhile, the percentage naming the U.S. has dropped from 50% to 43%. The publics of the countries surveyed vary in their views of China’s growing economic clout. In the West, opinion is divided in Britain, while majorities in Germany, France and Spain and a plurality in the U.S. see China’s economic strength as a bad thing for their country.

The Pakistanis (79%), Indonesians (61%) and Japanese (61%) regard China’s rising economic power as a positive development. Indians and to a lesser extent South Koreans do not. Latin American, Middle Eastern and African publics see their countries benefiting from China’s economic growth. The Turks (18%) overwhelmingly see it the other way.

China is clearly the most self-satisfied country in the survey. Nine-in-ten Chinese are happy with the direction of their country (87%), feel good about the current state of their economy (91%) and are optimistic about China’s economic future (87%). Moreover, about three-in-four Chinese (76%) think the U.S. takes into account Chinese interests when it makes foreign policy.

Europeans on Europe

In the midst of growing economic concerns in Europe, there is little indication of a broad public backlash against the European Union. Large majorities in Poland, Spain, France and Germany and nearly half in Britain remain supportive of the Brussels-based institution. And European publics continue to have a positive view of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is well-regarded in Britain, Spain and France. In fact, as in the past, Merkel gets better ratings in France than in Germany itself for her leadership in world affairs. And French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s ratings are, if anything, somewhat better in Germany than in France. The French leader is less well-regarded in Britain and Spain, but that has been so in previous surveys.

However, Europeans are divided in their views about major economic issues.² They are supportive of the euro, but disagree about the merits of European economic integration and the bailing-out of EU member countries in trouble. Opinion of Greece, the recipient of EU financial aid, is on balance positive in Britain and France. But, a majority of Germans express an unfavorable opinion of it.

At a time when NATO is developing a new strategic concept, majorities in major Europeans nations surveyed continue to hold a favorable view of it, as do most Americans. However, many fewer Germans express a positive assessment of it currently (57%) than did so in 2009 (73%). Germans who express opposition to the NATO effort in Afghanistan are far less likely to hold positive views of this defense organization (45%) than do those who back it (76%). This is also true, but to a lesser extent, in the other EU countries surveyed as well as in the U.S.

Limited Support for Extremism

Support for terrorism remains low among the Muslim publics surveyed. Many fewer Muslims in 2010 than in the middle of the past decade say that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. However, the new poll does show a modest increase over the past year in support for suicide bombing being often or sometimes justifiable, with a rise in Egypt from 15% to 20% and in Jordan from 12% to 20%. Still, these are below the levels of support observed mid-decade.

Overall attitudes toward Osama bin Laden have followed a similar trend line among the Muslim publics surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Views of the al Qaeda leader have been far more negative in recent years than they were mid-decade. And the poll shows considerably less positive regard for him in Jordan than was apparent in 2009. Support for bin Laden has also declined among Nigerian Muslims, although 48% still express confidence in the al Qaeda leader.

Iran and Its Nuclear Weapons Program

Among the nations surveyed, there is widespread opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and considerable support for tougher economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic. For instance, more than three-quarters of those who oppose the Iranian nuclear program in Spain (79%), Britain (78%), Germany (77%) and France (76%), as well as 67% in Russia and 58% in China, approve of tougher sanctions. Many are also willing to consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities, including about half of those who oppose Iran’s program in Poland, Germany, Spain, and Britain, and roughly six-in-ten in France.

Still, the Pew Global Attitudes survey foreshadows potential tension between the U.S. and other leading powers over what to do about the Iranian nuclear program. Among those who oppose Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons, Americans are more likely than Europeans, Japanese, Chinese, Indians or Russians to approve of economic sanctions against Iran and to support taking military action to stop Tehran from acquiring nuclear armaments.

Pakistan is the only country in which a majority (58%) favors Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Elsewhere among largely Muslim nations, public opinion on balance opposes a nuclear-armed Iran, although significant numbers of Jordanians (39%) and Lebanese (34%) do want Iran to have such capabilities. In predominantly Muslim countries, those who oppose Iranian nuclear weapons tend to favor tougher economic sanctions, and although fewer support using the military to prevent the Islamic Republic from developing these weapons, majorities or pluralities in four of the six countries surveyed favor this option.

Views on Climate Change

As in 2009, the new poll found substantial majorities of the publics in most countries seeing global climate change as a serious problem. The intensity of concern about this issue is less evident in the U.S., China, Russia, Britain and France than it is among the publics of other major carbon-emitting nations, such as Germany, India, Japan and South Korea.

The publics of the 22 nations surveyed are more divided about paying increased prices to combat climate change. Willingness to do so is nearly universal in China and clear majorities in India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey and Germany also favor consumers paying higher bills. Most people express opposition in the U.S., France, Russia and many of the less affluent countries surveyed, while views are more mixed in Britain, Spain and Brazil.

Also of Note:

• Somewhat more Americans than in 2005 (35% vs. 26%) think the U.S. is well-liked around the world. However, fully 60% think the U.S. is generally disliked. As in 2005, only Americans and Turks are more likely to say their country is disliked than to say it is liked.

• Americans are no more isolationist than Europeans. Asked whether their country should deal with its own problems and let others take care of themselves, 46% of Americans agree, as do 44% of Germans and 49% of British. The French are the most isolationist; 65% oppose helping other nations cope with their challenges.

• But Americans are among the least supportive of international trade among the 22 nations surveyed; nevertheless 66% think it is good for their country.

• While most Europeans and Japanese think Americans are too religious, people in the rest of the world – in 18 of 22 countries – think Americans are not religious enough. This includes the U.S., where 64% say their country should be more religious. Criticism of American secularism is particularly strong in the three Arab nations surveyed.

• Confidence in Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is on the rise, with his assessment up in all five EU member nations surveyed. The strongest backing is in Germany (50%) and the greatest improvement in Poland, where confidence in Medvedev has more than doubled in the last year, to 36%.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.