Europeans generally reacted to President Obama’s re-election with a mixture of excitement and relief, just as they did four years ago. For many across the Atlantic, Obama’s 2008 victory signaled the end of the Bush-era estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies, and the emergence of an America that would see the world a lot like Europeans do. However, despite Obama’s re-election at home and continued popularity in Europe, his presidency has not closed the long-running transatlantic values gap. Instead, on issues such as the use of military force, religion, and individualism, Americans and Europeans continue to disagree.

Obama has been popular in Europe since he toured the Continent as a presidential contender. Following George W. Bush’s two terms in office, Europeans immediately embraced Obama’s presidency. A stunning 93% of Germans expressed confidence in Obama in the early months of his first term, compared with just 14% for Bush during his final year in office. In Britain, France, and Spain, the new American president also received stratospheric ratings.

The result was a dramatic “Obama effect” on attitudes toward the U.S. In France, for instance, America’s favorability rating soared from 42% in 2008 to 75% in 2009. And importantly, support for American policies grew, especially support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The enthusiasm that greeted Obama’s election has waned a bit over time, even in Europe, but vestiges of “Obamamania” remain. The 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found at least eight-in-ten expressing confidence in the U.S. president in Germany, France, and Britain.

However, while the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded, the “values gap” between Americans and Europeans is alive and well. Polls consistently find a transatlantic divide when it comes to fundamental beliefs on a variety of political and cultural issues. Americans and Europeans view each other with less hostility today, but they still don’t see the world in the same way.

Take the issue of military force. Americans remain more inclined than Europeans to say it’s necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Meanwhile, they are significantly less likely than Europeans to believe that getting UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with international threats. America’s willingness to “go it alone” in world affairs has become an ingrained piece of the country’s international image – and it hasn’t changed much in the Obama years. Majorities across Europe continue to see the U.S. as acting unilaterally, not taking into account the interests of other nations when making foreign policy.

The Obama administration’s use of drone strikes illustrates the divide over hard power. About six-in-ten Americans – including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents – approve of U.S. drone attacks against extremist leaders and organizations in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But in seven of the eight EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2012, more than half oppose these strikes, including nine-in-ten Greeks and 76% in Spain. The lone exception is the British, who are almost evenly divided on this issue.

Religion is another topic where Americans and Europeans hold very different views. In largely secular Western European nations such as Spain, Germany, Britain, and France, less than a quarter consider religion very important to their lives. Even in Poland, where Catholicism still plays an important role in public life, only 27% say religion is very important. By contrast, fully half of Americans hold this view. Similarly, solid majorities in the six EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2011 said you do not have to believe in God to be a moral person, but only 46% of Americans felt this way.

The same 2011 poll asked Christians from the U.S. and eight European nations whether they identify first with their nationality or their religion. Americans were evenly split: 46% said they think of themselves first as Americans and 46% as Christians. In seven of the eight European countries, a majority of Christians identified primarily with their nationality. Only 8% of French Christians, for example, said they thought of themselves first as Christians.

Individualism also continues to differentiate Americans and Europeans. Most Americans believe individuals largely control their own fate – just 36% agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” However, half or more in Germany, France, and Spain agree with this statement.

Europeans also believe in a very different relationship between the individual and the state. When asked which is more important, that everyone be free to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, 58% of Americans choose the former. Majorities across Western and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, say making sure no one is in need should be a bigger priority.

Of course, even on fundamental values like these, opinions can and do shift over time, and on a few key issues, the values gap is shrinking. For instance, Americans are not as convinced as they used to be about their own cultural superiority – in 2002, six-in-ten agreed with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior.” By 2011, just 49% held this view, much closer to the levels typically registered in Europe.

Public opinion on homosexuality has also shifted dramatically. The percentage of Americans saying society should accept homosexuality rose from 49% in 2007 to 60% just four years later. This is still much lower than the high levels of acceptance witnessed in Europe – more than eight-in-ten in Spain, Germany, France, and Britain believe homosexuality should be accepted – but the gap is clearly closing. The recent passage of marriage equality ballot initiatives in four U.S. states highlights how quickly public opinion on this issue is changing.

Moreover, young Americans increasingly look like their cohorts across the Atlantic on these questions. Nearly seven-in-ten Americans under age 30 say homosexuality should be accepted and only 37% think their culture is superior to others. Young people are also much more likely than older Americans to believe the government should make sure no one is in need. If these trends continue and expand to other topics, the transatlantic values gap could someday vanish. But for the foreseeable future, the divide will likely persist, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Survey Report

As has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many important ways. Most notably, Americans are more individualistic and are less supportive of a strong safety net than are the publics of Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Americans are also considerably more religious than Western Europeans, and are more socially conservative with respect to homosexuality.

Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Moreover, Americans more often than their Western European allies believe that obtaining UN approval before their country uses military force would make it too difficult to deal with an international threat. And Americans are less inclined than the Western Europeans, with the exception of the French, to help other nations.

These differences between Americans and Western Europeans echo findings from previous surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. However, the current polling shows the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to that of other nations. Today, only about half of Americans believe their culture is superior to others, compared with six-in-ten in 2002. And the polling finds younger Americans less apt than their elders to hold American exceptionalist attitudes.

These are among the findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Spain from March 21 to April 14 as part of the broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011.

Use of Military Force

Three-quarters of Americans agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world; this view is shared by seven-in-ten in Britain and narrower majorities in France and Spain (62% each). Germans are evenly divided, with half saying the use of force is sometimes necessary and half saying it is not.

Germans are more supportive of the use of military force than they have been in recent years. For example, in 2007, just about four-in-ten (41%) Germans agreed that it was sometimes necessary, while 58% disagreed. Opinions have been more stable in the U.S., Britain and France.

For the most part, opinions about the use of force do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Germany and Spain, however, support for the use of military force is far more widespread among men than among women. Six-in-ten German men agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world, compared with just 40% of women. And while majorities across gender groups in Spain believe the use of force may be necessary, more Spanish men than Spanish women say this is the case (68% vs. 56%).

In Britain, France, Spain and the U.S., conservatives, or those on the political right, are more likely than liberals, or those on the left, to agree that the use of force is sometimes necessary to maintain world order. However, in the four countries, majorities across ideological groups express this view.¹

When asked whether their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with international threats, American opinion differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Americans are almost evenly divided on the question, with 45% saying that the U.S. should have UN approval while 44% say this would make it too difficult to deal with threats; in contrast, solid majorities in the four Western European nations surveyed, including about three-quarters in Spain (74%) and Germany (76%) say their country should have UN approval before it takes military action.

In Western Europe, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say their country should have UN approval before using military force, although majorities across both groups share this view. For example, in Spain, 84% of those who graduated from college say UN approval should be obtained, compared with 70% of those who do not have a college degree. Double-digit differences are also evident in Britain (15 percentage points), Germany (11 points) and France (10 points). This is not the case in the U.S., where respondents across education groups offer nearly identical views.

In Germany, gender differences are also notable; even though German men are more likely than women to say the use of military force is sometimes necessary, more men than women say their country should have UN approval before using force (83% vs. 70%).

The view that their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with threats is far more prevalent among American liberals than among conservatives. Close to six-in-ten (57%) liberals favor obtaining UN approval, while 33% say this would make it too difficult for the U.S. to deal with threats; in contrast, most conservatives (52%) say getting UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with threats, while 38% say this is an important step. Political moderates fall between the other two groups, with 49% saying the U.S. should seek the approval of the UN before using military force and 42% saying this would make it too difficult to deal with threats. The same ideological difference is generally not evident in Western Europe.

Views on International Engagement

About four-in-ten (39%) Americans say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems, while a narrow majority (52%) says the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems as best they can. In this regard, Americans are not drastically different from respondents in France, where 43% believe their country should help other countries and 57% say it should focus on its own problems.

The British are nearly evenly divided; 45% say their country should help other countries deal with their problems and about the same number (48%) believe Britain should deal with its own problems.

Compared with the U.S., France and Britain, Spain and Germany stand out as the only countries where majorities favor international engagement: 55% and 54%, respectively, say their countries should provide assistance to others, while 40% in Spain and 43% in Germany take the more isolationist view.

Opinions about international engagement have changed somewhat in the U.S., France and Spain since last year, but while publics in the two Western European countries are now more in favor of helping others than they were in 2010, more Americans currently take an isolationist position. Last year, about the same number of Americans said their country should help other countries (45%) as said it should let other countries deal with their own problems (46%). Similarly, the Spanish were nearly evenly divided, with 49% favoring engagement and 47% taking an isolationist approach. In France, where a majority continues to take an isolationist view, even more (65%) did so a year ago.

In the U.S. as well as in the four Western European countries surveyed, those with a college degree are far more likely than those with less education to offer an internationalist view. This is especially the case in Germany, where about three-quarters (73%) of those who graduated from college believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems, compared with a narrow majority (52%) of those without a college degree.

Political ideology is also a factor in Germany, France and Spain. In these three countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to take the isolationist view when it comes to international engagement. For example, while about half (48%) of left-wing French say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, about six-in-ten (59%) on the right offer this opinion.

Cultural Superiority

About half of Americans (49%) and Germans (47%) agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;” 44% in Spain share this view. In Britain and France, only about a third or fewer (32% and 27%, respectively) think their culture is better than others.

While opinions about cultural superiority have remained relatively stable over the years in the four Western European countries surveyed, Americans are now far less likely to say that their culture is better than others; six-in-ten Americans held this belief in 2002 and 55% did so in 2007. Belief in cultural superiority has declined among Americans across age, gender and education groups.

As in past surveys, older Americans remain far more inclined than younger ones to believe that their culture is better than others. Six-in-ten Americans ages 50 or older share this view, while 34% disagree; those younger than 30 hold the opposite view, with just 37% saying American culture is superior and 61% saying it is not. Opinions are more divided among those ages 30 to 49; 44% in this group see American culture as superior and 50% do not.

Similar age gaps are not as common in the Western European countries surveyed, with the exception of Spain, where majorities of older respondents, but not among younger ones, also think their culture is better than others; 55% of those ages 50 or older say this is the case, compared with 34% of those ages 30 to 49 and 39% of those younger than 30.

As is the case on other measures, opinions about cultural superiority vary considerably by educational attainment. In the four Western European countries and in the U.S., those who did not graduate from college are more likely than those who did to agree that their culture is superior, even if their people are not perfect. For example, Germans with less education are about twice as likely as those with a college degree to believe their culture is superior (49% vs. 25%); double-digit differences are also present in France (20 percentage points), Spain (18 points) and Britain (11 points), while a less pronounced gap is evident in the U.S. (9 points).

Finally, among Americans and Germans, political conservative are especially likely to believe their culture is superior to others. In the U.S., 63% of conservatives take this view, compared with 45% of moderates and just 34% of liberals. Similarly, a majority (54%) of right-wing Germans see their culture as superior, while 47% of moderates and 33% of those on the political left agree.

Individualism and the Role of the State

American opinions continue to differ considerably from those of Western Europeans when it comes to views of individualism and the role of the state. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) Americans believe it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state, while just 35% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need.

In contrast, at least six-in-ten in Spain (67%), France (64%) and Germany (62%) and 55% in Britain say the state should ensure that nobody is in need; about four-in-ten or fewer consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In the U.S., Britain, France and Germany, views of the role of the state divide significantly across ideological lines. For example, three-quarters of American conservatives say individuals should be free to pursue their goals without interference from the state, while 21% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need; among liberals in the U.S., half would like the state to play an active role to help the needy, while 42% prefer a more limited role for the state.

Those on the political right in Britain, France and Germany are also more likely than those on the left in these countries to prioritize freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference. Unlike in the U.S., however, majorities of those on the right in France (57%) and Germany (56%) favor an active role for the state, as do more than four-in-ten (45%) conservatives in Britain.

American opinions about the role of the state also vary considerably across age groups. About half (47%) of those younger than 30 prioritize the freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state and a similar percentage (46%) say it is more important for the state to ensure that nobody is in need; among older Americans, however, about six-in-ten consider being free a higher priority, with just about three-in-ten saying the state should play an active role so that nobody is in need. No such age difference is evident in the four Western European countries surveyed.

Asked if they agree that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” Americans again offer more individualistic views than those expressed by Western Europeans. Only 36% of Americans believe they have little control over their fate, compared with 50% in Spain, 57% in France and 72% in Germany; Britain is the only Western European country surveyed where fewer than half (41%) share this view.

In the U.S. and in Western Europe, those without a college degree are less individualistic than those who have graduated from college; this is especially the case in the U.S. and Germany. About three-quarters (74%) of Germans in the less educated group believe that success in life is largely determined by forces beyond one’s control, compared with 55% of college graduates. Among Americans, 41% of those without a college degree say they have little control over their fate, while just 22% of college graduates share this view.

Religion More Important to Americans

Americans also distinguish themselves from Western Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.

Moreover, Americans are far more inclined than Western Europeans to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 53% say this is the case in the U.S., compared with just one-third in Germany, 20% in Britain, 19% in Spain and 15% in France.

In the U.S., women and older respondents place more importance on religion and are more likely than men and younger people to say that faith in God is a necessary foundation for morality and good values. About six-in-ten (59%) American women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41% of men; and while a majority (56%) of Americans ages 50 and older say religion is very important to them, 48% of those ages 30 to 49 and 41% of those younger than 30 place similar importance on religion.

Similarly, while a majority of American women (58%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, men are nearly evenly divided, with 47% saying belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality and 51% saying it is not. Among Americans ages 50 and older, 58% say one must believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 50% of those ages 30 to 49 and 46% of those younger than 30 share this view.

Education also plays a role in views of religion in the U.S., to some extent. Although Americans with a college degree are about as likely as those without to say religion is very important to them (47% and 51%, respectively), the less educated are far more inclined to say that one must believe in God in order to be moral; 59% of those without a college degree say this, compared with 37% of those who have graduated from college.

Views of religion and whether belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality vary little, if at all, across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed. In Spain, however, respondents ages 50 and older place more importance on religion than do younger people, although relatively few in this age group say it is very important to them; 33% say this is the case, compared with 16% of those ages 30 to 49 and 11% of those younger than 30.

Politically, conservatives in the U.S., Spain and Germany are more likely than liberals to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, but while solid majorities of conservatives in the U.S. (66%) take this position, fewer than half of conservatives in Spain (31%) and Germany (46%) share this view. Meanwhile, just 26% of liberals in the U.S., 11% in Spain and 19% in Germany say belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality. Conservatives in the U.S. are also far more likely than liberals to consider religion very important in their lives (67% vs. 29%); in Western Europe, few across ideological groups place high importance on religion.

Religious vs. National Identity

American Christians are more likely than their Western European counterparts to think of themselves first in terms of their religion rather than their nationality; 46% of Christians in the U.S. see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In contrast, majorities of Christians in France (90%), Germany (70%), Britain (63%) and Spain (53%) identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

In Britain, France and Germany, more Christians now see themselves in terms of their nationality than did so five years ago, when national identification was already widespread in these countries. This change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

Among Christians in the U.S., white evangelicals are especially inclined to identify first with their faith; 70% in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among other American Christians, more identify with their nationality (55%) than with their religion (38%).

Homosexuality

Tolerance for homosexuality is widespread in the U.S. and Western Europe, but far more Western Europeans than Americans say homosexuality should be accepted by society; at least eight-in-ten in Spain (91%), Germany (87%), France (86%) and Britain (81%), compared with 60% in the U.S.

Acceptance of homosexuality has increased in recent years, and the shift is especially notable in the U.S., where only slightly more said it should be accepted (49%) than said it should be rejected (41%) in 2007. Today, more Americans accept homosexuality than reject it by a 27-percentage point margin.

While there are some differences in opinions of homosexuality across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed, overwhelming majorities across age, education and gender groups believe homosexuality should be accepted by society. In the U.S., however, these differences are somewhat more pronounced. For example, while 67% of American women believe homosexuality should be accepted, a much narrower majority of men (54%) share that view. Among Americans with college degrees, 71% accept homosexuality, compared with 56% of those with less education. Finally, about two-thirds (68%) of Americans younger than 30 say homosexuality should be accepted by society; 61% of those ages 30 to 40 and 55% of those ages 50 and older share this view.

In addition to demographic differences, an ideological divide on views of homosexuality is also notable in the U.S., where more than eight-in-ten (85%) liberals and 65% of moderates express tolerant views, compared with 44% of conservatives. In the four Western European countries surveyed, at least three-quarters across ideological groups say homosexuality should be accepted by society.

Muslim and Western publics continue to see relations between them as generally bad, with both sides holding negative stereotypes of the other. Many in the West see Muslims as fanatical and violent, while few say Muslims are tolerant or respectful of women. Meanwhile, Muslims in the Middle East and Asia generally see Westerners as selfish, immoral and greedy – as well as violent and fanatical.

However, the latest Pew Global Attitudes survey finds somewhat of a thaw in the U.S. and Europe compared with five years ago. A greater percentage of Western publics now see relations between themselves and Muslims as generally good compared with 2006.

In contrast, Muslims in predominantly Muslim nations are as inclined to say relations are generally bad as they were five years ago. And, as in the past, Muslims express more unfavorable opinions about Christians than Americans or Europeans express about Muslims.

For the most part, Muslims and Westerners finger point about the causes of problems in their relations, and about which side holds the high ground on key issues. Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere who say relations with the West are bad overwhelmingly blame the West. However, while Americans and Europeans tend to blame Muslims for bad relations, significant numbers believe Westerners are responsible.

One note of agreement between Westerners and Muslims is that both believe Muslim nations should be more economically prosperous than they are today. But they gauge the problem quite differently. Muslim publics have an aggrieved view of the West – they blame Western policies for their own lack of prosperity. Across the Muslim publics surveyed, a median of 53% say U.S. and Western policies are one of the top two reasons why Muslim nations are not wealthier.

In contrast, few Americans or Western Europeans think the economic challenges facing Muslim countries are a result of Western policies. And although Westerners have become less likely over the last five years to say Islamic fundamentalism is a chief cause of economic problems in Muslim nations, they remain much more likely than Muslims to hold this view.

Still, even on this issue there is some consensus. Both Muslims and Westerners believe corrupt governments and inadequate education in Muslim nations are at least partly responsible for the lack of prosperity. And perhaps reflecting the Arab Spring, in several Muslim and Western nations, people are more likely than they were five years ago to say the dearth of prosperity stems from a lack of democracy.

These are among the key findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted March 21 to May 15.¹ The survey updates a number of trend questions from a 2006 Pew Global Attitudes poll that explored how Muslim and Western publics view one another. The current survey finds that five years later – and nearly 10 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 – tensions remain high, although there are also some shared concerns.

For instance, both Muslims and Westerners are concerned about Islamic extremism. More than two-thirds in Russia, Germany, Britain, the U.S. and France are worried about Islamic extremists in their country. Fully 77% of Israelis also hold this view.

But extremism is considered a threat in predominantly Muslim nations as well. More than seven-in-ten Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims are worried about Islamic extremists in their countries, as are most Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. For Muslims, the most common concern about extremism is that it is violent, although in both Egypt and the Palestinian territories the top fear is that extremism could divide the country.

How Muslims, Christians and Jews See Each Other

In four of the six largely Christian nations included in the study, most say they have a positive opinion of Muslims. The exceptions are Germany (45% favorable) and Spain (37%), although views toward Muslims have improved in both countries since 2006.

Also, solid majorities in Western countries have a favorable opinion of Jews. In Spain, 59% now hold this view, up 14 percentage points from 2006.

Muslim views toward Christians vary considerably across countries. In Lebanon, which has a large Christian population, nearly all Muslims (96%) express a positive view of Christians. Narrow majorities of Jordanian (57%) and Indonesian (52%) Muslims also give Christians a favorable rating, while in Egypt – which has recently experienced violence between elements of its Muslim and Christian communities – views are divided (48% favorable; 47% unfavorable).

Meanwhile, very few Muslims in Pakistan (16%) or Turkey (6%) have a positive opinion of Christians.

Ratings for Jews are uniformly low in the predominantly Muslim nations surveyed – in all seven of these nations, less than 10% have a positive opinion of Jews. Indeed, outside of Indonesia, less than 5% offer a positive opinion.

Among Israel’s minority Muslim community, however, views are divided: 48% express a positive opinion of Jews, while 49% offer a negative opinion. In contrast, only 9% of Israeli Jews have a positive view of Muslims. Christians receive somewhat higher ratings among Israeli Muslims (67% favorable) than among Israeli Jews (51%).

Characteristics and Stereotypes

Muslims associate a number of negative traits with Westerners. Across the Muslim publics surveyed, the median percentages saying people in Western countries such as the U.S. and Europe are selfish, violent, greedy, immoral, arrogant and fanatical exceed 50%. By contrast, the median percentages of those who say that Westerners are respectful of women, honest, tolerant or generous range below 50%.

Since 2006, Indonesian Muslims have become more likely to associate positive traits with Westerners, but in Pakistan attitudes have moved in the opposite direction – the percentage of Pakistani Muslims saying that Westerners are greedy, immoral, selfish and fanatical has increased by double-digits over the last five years.

Non-Muslims in Western Europe, the U.S. and Russia offer somewhat more positive assessments of Muslims than Muslims do of Westerners. Relatively few, for example, say Muslims are greedy or immoral. However, a median of 58% label Muslims as fanatical and a median of 50% believe Muslims are violent. And few think Muslims are respectful of women.

National vs. Religious Identity

Across the nations surveyed, Christians and Muslims differ in the degree to which religion defines their identity. Among most of the Muslim publics polled, Muslims tend to identify with their religion, rather than their nationality. This is particularly true in Pakistan, where 94% think of themselves primarily as Muslim instead of Pakistani.

Lebanon and the Palestinian territories are exceptions to this pattern, however – more Muslims in both countries identify first with their nationality rather than with their religion. And many Muslims refuse to choose between nation and religion, volunteering that they identify with both.

Throughout Europe, most Christians think of themselves primarily in terms of their national identity. Fully 90% of French Christians take this view. The clear exception is the U.S., where Christians are divided: 46% primarily identify as American and 46% as Christian. Seven-in-ten white evangelical Christians in the U.S. identify first with their religion.

Both of the major religious communities in Israel identify primarily with their religion. Nearly six-in-ten (57%) Jews identify first as Jews, while among the country’s Muslim community 77% think of themselves first as Muslims.

Opinions About September 11

Nearly a decade after September 11, 2001, skepticism about the events of that day persists among Muslim publics. When asked whether they think groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., most Muslims in the nations surveyed say they do not believe this.

There is no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the attacks. Indeed, Muslims in Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey are less likely to accept this today than in 2006.

Also of Note

• There is a widespread perception that Muslims living in the West do not want to assimilate.  Majorities in Europe and the U.S. think Muslims wish to remain distinct from the rest of society, instead of embracing the way of life in Western nations.  More than two-thirds in Germany and Spain believe Muslims do not want to adopt national customs.
• Among Muslim publics, many believe that Americans and Europeans are hostile toward Muslims.  In fact, in Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan, the belief that Americans and Europeans are hostile has become more common since 2006.
• In Western nations, those who believe some religions are more prone to violence than others tend to say Islam is the most violent faith (when asked to choose among Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism).  Muslim publics who think some religions are especially prone to violence tend to name Judaism.
• Concerns about Islamic extremism have declined significantly in Jordan over the last five years.  Currently, 47% of Jordanian Muslims are worried about extremism, down from 69% in a spring 2006 poll conducted just months after the November 2005 bombing of three Amman hotels.
• Lebanese Muslims are consistently the least likely to assign negative characteristics to Westerners – less than half think Westerners are selfish, violent, greedy, immoral, arrogant, or fanatical.
• There is an education gap on views about Muslim assimilation – in Western Europe and the U.S., those who do not have a college degree are more likely than those who do to believe that Muslims want to remain distinct from the broader society.

When asked whether they associate a series of four positive and six negative traits with people in Western countries, majorities or pluralities among nearly every Muslim public surveyed say Westerners are violent, greedy, fanatical, selfish, immoral and arrogant; far fewer associate positive traits such as generosity, honesty, tolerance and respect toward women with people in Western countries.

Non-Muslims in the U.S., Russia and Western Europe offer somewhat more positive views of Muslims than Muslims do of Westerners; for example, majorities or pluralities in five of the six countries say Muslims are honest, and non-Muslims in Britain, France and Germany also say Muslims are generous. Yet, many attribute negative characteristics, particularly violence and fanaticism, to Muslims, and few say Muslims are tolerant or respectful of women.

Moreover, to the extent that people in Western countries say some religions are more prone to violence than others, large majorities say Islam is the most violent religion. Among Muslims who say some religions are more violent, Judaism is typically named as the worst offender.

Another notable difference between publics in many Western countries and in predominantly Muslim countries is in the way they see themselves. Christians in the four Western European countries surveyed and in Russia overwhelmingly identify first as citizens of their countries rather than as Christians; only in the U.S. do as many Christians identify primarily with their religion as identify with their nationality. In contrast, Muslims in most of the largely Muslim countries surveyed identify themselves primarily with their religion.

Mixed Views of Muslims in the West

Majorities in Britain (64%), France (64%), Russia (62%) and the U.S. (57%) express positive views of Muslims. Opinions are nearly divided in Germany, where 45% have a favorable view of Muslims and 47% offer negative ratings; in 2006, a majority (54%) of Germans had unfavorable views of Muslims, while 36% had positive opinions.

In Spain, however, attitudes toward Muslims remain negative, although more now express positive views than did so five years ago. Somewhat fewer than four-in-ten (37%) Spanish respondents have a favorable opinion, while a 55%-majority expresses unfavorable views of Muslims; in 2006, about three-in-ten (29%) had positive views and 61% had negative opinions.

Opinions about Muslims are especially negative in Israel. About one-in-five (19%) Israelis have favorable opinions, while 79% say they have an unfavorable view; among Israeli Jews, just 9% have positive views, while nine-in-ten have negative views of Muslims. In contrast, 87% of Muslims in Israel have a positive opinion of those who share their religion. Majorities among the other Muslim publics surveyed also express positive views of Muslims, although fewer Muslims in Turkey do so than was the case five years ago (72% now vs. 88% in 2006).

In France, Germany, Spain and the U.S., views of Muslims are more positive among younger respondents. For example, while most (57%) Germans younger than age 30 have favorable opinions of Muslims, 45% of those ages 30 to 49 and just 39% of those 50 and older share this view. In the U.S., majorities among those younger than 30 (69%) and those ages 30 to 49 (62%) express positive opinions of Muslims, compared with about half (48%) of older respondents. In Spain, fewer than half across age groups offer positive views, while in France, majorities in the three groups do so. But in both countries, younger respondents are more likely than older respondents to express favorable opinions.

Views of Christians Mostly Positive

Opinions about Christians remain overwhelmingly positive in the U.S., Western Europe and Russia; at least three-quarters in Spain (76%) and Germany (75%) and more than eight-in-ten in the U.S. (89%), Russia (89%), France (84%) and Britain (83%) express favorable views.

Outside of these predominantly Christian countries, views of Christian are more mixed. For example, a narrow majority (54%) of Israelis offer positive opinions of Christians, reflecting a divided opinion among Israeli Jews; 51% have a favorable view and 48% have an unfavorable opinion of Christians. Two-thirds of Muslims in Israel have a positive view of Christians.

Among the Muslim publics surveyed, those in Lebanon offer the most positive ratings of Christians; 96% express a favorable opinion of the religious group, which makes up about 40% of the Lebanese population. Majorities of Muslims in Jordan (57%) and Indonesia (52%) also rate Christians favorably; Egyptian Muslims are nearly evenly divided, with 48% offering positive views and 47% saying they have an unfavorable opinion.

In contrast, Muslims in Turkey and Pakistan offer overwhelmingly negative views of Christians. In Turkey, just 6% of Muslims have a favorable view and 82% offer negative opinions of Christians; among Pakistani Muslims, 16% have positive opinions and 66% offer unfavorable views. Favorable ratings of Christians among Muslims in Turkey and Pakistan are even lower than they were in 2006, when 16% and 26%, respectively, expressed positive views.

Views of Jews Positive in the West, Dismal in Muslim World

Attitudes toward Jews are positive in the U.S., Russia and Western Europe; at least seven-in-ten in France (84%), the U.S. (82%), Britain (76%) and Germany (71%) have favorable opinions of Jews, as do 63% of Russians and 59% in Spain.

Views of Jews among Spanish respondents are considerably more positive than they have been in recent years. In 2006, 45% had a favorable opinion and 39% had a negative view of Jews; as recently as 2008, more in Spain had an unfavorable opinion (46%) than had a favorable (37%) view of Jews.

Ratings of Jews are dismal in the seven predominantly Muslim nations surveyed. About one-in-ten (9%) Muslims in Indonesia, and even fewer in Turkey (4%), the Palestinian territories (4%), Lebanon (3%), Jordan (2%), Egypt (2%) and Pakistan (2%) express favorable opinions of Jews. Israeli Muslims, however, are divided in their opinions of Jews; 48% have favorable views and 49% express negative opinions.

Religion and Violence

Majorities in Israel (63%), Spain (63%), Germany (59%), the U.S. (54%) and Britain (52%), and a 39%-plurality in Russia, believe that some religions are more prone to violence than others. And when those who share this view are asked which religion they think is the most violent, large majorities in each of these countries name Islam.

The view that Islam is the most violent religion is particularly prevalent in Israel, France and Spain, where about nine-in-ten (91%, 90% and 87%, respectively) of those who say some religions are more prone to violence consider Islam to be the most violent.

At least two-thirds of those who say some religions are more violent than others in Germany (79%), Britain (75%), the U.S. (70%) and Russia (67%) also select Islam as the most violent.

Among the Muslim publics surveyed, majorities in Egypt (72%), Jordan (72%), Pakistan (60%) and the Palestinian territories (52%), as well as a 35%-plurality in Turkey, think some religions are more prone to violence than others. In Indonesia and Lebanon, more Muslims say that all religions are the same when it comes to violence (45% and 41%, respectively) than say some are more violent than others (23% and 18%).

In the Arab countries surveyed, large majorities of Muslims who say some religions are more prone to violence consider Judaism to be the most violent religion; 97% in Jordan, 93% in Egypt, 88% in the Palestinian territories and 77% in Lebanon share this view.

Outside of the Arab world, more than half of Muslims in Indonesia and Pakistan who say some religions are more violent also cite Judaism as the most violent (56% and 54%, respectively). In Turkey, however, slightly more say Christianity is the most violent religion than name Judaism (45% vs. 41%); in 2005, when the question was last asked, more than twice as many Turkish Muslims named Christianity as the most violent religion as named Judaism (46% vs. 20%).

Muslim Views of Westerners

Majorities of Muslims in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories associate each of six negative traits – violence, greed, fanaticism, selfishness, immorality and arrogance – with people in Western countries such as the United States and Europe. Many in Pakistan, Lebanon and Indonesia also attribute these negative characteristics to Westerners.

Views of Westerners are particularly negative in Jordan; at least seven-in-ten Muslims in that country say Westerners are violent (78%), greedy (74%), selfish (73%), or immoral (73%), while 66% describe Westerners as fanatical and a narrower 53%-majority say they are arrogant.

In contrast, Lebanese Muslims offer the least negative views of Westerners among the Muslim publics surveyed. For example, about a third of Lebanese Muslims describe people in Western countries as violent (34%) and arrogant (35%), while about half do not associate these traits with Westerners (51% and 49%, respectively). A substantial minority of Muslims in Lebanon say Westerners are greedy (41%), fanatical (41%) and immoral (38%), but more say that is not the case. And while Lebanese Muslims are about evenly divided when asked if Westerners are selfish – 43% say yes and 41% say no – majorities of Muslims in the other countries surveyed attribute this trait to people in Western countries.

When asked whether they associate each of four positive traits with Westerners, majorities or pluralities of Muslims in nearly every predominantly Muslim nation surveyed say they do not think of Westerners as generous, honest or tolerant.

However, many Muslims say people in Western countries are respectful of women, including majorities in the Palestinian territories (56%) and Lebanon (55%) and a 46%-plurality in Indonesia; among Egyptian and Jordanian Muslims, the perception that Westerners are respectful of women is more common than it was in 2006, although more in these countries still say this trait does not describe Westerners than say it does.

Muslims in Turkey and Pakistan are the least likely to associate positive traits with Westerners. Fewer than one-in-five Pakistani Muslims say people in Western countries are generous (17%), honest (16%), respectful of women (16%) or tolerant (12%). In Turkey, three-in-ten Muslims say Westerners are respectful of women, while just 19% describe Westerners as honest or tolerant and 15% say people in Western countries are generous.

Compared with five years ago, Indonesian Muslims consistently offer more positive assessments of Westerners. More now attribute positive characteristics such as honesty (33%, up 13 percentage points), generosity (38%, up 8 points), respect for women (46%, up 8 points) and tolerance (41%, up 7 points) to people in Western countries than did so in 2006; the percentages of Indonesian Muslims who say Westerners are violent, greedy, selfish, immoral or arrogant have declined by double digits.

In contrast, Pakistani Muslims express far more negative views of Westerners than they did in 2006. For example, 64% of Muslims in Pakistan now say people in Western countries are greedy, compared with 44% who shared this view five years ago; the percentage saying Westerners are immoral, selfish or fanatical has also increased by double digits (16, 14 and 13 percentage points, respectively). More Pakistani Muslims also say Westerners are violent (58% vs. 49% in 2006) and arrogant (61% vs. 53%). Fewer Pakistani Muslims now say people in Western countries are generous (down 7 percentage points), respectful of women (down 6 points) or honest (down 5 points).

Non-Muslim Views of Muslims

Opinions of the negative traits associated with Muslims are mixed across the U.S., Russia and the four Western European countries surveyed. Majorities or pluralities of non-Muslims in these countries do not associate greed and immorality with Muslims; but most non-Muslims in Spain (80%), Germany (68%), Russia (64%) and France (52%) say Muslims are fanatical, and majorities in three of these countries also describe Muslims as violent (61% in Spain and 54% in Germany and Russia).

The U.S. and Britain are the only two countries where fewer than half of non-Muslims attribute each of the six negative traits tested to Muslims, but even in these countries many have negative views. For example, about the same number of non-Muslims in the U.S. says Muslims are violent (45%) as say they are not (46%). Non-Muslims in Britain are nearly evenly divided on whether or not Muslims are fanatical: 43% say yes and 42% say no.

Non-Muslims in the U.S., Russia and Western Europe also offer mixed views of the positive traits tested. Majorities or pluralities in France (62%), Britain (60%), Germany (53%), the U.S. (49%) and Spain (45%) say Muslims are honest; a majority in France (61%) and a plurality in Germany (45%) and Britain (43%) also say Muslims are generous.

Yet, nowhere does a majority or plurality of non-Muslims describe Muslims as tolerant or respectful of women. Russians are the most likely to say Muslims respect women, although just 28% of non-Muslims in that country say this is the case. In Spain, only 9% say Muslims are respectful of women. Four-in-ten non-Muslims in Britain say Muslims are tolerant, more than in any other country.

Changes in views of traits associated with Muslims have not been consistent across the U.S., Russia and Western Europe since 2006. For example, non-Muslims in Russia are generally less likely to attribute positive characteristics to Muslims, but they are also less likely to say that Muslims are violent, selfish or fanatical. Similarly, more in Spain now say Muslims are generous than did so five years ago, but more also see Muslims as selfish, arrogant and immoral.

In general, younger respondents and those with college degrees tend to offer more positive views of Muslims, while older and less-educated respondents are more likely to associate negative traits with this religious group. For example, in France, Germany and Spain, non-Muslims with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say Muslims are generous and honest; by comparison, those without a college degree in these countries are more likely than the more educated groups to say Muslims are violent, greedy, fanatical, immoral and selfish.

Muslims Much More Critical

On balance, Muslims in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed are more likely to associate negative characteristics with Westerners than non-Muslims are to associate them with Muslims. For example, nearly nine-in-ten (89%) Jordanian Muslims use at least three of the six negative adjectives tested to describe people in Western countries, as do majorities in Egypt (81%), Turkey (73%), the Palestinian territories (71%), Pakistan (67%) and Indonesia (63%); only in Lebanon is this not the case.

In contrast, Spain is the only Western country surveyed where a majority (60%) of non-Muslims associate three or more negative characteristics with Muslims. At least three-in-ten non-Muslims in Britain (39%), the U.S. (35%) and France (30%) do not attribute any of the six negative characteristics tested to Muslims.

Religious vs. National Identity

Most Christians in the Western European countries surveyed and in Russia think of themselves first in terms of their nationality rather than as Christians. This is especially the case in France, where nine-in-ten Christians see themselves as primarily French. Seven-in-ten Christians in Germany, 68% in Russia, 63% in Britain and 53% in Spain also identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

National identification is even more widespread among Christians in Britain, France, Germany and Russia than it was five years ago, when majorities already identified primarily with their nationality. The change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

In contrast, American Christians are evenly divided; 46% see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In 2006, national identification was slightly more common than religious identification among Christians in the U.S. (47% vs. 43%).

Religious identification among Christians in the U.S. is especially prevalent among white evangelicals. Seven-in-ten in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among all other American Christians, more identify primarily with their nationality (55%) than identify with their religion (38%).

With the exception of Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, majorities and pluralities in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed see themselves first as Muslims rather than as citizens of their country. This is especially the case in Pakistan, where 94% of Muslims identify themselves primarily with their religion; in Jordan, about two-thirds (65%) see themselves first as Muslims.

Pluralities of Muslims in Turkey (49%), Egypt (46%) and Indonesia (40%) also consider themselves Muslims first, while 21%, 31% and 35%, respectively, self-identify primarily with their nationality. However, significantly fewer in Egypt now primarily identify with their religion than did so in 2005, when about six-in-ten (59%) Muslims identified themselves primarily with their religion, while 23% saw themselves first as Egyptians.

In Lebanon, however, 36% see themselves primarily as Lebanese, while 28% see themselves first as Muslims. Palestinians are more divided; 43% self-identify first as Palestinians and 40% consider themselves primarily Muslims.

Majorities of Israeli Jews and Muslims identify first with their religion rather than as Israelis, but this is especially the case among Muslims. About three-quarters (77%) of Muslims in Israel think of themselves primarily as Muslims, while just 10% say they are Israeli first. Among Jews, 57% prioritize their religious identity and 22% self-identify as Israelis.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

Pakistanis see their country in crisis. They give their national government lower ratings than at any time in this decade, and almost no one is satisfied with national conditions. Crime and terrorism are seen as major problems by virtually everyone. And huge percentages of Pakistanis also see their country struggling mightily with corruption and a deteriorating economy.

A long-standing concern about Islamic extremism has grown even greater over the past year. No fewer than 69% of the Pakistanis questioned worry that extremists could take control of the country. At the same time, indifference and mixed opinions about both al Qaeda and the Taliban have given way to a strong condemnation of both groups. In 2008, just 33% held a negative view of the Taliban; today, 70% rate it unfavorably. Similarly, the percentage of Pakistanis with an unfavorable opinion of al Qaeda has jumped from 34% to 61% in the last year.

However, growing concern about Islamic extremism has not resulted in an improved view of the United States. Opinions of America and its people remain extremely negative. Barack Obama’s global popularity is not evident in Pakistan, and America’s image remains as tarnished in that country as it was in the Bush years. Only 22% of Pakistanis think the U.S. takes their interests into account when making foreign policy decisions, essentially unchanged from 21% since 2007. Fully 64% of the public regards the U.S. as an enemy, while only 9% describe it as a partner.

Further, many express serious concerns about the U.S.-led effort to combat terrorism, both globally and in Pakistan specifically. In particular, many who are aware of the drone strikes targeting extremist leaders believe these strikes are causing too many civilian deaths and are being carried out by the U.S. without the consent of the Pakistani government.

However, for all the anti-American sentiment, the new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project also finds an openness to improving relations with the U.S. and considerable support for the idea of working with it to combat terrorism. By a margin of 53% to 29% Pakistanis say it is important that relations between the two countries improve.

Moreover, many endorse U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government in its fight with extremist groups.Nearly three-fourths of those interviewed (72%) would support U.S. financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremist groups operate. As many as 63% back the idea of the U.S. providing intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops who are combating these groups. And after being asked about these forms of cooperation between Pakistan and the U.S., nearly half (47%) then say they would favor U.S. missile strikes against extremist leaders.

It is not surprising that American cooperation with the Pakistani military is popular, given the confidence that Pakistanis have in it. As many as 86% say the military is having a good influence on the country, which is far greater than the number who feel that way about the police (39%), courts (58%), and even religious leaders (64%). Just 36% say the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is having a good impact, although many respondents (41%) do not offer an opinion.

These are the latest findings from the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey of Pakistan. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,254 adults in Pakistan between May 22 and June 9, 2009. The sample, which is disproportionately urban, includes Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). However, portions of Baluchistan and the NWFP are not included because of instability. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were not surveyed. The area covered by the sample represents approximately 90% of the adult population.¹ (Pakistan was surveyed as part of the Spring 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which included 24 nations and the Palestinian territories. For more findings from this survey, see Confidence in Obama lifts U.S. Image around the World; Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved, released July 23, 2009).

Concerns About India

Long-running concerns about India are also reflected in the poll. The dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir is cited as a major problem facing the country by no fewer than 88%. And growing worries about extremism notwithstanding, more Pakistanis judge India as a very serious threat to the nation (69%) than regard the Taliban (57%) or al Qaeda (41%) as very serious threats. Most Pakistanis see the U.S. as on the wrong side of this issue: by a margin of 54% to 4% the U.S. is seen as favoring India over Pakistan.

While fears about India persist, Pakistanis express overwhelmingly positive opinions about another Asian giant — 84% have a favorable view of China and 80% consider China a partner to their country.

Support for Severe Laws

One of the ironies in the survey is the extent to which Pakistanis embrace some of the severe laws associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda, even as they reject Islamic extremism and these extremist groups. The new poll finds broad support for harsh punishments: 78% favor death for those who leave Islam; 80% favor whippings and cutting off hands for crimes like theft and robbery; and 83% favor stoning adulterers.

Pakistani public opinion departs significantly from the Taliban on the issues of girls’ education and extremist violence. As many as 87% of Pakistanis believe it is equally important for boys and girls to be educated. The poll also finds that support for suicide bombing that targets civilians in defense of Islam remains very low. Only 5% of Pakistani Muslims believe these kinds of attacks can often or sometimes be justified; as recently as 2004 roughly four-in-ten (41%) held this view. Fully 87% now say such attacks can never be justified — the highest percentage among the Muslim publics included in the 2009 survey.

Breaking Down Views Toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda

Analysis of the survey data finds a number of important patterns regarding views of the Taliban and al Qaeda. First, both groups are unpopular across the board. Among all the major subgroups within Pakistani society analyzed in the study, negative views of the Taliban and al Qaeda outweigh positive views.

Second, support for both groups is low even among those who agree with some of the severe punishments endorsed by the Taliban and al Qaeda, such as stoning adulterers, cutting off the hands of thieves, and executing people who leave Islam. Still, those who disagree with these harsh measures are somewhat more likely to express an unfavorable view of both groups. For instance, among Pakistanis who support the death penalty for people who leave Islam, 69% have a negative view of the Taliban, while 77% of those who oppose the death penalty in such cases give the Taliban a negative rating.

Third, education plays a role in views about extremism. Pakistanis with higher levels of education are consistently more likely to reject the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Fourth, the Taliban and al Qaeda tend to be unpopular across regions, including the NWFP, where government forces are currently fighting extremist groups. However, Sindh stands out as the region with the most negative views. For example, 82% in Sindh have a negative opinion of the Taliban, compared with 75% in the NWFP and 67% in Punjab. More than half in Baluchistan do not offer opinions about the Taliban or al Qaeda.

Fifth, and perhaps unsurprisingly, views about the Taliban are linked to the extent to which people believe the country is threatened by extremist groups. Analysis of the data shows that people who think extremist groups may be able to seize control of the country are more likely to voice negative views about the Taliban, which has been engaged in armed-conflict with the Pakistani military.

Also of Note:

• The nation-state is of great significance to Pakistanis, and despite important ethnic and regional differences, national identity is strong throughout the country. Overall, 89% say they think of themselves first as Pakistani, rather than as a member of their ethnic group.
• Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s ratings have plummeted: Last year, 64% had a favorable opinion of him; now just 32% hold this view.
• Zardari is much less popular than the other public figures tested: opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (79% favorable), Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani (67%) and Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (61%).
• About seven-in-ten (72%) want the U.S. and NATO to remove their military troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Only 16% approve of Obama’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan.
• In 2008, 53% said the economy would improve in the next 12 months. This year, only 23% believe the economy will get better.
• The Pakistani media receives very high ratings — 77% say it is having a good influence on the country.
• While views about national conditions are overwhelmingly negative, most Pakistanis are upbeat about their personal lives — 74% say they are very or somewhat satisfied with their overall lives, and most are satisfied with their family lives and incomes. Nonetheless, compared with other nations, levels of personal satisfaction in Pakistan are relatively low.

Pope Benedict XVI’s trip to Turkey this week may well test the scholarly pontiff’s diplomatic skills. The visit — his first to a Muslim country since being elected pope — comes during a difficult period in Turkey’s relationship with the West. In Europe, a heated debate surrounds the granting of EU membership to Turkey. Meanwhile, the war in Iraq has created new strains for Turkish-American relations. And of course, the September controversy over Benedict’s remarks regarding Islam at Germany’s University of Regensburg has only added to these tensions.

A recent Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in April 2006, finds that public opinion in Turkey reflects this contentious atmosphere. For example, only 16% of Turks have a favorable view of Christians, down from 31% in 2004 — a sign of the challenges Benedict may face in trying to promote interfaith dialogue.

Turks generally have negative opinions of major Western countries, especially the United States. Only 12% of Turks have a favorable view of the U.S., down from 30% two years ago. American foreign policy is extremely unpopular — 70% say the Iraq war, which Turkey fears will further embolden its own Kurdish minority, has made the world more dangerous and 77% oppose the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

However, France does not fare much better — 61% say they have an unfavorable view of France, while only 18% hold a favorable opinion. Germany, home to a large number of Turkish immigrants, receives somewhat more positive marks, with Turks divided between those with favorable (43%) and unfavorable (41%) opinions.

Western leaders are remarkably unpopular in Turkey. Only 3% of Turks say they have a lot or some confidence in President George W. Bush to do the right thing in world affairs. While Bush is the most unpopular Western leader included on the survey, France’s Jacque Chirac (5% a lot or some confidence), Britain’s Tony Blair (7%), and Germany’s Angela Merkel (11%) are not far behind.

Turks also hold many negative views about the people of Western countries. Americans, for example are rated negatively by 69% of Turks. And when Muslims in Turkey were presented with a number of negative characteristics and asked if each one describes people in Western countries, such as the United States and Europe, solid majorities said they did associate these traits with Westerners. Roughly two-in-three Turks see Westerners as violent (70%), selfish (69%), arrogant (67%), and fanatical (67%) (for more on this, see the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s The Great Divide, June 22, 2006).

Turkey’s Secular-Religious Divide

Despite the strong tradition of secularism in modern Turkey, Islam remains central to the identity of most Turks, and indeed religious identification is on the rise. Roughly half of Turkish Muslims (51%) say they think of themselves first as Muslim rather than Turkish, while 19% identify primarily with their nationality, and 30% volunteer that they think of themselves as both. This represents a significant change from just one year ago, when only 43% identified primarily as Muslim.

Secular and religious identifiers share many of the same negative opinions about the West, but there are some important differences between these groups. For instance, secular identifiers are twice as likely as Muslim identifiers to have a favorable opinion of Christians; still, even among seculars, only one-in-four has a positive impression of Christians.

Secular and religious identifiers also differ over some of the hot button international issues affecting relations between the West and the Muslim world. When asked whom they sympathize with more in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Muslim identifiers are especially likely to say they side with the Palestinians. And those who think of themselves primarily as Muslim are also particularly likely to believe the victory of Hamas in the recent Palestinian elections will be good for the Palestinian people.

Muslim identifiers take a much more positive view of Iran. Roughly six-in-ten (59%) have a favorable view of the country, compared with only 41% of secular identifiers. And those who think of themselves first as Muslim are also more likely to favor Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, although even among this group only 26% support the idea of an Iran armed with nuclear capabilities.

When Muslim youth rioted in the suburbs of France late last year, commentators were quick to fault the French “color-blind” assimilation model. “The unrest in France’s cities shows that social and policing policy has failed, as well as integration,” read the headline on an article in the Economist magazine on November 12, 2005.

But findings from the latest Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which included over-samples of Muslims in four European countries,² suggest that the French model can claim some success, however mixed. Some aspects of that relative success are especially striking when compared with the attitudes and experiences of Muslims in Great Britain, where police last week foiled a home-grown plot by Islamic terrorists to blow up U.S.-bound airliners.

France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, an estimated 5 million persons primarily of Algerian and Moroccan extraction (since religion is not tabulated in France’s census, no official estimate is available). Similarly, Muslims in Spain are largely of Moroccan extraction. By contrast, Pakistanis predominate among Britain’s Muslims along with other ethnicities, while Germany’s Muslims are primarily Turkish in origin.

Where European Muslims Mostly Agree

French Muslims do share many opinions with their co-religionists in neighboring countries. Primary among them is concern about joblessness. More than half of French Muslims (52%) say they are very worried about unemployment among Muslims — the primary complaint of last fall’s rioters — and an additional 32% say they are somewhat concerned. These levels are comparable to those expressed by Spanish, German and, to a slightly lesser degree, by British Muslims. (Curiously, among French Muslims, only 48% of those under age 35 say they are very worried about unemployment compared with 59% of their elders.)

Like Muslims elsewhere in Europe, the French also worry more generally about the future of Muslims in their country — though, in this case, Muslims in France are significantly less worried than those in Great Britain. A majority (57%) is also at least somewhat concerned about the declining importance of religion among their co-religionists in France, though again, British Muslims are more troubled on this score with 73% sharing the worry. (In this, as in other questions in the survey, no significant difference is seen among the responses of French Muslims of Algerian, Moroccan or other ethnicity.)

Not surprisingly, a majority of French Muslims (63%) sympathize with their youthful rioters — but not much more so than do Muslims in Spain and Germany. Interestingly, British Muslims are significantly more tolerant of the French car-burners, with fully 75% offering their sympathy.

Common Attitudes toward Non-Muslims

French Muslims share the view that relations between Muslims and Westerners are bad, a view prevalent elsewhere in Europe — and in predominantly Muslim countries — with the exception of Spain, where nearly half of the Muslim population rates relations as good compared with fewer than a quarter who call them bad. But while 58% of French Muslims view relations with Westerners as bad, far more (41%) view these relations as good than do British or German Muslims.

Additional points of similarity between French and other European Muslims include generally unfavorable opinions of the United States, of its war on terrorism and, to a lesser degree, of its citizens

Also, like the great majority of Muslims in Great Britain and Spain (though less so in Germany) French Muslim sympathies in the Middle East lie with the Palestinians rather than with Israel. However, nearly two-in-three French Muslims (65%) worry about extremism among Muslims — as do even more (70%) of British Muslims. And, like Muslims elsewhere in Europe only a tiny minority of French Muslims (16%) say that suicide bombings and other violence against civilian targets in defense of Islam can often or sometimes be justified.

Voici La Différence

However, even on the hot button issues of the Middle East, French Muslims depart company with others of their faith both in Europe and in the Muslim world. For example, French Muslims are evenly split on the question of the effect of the victory by the radical group Hamas in this year’s Palestinian election, with 44% saying it was good for Palestinians and 46% judging it bad. By comparison, British Muslims weighed in lopsidedly on the positive side (56% ‘good’ vs. 18% ‘bad’) as did Spanish Muslims (57% vs. 22%).

Moreover, joined only by German Muslims in Europe, the French are heavily opposed (71%) to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. British Muslims, in contrast, are evenly split on the subject.

And while the majority of Muslims in all four European countries surveyed say they have little or no confidence in Osama bin Laden, French Muslims are virtually unanimous (93%) in their disdain. (By comparison, 68% of British Muslims submit a vote of no confidence in the Al Qaeda leader.)

Most striking, however, is the difference between the views that French Muslims hold about people of other faiths and the views held by Muslims elsewhere in Europe and in predominantly Muslim countries. French Muslims even top the general publics in the United States and France in favorable ratings of Christians (91% of French Muslims vs. 88% of Americans and 87% of the French take that view).

But what most distinguishes French Muslims from their co-religionists not only in the Muslim world but in Europe, is their attitude toward Jews. Fully 71% of French Muslims express a positive view of people of the Jewish faith, compared with only 38% of German Muslims, 32% of British Muslims, 28% of Spanish Muslims and still lower numbers in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed. In this, Muslims reflect the view of the larger French public among whom fully 86% express a favorable opinion of Jews, a higher proportion than even than among the American public.

At Home in France?

Most Muslims in France feel very French — but they feel that the French don’t see them that way, because they may look Arab or black…. Surveys suggest that Muslims are generally more conservative for example on issues such as sexuality and marriage… [But] the fraction of Muslims actively practicing their religion in France is only 10 percent, which is very similar to that of practicing Catholics.
- Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, immigration specialist and research director, Center for International Studies and Research, Paris

By and large, Muslims in France do not seem to see themselves as surrounded by hostile natives. Just 39% say they think many or most Europeans are hostile toward Muslims — considerably lower percentage than the 56% among the general French population who take that view. In Germany, where most Muslims are of Turkish descent, roughly half (51%) see Europeans as unwelcoming — a view shared by 63% of the larger German public. This perception of welcome persists despite the fact that French Muslims are somewhat more likely than those in other European countries to report that they have had a bad experience attributable to their race, ethnicity or religion. Nearly four-in-ten Muslims (37%) in France report such incidents, compared with 28% in Britain, 25% in Spain and 19% in Germany. Younger French Muslims are more likely to report a bad experience — 40% of those under age 35 compared with 31% of those age 35 or older.

But what most distinguishes French Muslims among others in Europe are their self-perceptions. Few Muslims living in France see a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. Seven-in-ten French Muslims (72%) perceive no such conflict, a view shared by a virtually identical 74%-share of the French general public. In Great Britain, however, Muslims split evenly (47% see a conflict, 49% do not) while only 35% of the British general public see no inherent conflict between devotion to Islam and adaptation to a modern society.

Moreover, when asked whether they consider themselves as a national citizen first or as a Muslim first, French Muslims split relatively evenly (42% vs. 46%) on the issue. Not only is this remarkably different from Muslims elsewhere in Europe (fully 81% of British Muslims self-identify with their religion rather than their nationality, for example) but it is remarkably close to the responses given by Americans when asked whether they identify first as national citizens or as Christians (48% vs. 42%). Perhaps in this, as in other things, Muslims living in France are indeed absorbing the secular ways of their countrymen, among whom fully 83% self-identify with their nationality, rather than their religion.

On this one question, however, some evidence of a growing Islamic identity among younger French Muslims appears. Among those under age 35, many of them French by birth, only 40% self-identify primarily as French while 51% self-identify first as Muslim, while 7% say both equally. Among those 35 and older, 45% self-identify with their nationality, 36% as Muslims and 16% as both equally.

However, no such age differential appears on the question of whether Muslims in France want either to be distinct from the larger culture or to adopt its customs. Nearly eight-in-ten French Muslims (78%) say they want to adopt French customs. Those under age 35 are equally as likely to say this as are their elders. This high preference for assimilation compares with that expressed by 53% of Muslims in Spain, 41% in Britain and 30% in Germany.

All in all, one might conclude that, despite their problems — prime among them joblessness among youth generally, not just Muslim youth — the French need take no integrationist lessons from their European neighbors.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has again drawn the world’s attention to Lebanon and its complicated mosaic of religious sects. Despite its small population — just under four million people — Lebanon is the most diverse country in the Middle East, with significant Sunni, Shia, Christian, and Druze populations. On many issues, Lebanon’s Muslim majority shares the views of other Muslims in the Middle East and throughout the world, especially its antipathy toward Israel (Lebanon’s Christian minority also shares this antipathy). But on other issues, Lebanese Muslims stand apart. In particular, data from a Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in May of last year (this year’s survey did not include Lebanon) shows that Lebanon’s Muslims are considerably more secular in their outlook than Muslims in other countries.

Although Lebanese Muslims consider Islam an important part of their lives, they place less emphasis on their faith than do Muslims elsewhere. In the six predominantly Islamic countries surveyed, Muslims in Lebanon are the least likely to say religion is very important in their life — just over half (54%) say religion is very important, compared with 69% of Muslims in Turkey, 86% in Jordan, and more than 90% in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Morocco.

Muslims in Lebanon are also less likely to identify primarily with their religion, rather than with their country, with equal numbers saying they think of themselves first as Muslim (30%) and saying they identify primarily as Lebanese (30%). Elsewhere, majorities or pluralities of Muslims identify more strongly with Islam than with their nationality — in many cases by lopsided proportions. Even in Turkey — a country with a long-running tradition of secularism — Muslim identifiers outnumber those who identify primarily as Turks by 13 percentage points.

Moreover, Lebanese Muslims are less concerned about the global role of Islam — just under half (47%) say it is very important for Islam to play a more important and influential role on the world stage. In contrast, 84% of Muslims in Morocco and 73% in Jordan would like to see Islam play a major role. Only Turkish Muslims, at 43%, show less interest in Islam’s global influence.

Views on Terrorism

Despite their relatively secular worldview, Lebanese Muslims are among the most supportive of terrorist acts in the name of Islam. In 2005, 39% said suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians are often or sometimes justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Only Jordan, at 57%, registered more support for suicide attacks.¹

In Morocco, Turkey, and Indonesia, fewer than one-in-five Muslims believe such attacks can often or sometimes be justified.

Lebanese Muslims also express considerable support for suicide bombing in Iraq — roughly half (49%) said suicide attacks against Americans and other westerners in Iraq are justifiable, a level equal to that found in Jordan (49%) and only slightly less than in Morocco (56%), which recorded the highest level of support.

However, the world’s best known proponent of suicide terrorism, Osama bin Laden, receives little support among Lebanese Muslims. Only 4% say they have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs. This is the lowest level of support for the al Qaeda leader found in any of the six predominantly Muslim countries surveyed.

Muslims and Christians in Lebanon: Agreement on Israel, Differing Views of the U.S.

Despite widespread sectarian violence during their country’s 1975-1990 civil war, today Lebanese Muslims and Christians generally have positive attitudes toward one another. Fully 86% of Muslims have a favorable opinion of Christians, by far the highest rating of Christians by any Muslim public. At the same time, 82% of Christians have a positive view of Muslims.

Attitudes toward Jews, however, are quite another matter. Even before the current conflict, negative sentiments about Jews and Israel were widespread in Lebanon, and they were not confined to the Muslim community. Indeed, no one in our Lebanese sample, Muslim, Christian, Druze, or otherwise, said they had a favorable view of Jews. Of course, negative attitudes towards Jews are not uncommon in the region — in neighboring Jordan, zero respondents had a favorable view of Jews, and Morocco and Pakistan also posted favorable ratings for Jews in the single digits.

Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, prior research has generally shown the Lebanese to be pessimistic about a two-state solution. A 2003 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that three-in-four Muslims (75%) and one-half of Christians (50%) agreed with the statement “the rights and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care of as long as the state of Israel exists.”

Both Lebanese Muslims and Christians are also suspicious of Jewish influence over U.S. foreign policy. When read a list of groups — including Jews, corporations, Christian conservatives, the media, the military, liberals, and ordinary Americans — and asked which one has the most influence on American policy towards other countries, 62% of Lebanese Muslims and 59% of Lebanese Christians said Jews are the most influential. This belief was also widely held in the other Arab countries surveyed — 60% of Jordanians and 50% of Moroccans also said Jews have the most power over America’s international policy.

Although Lebanon’s Muslims and Christians agree that Jews have wide-ranging influence in the United States, they disagree sharply in their attitudes toward the United States and toward American foreign policy. Only 22% of Muslims have a favorable opinion of the U.S. — a level consistent with anti-American sentiments found throughout much of the Muslim world. However, nearly three-in-four Christians (72%) have a favorable view of the U.S.

Muslims and Christians also differ with respect to attitudes toward the American people: 52% of Muslims have a favorable view of Americans, compared with 87% of Christians. In countries throughout the world, Pew Global Attitudes surveys have generally found that people give more favorable ratings to Americans than to the United States, and this is largely true in Muslim countries as well. However, the gap between perceptions of Americans and of the U.S. is particularly large among Muslims in Lebanon. Among other Muslim populations, perceptions of Americans tend to reflect perceptions of America more closely.

Muslims and Christians in Lebanon also hold sharply different views of U.S. actions in the international arena. For example, Muslims are considerably more likely to believe America acts unilaterally on the world stage. Only 19% of Muslims believe the U.S. takes into account the interests of countries like Lebanon a great deal or a fair amount when making foreign policy decisions, compared with 59% of Christians. And only 11% of Muslims favor the U.S.-led war on terrorism; however, 60% of Christians back U.S. anti-terrorism policies.

Another issue on which Muslims and Christians disagree is the threat posed to their country by Islamic extremism. Despite the dominant position of Iranian-backed Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, in last year’s survey only 4% of Lebanese Muslims considered Islamic extremism a very or fairly great threat to the country, the lowest percentage of the six Muslim publics. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s Christian minority sees this issue quite differently: 53% say Islamic extremism poses a very or fairly great threat.

Concerns over Islamic extremism, extensive in the West even before this month’s terrorist attacks in London, are shared to a considerable degree by the publics in several predominantly Muslim nations surveyed. Nearly three-quarters of Moroccans and roughly half of those in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia see Islamic extremism as a threat to their countries. At the same time, most Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam.

Nonetheless, the polling also finds that while Muslim and non-Muslim publics share some common concerns, they have very different attitudes regarding the impact of Islam on their countries. Muslim publics worry about Islamic extremism, but the balance of opinion in predominantly Muslim countries is that Islam is playing a greater role in politics — and most welcome that development. Turkey is a clear exception; the public there is divided about whether a greater role for Islam in the political life of that country is desirable.

In non-Muslim countries, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about Muslim minorities. Western publics believe that Muslims in their countries want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation’s customs and way of life. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the U.S., that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of Islamic identity. For the most part, this development is viewed negatively, particularly in Western Europe. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, those who see a growing sense of Islamic identity among resident Muslims overwhelmingly say this is a bad thing.

The latest survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted among more than 17,000 people in 17 countries this spring, finds that while many Muslims believe that radical Islam poses a threat, there are differing opinions as to its causes. Sizable minorities in most predominantly Muslim countries point to poverty, joblessness and a lack of education, but pluralities in Jordan and Lebanon cite U.S. policies as the most important cause of Islamic extremism.

The polling also finds that in most majority-Muslim countries surveyed, support for suicide bombings and other acts of violence in defense of Islam has declined significantly. In Turkey, Morocco and Indonesia, 15% or fewer now say such actions are justifiable. In Pakistan, only one-in-four now take that view (25%), a sharp drop from 41% in March 2004. In Lebanon, 39% now regard acts of terrorism as often or sometimes justified, again a sharp drop from the 73% who shared that view in 2002. A notable exception to this trend is Jordan, where a majority (57%) now says suicide bombings and other violent actions are justifiable in defense of Islam.

When it comes to suicide bombings in Iraq, however, Muslims in the surveyed countries are divided. Nearly half of Muslims in Lebanon and Jordan, and 56% in Morocco, say suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. However, substantial majorities in Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia take the opposite view.

As in past Global Attitudes surveys, publics in predominantly Muslim countries believe that democracy can work in their countries. Large and growing majorities in Morocco (83%), Lebanon (83%), Jordan (80%) and Indonesia (77%) — as well as pluralities in Turkey (48%) and Pakistan (43%) — say democracy can work well and is not just for the West.

Yet there is some ambivalence about the role of Islam in government. Majorities or pluralities in each of the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, except for Jordan, say Islam is playing a greater role in politics than a few years ago. But those who see Islam playing a large role in political life are also somewhat more likely to say that Islamic extremism poses a threat to their countries.

Overall, the sense that Islamic extremism poses a major national threat is strongest in Morocco, the site of a devastating terrorist attack two years ago, where nearly three-quarters of the public (73%) hold that view. In Pakistan, 52% believe Islamic extremism presents a very or fairly great threat to the country, as do 47% in Turkey. In Lebanon, opinions are divided, with Christians much more likely to see Islamic extremism as a threat than Muslims. And just 10% of Jordanians view Islamic extremism as at least a fairly great threat.

Outside the Muslim world, the Pew survey finds that in countries such as India, Russia, Germany and the Netherlands, concerns about Islamic extremism — both within their own borders and around the world — are running high. Worries over Islamic extremism are nearly as high in France and Spain. Concerns about terrorism at home and around the world run parallel in only three countries, Russia, India and Spain. Before the London terrorist attacks, Americans and Britons expressed more concern about extremism around the world than they did at home.

There also is evidence that these concerns are associated with opposition to Turkey’s entry into the European Union. Overall, nearly two-thirds of French (66%) and Germans (65%) oppose Turkey’s EU bid, as do a majority of the Dutch (53%). Support for Turkey’s admittance to the EU is most extensive in Spain (68%) and Great Britain (57%).

An analysis of the polling finds that opposition to Turkey’s admission is also tied to growing concerns about national identity. Negative views about immigration — not only from the Middle East and Africa but from Eastern Europe as well — are even more strongly related to opposition to Turkey’s admission to the EU than are concerns over Islamic extremism.

Nonetheless, favorable views of Muslims outpace negative views in most countries of North America and Europe. Hostility toward Muslims is much lower in Great Britain, the United States and Canada than in other Western countries surveyed. And while worries about Islamic extremism are substantial in these three English speaking countries, the survey found somewhat less concern about rising Islamic identity among their resident Muslim populations.

Islam in Politics

A complex set of attitudes about the place of Islam in politics emerges from the findings. Most people surveyed in predominantly Muslim countries identify themselves first as Muslims, rather than as citizens of their country. Moreover, except in Jordan, there is considerable acknowledgement that Islam is playing a significant role in the political life of these countries.

Worries about extremism are often greater among those who believe Islam has a significant voice in the political life of their country. This is particularly the case in Turkey and Morocco. The polling finds that those in Turkey who self-identify primarily with their nationality worry more about Islamic extremism than do those who think of themselves first as Muslim.

However, Muslim publics who see Islam’s influence in politics increasing say that this trend is good for their country, while those who see Islam’s influence slipping overwhelmingly say it is bad. Turkey, whose EU candidacy is weakened by European worries about Islamic extremism, has the least clear cut opinions on this issue. An increasing role for Islam in politics in Turkey, a country that has been officially secular since 1923, is seen as a bad thing. Those in Turkey who see Islam’s influence diminishing are divided over whether this is good (44%) or bad (47%).

Views of Religious Groups

Majorities in Great Britain, France, Canada, the U.S. and Russia, as well as pluralities in Spain and Poland, say they have a somewhat or very favorable view of Muslims. In the West, only among the Dutch and Germans does a majority or plurality hold unfavorable views of Muslims (51% and 47%, respectively).

For their part, people in predominantly Muslim countries have mixed views of Christians and strongly negative views of Jews. In Lebanon, which has a large Christian minority, 91% of the public thinks favorably of Christians. Smaller majorities in Jordan and Indonesia also have positive views of Christians. However, in Turkey (63%), Morocco (61%) and Pakistan (58%), solid majorities express negative opinions of Christians.

Anti-Jewish sentiment is endemic in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, all Muslims and 99% of Christians say they have a very unfavorable view of Jews. Similarly, 99% of Jordanians have a very unfavorable view of Jews. Large majorities of Moroccans, Indonesians, Pakistanis and six-in-ten Turks also view Jews unfavorably.

In the Asian countries surveyed, views of religious groups are generally more moderate. India, with its substantial Muslim minority, is closely divided with respect to views about Muslims; 46% hold a favorable view while 43% view them unfavorably. Opinions of Christians are considerably higher: 61% favorable compared with 19% unfavorable. Most Indians (56%) offer no opinion on Jews; those that do split 28% favorable to 17% unfavorable.

In China, half view Muslims unfavorably while only 20% hold a favorable opinion. Views about Christians are scarcely better: 47% unfavorable compared with 26% favorable. Chinese views of Jews are essentially the same as their attitudes toward Christians: 49% negative vs. 28% positive.

In most of Europe as well as North America, majorities or pluralities judge some religions as more prone to violence than others, and those that do mostly have Islam in mind. Similarly, in India, among the 39% who see some religions as more violent than others, nearly three-in-four (73%) point to Islam, while 17% designate Hinduism. In predominantly Muslim countries, many agree that some religions are more prone to violence than others, but those who think this mostly have Judaism in mind. In Turkey, a plurality sees Christianity as the most violent.

Ban Muslim Head Scarves?

On another controversial issue, the prohibition on wearing head scarves by Muslim women in public places including schools, attitudes are uniformly negative in the Muslim world but differ sharply among non-Muslim countries.

Majorities in the U.S., Canada and Great Britain, as well as pluralities in Spain, Russia and Poland, view such prohibitions as a bad idea. However, in France, where a ban on wearing head scarves and other “conspicuous” religious symbols in secular schools went into effect last year, a large majority (78%) favors such prohibitions. They are joined in this view by smaller majorities in Germany (54%), the Netherlands (51%) and by nearly two-thirds of the Indian public (66%).

In Turkey, where a longstanding ban on head scarves in schools and public buildings has come under increasing attack from Muslim activists, 64% of the public calls such a ban a bad idea compared with 29% who view it as a good idea. Lebanon weighs in against head scarf bans by 59% opposed to 29% in favor, while even larger majorities in Jordan (97%), Indonesia (95%), Morocco (90%) and Pakistan (77%) call them a bad idea.

Views of bin Laden

While support for suicide bombings and other terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority nations surveyed, so too has confidence in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In Lebanon, just 2% report some or a lot of confidence in bin Laden, and in Turkey only 7% do so.

In Morocco, just 26% of the public now say they have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden, down sharply from 49% in May 2003. In Indonesia, the public is now about evenly split, with 35% saying they place at least some confidence in bin Laden and 37% saying they have little or none; that represents a major shift since 2003, when 58% expressed confidence in bin Laden.

In Pakistan, however, a narrow majority (51%) places some measure of confidence in bin Laden, a slight increase from 45% in 2003. And in Jordan, support for the Al Qaeda leader has risen over the last two years from 55% to a current 60%, including 25% who say they have a lot of confidence in him. Unsurprisingly, support for bin Laden in non-Muslim countries is measured in the small single digits.

Declining support for terror in a number of the Muslim countries surveyed tracks with previously reported dramatic increases in favorable views of the United States in Indonesia and Morocco. Favorable opinions of the U.S. surged most among younger people in Morocco, but were equally evident among both the young and old in Indonesia. The polling also found that in most Muslim countries women were less likely to express an opinion of the U.S. than were men, but when they did, they held a somewhat more positive view.