Russian Nationalism

Roughly half of Russians (53%) agree that their homeland should be for Russians only; four-in-ten disagree. The public voiced a similar degree of ethnic chauvinism in 2009, when 54% said “Russia should be for Russians.” In contrast, when the Soviet Union was in its last throes in 1991, 69% disagreed and only 26% agreed with that notion that Russia should be exclusively for Russians.

Along with strains of ethnic nationalism, the image of Russia as an imperial power persists among a substantial number of Russians today. A 44%-plurality say it’s natural for their country to have an empire, compared with 31% who disagree and a quarter who do not have a definite opinion. In 2009, roughly the same number (47%) felt it was natural for Russia to have its own empire. Two decades ago, with the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, only 37% shared this view.

Notably, Russians who admire Vladimir Putin are not especially adamant about their country’s imperial claims. Among those with a favorable opinion of Putin, 45% think it’s natural for their country to have an empire, compared with 43% among those who have a negative opinion of the Russian president.

Russia’s International Image

A little more than half of Russians (55%) think people in other countries generally dislike Russia. This is up from 47% in 2010, but comparable to the 57% who expressed the same view in 2005. Today, 31% say Russia generally is liked around the world, while 14% give no opinion.

Nearly three-in-four Russians (73%) say their country should be more respected around the world; only 16% believe that internationally Russia is as respected as it should be.

The sense that Russia deserves greater respect from other countries is fairly constant across age, education and income groups.

Following a winter of discontent Russians express an increased appetite for political freedom, and at the same time strongly endorse Vladimir Putin.

Compared with just a few years ago, more Russians believe that voting gives people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion about the country’s governance, more feel that it is important to be able to openly criticize the government, and greater numbers see freedom of the press and honest elections as very important.

Consistent with the value placed on core democratic principles, a solid majority (64%) see attending protests as an opportunity to speak out about how the government is run, and more than half (56%) specifically approve of the mass demonstrations that followed the December 2011 parliamentary vote, which was marred by fraud allegations. In that regard, while a modest 56%-majority says they are satisfied with the outcome of the March 4, 2012 presidential election, just 47% believe that election was fair.

Nonetheless, the poll finds a number of indicators of support for the status quo. Most notably, 72% of Russians voice a favorable opinion of Vladimir Putin, while almost as many hold a positive opinion of Dmitri Medvedev (67%). Putin’s popularity is being fueled more by views of the economy and perceptions of social mobility than it is being hurt by democratic aspirations. Relatively few Russians express favorable views of other prominent political figures. Roughly four-in-ten or fewer have positive opinions of presidential contenders Gennady Zyuganov (39%), Mikhail Prokhorov (36%), Sergei Mironov (36%) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (28%). Meanwhile, 54% of Russians are unfamiliar with government critic and protest organizer Alexei Navalny.

Further, as they have for most of the post-Soviet era, a majority of Russians continue to feel that relying on a leader with a strong hand in order to solve problems is more important than relying on a democratic form of government (57% vs. 32%). In addition, strong majorities say it is very important to live in a country where there is law and order (75%) and economic prosperity (71%). In fact, three-quarters say they would choose a strong economy over a good democracy.

These are among the principal findings from a nationwide survey of Russia by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,000 adults in Russia between March 19 and April 4, 2012. The poll finds that Russians are generally divided about their country’s direction as Putin begins his third term as president: 46% are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, while 45% are not. At home, the economy is a concern for many Russians, with only 32% describing the current economic situation as good. Meanwhile, in the international arena, a solid majority (73%) believe Russia deserves greater respect from other countries. The survey also finds persistent strains of ethnic nationalism among Russians, with about half (53%) saying Russia should be for Russians only, and 44% saying it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Democratic Freedoms More Valued

Against the backdrop of protests over the conduct of elections and the state of democracy in Russia, increasing numbers of Russians endorse the importance of key civic freedoms and institutions. Looking back a full ten years, five of the six measures of democratic freedom tested by the Global Attitudes Project have witnessed double-digit increases in terms of the percentage of Russians describing them as “very important.”

As they have in the past, today Russians place the greatest value on a judiciary that treats all citizens equally (71%), but compared with 2009, more now also value a civilian-controlled military (up 14 percentage points), an uncensored media (up 12 points) and honest elections (up 11 points). The importance of free speech and religious freedom has grown more modestly over the past three years (up 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively).

Although growing numbers of Russians value civic freedoms and institutions, relatively few see these as a reality in their country. Roughly one-in-five or fewer say a fair judiciary (17%), honest elections (16%), uncensored media (15%) and a civilian-controlled military (14%) describe Russia very well. Slightly more (28%) say that freedom of speech is characteristic of their country, while almost half (46%) agree that citizens are generally free to practice their religion.

Comparing the percentage of Russians who place a high value on core political freedoms with the percentage who believe the same freedoms are a fact of life in Russia, it is possible to discern a growing gap between democracy’s promise and practice.

In light of this gap, it is not surprising to find only 31% of Russians are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This sentiment is pervasive across demographic groups. And although those with a favorable view of Putin are somewhat more upbeat about the state of democracy in Russia (36% satisfied), even within this group a majority (57%) see room for improvement.

Voting, Protests Seen as Important

Despite the public’s disappointment with democratization in Russia, the number of people who say voting matters has actually risen. In 1991, when the Times Mirror Center, precursor to the Pew Research Center, first asked if voting gave people an opportunity to express their opinion about how government runs things, just 47% agreed. In 2009, the balance of opinion showed more doubting the power of voting. But this spring there seems to be a renewed conviction that casting one’s vote matters – a 56%-majority now believes this to be true.

Positive shifts in the value placed on voting are evident across education and income groups. Meanwhile, attitudes among older Russians appear to have “caught up” with those of younger Russians. In 2009, just over half (54%) of those ages 18-29 said that voting gave them a say about governance, but fewer among 30-49 year olds (42%) or those over 50 (38%) felt the same. Today, about the same number of 18-29 year olds think voting matters (51%), but more among the 30-49 and 50-plus cohorts now share this view, (55% and 61%, respectively).

Along with generally endorsing the importance of voting, a strong majority of Russians (64%) believe that attending protests or demonstrations is an effective way for average citizens to comment on the government’s actions. And more than half (56%) say they support the protests for fair elections that arose in the wake of the controversial parliamentary vote in December of last year.

While some in Russia have suggested that the protests for fair elections are the result of Western meddling, most Russians (58%) disagree, attributing the demonstrations instead to genuine dissatisfaction among the public.

Mixed Reaction to Presidential Vote

Protests in the wake of the December 2011 parliamentary elections brought to the fore questions about the fairness of the March 4, 2012 presidential vote. Following Putin’s first-round victory, the public offers a mixed assessment of the balloting: 47% believe the election was free from manipulation, while roughly a third (35%) disagree and 18% are uncertain.

Overall, a majority (56%) say they are satisfied with the results of the election, compared with a third (33%) who are dissatisfied. One-in-ten do not have an opinion either way.

The perceived fairness of the March 4th vote is a key factor influencing satisfaction with the outcome. Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) who think the election was “clean” say they are satisfied with the outcome. By contrast, only one-in-five who believe the vote was unfair say the same. Russians who are unsure whether the election was fair, meanwhile, tend to be satisfied (46%) with Putin’s victory.

Not surprisingly, reaction to the election results is especially positive among Russians who hold a favorable opinion of Putin (71% satisfied) and those who feel they are better off financially than they were five years ago (71% satisfied).

Putin’s Continued Appeal

While some Russians may have their doubts about the fairness of the March 4th presidential vote, Putin clearly remains popular. Roughly seven-in-ten (72%) say they have a favorable opinion of the returning president. Only about a quarter (24%) of respondents voice the opposite view.

Putin’s base of support is broad, although he is especially popular among women, Russians ages 30-49 and those with less than a college education. Overall, opinion of the newly elected president is more influenced by views of the economy and perceived social mobility. People who say the economy is good and feel they are better off than their parents are more likely to have a positive view of Putin. To the degree that democratic leanings help shape attitudes toward Putin, those who say an uncensored media is very important are less likely to have a favorable opinion of Russia’s long-time leader.

Dmitri Medvedev, who will now be stepping into the role of prime minister, is also widely popular. Two-thirds of Russians have a favorable view of Medvedev, while only 28% voice an unfavorable opinion.

In terms of public support, Putin and Medvedev clearly stand out from other figures on Russia’s political stage. Among the presidential candidates this spring, for example, Putin is the only one viewed favorably by a majority of Russians. Indeed, on balance, opinions of veteran politicians such as Communist Party head Zyuganov, A Just Russia’s Mironov and Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky are negative (52%, 51% and 66% unfavorable, respectively).

Views are similarly negative for presidential candidate Prokhorov: roughly half (48%) have an unfavorable view of the billionaire businessman. Meanwhile, among the relatively few Russians familiar with Alexei Navalny, the online activist and a prominent organizer of anti-government protests, views also tend to be more negative than positive (31% vs. 16%).

Challenges Ahead?

As Putin assumes the presidency for the third time, he faces a public with mixed views about the state of their nation. At home, opinion is nearly evenly split as to whether the country is headed in the right direction. On one hand, more today (46%) than at any point since 2008 say things are going well. But on the other, worries persist. In particular, a majority (64%) continues to describe the economy as bad.

Internationally, meanwhile, Russians show signs of insecurity. Slightly more than half (55%) believe their country is generally disliked by other countries – an increase of 8 percentage points since 2010. And fully 73% say Russia deserves to be more respected around the world than it currently is.

The desire for enhanced prestige on the world stage coexists with a persistent strain of ethnic nationalism. Roughly half (53%) of Russians say their homeland should be for Russians, while 44% think it is natural for Russia to have an empire.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

On balance, publics in both Ukraine and Lithuania are favorably inclined toward Russia. However, the Ukrainian public’s embrace of its neighbor is much more enthusiastic than that found in Lithuania, where attitudes toward Russia are more mixed.

Opinions of U.S. and Russia

Majorities in all three post-Soviet nations surveyed rate the U.S. favorably. Favorable views of America are most widespread in Lithuania, where more than seven-in-ten (73%) give the U.S. positive marks. Among Ukrainians, six-in-ten view the U.S. favorably, while slightly fewer Russians (56%) are of the same opinion.

In both Ukraine and Lithuania, positive assessments of the U.S. co-exist with favorable opinions of Russia. In Ukraine, more than eight-in-ten (84%) say they have a favorable opinion of their neighbor, while a slim majority in Lithuania (53%) shares this view.

With respect to views of the U.S., younger people in all three countries tend to give the U.S. a more favorable rating than do older generations. The difference is most pronounced when comparing 18-29 year olds with those 65 years and older. In Lithuania, for example, 82% of those under age 30 hold a favorable view of the U.S., compared with 61% of those 65 years and above. Similarly, about two-thirds of younger Ukrainians (68%) and Russians (67%) give the U.S. positive marks, compared with smaller numbers of those 65 and older in each country (55% and 41%, respectively).

In Ukraine, views of Russia are consistent across age groups. Among Lithuanians, however, older age groups tend to have a more favorable opinion of Russia than do younger people. For instance, among those 65 years or older, about six-in-ten (59%) express a favorable opinion of Russia as compared with less than half (46%) among those between the ages of 18 and 29.

EU and NATO

The EU receives positive marks in all three nations surveyed. Lithuanians, in particular, hold the EU in esteem, with nearly eight-in-ten (78%) saying they have a favorable opinion of this major European institution. In Ukraine, roughly seven-in-ten (72%) also express a positive view, as do more than six-in-ten (64%) in Russia.

In Lithuania, strongly favorable views of the EU contrast with more mixed assessments of the country’s own involvement in the organization. Although nearly half (49%) say Lithuania’s membership in the EU is a good thing, about three-in-ten (31%) say it is neither good nor bad, while 8% say it is both and another 8% say it is only bad. This assessment is little changed from fall 2009, when the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked Lithuanians about belonging to the EU.

Unlike attitudes toward the EU, assessments of NATO diverge among the three post-Soviet publics. In Lithuania, which is a NATO member, a clear majority (65%) views the trans-Atlantic organization favorably. The fall 2009 survey also found favorable views in most of the other Eastern European countries surveyed. However, as was the case two years ago, opinion leans in the opposite direction in both Russia (37% favorable vs. 43% unfavorable) and Ukraine (34% favorable vs. 41% unfavorable).

The fall 2009 survey also asked about Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO. About half of Ukrainians (51%) opposed their country joining NATO, as did roughly seven-in-ten Russians (72%). By contrast, a majority of Lithuanians (58%) were in favor of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The prevailing view among other Eastern European publics was that Ukraine should join NATO; however only in Poland did a majority (64%) voice support for such a move.

In the case of both NATO and the EU, younger people in the three countries surveyed in 2011 tend to view these organizations more favorably. For example, more than four-in-ten (45%) Ukrainians younger than age 30 say they have a positive view of NATO, as compared with only 28% among those 65 years or older. Similarly, in Russia, opinion of NATO is more favorable among 18-29 year olds than among those 65 and older (44% vs. 34%).

Meanwhile, seven-in-ten Russians under age 30 see the EU in a favorable light as compared with 57% among those ages 65 or older. Similarly, 83% of younger Lithuanians give a positive evaluation to the EU as compared with 69% among those 65 years of age or older.

In Ukraine, attitudes toward NATO also vary by region. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central region (38%) as well as those in the South (21%) and East (18%) are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance. In the Western and Central regions, at least three-in-ten do not offer an opinion.

Influence of U.S., EU and Russia

On the question of whether the U.S., EU and Russia are having a positive influence on the way things are going in their country, opinion among Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians varies. In the fall 2009 survey, for example, a majority in Lithuania (62%) described the EU’s influence on their country as good, compared with only 40% of Ukrainians and 37% of Russians who said the same.

In the same survey, fewer in each country thought the U.S. was exerting a positive influence, although substantially more Lithuanians (39%) felt this way than either Ukrainians (24%) or Russians (15%). As for Russia, twice as many Ukrainians (46%) as Lithuanians (22%) said the largest of the post-Soviet states was having a good influence on how things were going in their respective countries.

Regionally, the fall 2009 survey found that Ukrainians’ and Russians’ tepid assessment of the EU’s influence was matched only in Hungary, where just 36% said the EU was favorably affecting how things were going in their country. In the other former communist countries polled in 2009, majorities saw the EU having a good influence. With regard to the U.S., only in Poland did as many as half (52%) say America was having a positive influence. Meanwhile, the prevailing view in these nations, with the exception of Bulgaria and Slovakia, was that Russia’s influence was more negative than positive.

Allies and Threats

Contrasts in opinion also surface with regard to which countries or international organizations Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians view as allies or threats to their country. In the fall 2009 survey, roughly two-in-ten Lithuanians named the EU (21%), Latvia (20%) and the U.S. (19%) as their closest allies, while 39% named Russia as their greatest threat.

Ukrainians had a very different view. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) named Russia as their most dependable ally, while roughly one-quarter (27%) saw the U.S. as the greatest threat to their country. Meanwhile, among Russians, fully 57% said the U.S. posed the largest threat, while roughly one-third (34%) named Belarus as their closest ally, followed by about a quarter (23%) who named China.

Across Eastern Europe, the U.S. was among the closest allies named by Czechs (22%), Poles (18%), and Hungarians (15%). The U.S. was also seen as an ally by 16% of Bulgarians, although more than twice as many (38%) named Russia as a close ally.

When asked their opinions of two key ethnic minorities in their country, however, Russians continue to express positive views of Ukrainians and Lithuanians. Similarly, Ukrainians view Russians, Poles and Lithuanians in their country favorably, and Lithuanians offer positive opinions of Russians, Ukrainians and Poles in their country.

Russian Nostalgia for Soviet Era

Russians remain largely nostalgic for the Soviet era, although this sentiment has abated somewhat over the past two years. Half of Russians now agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, while 36% disagree; in 2009, nearly six-in-ten (58%) lamented the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while 38% did not share this view.

The drop in the percentage expressing regret about the demise of the Soviet Union has been especially notable among older Russians, although most in these groups remain nostalgic.

Currently, about six-in-ten of those 65 and older (63%) and those ages 50 to 64 (61%) agree that it is a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists, compared with 45% of those ages 30 to 49 and even fewer among those younger than 30 (36%).

In 2009, more than eight-in-five (85%) Russians in the oldest age group and 71% of those ages 50 to 64 expressed regret that the Soviet Union no longer exists; 51% of those ages 30 to 49 and 38% of those younger than 30 shared this view.

Nationalism on the Rise

About half of Russians (48%) agree that it is natural for their country to have an empire,
while one third disagree with this notion. Although virtually unchanged from when the question was last asked in 2009, this represents a considerable shift from Russian sentiment as the Soviet Union was collapsing. In 1991, 37% of Russians said it was natural for their country to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Similarly, the 2009 survey found that Russians were far more likely than they were two decades ago to agree that “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us;” about six-in-ten (58%) said this was the case two years ago, compared with just 22% in 1991. Moreover, about twice as many Russians agreed that Russia should be for Russians in 2009 as did so in 1991 (54% vs. 26%).

Ukrainians are as likely as Russians to say it is natural for Russia to have an empire; 46% agree with this statement, while 34% disagree. In 1991, only about one-in-five (22%) shared the view that an empire was natural for Russia; a majority of Ukrainians (55%) disagreed with this sentiment.

Views of Ethnic Minorities

As was the case two decades ago, publics in the three former Soviet republics surveyed hold favorable views of some key ethnic minorities in their countries. That is especially the case in Ukraine, where about nine-in-ten express positive opinions of Russians (93%), Poles (88%) and Lithuanians (87%).

At least seven-in-ten Lithuanians have favorable views of Russians (77%) and Ukrainians (73%); a narrower majority (57%) expresses similar views of Poles. And in Russia, 80% give ethnic Ukrainians positive marks, while 62% say the same about Lithuanians in their country.