Europeans generally reacted to President Obama’s re-election with a mixture of excitement and relief, just as they did four years ago. For many across the Atlantic, Obama’s 2008 victory signaled the end of the Bush-era estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies, and the emergence of an America that would see the world a lot like Europeans do. However, despite Obama’s re-election at home and continued popularity in Europe, his presidency has not closed the long-running transatlantic values gap. Instead, on issues such as the use of military force, religion, and individualism, Americans and Europeans continue to disagree.

Obama has been popular in Europe since he toured the Continent as a presidential contender. Following George W. Bush’s two terms in office, Europeans immediately embraced Obama’s presidency. A stunning 93% of Germans expressed confidence in Obama in the early months of his first term, compared with just 14% for Bush during his final year in office. In Britain, France, and Spain, the new American president also received stratospheric ratings.

The result was a dramatic “Obama effect” on attitudes toward the U.S. In France, for instance, America’s favorability rating soared from 42% in 2008 to 75% in 2009. And importantly, support for American policies grew, especially support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The enthusiasm that greeted Obama’s election has waned a bit over time, even in Europe, but vestiges of “Obamamania” remain. The 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found at least eight-in-ten expressing confidence in the U.S. president in Germany, France, and Britain.

However, while the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded, the “values gap” between Americans and Europeans is alive and well. Polls consistently find a transatlantic divide when it comes to fundamental beliefs on a variety of political and cultural issues. Americans and Europeans view each other with less hostility today, but they still don’t see the world in the same way.

Take the issue of military force. Americans remain more inclined than Europeans to say it’s necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Meanwhile, they are significantly less likely than Europeans to believe that getting UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with international threats. America’s willingness to “go it alone” in world affairs has become an ingrained piece of the country’s international image – and it hasn’t changed much in the Obama years. Majorities across Europe continue to see the U.S. as acting unilaterally, not taking into account the interests of other nations when making foreign policy.

The Obama administration’s use of drone strikes illustrates the divide over hard power. About six-in-ten Americans – including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents – approve of U.S. drone attacks against extremist leaders and organizations in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But in seven of the eight EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2012, more than half oppose these strikes, including nine-in-ten Greeks and 76% in Spain. The lone exception is the British, who are almost evenly divided on this issue.

Religion is another topic where Americans and Europeans hold very different views. In largely secular Western European nations such as Spain, Germany, Britain, and France, less than a quarter consider religion very important to their lives. Even in Poland, where Catholicism still plays an important role in public life, only 27% say religion is very important. By contrast, fully half of Americans hold this view. Similarly, solid majorities in the six EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2011 said you do not have to believe in God to be a moral person, but only 46% of Americans felt this way.

The same 2011 poll asked Christians from the U.S. and eight European nations whether they identify first with their nationality or their religion. Americans were evenly split: 46% said they think of themselves first as Americans and 46% as Christians. In seven of the eight European countries, a majority of Christians identified primarily with their nationality. Only 8% of French Christians, for example, said they thought of themselves first as Christians.

Individualism also continues to differentiate Americans and Europeans. Most Americans believe individuals largely control their own fate – just 36% agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” However, half or more in Germany, France, and Spain agree with this statement.

Europeans also believe in a very different relationship between the individual and the state. When asked which is more important, that everyone be free to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, 58% of Americans choose the former. Majorities across Western and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, say making sure no one is in need should be a bigger priority.

Of course, even on fundamental values like these, opinions can and do shift over time, and on a few key issues, the values gap is shrinking. For instance, Americans are not as convinced as they used to be about their own cultural superiority – in 2002, six-in-ten agreed with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior.” By 2011, just 49% held this view, much closer to the levels typically registered in Europe.

Public opinion on homosexuality has also shifted dramatically. The percentage of Americans saying society should accept homosexuality rose from 49% in 2007 to 60% just four years later. This is still much lower than the high levels of acceptance witnessed in Europe – more than eight-in-ten in Spain, Germany, France, and Britain believe homosexuality should be accepted – but the gap is clearly closing. The recent passage of marriage equality ballot initiatives in four U.S. states highlights how quickly public opinion on this issue is changing.

Moreover, young Americans increasingly look like their cohorts across the Atlantic on these questions. Nearly seven-in-ten Americans under age 30 say homosexuality should be accepted and only 37% think their culture is superior to others. Young people are also much more likely than older Americans to believe the government should make sure no one is in need. If these trends continue and expand to other topics, the transatlantic values gap could someday vanish. But for the foreseeable future, the divide will likely persist, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

Beyond the impact on specific groups, the prevailing view across all three countries is that the changes since 1991 have had a more negative than positive influence on society. When asked about the impact of political and economic changes on a range of issues – including national pride, ethnic relations and social values, fewer than half in each country say the changes have had a good influence in any area. In fact, majorities in all three countries say the changes since 1991 have had a deleterious effect on such things as living standards, public morality, how much people care about others, and law and order.

Lithuanians today are considerably less enthusiastic about the impact of political and economic change compared with 1991, when publics in the three nations were first asked about the dramatic transformations under way in their countries. However, criticism in Lithuania tends to be less harsh than in Ukraine or Russia, where negative assessments concerning two decades of change are both more pervasive and more intense.

Who Has Benefited?

In each of the countries surveyed, most believe ordinary citizens have benefited little, if at all, from the political and economic changes ushered in by the demise of the Soviet Union. Only about a quarter of Russians (26%) say average citizens have gained from two decades of change, while even fewer Lithuanians (20%) and Ukrainians (11%) agree. Across the three nations, roughly seven-in-ten or more say ordinary citizens have benefited not too much or not at all.

In sharp contrast, publics in each of the three countries are widely convinced that people who own businesses have benefited a fair amount or a great deal from the political and economic changes of the past two decades. Super-majorities in Russia (80%), Lithuania (78%) and Ukraine (76%) all hold this view.

Overwhelming numbers in each nation also believe politicians have gained from the changes since 1991. More than nine-in-ten Ukrainians (95%) and Lithuanians (91%) feel this is the case, while slightly fewer Russians (82%) think politicians have benefited from the changes.

Russian and Ukrainian assessments about who has gained the most from two decades of political and economic change have shifted only slightly since a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey first asked the same questions.

Publics in five other former communist-bloc countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – were also asked in the 2009 survey about who had gained from the political and economic changes in their countries.² Clear majorities in all five nations agreed that politicians and business owners had benefited from the changes. Only in the Czech Republic did more than half (53%) say the same about ordinary people. Elsewhere, the majority view was that average citizens had generally not benefited from the changes.

Impact of Change Across Countries

Given that most people in Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine believe the revolutionary changes set in motion twenty years ago have done little to improve the lives of ordinary citizens, it is not surprising that across a range of measures – from standard of living to law and order to family values to ethnic relations – the prevailing view is that the developments of the past two decades have done more harm than good in terms of personal and social well-being.

While disenchantment is evident in all three countries, Ukrainians and Russians tend to be more negative about the impact of political and economic change than Lithuanians. That said, compared with 1991, Ukrainian and Russian reactions to change have softened somewhat, while Lithuanians have grown generally more critical.

Influence of Changes: Ukraine

Ukrainians offer some of the harshest assessments of how two decades of change have impacted society. Roughly eight-in-ten, for instance, believe the political and economic transformations since 1991 have had a bad or very bad influence on the standard of living (82%), how much people care about others (82%) and law and order (79%). About two-thirds or more also point to negative impacts in terms of public morality (72%) and how hard people work (66%).

Roughly half of Ukrainians are critical of how the changes since 1991 have affected family values (53%) and spiritual values (49%). In the case of the former, only about a fifth (21%) believe the political and economic changes have had a positive effect on family values, while slightly more (31%) say spiritual values have improved.

When it comes to how different ethnic groups get along with one another, just over a third of Ukrainians (36%) believe two decades of change have hurt inter-ethnic relations. By comparison, about a quarter say political and economic changes have had either no influence (25%) or a positive influence (23%) on relations between ethnic groups.

Ukrainians are divided as to what the changes since 1991 have meant for their own outlook on life. About three-in-ten (28%) say the impact on how they think about things has been negative, while nearly the same percentage say the effect has been either non-existent (29%) or positive (28%).

Compared with twenty years ago, Ukrainian criticism of political and economic change has tended to soften. The largest shift has occurred with respect to inter-ethnic relations. Two decades ago, roughly three-quarters of Ukrainians (76%) thought the changes underway were having a bad influence on relations between ethnic groups; today, the number who hold this view is down 40 percentage points. Meanwhile, the proportion of Ukrainians who think political and economic changes are adversely affecting how people get along with one another has dropped 22 percentage points.

On other measures, Ukrainian opinion has shifted less dramatically. For example, the percentage of Ukrainians saying the political and economic transformations in their country have had a deleterious effect on how hard people work, living standards and national pride has declined 12 percentage points in each case since 1991.

There have also been slight declines in the number of Ukrainians who believe political and economic changes have had a bad influence on spiritual values (-7 percentage points), law and order (-7 points), family values (-6 points) and public morality (-5 points).

Influence of Changes: Russia

Although not as harsh as Ukrainians in judging particular societal impacts, Russians are nonetheless broadly critical of how twenty years of political and economic changes have affected their country. In fact, in all but one of the 11 areas measured by the survey, majorities in Russia say the changes have had a negative influence. This includes six-in-ten or more who believe that the past twenty years have brought deterioration in public morality (68%), the degree to which people care about others (65%), how well people get along with one another (63%), law and order (61%), standard of living (61%) and relations between ethnic groups (60%).

Smaller majorities in Russia believe the political and economic changes have adversely affected family values (57%), national pride (56%), spiritual values (53%) and how hard people work (52%).

Similar to Ukrainians, the one area where Russians are less certain about the impact of the past two decades is personal outlook. Three-in-ten say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on how they think about things, compared with the same percentage who say the changes have had a good influence. A fifth (20%) say the changes have not impacted their personal outlook.

In 1991, Russians tended to be even more critical of the political and economic transformations under way in their country. Since then, negative reactions have generally eased. The most dramatic shift in Russian views has occurred with respect to living standards. In 1991, fully nine-in-ten stated that political and economic changes were undercutting living standards; today, the percentage holding this view is 29 percentage points lower.

Russian criticism has also softened on other measures of social and personal well-being. For instance, over the past twenty years, there has been a sizable drop in the number of Russians who believe the changes have had a negative impact on how well people get along with one another (-20 percentage points), law and order (-19 points), inter-ethnic relations (-19 points) and how hard people work (-18 points).

Smaller shifts have occurred with respect to the percentage of Russians who see negative consequences for national pride (-13 percentage points) and public morality (-8 points).

Areas in which public opinion has remained basically unchanged compared with 20 years ago include personal outlook, family and spiritual values and how much people care about one another.

Influence of Changes: Lithuania

Like their post-Soviet counterparts, Lithuanians are critical of how the political and economic changes of the past twenty years have affected social and personal well-being in their country. As in Russia and Ukraine, majorities say the changes have had a negative influence on how much people care about others (60%), standard of living (56%), law and order (55%) and public morality (55%).

Roughly half also point to negative consequences for family values (50%) and how people get along with one another (48%). And more, on balance, believe the changes since 1991 have had a negative rather than positive influence on relations among people who live in their country (45% vs. 27%) and spiritual values (40% vs. 33%).

Unlike Ukrainians and Russians, however, Lithuanians allow that the past two decades have actually done more good than harm in a few areas. About half (49%), for instance, say that the political and economic changes have had a positive impact on national pride, compared with 30% who disagree. In addition, more say the last twenty years have had a good (39%) rather than bad (28%) influence on their personal outlook, and just over a third (36%) think that the changes since 1991 have positively influenced how hard people work, compared with 30% who hold the opposite view.

Twenty years ago, positive assessments of change were much more common in Lithuania. Indeed, since 1991, negative reactions have intensified on a number of fronts. Some of the biggest shifts in public opinion have occurred with respect to family and spiritual values, as well as national pride. Two decades ago, just 23% of Lithuanians thought the political and economic changes were having a bad influence on family values; today, 50% hold that view.

Meanwhile, opinion about the impact on spiritual values has moved in the same direction, with the percentage of Lithuanians seeing a negative impact increasing 24 percentage points between 1991 and 2011. Similarly, the proportion saying the changes have had a negative influence on national pride has risen 23 percentage points between 1991 and 2011.

Compared with twenty years ago, Lithuanians are also now more inclined to believe that political and economic changes have had a bad influence on how much people care about others (+19 percentage points) and public morality (+18 percentage points). More modest increases have occurred with respect to the number of Lithuanians who see negative consequences for how well people get along with one another and personal outlook (+8 and +5 percentage points, respectively).

Yet, there are exceptions to this pattern. On several measures, fewer, not more Lithuanians are downbeat about the impact of political and economic change. For example, the number worried that the political and economic changes have had a negative influence on the standard of living has declined 31 percentage points. Concerns about the impact of changes on relations between people have also eased, with the number seeing negative consequences falling 12 percentage points.

In addition, the proportion of Lithuanians who believe the political and economic changes have adversely affected how hard people work or harmed law and order has declined slightly (-7 percentage points in each case).

Moreover, most Lithuanians blame individual failure on personal shortcomings, while Ukrainians and Russians are more divided on whether to blame society or the individual. However, there is overwhelming agreement across these three former Soviet republics that the state should play an active role in society so that nobody is in need.

Reasons for Success

A majority of Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition than other people, while 41% say people who get ahead do so mainly at the expense of others. In contrast, fewer than four-in-ten in Russia (38%) and Ukraine (32%) say people succeed because of their own ability.

Ukrainians and Russians are more likely than they were two decades ago to say that people get ahead at other people’s expense. This is especially the case in Ukraine, where 44% shared this view in 1991. The change has been more modest in Russia; 46% said that people got ahead at the expense of others in 1991. Opinions in Lithuania have remained generally steady since the early 1990’s.

Younger people, who grew up in post-communist societies, are less likely than older generations to say that people who get ahead do so at the expense of others; rather, young people tend to credit ability and ambition. For example, just 37% of Russians younger than 30 believe that people get ahead at the expense of others, compared with majorities of those ages 30 to 49 (56%), 50 to 65 (60%) and ages 65 or older (66%). A similar pattern is evident in Ukraine, but not as clear among Lithuanians.

Reasons for Failure

Nearly six-in-ten (58%) in Lithuania say that people who don’t succeed in life fail as the result of their own shortcomings, while only about a third (34%) blame society at large. A plurality (47%) in Russia also points to personal shortcomings, but only somewhat fewer (40%) say society is to blame for individual failures.

Ukrainians, however, have the opposite view, with only 40% saying that people who don’t succeed do so because of their own personal failures; about half (49%) say that people who don’t succeed in life fail because of society’s faults. In all three countries, views on what is to blame for one’s lack of success have remained stable since the question was last asked in 1991.

For the most part, views on personal failure do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Russia, however, those who are 65 or older tend to place more blame on society than do those in younger generations. This gap is particularly notable between the older generation and those who are younger than 30. Half of Russians ages 65 or older say people who don’t succeed have society to blame, while 30% say personal shortcomings are responsible for individual failure; among the younger group, 55% blame individuals themselves, while 36% hold society responsible.

Role of the State

When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” overwhelming majorities in all three countries favor a stronger role for the state. At least two-thirds of Russians (68%), Ukrainians (75%), and Lithuanians (76%) prefer that the state ensures that nobody is in need within their society. Few in each country prioritize freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference.

Opinions in these three former Soviet republics are consistent with those of other Eastern and Western European publics. In a 2009 survey, opinions from the rest of Europe generally conformed to this pattern. Majorities or pluralities in all European countries in fall 2009 said that it is more important that the state ensure that no one is in need. (For more information on European views on this issue, see “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

People in the three former Soviet republics surveyed now consider freedom from state interference much less of a priority than they did 20 years ago. The steepest decline has occurred in Ukraine, where the percentage saying that they should be able to pursue life’s goals unhindered has dropped by 33 percentage points, from 54% in 1991. Comparable declines have also occurred in Russia (-27 percentage points) and Lithuania (-20 percentage points).

In the three countries, those younger than 30 are about twice as likely as those ages 65 and older to prefer a society where everyone is free to pursue life’s goals; still, solid majorities across all age groups say ensuring nobody is in need should be the state’s priority.

Survey Report

As has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many important ways. Most notably, Americans are more individualistic and are less supportive of a strong safety net than are the publics of Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Americans are also considerably more religious than Western Europeans, and are more socially conservative with respect to homosexuality.

Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Moreover, Americans more often than their Western European allies believe that obtaining UN approval before their country uses military force would make it too difficult to deal with an international threat. And Americans are less inclined than the Western Europeans, with the exception of the French, to help other nations.

These differences between Americans and Western Europeans echo findings from previous surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. However, the current polling shows the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to that of other nations. Today, only about half of Americans believe their culture is superior to others, compared with six-in-ten in 2002. And the polling finds younger Americans less apt than their elders to hold American exceptionalist attitudes.

These are among the findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Spain from March 21 to April 14 as part of the broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011.

Use of Military Force

Three-quarters of Americans agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world; this view is shared by seven-in-ten in Britain and narrower majorities in France and Spain (62% each). Germans are evenly divided, with half saying the use of force is sometimes necessary and half saying it is not.

Germans are more supportive of the use of military force than they have been in recent years. For example, in 2007, just about four-in-ten (41%) Germans agreed that it was sometimes necessary, while 58% disagreed. Opinions have been more stable in the U.S., Britain and France.

For the most part, opinions about the use of force do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Germany and Spain, however, support for the use of military force is far more widespread among men than among women. Six-in-ten German men agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world, compared with just 40% of women. And while majorities across gender groups in Spain believe the use of force may be necessary, more Spanish men than Spanish women say this is the case (68% vs. 56%).

In Britain, France, Spain and the U.S., conservatives, or those on the political right, are more likely than liberals, or those on the left, to agree that the use of force is sometimes necessary to maintain world order. However, in the four countries, majorities across ideological groups express this view.¹

When asked whether their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with international threats, American opinion differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Americans are almost evenly divided on the question, with 45% saying that the U.S. should have UN approval while 44% say this would make it too difficult to deal with threats; in contrast, solid majorities in the four Western European nations surveyed, including about three-quarters in Spain (74%) and Germany (76%) say their country should have UN approval before it takes military action.

In Western Europe, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say their country should have UN approval before using military force, although majorities across both groups share this view. For example, in Spain, 84% of those who graduated from college say UN approval should be obtained, compared with 70% of those who do not have a college degree. Double-digit differences are also evident in Britain (15 percentage points), Germany (11 points) and France (10 points). This is not the case in the U.S., where respondents across education groups offer nearly identical views.

In Germany, gender differences are also notable; even though German men are more likely than women to say the use of military force is sometimes necessary, more men than women say their country should have UN approval before using force (83% vs. 70%).

The view that their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with threats is far more prevalent among American liberals than among conservatives. Close to six-in-ten (57%) liberals favor obtaining UN approval, while 33% say this would make it too difficult for the U.S. to deal with threats; in contrast, most conservatives (52%) say getting UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with threats, while 38% say this is an important step. Political moderates fall between the other two groups, with 49% saying the U.S. should seek the approval of the UN before using military force and 42% saying this would make it too difficult to deal with threats. The same ideological difference is generally not evident in Western Europe.

Views on International Engagement

About four-in-ten (39%) Americans say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems, while a narrow majority (52%) says the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems as best they can. In this regard, Americans are not drastically different from respondents in France, where 43% believe their country should help other countries and 57% say it should focus on its own problems.

The British are nearly evenly divided; 45% say their country should help other countries deal with their problems and about the same number (48%) believe Britain should deal with its own problems.

Compared with the U.S., France and Britain, Spain and Germany stand out as the only countries where majorities favor international engagement: 55% and 54%, respectively, say their countries should provide assistance to others, while 40% in Spain and 43% in Germany take the more isolationist view.

Opinions about international engagement have changed somewhat in the U.S., France and Spain since last year, but while publics in the two Western European countries are now more in favor of helping others than they were in 2010, more Americans currently take an isolationist position. Last year, about the same number of Americans said their country should help other countries (45%) as said it should let other countries deal with their own problems (46%). Similarly, the Spanish were nearly evenly divided, with 49% favoring engagement and 47% taking an isolationist approach. In France, where a majority continues to take an isolationist view, even more (65%) did so a year ago.

In the U.S. as well as in the four Western European countries surveyed, those with a college degree are far more likely than those with less education to offer an internationalist view. This is especially the case in Germany, where about three-quarters (73%) of those who graduated from college believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems, compared with a narrow majority (52%) of those without a college degree.

Political ideology is also a factor in Germany, France and Spain. In these three countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to take the isolationist view when it comes to international engagement. For example, while about half (48%) of left-wing French say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, about six-in-ten (59%) on the right offer this opinion.

Cultural Superiority

About half of Americans (49%) and Germans (47%) agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;” 44% in Spain share this view. In Britain and France, only about a third or fewer (32% and 27%, respectively) think their culture is better than others.

While opinions about cultural superiority have remained relatively stable over the years in the four Western European countries surveyed, Americans are now far less likely to say that their culture is better than others; six-in-ten Americans held this belief in 2002 and 55% did so in 2007. Belief in cultural superiority has declined among Americans across age, gender and education groups.

As in past surveys, older Americans remain far more inclined than younger ones to believe that their culture is better than others. Six-in-ten Americans ages 50 or older share this view, while 34% disagree; those younger than 30 hold the opposite view, with just 37% saying American culture is superior and 61% saying it is not. Opinions are more divided among those ages 30 to 49; 44% in this group see American culture as superior and 50% do not.

Similar age gaps are not as common in the Western European countries surveyed, with the exception of Spain, where majorities of older respondents, but not among younger ones, also think their culture is better than others; 55% of those ages 50 or older say this is the case, compared with 34% of those ages 30 to 49 and 39% of those younger than 30.

As is the case on other measures, opinions about cultural superiority vary considerably by educational attainment. In the four Western European countries and in the U.S., those who did not graduate from college are more likely than those who did to agree that their culture is superior, even if their people are not perfect. For example, Germans with less education are about twice as likely as those with a college degree to believe their culture is superior (49% vs. 25%); double-digit differences are also present in France (20 percentage points), Spain (18 points) and Britain (11 points), while a less pronounced gap is evident in the U.S. (9 points).

Finally, among Americans and Germans, political conservative are especially likely to believe their culture is superior to others. In the U.S., 63% of conservatives take this view, compared with 45% of moderates and just 34% of liberals. Similarly, a majority (54%) of right-wing Germans see their culture as superior, while 47% of moderates and 33% of those on the political left agree.

Individualism and the Role of the State

American opinions continue to differ considerably from those of Western Europeans when it comes to views of individualism and the role of the state. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) Americans believe it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state, while just 35% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need.

In contrast, at least six-in-ten in Spain (67%), France (64%) and Germany (62%) and 55% in Britain say the state should ensure that nobody is in need; about four-in-ten or fewer consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In the U.S., Britain, France and Germany, views of the role of the state divide significantly across ideological lines. For example, three-quarters of American conservatives say individuals should be free to pursue their goals without interference from the state, while 21% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need; among liberals in the U.S., half would like the state to play an active role to help the needy, while 42% prefer a more limited role for the state.

Those on the political right in Britain, France and Germany are also more likely than those on the left in these countries to prioritize freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference. Unlike in the U.S., however, majorities of those on the right in France (57%) and Germany (56%) favor an active role for the state, as do more than four-in-ten (45%) conservatives in Britain.

American opinions about the role of the state also vary considerably across age groups. About half (47%) of those younger than 30 prioritize the freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state and a similar percentage (46%) say it is more important for the state to ensure that nobody is in need; among older Americans, however, about six-in-ten consider being free a higher priority, with just about three-in-ten saying the state should play an active role so that nobody is in need. No such age difference is evident in the four Western European countries surveyed.

Asked if they agree that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” Americans again offer more individualistic views than those expressed by Western Europeans. Only 36% of Americans believe they have little control over their fate, compared with 50% in Spain, 57% in France and 72% in Germany; Britain is the only Western European country surveyed where fewer than half (41%) share this view.

In the U.S. and in Western Europe, those without a college degree are less individualistic than those who have graduated from college; this is especially the case in the U.S. and Germany. About three-quarters (74%) of Germans in the less educated group believe that success in life is largely determined by forces beyond one’s control, compared with 55% of college graduates. Among Americans, 41% of those without a college degree say they have little control over their fate, while just 22% of college graduates share this view.

Religion More Important to Americans

Americans also distinguish themselves from Western Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.

Moreover, Americans are far more inclined than Western Europeans to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 53% say this is the case in the U.S., compared with just one-third in Germany, 20% in Britain, 19% in Spain and 15% in France.

In the U.S., women and older respondents place more importance on religion and are more likely than men and younger people to say that faith in God is a necessary foundation for morality and good values. About six-in-ten (59%) American women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41% of men; and while a majority (56%) of Americans ages 50 and older say religion is very important to them, 48% of those ages 30 to 49 and 41% of those younger than 30 place similar importance on religion.

Similarly, while a majority of American women (58%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, men are nearly evenly divided, with 47% saying belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality and 51% saying it is not. Among Americans ages 50 and older, 58% say one must believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 50% of those ages 30 to 49 and 46% of those younger than 30 share this view.

Education also plays a role in views of religion in the U.S., to some extent. Although Americans with a college degree are about as likely as those without to say religion is very important to them (47% and 51%, respectively), the less educated are far more inclined to say that one must believe in God in order to be moral; 59% of those without a college degree say this, compared with 37% of those who have graduated from college.

Views of religion and whether belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality vary little, if at all, across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed. In Spain, however, respondents ages 50 and older place more importance on religion than do younger people, although relatively few in this age group say it is very important to them; 33% say this is the case, compared with 16% of those ages 30 to 49 and 11% of those younger than 30.

Politically, conservatives in the U.S., Spain and Germany are more likely than liberals to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, but while solid majorities of conservatives in the U.S. (66%) take this position, fewer than half of conservatives in Spain (31%) and Germany (46%) share this view. Meanwhile, just 26% of liberals in the U.S., 11% in Spain and 19% in Germany say belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality. Conservatives in the U.S. are also far more likely than liberals to consider religion very important in their lives (67% vs. 29%); in Western Europe, few across ideological groups place high importance on religion.

Religious vs. National Identity

American Christians are more likely than their Western European counterparts to think of themselves first in terms of their religion rather than their nationality; 46% of Christians in the U.S. see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In contrast, majorities of Christians in France (90%), Germany (70%), Britain (63%) and Spain (53%) identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

In Britain, France and Germany, more Christians now see themselves in terms of their nationality than did so five years ago, when national identification was already widespread in these countries. This change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

Among Christians in the U.S., white evangelicals are especially inclined to identify first with their faith; 70% in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among other American Christians, more identify with their nationality (55%) than with their religion (38%).

Homosexuality

Tolerance for homosexuality is widespread in the U.S. and Western Europe, but far more Western Europeans than Americans say homosexuality should be accepted by society; at least eight-in-ten in Spain (91%), Germany (87%), France (86%) and Britain (81%), compared with 60% in the U.S.

Acceptance of homosexuality has increased in recent years, and the shift is especially notable in the U.S., where only slightly more said it should be accepted (49%) than said it should be rejected (41%) in 2007. Today, more Americans accept homosexuality than reject it by a 27-percentage point margin.

While there are some differences in opinions of homosexuality across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed, overwhelming majorities across age, education and gender groups believe homosexuality should be accepted by society. In the U.S., however, these differences are somewhat more pronounced. For example, while 67% of American women believe homosexuality should be accepted, a much narrower majority of men (54%) share that view. Among Americans with college degrees, 71% accept homosexuality, compared with 56% of those with less education. Finally, about two-thirds (68%) of Americans younger than 30 say homosexuality should be accepted by society; 61% of those ages 30 to 40 and 55% of those ages 50 and older share this view.

In addition to demographic differences, an ideological divide on views of homosexuality is also notable in the U.S., where more than eight-in-ten (85%) liberals and 65% of moderates express tolerant views, compared with 44% of conservatives. In the four Western European countries surveyed, at least three-quarters across ideological groups say homosexuality should be accepted by society.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

The image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office. Improvements in the U.S. image have been most pronounced in Western Europe, where favorable ratings for both the nation and the American people have soared. But opinions of America have also become more positive in key countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well.

Signs of improvement in views of America are seen even in some predominantly Muslim countries that held overwhelmingly negative views of the United States in the Bush years. The most notable increase occurred in Indonesia, where people are well aware of Obama’s family ties to the country and where favorable ratings of the U.S. nearly doubled this year. However for the most part, opinions of the U.S. among Muslims in the Middle East remain largely unfavorable, despite some positive movement in the numbers in Jordan and Egypt. Animosity toward the U.S., however, continues to run deep and unabated in Turkey, the Palestinian territories and Pakistan.

Israel stands out in the poll as the only public among the 25 surveyed where the current U.S. rating is lower than in past surveys.¹

In contrast, in Germany favorable opinion of the U.S. jumped from 31% in 2008 to 64% in the current survey. Large boosts in U.S. favorability ratings since last year are also recorded in Britain, Spain and France. In its own hemisphere, America’s image rose markedly in Canada, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. Improvements in U.S. ratings are less evident in countries where the country’s image had not declined consistently during the Bush years, including Poland, Japan and South Korea. Opinions of the U.S. remain very positive in the African nations of Kenya and Nigeria, while increasing significantly in India and China.

The new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted May 18 to June 16, finds that confidence in Barack Obama’s foreign policy judgments stands behind a resurgent U.S. image in many countries. Belief that Obama will “do the right thing in world affairs” is now nearly universal in Western countries, where lack of confidence in President Bush had been almost as prevalent for much of his time in office. In France and Germany, no fewer than nine-in-ten express confidence in the new American president, exceeding the ratings achieved by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel in their own countries.

In Asia, optimism about Obama is almost as extensive with 85% of Japanese and 81% of South Koreans expressing confidence in the American president, and only somewhat lower percentages expressing that view in India (77%) and China (64%). In Brazil, 76% have confidence in Obama, as do most Argentines (61%), despite their generally skeptical view of the U.S. as expressed in this and earlier surveys.

Even in some countries where the U.S. remains unpopular, significant percentages nonetheless say that they think Obama will do the right thing in international affairs. In Egypt and Jordan, sizable numbers have confidence in him – 42% and 31% respectively. This represents a three-fold increase compared with opinions about President Bush in 2008. But in Pakistan and the Palestinian territories, ratings of Obama are only marginally better than the abysmal ratings accorded Bush. Again, Israel stands alone as the only country where Obama does not engender more confidence than did President Bush. And only about one-in-three Russians (37%) voice confidence in the new president, although this is still a considerably better rating than Bush received in 2008 (22%).

In most countries where opinions of the U.S. have improved, many say that Obama’s election led them to have a more favorable view of the U.S. This admission is most apparent in Western Europe, Canada and Japan. In Indonesia, where opinion of America improved dramatically, no fewer than 73% say that his election bettered their opinion of the U.S. However even in countries where there was little or no upswing in the U.S.’s ratings, many people say that Obama’s election has led them to think more favorably of the U.S. For example in Egypt and Turkey, where America’s favorable ratings remain very low, as many as 38% in both countries say they have better opinions of the U.S. because of Obama. However, fewer than one-in-ten (9%) in Pakistan express that view.

More generally, analysis of the survey finds that views of the U.S. are being driven much more by personal confidence in Obama than by opinions about his specific policies. That is, opinions about Obama personally are more associated with views of the U.S. than are judgments of his policies that were tested in the poll.

Obama’s Cairo Speech

The polling in the Muslim world took place around the time of President Obama’s Cairo speech. In some countries, interviews took place both before and after the speech, providing some gauge of the effect of Obama’s remarks on his image and opinions of the U.S. more broadly. In Turkey a sufficient number of interviews were conducted before and after the speech to allow for an analysis of how much impact it had on public opinion. This analysis suggests that the speech had little measurable impact on views of the U.S. or Obama himself. However, the pre-post comparisons were rudimentary ones that could only have detected a major swing in public opinion.

In Israel and the Palestinian territories full surveys were conducted both before and after the Cairo speech. A pre-post analysis among both publics suggests that Obama’s June 4 speech had a more negative impact on attitudes toward America among Israelis than it had a positive one among Palestinians. Before the speech, 76% of Israelis questioned had a favorable view of the U.S., but after the speech that rating fell to 63%. Similarly, confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs slipped from 60% pre-speech to 49% post-speech.

Among Palestinians, in contrast, overall ratings of the U.S. and Obama improved but only marginally (+5 percentage points), a difference that is not statistically significant. However, one apparently positive consequence of the speech on Palestinian public opinion was observed in the survey. The number of Palestinians thinking that Obama would consider their country’s interests when making international policy rose from 27% to 39%, following the Cairo speech.

Obama vs. bin Laden

More generally, there is little evidence that a more positively regarded U.S. president has spurred further declines in support for terrorism in Muslim countries. Pew Global Attitudes surveys over the last few years have found many fewer Muslims than earlier in the decade saying that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. However, support for suicide bombing has not fallen further over the past year.

Opinions about Osama bin Laden have followed a similar trend line among the Muslim publics surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Views of him have been far more negative in recent years than they were mid-decade, but overall they have not declined further over the past year. However, for the first time over the course of Pew’s surveys, there is more confidence in the American president than in bin Laden in a number of countries with predominantly Muslim publics; including: Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Nigeria and Indonesia.

In 2008, most Muslim publics rated bin Laden as high, or higher than they rated President Bush. But in the current survey Obama inspires confidence in many more people than does the al Qaeda leader. However, in the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, bin Laden’s ratings still top Obama’s by sizable margins. (Lebanon is the only country in the survey where Bush’s ratings had been higher than bin Laden’s among Muslims in recent years).

Obama Runs the Table on Guantanamo and Iraq

Obama’s overall approval rating for some of his current international policies is high in most countries. This is especially so in Western Europe, where markedly more people than in the U.S. itself give a thumbs up to the new president’s foreign policy. Closing the military prison at Guantanamo and withdrawing troops from Iraq are the specific policies that engender the most public international support. Supra majorities in almost all countries favor both measures – including nearly all of the publics of predominantly Muslim countries surveyed. The one notable exception is the U.S., where the public is now divided about closing the military prison at Guantanamo.

Sending more troops to Afghanistan is the only Obama policy tested that does not engender broad global support. In fact, majorities in most countries oppose the added deployments. This includes the publics of several NATO countries – such as Britain, Germany, Spain and Canada – most of which in recent years have called for removing troops from Afghanistan. A majority of Pakistanis also oppose the call for more troops in Afghanistan, reflecting longstanding opposition to NATO operations in that country. Opinions in the U.S. and Israel are exceptional – majorities in both countries favor Obama’s request for more troops.

Afghanistan not withstanding, people around the world for the most part have high expectations for Barack Obama. Majorities of the publics of America’s traditional allies, who have thought the U.S. favors Israel too much think that Obama will be fair in his dealing with the Palestinians and Israelis. In the Mideast, however, large majorities are dubious. More than six-in-ten Jordanians (69%), Egyptians (66%) and Lebanese (63%) do not expect Obama to be even handed. In Israel, the number thinking Obama will be fair was 57% prior to the Cairo speech, but just 47% after Obama’s address. Among Palestinians, the view that the new American president will be fair rose marginally after the speech (25% to 31%).

The nearly 27,000 people questioned in the new Pew Global Attitudes survey are also generally optimistic that Obama will seek international approval before using military force and will take into account the interests of their country when making U.S. policy. Western Europeans and Canadians are especially positive in these regards. Publics around the world are also optimistic on another issue that has been a source of contention with regard to the U.S.: climate change. Majorities or pluralities of people in almost every country surveyed believe that Obama will get the U.S. to take significant measures to control climate change.

While the image of the U.S. is much improved and expectations about Obama are high, there has been only modest change in opinion of the U.S. on two key issues: multilateralism and the impact of the American global footprint. Expectations about Obama’s multilateralism not withstanding, most still say the U.S. is not considering their country when making foreign policy. Only in Germany, India, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, China and Brazil do majorities think the U.S. is taking their country’s interest into account when making foreign policy. And overwhelming numbers of people around the world continue to see the U.S. as having a big influence on their country, with the publics of most nations surveyed describing that influence as bad, rather than good. Exceptions are India and Kenya, where majorities say that the U.S. impact is positive.

Nonetheless, one concrete, positive sign for the new administration in the survey is a surge in support for U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism. The percentage favoring the U.S. effort among the nation’s allies had steadily declined from 2002 to 2007. The new survey once again finds majorities of Western Europeans and Canadians approving of the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. But increased support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts is also apparent in Poland, Russia, Brazil and Mexico. Among majority-Muslim publics, Indonesians are alone in supporting American anti-terrorism efforts. In that regard, while the image of the U.S. has improved somewhat in many predominantly Muslim countries, majorities in most continue to fear that the U.S. could pose a military threat to their country someday.

It’s Still the Economy

As in 2008, most people surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project say they are dissatisfied with conditions in their country. However, discontent increased sharply over the past year in Spain, Poland, Russia, Pakistan and Mexico. As in previous polls, an overwhelming number of Chinese (87%) say they are satisfied with conditions in their country. Majorities in Canada and India also express satisfaction with the way things were going in their countries. For India, the current recorded level of national contentment represents a major increase over 2008.

Overwhelmingly negative views of national economies underlie national discontent in most countries. Overall, ratings of national economic conditions have grown more negative in the last year. Among the 21 countries surveyed in 2008 and 2009, the median percentage rating their economy as bad is 74% this year, compared with 62% last year. Evaluations of economic conditions soured the most over the past year in Europe – specifically in Britain, Germany, Spain, Poland and Russia. But in China, India and Indonesia, where GDP has continued to grow, opinions of economic conditions have improved since 2008, especially in India.

Even though America’s image has improved markedly over the past year, majorities or pluralities in 20 of 25 publics believe that the U.S. economy is hurting their own economies. This was the prevailing view in most countries in the 2008 survey, as well. It is slightly more prevalent in the new poll – especially in Russia and Nigeria. In India most (55%) see the U.S. as having a positive effect on the economy, while the Chinese are divided about evenly on the American impact.

There is little consensus as to which of the major powers has the best plan to fix the economy. In Europe, only the French and Germans express strong confidence in the European Union. In Britain and Spain, where many favor the U.S. approach, confidence in the EU is lower. Most Americans (60%) believe the U.S. has the best approach to dealing with the global recession, though the poll does find that Obama’s economic stimulus plan is less popular in the United States than in Western Europe. As in the United States, most Chinese (60%) say their country’s approach to the global recession is best.

The 25-nation poll finds a mixed message in responses to the global recession. As in the past, majorities in most nations continue to endorse a free market economy and most people polled continue to endorse growing international trade ties. However, still more people say their governments should take steps to protect their countries economically, even if other friendly nations object. And as in previous surveys in this series, large percentages of people believe that their country needs to be protected against foreign influence and most favor greater restrictions and control on immigration.

While global recession concerns are clearly evident, huge majorities of the 25 publics questioned in the poll continue to see global warming as a serious problem. As has been the case in past years, the intensity of concern about this issue is somewhat less among the Chinese and the Americans compared with people in other major nations. But the current poll found the intensity of worry also slipping in Canada, Mexico, Britain, Spain, Poland, Russia and Turkey compared with levels in 2008. Stronger concern for global warming was recorded in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria and China. However, the Chinese continue to report far less intense worry about global warming than any of the other publics polled.

Notably, however, willingness to pay increased prices to combat climate change was much higher in China, and also India, than in other countries. Close to nine-in-ten among these two publics, both of which have seen GDP growth in the past year, agree that people should be willing to pay higher prices to address this problem. And support for higher prices to deal with climate change was also a good deal higher than average among the publics of two other major Asian economies – South Korea and Japan.

The poll found near universal awareness of swine flu among the 25 publics surveyed in late May and early June. Pakistan is the only country polled where people were largely unaware of the disease. Concern about swine flu was considerable: Majorities of those who have heard about the disease in most countries polled were very or somewhat worried about being exposed to it. Concerns were especially strong in parts of Asia, but surprisingly modest in Mexico, despite the number of deaths from swine flu that have occurred there.

Also of Note:

• Lebanese Sunnis are more confident in Obama than are either Christians or Shia. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon say they have at least some confidence in Obama, compared with 46% of Christians and just 26% of Shia Muslims.
• Brazilians increasingly view China, a fellow member of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as a partner. Nearly half of Brazilians (49%) now see China as a partner, up from 34% in 2008.
• Opinions of the European Union remain fairly tepid in Britain. In fact, more Canadians (71%) and Americans (56%) than the British (50%) express favorable opinions of the EU.
• Views of the United Nations have improved in the United States, as well as in Britain and France. Currently, 61% of Americans say they have a favorable view of the U.N., compared with 48% in 2007
• There is as much support for the free market in the Middle East as there is in Western Europe. And a higher percentage of Palestinians (82%) than any Western European public agrees that people are better off in a free market economy, even though some are rich and some are poor.

Still, the new survey finds concerns about the implications of globalization. Large majorities want their government to do what is necessary to protect their country economically, even if that results in tensions with allies. And there are widespread worries about immigration and foreign influences on a country’s way of life.

More Support for Trade

In the wake of a difficult economic year throughout much of the world, support for trade remains high, and in fact has increased in many nations. Majorities in all 25 countries included in the current survey say growing trade and business ties between nations are very or somewhat good for their country. Among the 21 countries included in both the 2008 and 2009 surveys, support for trade has increased in 10, decreased in only two, and stayed basically the same in nine.

In 16 nations, at least eight-in-ten say trade is good for their country. Support is especially high in the Asian economic powers of India (96% good), China (93%) and South Korea (92%).

In a reversal of recent trends, the largest increase in support for trade has occurred in the United States. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage of Americans who believed trade was good for their country dropped precipitously – from 78% to 53% – but over the last year, support has risen by 12 percentage points, the largest increase in the survey.

Positive opinions about trade rose most markedly among Democrats. Two years ago, Democrats were less likely than Republicans or independents to believe trade is good for the U.S.; now they are more likely than Republicans or independents to hold this view. At the same time, support for trade has also increased among Republicans and independents, following a decline among both groups last year.

There were also significant increases in Mexico (+10 percentage points), Egypt (+10), and Indonesia (+8), as well as in three of the four BRIC nations: Brazil (+7), India (+6) and China (+6). There has been little change in the fourth member of this group – 80% of Russians say trade is a good thing for their country, almost the same as last year’s 81%.

Personal Impact of Trade

Among the countries surveyed, a consensus holds that trade is beneficial not only for national economies, but for individuals as well. Majorities in all 25 nations say growing trade and business ties are having a very or somewhat good impact on themselves and their families.

India again stands out in its enthusiasm for trade – 94% of Indians see trade as personally benefiting them – and they are joined in this view by at least 80% of the publics in 12 other nations.

In a number of countries people have become more likely in the last year to say trade is good for themselves and their families. This is especially true in the Arab nations of Egypt (+19 percentage points) and Jordan (+13), as well as all three Latin American nations surveyed, Argentina (+10), Brazil (+9), and Mexico (+8).

The belief that trade is personally beneficial has also become more common in the U.S. (+8). Americans are about as likely to say trade has a positive impact on them personally (63%) as to say it has a positive impact on the country (65%). Overall, however, respondents are somewhat more likely to believe trade benefits their country than to believe it benefits them personally – in 13 nations the percentage saying trade is good for the country is higher than the percentage saying it is good on a personal level. There is no country in which people are more likely to say trade is personally beneficial.

Economic Nationalism

While there is relatively little enthusiasm for protectionism among the publics surveyed, there is nonetheless a widely held belief that governments should protect their national economic interests. In all 25 countries, large majorities agree that their government should take steps to protect their nation economically, even if other allies object. In 11 nations, majorities completely agree with this idea.

Economic nationalism, as measured by this question, is somewhat less intense among European Union members – just 30% of Germans completely agree, along with fewer than half in France (33%), Spain (36%), Poland (41%) and Britain (46%).

Similarly, fewer than half completely agree with this view in the U.S. (45%) and Canada (34%). Economic nationalism is least intense, however, in China (26% completely agree) and South Korea (21%).

Free Market Remains Popular

On balance, the global economic downturn has had little impact on support for the free market. In 22 of 25 countries, majorities completely or mostly agree with the statement “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.” Among the 24 nations where this question was asked in 2007 and 2009, the percentage saying they agree has risen in 10 nations, dropped in eight, and remained about the same in six.

More than three-in-four agree with the statement in a diverse set of nations. Support for the free market approach is strongest in two of the poorest nations on the survey, Kenya (84% agree) and the Palestinian territories (82%). Palestinians are now considerably more likely to endorse free market economics than they were two years ago, when 66% held this view.

Support is also high in the growing Asian giants India (81%) and China (79%), as well as in the U.S. (76%), South Korea (76%) and Israel (72%).

Enthusiasm for the capitalist approach is lowest in Japan and Argentina, and it has declined in both nations since 2007. Two years ago, 49% of Japanese said most people are better off in a free market system, even though it may result in inequalities; today, 41% take this view. In Argentina, 43% said people are better off under a free market in 2007, compared with 36% now. There is also less support for the free market now in Nigeria (-13 percentage points), Spain (-10), and Lebanon (-10).

Somewhat More Concern About Foreign Influence

Concerns about foreign influence are common among the publics included in the study. Majorities in all 25 nations agree with the statement “Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.”

This perspective is somewhat less common in EU nations, although even in Germany (62%), Britain (62%), Poland (61%) and France (59%) roughly six-in-ten hold this view, as do 71% in Spain.

Fully 69% of Americans think their way of life must be protected against foreign influence, up seven percentage points from 2007. And there have been increases elsewhere as well – in 10 of 24 other nations, more now want protection from foreign influences.

The biggest increases in concern about foreign influence have occurred in Israel (+12 percentage points), China (+11) and Japan (+10). Notable rises have also taken place in Pakistan (+9), South Korea (+9), Germany (+9), Mexico (+8), Britain (+8) and France (+7).

There is less demand for protection today in only four nations: Indonesia (-10), Russia
(-8), Argentina (-7) and Brazil (-7). In 10 countries there has essentially been no change on this question.

Support for Immigration Controls

Publics around the world want tighter restrictions on immigration to their countries. Majorities in 22 of 25 nations completely or mostly agree with the statement: “We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.”

This sentiment is common both in economically developed nations such as Israel (82% agree), Britain (80%) and Spain (77%), and in less-developed nations such as India (86%), Indonesia (83%) and Kenya (81%).

The only three publics in which less than half of respondents favor stricter immigration policies are Japan (44% agree), the Palestinian territories (43%) and South Korea (29%).

Roughly three-quarters in the U.S. (74%) endorse stronger controls on immigration, basically unchanged from 2007.

In most countries surveyed, there has not been significant change on this question since 2007, although Israelis (+8 percentage points) are somewhat more likely to call for tighter restrictions than they were two years ago and the French (-7) are somewhat less likely.

North Americans Remain More Individualistic

As in previous Pew Global Attitudes polls, majorities in most countries surveyed agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.”

This view is especially prevalent in India (79%), South Korea (75%), Kenya (71%) and Nigeria (70%). However, large majorities agree outside of Asia and Africa as well, including more than two-thirds of Germans (69%) and Poles (68%).

The only nations where clear majorities disagree with this perspective are the U.S. and Canada, although since 2007 both publics have become somewhat more likely to believe that success in life is determined by forces outside our control. Two years ago, 33% of Americans agreed that success was beyond an individual’s control, compared with 39% today. Similarly, 34% of Canadians felt this way in 2007, compared with 38% now.

Overall, the publics surveyed have become slightly more likely to believe that success is determined by external factors – in nine countries, the percentage who agree with this statement has increased since 2007, while declining in only one (Lebanon, where the percentage who agree has dropped 15 percentage points). However, even in most countries where there have been increases, they have typically been small. The two largest increases have occurred in Egypt (+12 percentage points) and Nigeria (+7%).

The publics of the world broadly embrace key tenets of economic globalization but fear the disruptions and downsides of participating in the global economy. In rich countries as well as poor ones, most people endorse free trade, multinational corporations and free markets. However, the latest Pew Global Attitudes survey of more than 45,000 people finds they are concerned about inequality, threats to their culture, threats to the environment and threats posed by immigration. Together, these results reveal an evolving world view on globalization that is nuanced, ambivalent, and sometimes inherently contradictory.

There are signs that enthusiasm for economic globalization is waning in the West — Americans and Western Europeans are less supportive of international trade and multinational companies than they were five years ago. In contrast, there is near universal approval of global trade among the publics of rising Asian economic powers China and India.

The survey also finds that globalization is only one of several wide-ranging social and economic forces that are rapidly reshaping the world. Strong majorities in developing countries endorse core democratic values, but people are less likely to say their countries are ensuring free speech, delivering honest elections or providing fair trials to all. Conflicting views on the relationship between religion and morality sharply divide the world. But on gender issues, the survey finds that a global consensus has emerged on the importance of education for both girls and boys, while most people outside the Muslim world also say that women and men make equally good political leaders.

Costs and Benefits of Globalization

Overwhelmingly, the surveyed publics see the benefits of increasing global commerce and free market economies. In all 47 nations included in the survey, large majorities believe that international trade is benefiting their countries. For the most part, the multinational corporations that dominate global commerce receive favorable ratings. Nonetheless, since 2002 enthusiasm for trade has declined significantly in the United States, Italy, France and Britain, and views of multinationals are less positive in Western countries where economic growth has been relatively modest in recent years.

In most countries, majorities believe that people are better off under capitalism, even if it means that some may be rich and others poor. Support for free markets has increased notably over the past five years in Latin American and Eastern European nations, where increased satisfaction with income and perceptions of personal progress are linked to higher per capita incomes.

But there are widely shared concerns about the free flow of people, ideas and resources that globalization entails. In nearly every country surveyed, people worry about losing their traditional culture and national identities, and they feel their way of life needs protection against foreign influences. Importantly, the poll finds widespread concerns about immigration. Moreover, there is a strong link between immigration fears and concerns about threats to a country’s culture and traditions. Those who worry the most about immigration also tend to see the greatest need for protecting traditional ways of life against foreign influences.

Immigration Fears

In both affluent countries in the West and in the developing world, people are concerned about immigration. Large majorities in nearly every country surveyed express the view that there should be greater restriction of immigration and tighter control of their country’s borders.

Although Western publics remain concerned about immigration, they generally are less likely to back tighter controls today than they were five years ago, despite heated controversies over this issue in both Europe and the United States over the last few years. In Italy, however, support for greater restrictions has increased — 87% now support more controls on immigration, up seven points from 2002.

Concerns about immigration have increased in other countries as well, perhaps most notably in Jordan, where an influx of Iraqi refugees has raised the salience of this issue — 70% of Jordanians back tighter immigration controls, up from 48% five years ago.

Religion and Social Issues

Global publics are sharply divided over the relationship between religion and morality. In much of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, there is a strong consensus that belief in God is necessary for morality and good values. Throughout much of Europe, however, majorities think morality is achievable without faith. Meanwhile, opinions are more mixed in the Americas, including in the United States, where 57% say that one must believe in God to have good values and be moral, while 41% disagree.

The survey finds a strong relationship between a country’s religiosity and its economic status. In poorer nations, religion remains central to the lives of individuals, while secular perspectives are more common in richer nations.¹ This relationship generally is consistent across regions and countries, although there are some exceptions, including most notably the United States, which is a much more religious country than its level of prosperity would indicate. Other nations deviate from the pattern as well, including the oil-rich, predominantly Muslim — and very religious — kingdom of Kuwait.

The survey also measured global opinion about contemporary social issues, finding a mix of traditional and progressive views. Throughout Western Europe and much of the Americas, there is widespread tolerance towards homosexuality. However, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Israel stand apart from other wealthy nations on this issue; in each of these countries, fewer than half of those surveyed say homosexuality should be accepted by society. Meanwhile, in most of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, there is less tolerance toward homosexuality.

Regarding gender issues, there is a broad consensus that both boys and girls should receive an education. In all 47 countries surveyed, at least seven-in-ten respondents believe that education is equally important for boys and girls. Most publics also believe that men and women are equally qualified for political leadership, although there is less agreement on this issue. Notably, in several predominantly Muslim publics — including Mali, the Palestinian territories, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bangladesh — majorities say that men make better political leaders. The survey also asked about another often contentious gender issue: Muslim women wearing the veil. In 15 of 16 Muslim publics surveyed, majorities say women should have the right to decide whether they wear a veil. Women generally are more likely than men to express this opinion.

Views of Democracy

Most key democratic principles are broadly supported throughout the developing world. Large majorities in most of the 35 developing countries surveyed strongly value religious freedom and an impartial judicial system. Somewhat smaller majorities endorse honest multiparty elections, free speech and a media free from government censorship. But majorities in only six nations rate civilian control of the military as very important, the least valued of the six core democratic principles tested.

While basic democratic freedoms are prized throughout the developing world, experiencing such liberties is another matter. This “democracy gap” is generally widest in the Middle East. In Lebanon, for example, more than eight-in-ten people view free speech, honest multiparty elections and a fair judicial system as “very important.” But the number of Lebanese who believe these characteristics describe their country “very well” is much lower — only 36% for free speech, 23% for a fair judicial system, and 17% for multiparty elections.

As in past surveys, majorities in predominantly Muslim nations continue to believe Western-style democracy can work in their countries. But in the current poll, Turks are more skeptical of this than they have been over the past five years. This may reflect anti-Western sentiment more than a diminished appetite for democracy, which Turks broadly embrace. In contrast, however, the weakest endorsement of democracy comes not from the Muslim world, but from Russia, where by a greater than two-to-one margin people say a strong leader, rather than democracy, can best solve the country’s problems.

Other questions suggest that the struggle to meet basic human needs can supersede support for democracy. For example, most publics in both the developed and developing world say being free from hunger and poverty is more important to them than either free speech or religious freedom. The conflict between basic rights and basic needs is particularly apparent in the developing world, home to many of the newest and most fragile democracies. When asked to choose between a strong economy and a good democracy, majorities in 14 of 36 developing countries choose prosperity, while majorities in 15 select a good democracy.

Other findings from this wide-ranging survey include:

Attitudes toward government

• Concerns about excessive government control have increased in much of Western and Eastern Europe, with particularly large increases in Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic. Overall, worries about government intrusion into daily life are higher in Western Europe than in the former Eastern bloc.
• Majorities in every country surveyed say that the government should take care of the very poor who cannot take care of themselves. Support for a social safety net is widespread across all regions, although slightly weaker in Japan, Jordan and Egypt.
• Few publics favor economic growth at the expense of the environment. In 46 of 47 countries surveyed, majorities say the environment should be given priority, even if this means lower growth and fewer jobs.

American exceptionalism

• Americans tend to be more religious than the publics of other affluent nations. Americans also are more likely to say that individuals are in control of their lives, another indication of what some scholars describe as “American exceptionalism” in terms of core attitudes and beliefs.
• Americans are somewhat more likely than the publics of most NATO allies to support the use of force in the international arena. Overwhelmingly, Americans think military force is sometimes necessary in world affairs, while among European publics there is greater division on this issue. Egyptians, Jordanians and Germans are most likely to reject the view that military force is sometimes necessary.
• More than half of Americans say their culture is superior to others, a larger proportion than in most other Western publics. But in Italy, nearly seven-in-ten say their way of life is better.

Muslims and their beliefs

• In most Muslim countries, at least one-in-three Muslims — including more than half in Lebanon and Turkey — sees a struggle between Islamic fundamentalists and those who want to modernize their countries.
• While most publics agree that religion and politics do not mix, opinions are moving in opposite directions in two key Muslim allies of the United States. Support for strict separation between religion and government is growing in Pakistan, while in Turkey support for such separation has declined significantly in the past five years.
• Large majorities in every Latin American, Eastern European and African country surveyed say that women should be able to choose their own husbands. But sizable minorities in several predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and Asia — and a majority in Pakistan — say that a woman’s family should choose her husband.

Immigration

• North Americans generally are more welcoming to immigrants than are Western Europeans. Among Western European publics, Swedes are the most likely to say immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as from Eastern Europe, is a good thing for their country, while Italians and Germans express the most negative views.
• Sizable minorities in 11 of the 36 developing countries surveyed say they regularly receive money from relatives living in another country. In Lebanon and Bangladesh, nearly half of respondents say they receive help from family members living abroad.

Media and technology

• People around the world continue to turn to television for news about international and national issues. The only exceptions are several African nations where radio is still the primary source of information. Newspapers continue to lose readers and trail far behind television as a news source.
• Online news sources are steadily gaining in popularity in the West and parts of Asia but draw only a tiny audience in Africa or Latin America.
• Computer ownership has steadily risen in the past five years, particularly in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the gap in technology use between the world’s advanced countries and less developed nations has increased significantly.
• Cell phone ownership is increasing at a dramatic pace in both the developed and developing worlds. Since 2002, cell phone ownership has grown by 20 percentage points or more in 24 of the 35 countries where trend data is available.

When asked why people leave their country to live in another country, solid majorities in every Latin American, Eastern European, and African country surveyed, as well as in several Middle Eastern and Asian countries, say it is for job opportunities. This opinion is nearly unanimous in Senegal, Bolivia, Poland, Morocco, Bangladesh, Peru, Ivory Coast, Brazil, Slovakia, and Mali, where more than nine-in-ten say jobs are the main reason people emigrate.

The survey also finds that more than one-in-five in eleven countries, including nearly half in Lebanon (47%) and Bangladesh (45%), say they receive money from relatives living in another country.

Widespread Support for Restricting Immigration

Support for tighter border control is high both in the affluent countries of the West and in the developing world. With the exception of Japan, South Korea and the Palestinian territories, majorities in every country polled say their countries should restrict immigration more than they do now. This view is particularly widespread in Africa, where at least three-quarters in seven of the countries surveyed agree that the entry of people into their country should be more restricted, and in southern Asian countries. More than nine-in-ten in Ivory Coast (94%) and almost as many in South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia (89% each) agree.

Majorities of Americans and Canadians also say that there should be more restrictions on people entering their countries than there is today. Three-quarters of Americans and 62% of Canadians express that opinion. These concerns are shared by Latin American publics as well. About three quarters of Venezuelans (77%), Chileans (74%) and Bolivians (73%) agree that their countries should restrict and control immigration more than they do today, as do solid majorities of Brazilians (72%), Mexicans (71%) and Argentines (68%) and just slightly more than half of Peruvians (51%).

Among European publics, Italians express the most concern about the levels of immigration to their country. Fully 87% of Italians agree that their country should restrict and control the entry of people more than it does today. (Italians also are more likely than any other public surveyed to say immigration is a very big problem in their country; for more details see “ Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Moods in the Developing World ,” released July 24.)

This sentiment is shared by more than seven-in-ten in Spain (77%), Britain (75%), the Czech Republic (75%) and Russia (72%), and more than six-in-ten in France (68%), Germany (66%), Slovakia (64%) and Ukraine (63%). Narrow majorities in Sweden, Bulgaria and Poland (53% each) also agree that there should be more restrictions on immigration to their country.

Publics in Western nations for which trends are available are somewhat less likely than they were five years ago to agree that their country should impose tighter restrictions on immigration, as are publics in twelve other countries included in the 2002 poll. But concerns about levels of immigration have risen considerably in some parts of the world in the last five years. For example, in Jordan, where an influx of Iraqis since the start of the war led the government to tighten border regulations in 2006, the percent saying their country should restrict and control the entry of people more than it does now is up 22 points. In 2002 the Jordanian public was divided – 48% agreed that tighter restrictions were needed and 52% disagreed. Today seven-in-ten Jordanians want more border regulations and fewer than three-in-ten (29%) disagree. Support for increased border control is also up dramatically in Bangladesh (+25 points), Tanzania (+22 points), and Pakistan (+16 points).

Views on Immigration and Worries About Culture

As noted in Chapter 1, opinions about immigration are closely linked to perceptions about threats to a country’s culture. In 46 of 47 countries, those who favor stricter immigration controls are also more likely to believe their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.

In every region, this relationship is generally strong and consistent. In Western European nations, Canada, and the United States the pattern is especially clear – in each of these countries, the percentage of respondents who support protecting their way of life against foreign influence is at least 30 points higher among those who favor tighter immigration restrictions than among those who oppose such restrictions.

The relationship between views on immigration and cultural threats is also strong in Israel and Lebanon, although elsewhere in the Middle East it is somewhat muted. This is due to the fact that concerns about foreign influence are high among both those who want more restrictions on immigration and those who do not. This is especially true in Egypt – the only country in the survey where there is no link between opinions about immigration and attitudes toward influence from abroad.

Mixed Views about Key Immigrant Groups in Europe

Publics in Western Europe offer mixed opinions about immigration from the Middle East and North Africa and from East European countries. Of the six Western European publics polled, the Swedes are the most welcoming. More than six-in-ten in that country (63%) say immigration from Eastern Europe is a good thing and just slightly fewer (57%) express that opinion about immigration from the Middle East and North Africa.

By contrast, Italian and German respondents offer overwhelmingly negative views of immigrants. Two-thirds of Italians say it is a bad thing that people from the Middle East and North Africa and from Eastern Europe come to live and work in their country. Germans express similarly negative opinions. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) say immigration from East European countries is a bad thing and an even larger share say the same about immigration from the Middle East and North Africa (64%).

In France and Britain, majorities offer positive opinions about key immigrant groups, but the percentage of respondents in those countries who say immigration from the Middle East and Africa and from Eastern Europe is a good thing has dropped since last year. Following a slight increase in the proportion of the French public expressing positive views about immigrants in 2006, the French are now as likely as they were in 2005 to say immigration from the Middle East and North Africa and from East European countries is a good thing. Just over half of the French express positive views about key immigrant groups (53%) today. In 2006, nearly six-in-ten (58%) said immigration from the Middle East and North Africa and from Eastern Europe was a good thing.

Positive opinions about immigration have been declining gradually among the British since 2005, and this is especially the case when it comes to views of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. Two years ago, 61% of British respondents said it was a good thing that people from the Middle East and North Africa came to live and work in their country. In 2006, slightly fewer than six-in-ten (57%) shared that view. Today, a narrow majority (51%) in Britain says immigration from the Middle East and North Africa is a good thing.

Spanish respondents are the most divided when it comes to key immigrant groups. Virtually the same number says it is a good thing that people from the Middle East and North Africa (44%) and Eastern Europe (45%) come to live and work in their country as say it is a bad thing (45% say that about people from the Middle East and North Africa and 43% offer that opinion about people from East European countries). This is a sharp decline from just a year ago, when about six-in-ten in Spain viewed immigration from the Middle East and Africa (62%) and from Eastern Europe (60%) positively.

North Americans More Welcoming Than Europeans

Americans and Canadians continue to be generally more welcoming to newcomers than Europeans. As in 2005, solid majorities in both countries say it is a good thing that people from Asia and from Mexico and Latin America come to live and work in their countries. About six-in-ten Americans express positive views about Asian (61%) and Latin American (57%) immigrants. Canadians are even more welcoming – about seven-in-ten say immigration from Asia (71%) and from Latin America (72%) is a good thing.

In the United States, views about immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries are somewhat reflective of partisan differences. More than six-in-ten Democrats (61%) welcome immigrants from those countries, compared with a narrower majority of Republicans (53%). But when it comes to Asian immigrants, Democrats and Republicans offer nearly identical views. Fully 62% of Democrats and 59% of Republicans say it is a good thing that Asians come to live and work in the United States.

Negative Views about Immigration in Israel

Immigration has long been a topic of heated political debate in Israel. Most recently, a decision by the Israeli government to turn away refugees from Darfur entering the country illegally through the Egyptian border has drawn criticism from some in Israel who say their country has a duty to offer a safe haven to refugees because of its history. The poll finds that the Israeli public expresses overwhelmingly negative views about immigration from Africa. More than six-in-ten Israelis (63%) say it is a bad thing that people from African countries come to live and work in Israel and only about a quarter (26%) say immigration from Africa is a good thing.

But Africans are not the only immigrants Israelis express reservations about – a narrow majority of Israelis also see immigration from Eastern Europe as a bad thing. Opinion about immigrants from East European countries is more positive than opinions about African immigrants, but fewer than four-in-ten Israelis (37%) say it is good that people from Eastern Europe come to live and work in their country. Slightly more than half of Israelis (52%) say it is a bad thing.

Reasons for Emigrating

Majorities in 32 of the 36 countries where respondents were asked about the main reason people leave their country to live elsewhere, including overwhelming majorities in every Latin American, East European, and African country surveyed, say people emigrate in pursuit of job opportunities. But considerable minorities in parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East also cite education and nearly three-in-ten (28%) in Lebanon say safety is the main reason people leave their country to live elsewhere.

In Kuwait, the only country where more people say something other than jobs is the main reason people leave their country, more than a quarter (27%) say people leave to get an education elsewhere. Education is also mentioned by a considerable minority in Jordan (33%), Malaysia (26%), Kenya (25%), Egypt (22%) and China (19%).

Lebanese respondents are the most likely to say safety is the main reason people leave their country. Nearly three-in-ten (28%) in Lebanon offer that opinion. Christians and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are considerably more likely than Shia Muslims to say people leave mainly for safety reasons. Close to four-in-ten (37%) Lebanese Christians and three-in-ten Lebanese Sunnis say that is the case, compared with just 17% of Lebanese Shia.

Many Receive Money from Abroad

Each year, migrant workers send more than $230 billion to their families in their home countries, according to the World Bank. The Pew Global Attitudes survey finds that more than one-in-five respondents in 11 of the 36 developing countries polled, including nearly half in Lebanon (47%) and Bangladesh (45%), say they receive money from relatives living in another country. This is especially common in Africa, where sizable minorities in Mali (42%), Nigeria (38%), Senegal (37%), Ethiopia (35%), Ghana (33%) and Ivory Coast (27%) say they receive money from relatives living abroad at least occasionally.

Among Latin Americans, Mexicans are the most likely to say they receive money from relatives living abroad. About a quarter (23%) of Mexicans say that is that case. In the Middle East, more in Lebanon (47%) and Egypt (30%) than in any other country say they receive remittances from family members. And in Asia, Bangladesh (45%) and Pakistan (27%) are the only countries where sizable minorities receive money from relatives living in other countries.