Russian Nationalism

Roughly half of Russians (53%) agree that their homeland should be for Russians only; four-in-ten disagree. The public voiced a similar degree of ethnic chauvinism in 2009, when 54% said “Russia should be for Russians.” In contrast, when the Soviet Union was in its last throes in 1991, 69% disagreed and only 26% agreed with that notion that Russia should be exclusively for Russians.

Along with strains of ethnic nationalism, the image of Russia as an imperial power persists among a substantial number of Russians today. A 44%-plurality say it’s natural for their country to have an empire, compared with 31% who disagree and a quarter who do not have a definite opinion. In 2009, roughly the same number (47%) felt it was natural for Russia to have its own empire. Two decades ago, with the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, only 37% shared this view.

Notably, Russians who admire Vladimir Putin are not especially adamant about their country’s imperial claims. Among those with a favorable opinion of Putin, 45% think it’s natural for their country to have an empire, compared with 43% among those who have a negative opinion of the Russian president.

Russia’s International Image

A little more than half of Russians (55%) think people in other countries generally dislike Russia. This is up from 47% in 2010, but comparable to the 57% who expressed the same view in 2005. Today, 31% say Russia generally is liked around the world, while 14% give no opinion.

Nearly three-in-four Russians (73%) say their country should be more respected around the world; only 16% believe that internationally Russia is as respected as it should be.

The sense that Russia deserves greater respect from other countries is fairly constant across age, education and income groups.

Following a winter of discontent Russians express an increased appetite for political freedom, and at the same time strongly endorse Vladimir Putin.

Compared with just a few years ago, more Russians believe that voting gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about the country’s governance, more feel that it is important to be able to openly criticize the government, and greater numbers see freedom of the press and honest elections as very important.

Consistent with the value placed on core democratic principles, a solid majority (64%) see attending protests as an opportunity to speak out about how the government is run, and more than half (56%) specifically approve of the mass demonstrations that followed the December 2011 parliamentary vote, which was marred by fraud allegations. In that regard, while a modest 56%-majority says they are satisfied with the outcome of the March 4, 2012 presidential election, just 47% believe that election was fair.

Nonetheless, the poll finds a number of indicators of support for the status quo. Most notably, 72% of Russians voice a favorable opinion of Vladimir Putin, while almost as many hold a positive opinion of Dmitri Medvedev (67%). Putin’s popularity is being fueled more by views of the economy and perceptions of social mobility than it is being hurt by democratic aspirations. Relatively few Russians express favorable views of other prominent political figures. Roughly four-in-ten or fewer have positive opinions of presidential contenders Gennady Zyuganov (39%), Mikhail Prokhorov (36%), Sergei Mironov (36%) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (28%). Meanwhile, 54% of Russians are unfamiliar with government critic and protest organizer Alexei Navalny.

Further, as they have for most of the post-Soviet era, a majority of Russians continue to feel that relying on a leader with a strong hand in order to solve problems is more important than relying on a democratic form of government (57% vs. 32%). In addition, strong majorities say it is very important to live in a country where there is law and order (75%) and economic prosperity (71%). In fact, three-quarters say they would choose a strong economy over a good democracy.

These are among the principal findings from a nationwide survey of Russia by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,000 adults in Russia between March 19 and April 4, 2012. The poll finds that Russians are generally divided about their country’s direction as Putin begins his third term as president: 46% are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, while 45% are not. At home, the economy is a concern for many Russians, with only 32% describing the current economic situation as good. Meanwhile, in the international arena, a solid majority (73%) believe Russia deserves greater respect from other countries. The survey also finds persistent strains of ethnic nationalism among Russians, with about half (53%) saying Russia should be for Russians only, and 44% saying it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Democratic Freedoms More Valued

Against the backdrop of protests over the conduct of elections and the state of democracy in Russia, increasing numbers of Russians endorse the importance of key civic freedoms and institutions. Looking back a full ten years, five of the six measures of democratic freedom tested by the Global Attitudes Project have witnessed double-digit increases in terms of the percentage of Russians describing them as “very important.”

As they have in the past, today Russians place the greatest value on a judiciary that treats all citizens equally (71%), but compared with 2009, more now also value a civilian-controlled military (up 14 percentage points), an uncensored media (up 12 points) and honest elections (up 11 points). The importance of free speech and religious freedom has grown more modestly over the past three years (up 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively).

Although growing numbers of Russians value civic freedoms and institutions, relatively few see these as a reality in their country. Roughly one-in-five or fewer say a fair judiciary (17%), honest elections (16%), uncensored media (15%) and a civilian-controlled military (14%) describe Russia very well. Slightly more (28%) say that freedom of speech is characteristic of their country, while almost half (46%) agree that citizens are generally free to practice their religion.

Comparing the percentage of Russians who place a high value on core political freedoms with the percentage who believe the same freedoms are a fact of life in Russia, it is possible to discern a growing gap between democracy’s promise and practice.

In light of this gap, it is not surprising to find only 31% of Russians are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This sentiment is pervasive across demographic groups. And although those with a favorable view of Putin are somewhat more upbeat about the state of democracy in Russia (36% satisfied), even within this group a majority (57%) see room for improvement.

Voting, Protests Seen as Important

Despite the public’s disappointment with democratization in Russia, the number of people who say voting matters has actually risen. In 1991, when the Times Mirror Center, precursor to the Pew Research Center, first asked if voting gave people an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things, just 47% agreed. In 2009, the balance of opinion showed more doubting the power of voting. But this spring there seems to be a renewed conviction that casting one’s vote matters – a 56%-majority now believes this to be true.

Positive shifts in the value placed on voting are evident across education and income groups. Meanwhile, attitudes among older Russians appear to have “caught up” with those of younger Russians. In 2009, just over half (54%) of those ages 18-29 said that voting gave them a say about governance, but fewer among 30-49 year olds (42%) or those over 50 (38%) felt the same. Today, about the same number of 18-29 year olds think voting matters (51%), but more among the 30-49 and 50-plus cohorts now share this view, (55% and 61%, respectively).

Along with generally endorsing the importance of voting, a strong majority of Russians (64%) believe that attending protests or demonstrations is an effective way for average citizens to comment on the government’s actions. And more than half (56%) say they support the protests for fair elections that arose in the wake of the controversial parliamentary vote in December of last year.

While some in Russia have suggested that the protests for fair elections are the result of Western meddling, most Russians (58%) disagree, attributing the demonstrations instead to genuine dissatisfaction among the public.

Mixed Reaction to Presidential Vote

Protests in the wake of the December 2011 parliamentary elections brought to the fore questions about the fairness of the March 4, 2012 presidential vote. Following Putin’s first-round victory, the public offers a mixed assessment of the balloting: 47% believe the election was free from manipulation, while roughly a third (35%) disagree and 18% are uncertain.

Overall, a majority (56%) say they are satisfied with the results of the election, compared with a third (33%) who are dissatisfied. One-in-ten do not have an opinion either way.

The perceived fairness of the March 4th vote is a key factor influencing satisfaction with the outcome. Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) who think the election was “clean” say they are satisfied with the outcome. By contrast, only one-in-five who believe the vote was unfair say the same. Russians who are unsure whether the election was fair, meanwhile, tend to be satisfied (46%) with Putin’s victory.

Not surprisingly, reaction to the election results is especially positive among Russians who hold a favorable opinion of Putin (71% satisfied) and those who feel they are better off financially than they were five years ago (71% satisfied).

Putin’s Continued Appeal

While some Russians may have their doubts about the fairness of the March 4th presidential vote, Putin clearly remains popular. Roughly seven-in-ten (72%) say they have a favorable opinion of the returning president. Only about a quarter (24%) of respondents voice the opposite view.

Putin’s base of support is broad, although he is especially popular among women, Russians ages 30-49 and those with less than a college education. Overall, opinion of the newly elected president is more influenced by views of the economy and perceived social mobility. People who say the economy is good and feel they are better off than their parents are more likely to have a positive view of Putin. To the degree that democratic leanings help shape attitudes toward Putin, those who say an uncensored media is very important are less likely to have a favorable opinion of Russia’s long-time leader.

Dmitri Medvedev, who will now be stepping into the role of prime minister, is also widely popular. Two-thirds of Russians have a favorable view of Medvedev, while only 28% voice an unfavorable opinion.

In terms of public support, Putin and Medvedev clearly stand out from other figures on Russia’s political stage. Among the presidential candidates this spring, for example, Putin is the only one viewed favorably by a majority of Russians. Indeed, on balance, opinions of veteran politicians such as Communist Party head Zyuganov, A Just Russia’s Mironov and Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky are negative (52%, 51% and 66% unfavorable, respectively).

Views are similarly negative for presidential candidate Prokhorov: roughly half (48%) have an unfavorable view of the billionaire businessman. Meanwhile, among the relatively few Russians familiar with Alexei Navalny, the online activist and a prominent organizer of anti-government protests, views also tend to be more negative than positive (31% vs. 16%).

Challenges Ahead?

As Putin assumes the presidency for the third time, he faces a public with mixed views about the state of their nation. At home, opinion is nearly evenly split as to whether the country is headed in the right direction. On one hand, more today (46%) than at any point since 2008 say things are going well. But on the other, worries persist. In particular, a majority (64%) continues to describe the economy as bad.

Internationally, meanwhile, Russians show signs of insecurity. Slightly more than half (55%) believe their country is generally disliked by other countries – an increase of 8 percentage points since 2010. And fully 73% say Russia deserves to be more respected around the world than it currently is.

The desire for enhanced prestige on the world stage coexists with a persistent strain of ethnic nationalism. Roughly half (53%) of Russians say their homeland should be for Russians, while 44% think it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

When asked their opinions of two key ethnic minorities in their country, however, Russians continue to express positive views of Ukrainians and Lithuanians. Similarly, Ukrainians view Russians, Poles and Lithuanians in their country favorably, and Lithuanians offer positive opinions of Russians, Ukrainians and Poles in their country.

Russian Nostalgia for Soviet Era

Russians remain largely nostalgic for the Soviet era, although this sentiment has abated somewhat over the past two years. Half of Russians now agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, while 36% disagree; in 2009, nearly six-in-ten (58%) lamented the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while 38% did not share this view.

The drop in the percentage expressing regret about the demise of the Soviet Union has been especially notable among older Russians, although most in these groups remain nostalgic.

Currently, about six-in-ten of those 65 and older (63%) and those ages 50 to 64 (61%) agree that it is a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, compared with 45% of those ages 30 to 49 and even fewer among those younger than 30 (36%).

In 2009, more than eight-in-five (85%) Russians in the oldest age group and 71% of those ages 50 to 64 expressed regret that the Soviet Union no longer exists; 51% of those ages 30 to 49 and 38% of those younger than 30 shared this view.

Nationalism on the Rise

About half of Russians (48%) agree that it is natural for their country to have an empire,
while one third disagree with this notion. Although virtually unchanged from when the question was last asked in 2009, this represents a considerable shift from Russian sentiment as the Soviet Union was collapsing. In 1991, 37% of Russians said it was natural for their country to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Similarly, the 2009 survey found that Russians were far more likely than they were two decades ago to agree that “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us;” about six-in-ten (58%) said this was the case two years ago, compared with just 22% in 1991. Moreover, about twice as many Russians agreed that Russia should be for Russians in 2009 as did so in 1991 (54% vs. 26%).

Ukrainians are as likely as Russians to say it is natural for Russia to have an empire; 46% agree with this statement, while 34% disagree. In 1991, only about one-in-five (22%) shared the view that an empire was natural for Russia; a majority of Ukrainians (55%) disagreed with this sentiment.

Views of Ethnic Minorities

As was the case two decades ago, publics in the three former Soviet republics surveyed hold favorable views of some key ethnic minorities in their countries. That is especially the case in Ukraine, where about nine-in-ten express positive opinions of Russians (93%), Poles (88%) and Lithuanians (87%).

At least seven-in-ten Lithuanians have favorable views of Russians (77%) and Ukrainians (73%); a narrower majority (57%) expresses similar views of Poles. And in Russia, 80% give ethnic Ukrainians positive marks, while 62% say the same about Lithuanians in their country.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

Taken aback by critical depictions of their country’s “collective funk,” Italians are currently engaged in considerable hand-wringing over the condition of their national psyche. It started a few weeks ago with a broadside from across the Atlantic by Ian Fisher in the New York Times. “Italy,” Fisher wrote, “seems not to love itself.” Analyzing the country’s malaise, he detailed a litany of woes: an anemic economy, a low birth rate, corrupt politicians, mobsters. Only days later, the London Times piled on, lamenting Italy’s “national angst” as it “faces up to being old and poor.” Worse still, the country’s international image has suffered with press reports of Naples’ garbage crisis — with landfills overflowing in late December, collectors stopped picking up trash, which now piles up in unpleasant mounds across the city.

Certainly rotting trash is not the image most Americans associate with Italy, the land of dramatic history, great food, and expensive style (think Gucci, Armani, Ferrari). And many Americans return from Italy with a strong appreciation for the Italian approach to living — the slower pace, the long meals, the passeggiata, or “evening stroll.” But in truth, the malaise camp might be on to something. Italians are a bit glum, and it shows in public opinion polls. In spring 2007, the Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed 47 countries, and on a variety of issues — life satisfaction, national conditions, immigration — Italians had a distinctively negative outlook.¹

Italians Less Satisfied With Life

Despite its reputation for la dolce vita, when it comes to rating their current lives and looking to the future, Italians are generally gloomier than their fellow Europeans, as well as Americans and Canadians. For example, when asked to place themselves on a “ladder of life,” where zero represents the worst possible life and 10 the best possible life, fewer than half of Italians (48%) rate their life at least a seven. On the other hand, in Sweden (72%), Canada (71%), Spain (66%), and the United States (65%), more than six-in-ten respondents place themselves on the top rungs of the ladder.

As is true throughout much of Europe, dissatisfaction is particularly common among older citizens — only 37% of Italians ages 55 and older give their current life a high rating, compared with 49% of those ages 35-54. On a positive note, young Italians (ages 18-34) are much happier — 60% rate their life at least a seven on the zero-to-10 scale.
Figure

People who live in Northern Italy also tend to be more satisfied — 55% are in the high category, compared with only 42% of those from the less economically developed Southern and Central provinces. Compared with other western publics, however, even Northern Italians are relatively dissatisfied.

Little Optimism

Italians are also the least optimistic among the eight Western countries surveyed. Only 37% of Italians think they will be at a higher spot on the ladder of life in five years. In contrast, in the United States — a country famous for its optimism — 55% say they will be better off.

Italians are even less optimistic if the timeframe is extended further into the future — only 10% believe children in their country will have a better life than people do now, the lowest percentage among Western countries. Of course, pessimism about the long-term future is pretty common throughout the West. With just 36% saying their nation’s children will have a better life, the Spanish emerge as the most optimistic on this score.

Widespread Dissatisfaction With National Conditions

Italians also stand apart from others in the West when it comes to rating their national conditions. In the Pew survey, only 16% of Italians were satisfied with the way things were going in their country, the lowest percentage in any Western country. Certainly, much of this dissatisfaction is tied to the country’s lackluster economic growth. As Richard Owen notes in the London Times piece, in 2007 Italian living standards fell below those in Spain, dealing yet another blow to the country’s ego. Seven-in-ten Italians characterize the country’s economy as somewhat or very bad.

Crime and political corruption are also considered much bigger problems in Italy than in other Western nations. Nearly eight-in-ten (78%) Italians say crime is a “very big problem” for their country, while two-thirds rate corrupt political leaders a very big problem.

Strong Concerns About Immigration

Immigration, however, may be the issue on which Italy is most distinctive. Like much of Western Europe, over the last few years Italy has wrestled with how to successfully integrate and assimilate its Muslim minority. Additionally, the recent influx of Romanian immigrants — especially Roma, or gypsies from Romania — into Italy has led to new controversies over immigration. The 2007 Pew poll included a number of questions on immigration, and on each of these, Italians held the most negative opinions of any Western public.Nearly two-thirds of Italians (64%) believe immigration is a very big problem for their country. In no other Western nation did a majority rate immigration a very big problem (Spain was the closest at 42%). In fact, Italy’s level of concern was the highest, not only among Western countries, but among all 47 nations included in the survey.

Similarly, roughly three-in-four Italians (73%) say immigrants are having a bad effect on their country, considerably more than any other Western public, and second only to South Africa (75%) among the 47 nations in the study.

Fully 87% of Italians say there should be tighter restrictions on people coming into their country — up seven points from 2002, and again, the highest percentage among Western countries. Italian attitudes are overwhelmingly negative toward immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as immigrants from Eastern Europe. Two-thirds say immigration from each of these areas is a bad thing.

National Pride

Despite all these signs of a rather dark mood, many Italians still reject the malaise argument, including Giuliano Amato, the country’s interior minister. A week after Fisher’s article appeared, Amato struck back in a letter to The New York Times, trumpeting his country’s economy and health care system, and its recent successes in fighting the mafia.

Certainly, Amato is not alone in taking pride in his country, especially its culture. Italians are much more likely than their fellow Westerners to believe in their country’s cultural pre-eminence. About two-in-three Italians (68%) agree with the statement “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.”

By contrast, in neighboring France — a country well known for having pride in its language and culture — only 32% say their culture is better than others. Italians are even more confident in their cultural superiority than Americans (55%), who themselves are well known for their strong national pride.

Why is anti-Americanism on the rise? In their new book, America Against the World, Pew Research Center President Andrew Kohut and journalist Bruce Stokes explore findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s series of international surveys that highlight the role American values play in the worldwide rise in anti-Americanism in the 21st century. In the following excerpt, the authors examine the major factors, real and imagined, that contribute to this growing alienation between America and other countries, both friends and foes, around the globe.

Differences in American values and attitudes, modest as many may be, do matter in the daily relations between nations because of the status of the United States as an unprecedented superpower and the driving influence of American business and culture. While other publics hold exceptional views, Argentine, Czech, and Japanese exceptionalism do not face such resistance because Argentina, the Czech Republic, and Japan do not dominate the globe the way that the United States does. Americans’ exceptionalism is America’s problem, not so much because Americans are that different from others, but because any dissimilarity in attitudes or values is magnified by the United States’ place in the world, and others often resent those differences.

In pursuing these differences, it is helpful to differentiate between three types of American exceptionalism that shape both the ways that U.S. citizens look at the world and the ways that the world looks at them:

• Misunderstood exceptionalism — American values and attitudes that many in the United States as well as abroad regard as part of the problem, though there is little evidence to support this contention.
• Conditional exceptionalism — Aspects of the American character that are distinctive, but not so much that they are destined to consistently divide the American people from the rest of the world. These include values and attitudes that are products of the times or subject to the course of events and the influence of American leadership.
• Problematic exceptionalism — How Americans view themselves, their country, and the world in ways that reflect potentially unbridgeable, persistent gaps in opinions on important issues.

Not all characteristics that distinguish Americans fall neatly into one or another of these categories, of course. And it is important to emphasize that we use the term exceptionalism without the normative judgments — specifically, the implication of superiority–often associated with it. Whether the special qualities of American attitudes and values have encouraged a sense of American superiority is an issue to be explored.

Misunderstood

Two aspects of the American character — nationalism and religiosity — are assumed to significantly influence the way the United States conducts itself in the world. As Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has put it, “Today’s strident anti-Americanism represents much more than a wimpy reaction to U.S. resolve or generic fears of a hegemon running amok. Rather, the growing unease with the United States should be seen as a powerful global backlash against the spirit of American nationalism that shapes and animates U.S. foreign policy.”¹

Reflecting the world’s worries at the time of the run-up to the war in Iraq, the editors of The Economist opined that, “only one thing unsettles George Bush’s critics more than the possibility that his foreign policy is secretly driven by greed. That is the possibility that it is secretly driven by God….War for oil would merely be bad. War for God would be catastrophic.”²

Such punditry makes convincing reading because it reinforces longstanding prejudices. And certainly, long-term U.S. support for Israel, and, more recently, strong support among Christian evangelicals for the repossession by the Jewish people of the land promised in the Bible, have heightened concern in predominately Muslim countries — as well as in Europe — that America is on a religious crusade. But little hard data support the idea that either religiosity or nationalism plays a significant role in Americans’ actual opinions about how the United States should relate to the world.

The City on a Hill Syndrome

Nothing is more vexing to foreigners than Americans’ belief that America is a shining city on a hill — a place apart where a better way of life exists, one to which all other peoples should aspire. And, compared with Western Europeans, average Americans are more likely to express their pride and patriotism. In 1999, when Americans were asked to account for their country’s success in the 20th century, they credited the “American system.” Many among the public may have been frustrated by how the system operated, but they liked the design.

At the same time, Americans also hold a number of other attitudes that mitigate their nationalism. Most important, contrary to widespread misconceptions, Americans’ pride in their country is not evangelistic. The American people, as opposed to some of their leaders, seek no converts to their ideology. A Gallup poll taken in February 2005, just days after President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address in which he made far reaching and eloquent calls for increased democracy in the Middle East, found that only 31 percent of the U.S. public thought that building democracy should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy. Their real priorities were preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and maintaining U.S. military power, not planting the flag of American-style democracy in far-away places. A subsequent poll for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, conducted in September 2005, found only 27 percent of the public strongly committed to spreading democracy.³

Similarly, while U.S. citizens are alone in thinking it is a “good thing” that American customs are spreading all around the world, they see people from other countries benefiting more from such Americanization than themselves. Americans are accused of believing “Aren’t we great? Do as we do!” In reality, they are far more likely to say, “We think the American way is great; we assume you want to be like us, but, if you don’t, that’s really not our concern.”

The ordinary American’s modest appetite for spreading U.S. ideals goes hand in hand with the public’s lack of imperial aspirations. Consider the American reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union. While pundits and politicians made much of the vindication of democracy and capitalism, ordinary Americans barely paid attention–less than half the public very closely followed news about the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, according to Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press surveys at the time. Far from a mood of triumph or hunger for world domination, the American public became even more indifferent to international affairs than it had been, while the size of the isolationist minority in the United States rose to a 40-year high.

Today, in a more dangerous and contentious time, even American elites — academics, journalists, business leaders and so forth — show few aspirations for empire and little appetite for proselytizing. While two out of three American opinion leaders believe that the United States should play a strong leadership role in the world (twice the proportion of the public at large), fewer than 10 percent think the United States should be the single world leader– a consistent finding in surveys throughout the 1990s and into 2001. Further, American elites have not given the spread of democracy around the world much greater priority than has the average citizen.⁴

It is true that the idea that the United States should play the evangelist because its values are the “right” ones has in recent years echoed in speeches by America’s leaders and in commentaries by political analysts. Writing in the Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and William Kristol asserted in 2002 that “September 11 really did change everything…. George W. Bush is now a man with a mission. As it happens, it is America’s historic mission.”⁵ But while Bush administration officials and many neo-conservatives have given the impression that U.S. nationalism is proactive and evangelistic, their views do not reflect general public opinion.

The case that Americans are dangerously nationalistic is further undermined by Americans’ refreshing penchant for self-criticism. Pew’s 2005 global survey asked people in 16 countries and the United States what words or phrases they associated with the American people. Fully 70 percent of Americans described their fellow countrymen as greedy, a harsher criticism than that leveled by any non-Americans in the survey. About half of Americans, 49 percent, saw themselves as violent, a self-criticism with which majorities agreed in 13 of the 16 other countries surveyed. These significant reservations about their own character suggest a healthy self-doubt that tempers any tendencies toward imperial hubris.

America, the Blessed Nation

American religiosity is also a growing concern to many foreigners. This is especially the case among America’s traditional European allies, who are among the most secular people in the world. However, American religious fervor also influences the views of people in some Muslim societies.

The United States has a long tradition of separating church from state — but an equally powerful inclination to mix religion with politics. Throughout the nation’s history, great political and social movements — from abolition to women’s suffrage to civil rights to today’s struggles over abortion and gay marriage — have drawn upon religious institutions for moral authority, inspirational leadership, and organizational muscle. But for the past generation, religion has come to be woven more deeply into the fabric of partisan politics than ever before.

Within the United States, there is little question that religious views have a decided impact on many social issues such as abortion, end-of-life decisions, stem cell research and homosexuality. In fact, whether a person regularly attends church or synagogue or mosque was more important in determining his or her vote for president in 2004 than such demographic characteristics as gender, age, income, and region; and it was just as important as race.

Little wonder then that a solid majority of European respondents in Pew’s 2005 poll described the American people as “too religious.” It is also not surprising that critics of President Bush would see his religious and moralistic rhetoric — especially in his use of the phrase, “axis of evil” — as just the kind of American religious fervor that they fear in U.S. foreign policy. Upon hearing that Christian fundamentalists in the United States link their support for Israel to their own apocalyptic vision of history, it is understandable that Muslims might fear that religious conservatives are driving U.S. Middle-East policy.

Yet there is little evidence that Americans make their judgments about world affairs based on their religious beliefs. For nearly a decade, Pew has asked national samples of the U.S. public how they feel about a range of concerns to discover what factors were most influential in shaping their opinions. On personal issues, such as gay marriage, euthanasia, and cloning, those who take conservative stances do largely credit their religious beliefs. But this link between religion and policy did not exist when it came to the use force in the Balkans and Iraq, or even in preventing genocide. Only when people were asked about their basic sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute did religion emerge as a significant factor and even then, Americans cited media coverage as a stronger influence on their support for Israel.

Thus, while Americans are clearly nationalistic and quite religious, there is little evidence that either their patriotism or their faith drives public support for the more activist and unilateralist U.S. foreign policy that has fueled anti-Americanism in recent years.

It All Depends

The world’s biggest complaint about the United States is that Washington too often acts unilaterally, without concern for the interests of others. Certainly the American public is ambivalent about multilateralism, running hot and cold on whether the United States should cooperate with allies or adopt a go-it-alone approach.

This conflict in public thinking was clearly illustrated in an August 2004 Pew and Council on Foreign Relations poll that found two-thirds of the U.S. public saying that the United States was less respected globally than in the past and by roughly a two-to-one margin viewing this loss as a major problem for the nation.⁶ But in the same poll Americans ranked improving relations with allies only ninth out of 19 international objectives. Further Pew polls that year found that Americans, unlike Europeans, felt that their country did not need to seek UN approval in order to take preventive military action to protect itself and that the United States ensure that the country remains the sole global military superpower. Three months after the August 2004 survey, voters re-elected George W. Bush, and they did so mostly because they liked the president’s leadership style and stewardship of the war on terrorism.

While we have no public opinion data dating back to the early days of the republic, it is fair to say that unilateralism and hegemony (at least with regard to the Western Hemisphere) have been accepted by the American people for most of their history. In the view of Yale University historian John Gaddis, it was not until the mid-1930s that the United States began to pursue a more multilateralist course in foreign affairs. And even then, Franklin Delano Roosevelt had to convince voters that working closely with others was the best way to preserve U.S. resources and to get the allies “to do most of the fighting.”⁷ This shift in Americans’ views about their relations with the rest of the world defined American foreign policy for the remainder of the 20th century. But the September 11 attacks have rekindled Americans’ support for unilateralism. That stance has clearly divided the U.S. public from its traditional allies.

Most Americans are oblivious to this alienation. Pew’s 17-nation poll in 2005 found that while 69 percent of Americans believed that the United States was “generally disliked” by people in other parts of the world, 67 percent also believed, quite contrary to the view of most people in other countries, that the United States paid attention to foreigners’ interests. This is a disconnect of a major order.⁸

Americans’ reawakened affinity for unilateralism also resonates with their opposition to ceding sovereignty over international endeavors. Polls have consistently found public opposition to U.S. troops serving under UN command and Americans, unlike a majority of Europeans, are not prepared to allow their soldiers to be tried in international criminal courts when charged with war crimes. U.S. citizens are also considerably less willing than other Western publics to give an international organization final say on global environmental policies.

But such go-it-alone American exceptionalism is both equivocal and conditional. While Americans are protective of their sovereignty and jealous of their right to protect themselves, the urge to be good world citizens and cooperate with allies is never far from the surface. The 2004 Pew poll also found that, by a 49 percent to 35 percent plurality, Americans continued to believe that U.S. foreign policy should take into account the interests of allies rather than be based mostly on U.S. interests. It also found rising criticism of President Bush for paying too little attention to the interest of close allies.

Furthermore, it is now the American public that seeks a closer working relationship with traditional allies, while Europeans want more space. In Pew’s 2005 survey, sizable majorities in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Holland said that their governments should take a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs than they have in the past. However, two in three Americans felt that the U.S. and Western Europe should remain as close ever.

Problems, You Say?

While nationalism and religiosity are misunderstood manifestations of American exceptionalism, and U.S. internationalism often depends on the tenor of the times and who is in the White House, a deep-seated individualism, coupled with an inherent optimism, truly distinguishes Americans. The American ethic of self-reliance and independence, coupled with the unparalleled economic and military success of the United States since its founding, has given Americans boundless optimism.

But these traits entail a number of problematic consequences for the U.S. relationship with the world. First, Americans’ self-reliance leads them to believe that they really don’t need the rest of the world. For example, Pew’s surveys have found majorities of Americans saying that what happens in Europe and Asia–even events in neighbor countries, Mexico and, especially, Canada–has little, if any, impact on their lives. While these polls date to the 1990s and the early days of September 2001, there is little to suggest that these attitudes have changed. Americans have remained disinterested in foreign news except when it deals directly with the United States or the war on terrorism. Polls conducted by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) also found that, despite being citizens of the world’s leading trading economy, Americans believed that other countries benefit more from global trade than does the United States.

Indeed, Americans’ self-confidence breeds indifference and inertia toward dealing with problems generally and international problems in particular. Americans tend to minimize challenges even as they acknowledge them. In mid-1999, Pew conducted a series of major polls asking Americans to look back on the 20th century and ahead to the 21st. Despite gloomy consensus forecasts of natural disasters, environmental calamities, and international terrorism, a resounding 81 percent of adults were steadfast in their optimism about what the 21st century held for them and their families, and 70 percent believed the country as a whole would do well. Eight in ten Americans described themselves as hopeful, anticipating that the new millennium would usher in the triumph of science and technology. Majorities predicted that it was most likely cancer would be cured, AIDS would be eradicated, and ordinary people would travel in space.⁹

Such confidence in the face of looming problems is a key element in Americans’ “can do” reputation. But optimism can also reinforce a “muddle through” mentality, which, in turn, makes it more difficult to bring public pressure to bear on elected leaders to deal forcefully with problems that Americans themselves see on the horizon. For example, PIPA surveys showed that a very strong majority of the U.S. public believed that global warming is a real and serious problem. Yet 21 percent of respondents stated that unless global warming is a certainty, no steps should be taken to deal with it, and another 42 percent said only gradual, low-cost steps should be taken. Just 34 percent of the public said it was necessary to deal with global warming right now. Moreover 66 percent thought that the United States was either doing more or about as much to limit greenhouse gases as other advanced nations.

Finally, Americans’ strong sense of individual freedom combined with their overweening optimism leads many to think they can have it both ways. Energy is a prime case in point. Americans have long acknowledged the risk of dependence on foreign energy sources. Yet, even the September 11 attacks, carried out largely by nationals of Saudi Arabia, America’s largest oil provider, had minimal impact on attitudes toward the car culture. It was not until the sharp spurt in prices in late August and early September 2005 that support for policies such as tighter automobile fuel-efficiency standards and incentives for alternative energy-source development rose substantially.¹⁰ For most Americans, the high cost of gasoline represents a challenge to their assumed right to low-priced fuel, an integral part of their SUV culture.

A similar two-mindedness is apparent with respect to trade policy. Many Americans deplore the loss of U.S. jobs because of imports. But in recent years they have happily purchased record amounts of imported goods, citing their high quality and relatively low prices. In effect, Americans are saying, “protect our jobs but keep those affordable frocks and gadgets coming.”

Throughout the world, there is a tension in opinion brought on by the push and pull of globalization. Strong majorities in all regions believe that increased global interconnectedness is a good thing. But globalization is more popular among the youth of the world. Everywhere but Latin America, young people are more likely than their elders to see advantages in increased global trade and communication, and they are more likely to embrace “globalization” per se¹. This hesitation among some older citizens to embrace the movement toward globalization may be due in part to latent nationalism. Trend data from the World Values Survey² , in successive surveys over the past 20 years, show that for the last two decades older people in the U.S. and throughout Western Europe have consistently expressed more national pride than a generation of older citizens.

Whose Culture is Best?

The Global Attitudes survey shows that people all over the world and of all ages are proud of their cultures. Yet it is only in the West (North America and Western Europe) where that pride is markedly stronger among the older generations, while younger people tend to be less wedded to their cultural identities.

In the U.S., 68% of those ages 65 and older agree with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior,” while only 49% of those ages 18-29 agree. The generation gap in Western Europe is similar. More than half of older Western Europeans (53%) are culturally chauvinistic, compared with only one-in-three (32%) of their younger counterparts. The difference between generations is particularly apparent in France, where only 21% of those under age 30 support the notion of cultural superiority while 56% of those aged 65 and older say French culture is superior.

Eastern Europeans overall are more likely than their Western counterparts to say that their culture is superior. However, generational differences are not as sharp or as consistent as those seen in the US and Western Europe. In Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine, citizens of all ages agree about the superiority of their respective cultures. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic, there are differences in perspective across age groups.

In Africa and Latin America, strong majorities, cutting across almost all ages, believe their culture is superior. In Asia, feelings of cultural superiority are even more intense. There are no major generation gaps in the region, except in Japan, where 84% of older people think that their culture is superior, compared with only 56% of those under age 30 who hold that view.

Protecting “Our Way of Life”

Despite the general attraction of globalization and possibly, as a reflection of their sense of cultural superiority, solid majorities everywhere think that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. In most parts of the world, that desire cuts across all age groups. However, in the U.S., Western Europe and parts of Eastern Europe, older people are much more worried than the young about defending their country’s way of life.

In the U.S., seven-in-ten (71%) people ages 65 and older want to shield their way of life from foreign influence, while just over half (55%) of those ages 18 to 29 agree. This generation gap is even greater in France, Germany and Britain, where older people are twice as likely as young people to be worried about erosion of their way of life. Generational differences are less consistent in Eastern Europe. Concern is greatest among older people in Russia and Ukraine, while young Czechs are more worried than their elders about foreign influence.

Africans, Asians, Latin Americans and people living in the Middle East are generally even more worried than Americans and Europeans about a pernicious foreign influence on their way of life, but that concern is broadly shared across generations, with little significant difference between age groups.

Putting the Brakes on Immigration

Skepticism about foreign influence is evident in widespread, intense antipathy toward immigration. Majorities in nearly every country surveyed support tougher restrictions on people entering their countries. Immigrants are particularly unpopular across Europe, especially among the older generation, where half of those surveyed completely agree with the need for additional immigration controls. The anti-immigrant generation gap is widest in France, where more than half (53%) of those ages 65 and older completely agree that immigration should be restricted. Only a quarter (24%) of younger French men and women shared such strong views.

Anti-immigrant sentiment also runs high in the United States, especially among older Americans. Half (50%) of those ages 65 and older strongly support new controls on entry of people into the country. Only four-in-ten (40%) young people share that intensity of sentiment.

Support for greater immigration controls also is widespread in Africa, Asia and Latin America, without the generational differences seen in Europe and the United States. The principal exception is Japan, where older people are much more vehement than younger people that foreigners should face restrictions for entering their country. Fully 64% of Japanese ages 65 and older say there should be more control over foreign immigration. Only 12% of those ages 18-29 agree.

Most Agree English is Important

While most citizens of the world long to preserve their own national identities and to protect their cultures from foreign influence, majorities everywhere agree on the importance of children learning English or, in the case of the U.S. and Britain, on the necessity for children to learn a foreign language.

Generational differences on language training suggest that, while older Americans and Western Europeans are quite worried about foreign threats to their way of life, they still place great value on developing the language skills necessary to cope with the broader world. Fully 42% of US senior citizens completely agree that children need to learn a foreign language. Only 29% of those under the age of 30 feel that strongly about language training. In France, 68% of those ages 65 and older completely agree that kids need to learn English to succeed in the world today. Only 44% of those ages 18-29 feel that strongly. The age gap is equally wide in Britain and less pronounced in Germany and Italy.

In Eastern Europe, the generational difference on this issue runs in the opposite direction. Young people are much more strongly committed to the idea of learning English than the older generation. Overall, 53% of Eastern Europeans under the age of 30 completely agree that children need to learn English to succeed in the world today. Only 29% of those ages 65 and older feel the same way.

In Latin America, overwhelming majorities of all ages agree about the importance of learning English. Only in Mexico do young people place much greater value on language training than do their elders. In Asia, there is similarly widespread agreement among all age groups about the need to learn English. The lone exception is Japan, where 75% of those ages 65 and older completely agree that it is important for kids to learn English, while only 45% of those ages 18-29 completely agree.

In the United States, Eastern Europe and throughout most of Africa, Asia and Latin America, majorities believe that their culture is superior to others. This sentiment is particularly strong in a number of developing nations. Fully nine-in-ten respondents in Indonesia and South Korea and more than eight-in-ten Indians (85%) are strong boosters of their own culture. In fact, Jordan is the only developing country surveyed in which a majority of the population does not believe their culture is superior.

Among wealthy nations, Americans stand out for their sense of cultural superiority. Six-in-ten people in the United States agree with the statement: “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.” By comparison, just a third of the French claim their culture is superior to others. Only about four-in-ten in Great Britain (37%) and Germany (40%) say the same about their cultures. In Western Europe, only in Italy does a majority (55%) of the population view their culture as better than others.

Many See Their Way of Life Threatened

Among the world‘s people, the belief that their way of life needs protection from foreign influence is even more pervasive than the sense of cultural superiority. This sentiment also is strongest among people in a number of developing countries.

Nearly nine-in-ten Turks (89%) agree that their way of life needs defending, an overwhelming 69% completely agree with that statement – by far the highest percentage in the world. But the general view is nearly as widespread in Indonesia (87%), Uganda (87%), Kenya (86%), Senegal (86%) and Egypt (85%). Strong majorities in most of Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East/Conflict Area also want to defend their way of life from outside influence.

Fewer people in Western Europe are persuaded that their way of life needs protection. Still, narrow majorities France (53%), Great Britain (51%) and Germany (51%) say their way of life needs defending. Italians, who have a greater sense of cultural superiority than others in Western Europe, also are more likely to say their way of life needs protecting (68% agree). A similar pattern is apparent in the United States. More than six-in-ten Americans (64%) say their way of life needs protection from foreign influence, while just half as many (32%) disagree.

Territorial Ambitions

Territorial nationalism, the cause of many conflicts throughout history, is still alive and well. Majorities in 22 of 42 countries where the question was asked say that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to their own country.

The potential clash of such territorial ambitions is acutely evident in several global hot spots. Three-in-four Indians (73%) and two-in-three Pakistanis (67%) feel parts of neighboring countries rightfully belong to their own. Seven-in-ten Lebanese (71%) and six-in-ten South Koreans (63%) also believe parts of other countries really belong to their country. At least half of the respondents in the six Asian nations in which this question was asked – including the Philippines (79%) and Japan (50%) – believe their countries have justifiable territorial claims.

Fewer people in Western Europe and North America express such sentiments. Still, a third of the Germans and a quarter of the French express this view. Italians are divided on this issue: 42% agree that parts of neighboring countries belong to Italy, while the same number disagrees. While a majority of Americans (52%) reject the idea that other countries‘ land belongs to the U.S., nearly a third (32%) agree with that statement.

Nearly two-thirds of Russians (63%) believe parts of neighboring countries really belong to Russia. That number has tripled since the 1991 Pulse of Europe study, when just 22% of Russians expressed that view. Majorities in Poland (59%) and Bulgaria (54%) also say there are parts of other countries that really belong to their own countries, although the percentage holding that opinion in each country has not changed significantly in the past dozen years.

Where Nationalism Prevails

Large majorities in several countries affirm each of these sentiments – they believe their culture is superior, that it needs defending, and that other lands are rightfully theirs. People in India, for example, are among the most likely to agree with all three statements. Turks, Bangladeshis, South Africans and Pakistanis also rank relatively high on all three measures.

By contrast, the British, French and German people express far less nationalism, based on these questions. They are among the least likely, of all nations surveyed, to say their culture is superior, that their way of life needs protection, and that other lands really belong to their countries.

Immigrants a Widespread Concern

Globalization is not just about international commerce and the cross-border flow of investment and communication. It also involves the movement of millions of people across national borders each year.

Immigrants and minority groups are generally seen as having a bad influence on the way things are going by people in most countries. Only in Canada does a strong majority of the population (77%) have a positive view of immigrants. Among other advanced countries, Americans show the greatest support for immigrants (49%). Nevertheless, a large minority of Americans (43%) believes immigrants are bad for the nation. Half or more in France (50%), Britain (50%), Japan (55%), Germany (60%) and Italy (67%) say immigrants are bad for their nations.

Immigrants are particularly unpopular across Europe. In every European country except Bulgaria immigrants, on balance, are seen as having a bad influence on the country. This negative sentiment coincides with the fact that for the first time in modern history, immigrants now comprise a large and growing minority in every Western European nation surveyed.

Negative sentiment is even higher in Eastern Europe. Strong majorities in the Czech and Slovak Republics take a dim view of immigrants (79%, 69%), as do a majority in Russia (59%) – a country where illegal immigration is soaring. Respondents in Poland and Ukraine have a somewhat less negative opinion of immigrants (45% negative in Poland, 47% in Ukraine).

Given the widespread negative attitude toward immigration, it is not surprising then that overwhelming majorities in 38 of 42 countries where the question was asked support tighter immigration controls. This view is shared by overwhelming percentages in countries that take a dim view of immigrants, such as the Czech Republic (83% support tighter controls), but also by smaller but substantial majorities in Canada (69%), which has a favorable opinion of immigrants.

While border concerns are widespread, the intensity of public views about restricting immigration varies. Nearly half of Americans and Italians (46% and 48%, respectively) completely agree that entry to the country should be more restricted, but it is not only people in wealthy countries who want to erect more barriers against foreigners. Three-quarters of those surveyed in the Ivory Coast (76%), two-thirds in South Africa (67%), and majorities in Mali, India, Turkey, Venezuela and Guatemala feel strongly about this as well.

In Japan, which already has some of the world’s toughest immigration laws and the lowest immigration rate among advanced societies, just 20% completely agree that tougher restrictions should be placed on people entering the country. Poland, Bulgaria and South Korea have even lower levels of intense opinion about this issue.

Favorable Views of Multinationals

Anti-globalization protestors have long leveled their fire at a number of institutions – international corporations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund – that they claim promote and abuse globalization. For the most part, the public rejects the criticisms of these symbols of a new global order.

In 33 of 43 countries in which the question was asked, majorities think that foreign corporations have a generally positive influence on their countries. Majorities in every African country surveyed say major foreign companies have a good influence.

Asians also have a favorable view of multinationals, although opinions are somewhat less positive than in Africa. Approval of foreign firms is highly favorable in Vietnam (93%), China (76%) and the Philippines (74%), but less so in South Korea (56%), Bangladesh (48%) and India (46%). Latin Americans also have a generally favorable view of multinationals – with the notable exception of Argentina, where just a quarter of respondents believe major foreign companies have had a positive impact on their country.

By contrast, Americans and Europeans have more measured opinions of companies from other countries. Just half of those surveyed in the U.S. (50%), France (50%) and Italy (51%) give global firms good marks. Multinational companies are viewed favorably by even fewer respondents in Poland (44%) and Russia (42%), which have seen a number of big foreign companies acquire local businesses.

It is important to note that while opinion of multinationals is favorable in most countries, most people say such firms have a somewhat good influence on their countries, rather than a very good influence. In North America and Europe, at most only about one-in-ten say foreign firms‘ influence has been very positive.

As might be expected, there is a correlation between public sentiment toward globalization and multinational companies. People who think well of big companies from other countries generally take a more positive view of the effect of globalization on their nation than those who see foreign companies as a problem. This pattern is seen in all advanced economies. It is also notable in a number of developing nations, such as Bolivia, India, the Philippines, Russia and Bulgaria, though in most nations, even those critical of international firms have, on balance, favorable views of globalization.

Good Ratings for IMF, World Bank

Public support is even more extensive for international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In most developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, majorities think such international institutions have a good influence on their societies. Nearly six-in-ten people in North America, Western Europe and Japan agree.

Criticism for these multilateral institutions is largely confined to countries that have recently suffered from economic belt-tightening – government spending cuts, higher interest rates – imposed by the World Bank and IMF in return for international loans. Two-thirds of Argentines (66%), more than half of Turks (57%) and nearly half of Brazilians (48%) say such institutions have been bad for their countries.

Notably, about four-in-ten respondents in Bangladesh and India, and six-in-ten in Pakistan, offered no opinion about these institutions, although their countries have received billions of dollars in loans from the World Bank and IMF. Still, positive assessments of these institutions far outnumber negative ones in India and Bangladesh, but Pakistanis are divided (23% positive/18% negative).

Criticism of these organizations is most clearly linked to overall concerns about globalization in North America, Western Europe and parts of Eastern Europe. While the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO are generally rated as having a good influence in these parts of the world, people who are critical of globalization overall take a significantly dimmer view of these institutions.

Anti-Globalization Protesters: Not Widely Known

To a considerable degree, anti-globalization protestors have simply failed to register on the public‘s consciousness. Majorities or pluralities in most of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe say they do not know enough about anti-globalization critics to have an opinion or declined to offer one.

In countries where anti-globalization protesters are better known – mostly in North America and Western Europe – their image is fairly negative. In Italy, the site of a bloody clash involving anti-globalization protesters at the 2001 G-8 summit, negative opinions of the protesters outnumber positive ones by two-to-one (54%-27%). Majorities or pluralities in other Western European nations – as well as the U.S. and Canada – have unfavorable views of the protesters.

The Philippines is the only country in which a majority (54%) believes the anti-globalization protesters have a positive influence on their country. But there are several countries in which sizable minorities give them positive ratings, including France (44% positive), where anti-globalization leader José Bové bulldozed a McDonalds some years ago, South Africa (44%), Guatemala (44%), and Honduras (46%). In Bolivia, where popular resistance to the privatization and sale of municipal water supplies is ongoing, nearly half (47%), give the protestors positive ratings.

NGOs, Unions Popular

Non-governmental service organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross, Care International and Amnesty International, are well known and well liked. Solid majorities in most countries – more than three quarters in North America and Europe, with the exception of Bulgaria (68%) – believe non-governmental organizations have a positive influence on their countries.

Support for these organizations, which deliver humanitarian relief and work to protect the environment and defend human rights, is nearly as strong in most of Africa, Latin America, Asia and much of the Middle East/Conflict Area. The only significant criticism of non-governmental organizations is in Jordan, where four-in-ten (42%) say such organizations have a bad influence on the nation. About one-in-five in Bangladesh (27%) and Japan (23%) also say NGO‘s have had a negative impact.

Trade unions, which are often at odds with corporations and often critical of globalization, are held in fairly high esteem in many parts of the world. About six-in-ten Americans (63%) and French (59%), and somewhat higher percentages of Germans (65%) and British (67%) think organized labor has a good influence in their societies.
But as is the case with corporations, support for labor unions is broad but tempered. Even in North America and Europe, where people have a generally favorable opinion of unions, only about one-in-ten say they completely agree that unions have a good influence on their countries.

Argentina is the only country in which an overwhelming majority (75%) says that trade unions have a bad influence. Criticism of unions also is widespread in Jordan (57% negative) and in Venezuela (55% negative), where strikes recently crippled the economy.

Questions of Sovereignty: Environment, Criminal Court

In instances where the authority of international organizations and national governments come into conflict – as with global environmental efforts and the International Criminal Court – Americans come down on the side of national sovereignty, while Europeans tend to be more supportive of international authority.

But there are interesting variations in European views on these issues. For example, two-thirds of the French (65%), along with most Americans (54%), say their national governments should have the final word on global environmental disputes as opposed to an international organization like the U.N. The balance tilts the other way – toward giving an international organization final say – in Great Britain (54%) and Germany (67%). Russians are divided, with 45% saying the final decision should rest with the U.N. or another international body and 43% saying the Russian government.

Americans are just as resistant to ceding authority over U.S. military forces. Just 37% say the International Criminal Court should have jurisdiction over U.S. troops accused of war crimes, even if the U.S. government refuses to try them. People in Russia agree – just one-in-three Russian respondents favor giving the International Criminal Court the right to try Russian troops. But the French side with the Germans and British in supporting the authority of the international court to try their countries‘ troops if their governments refuse to do so.