Special to Reuters

The long-discussed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union was formally endorsed by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address to Congress. Obama asserted that “trade that is fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” A prominent presidential endorsement will not prevent a long and disputatious negotiation, but a trade pact could yield potentially huge economic rewards — and also provoke serious political opposition on both sides.

A U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has been talked about for two decades but never actively pursued. On both sides of the Atlantic, there has been fear that any such deal between the world’s two largest economies would disadvantage poorer nations. A U.S.-EU accord was deemed less desirable because greater economic benefits could be gained from a global trade agreement involving more countries. Trade experts worried that it would undermine the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization. Moreover, based on past bitter disputes over frozen chickens, bananas, genetically modified organisms and other food and agricultural products, a U.S.-European Union agreement was deemed too politically fraught and difficult.

Now, with Europe in recession, the United States unemployment rate stubbornly high and both regions groaning under public indebtedness, Brussels and Washington are looking for ways to stimulate jobs and growth without spending money. Liberalization of trade and investment is seen as one way to do that.

In addition, in the wake of the failed Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, a U.S.-EU deal is thought to pose little immediate threat to the WTO because there is no comprehensive global trade deal in the offing any time soon. Moreover, the rising competitive challenge from China has increased the incentive for both Europe and America to develop common technical and regulatory standards for a $30 trillion transatlantic market to ensure that Western-style capitalism, not Chinese state capitalism, remains the global norm.

Publics on both sides of the Atlantic appear to be receptive to the idea.

The virulent European anti-Americanism of the last decade — owing to European opposition to the Iraq war and the policies of U.S. President George W. Bush — is ancient history. More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the French had a favorable view of the United States in 2012, compared with 42 percent in 2008, the last year of the Bush administration, according to Pew Research Center surveys. Fifty-two percent of Germans held a positive opinion of America, compared with 31 percent four years earlier. And 58 percent of the Spanish were favorably disposed toward the United States, much greater than the 33 percent who held such views in 2008.

There has been a similar, if less robust, rebound in American response to the European Union. In 2012, half the country had a favorable view of the EU, compared with only 39 percent at the nadir in 2004.

Moreover, contrary to the widespread assumption that protectionist sentiments are rising in the wake of the Great Recession, 58 percent of Americans say they support increased trade with the EU. The same feeling exists across the Atlantic. Three-quarters of the Italians, nearly two-thirds of the British (65 percent) and more than half of the French (58 percent) and Germans (57 percent) believe in deepening trade and investment ties between the European Union and the United States; 63 percent of Americans agree, according to a 2007 German Marshall Fund survey.

There is also strong support for one of the thorniest challenges that lie ahead: harmonization or mutual recognition of national regulations on goods and services, everything from food standards to insurance. Overwhelmingly Italians (87 percent), British (84 percent), French (82 percent), Americans (76 percent) and Germans (71 percent) support such efforts, according to the Marshall Fund survey.

European backing may reflect a half century of experience aligning regulations while building the European Union. American enthusiasm may reflect a lack of appreciation of just how arduous that can be.

The removal of all remaining tariffs on goods traded between Europe and the United States, traditionally the core of any trade and investment agreement, has strong, if slightly less enthusiastic support, on both sides of the Atlantic. Fully 70 percent of the British and Italians, 65 percent of the Poles and 54 percent of the Germans back such an effort, according to the GMF survey. Roughly half of the French (50 percent) and Americans (48 percent) agree.

Despite this seeming goodwill, negotiating a deal in the current political environment will not be easy. Publics and their elected leaders are domestically preoccupied. In some nations, protectionism and nationalism seem to be on the rise.

Once actual trade and investment negotiations finally get under way, the bargaining is likely to be challenging. If history is any guide, inevitable frictions will erode public support as adversely affected interests complain, while those that stand to benefit are less vocal. So the ultimate public verdict on a U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has yet to be rendered.

But on the eve of such negotiations, both Americans and Europeans seem disposed to try.

The economic euphoria in India over the last few years, inspired by the country’s seemingly inevitable march toward double-digit growth, has suddenly soured. Although still relatively upbeat compared with many other countries, the Indian public’s confidence in their country’s direction and future economic growth has declined significantly compared with just a year ago. In a world where the Americans, the Europeans and even the Chinese have reason to worry about their economies, it is the Indians who have lost the greatest faith in their economic fortunes.

Indians today are mixed in their assessment of their national economy: 49% say the economy is in good shape, while 45% describe the economy as bad. A year ago opinion was more upbeat, with a 56%-majority saying the national economy was doing well, compared with 43% who disagreed. Despite this decline, Indians remain more positive about current economic conditions than populations in most of the 17 countries surveyed in both 2011 and 2012 by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. And Indians are more optimistic about their economy’s trajectory over the next year than many of the publics surveyed in both years (for more, see “Pervasive Gloom about the World Economy,” released July 12, 2012).

Nevertheless, the trend line in India conveys a more troubling story. Just 38% of Indians are satisfied with the way things are going in the country – a 13 percentage point decline since last year. This is among the largest drops in national contentment across the countries surveyed in 2011 and 2012.

Meanwhile, the proportion of Indians who think current economic conditions are good is down seven percentage points from 2011. And only 45% of Indians think their economy will improve over the next 12 months. Such optimism has declined 15 points since 2011, again the largest falloff among the 17 nations with comparable data.

A year ago, Indians’ economic mood trailed that in China, bested that in Europe and the United States, and was comparable to that in Brazil. Today, Indians’ evaluation of their current national economic situation trails that in China by 34 percentage points and Brazil by 16 points. And Indian optimism about the next year lags behind that in Brazil by 39 points and China by 38 points. Indian satisfaction with the direction of the country is descending toward that in Europe and the United States and hope for the future has been surpassed by that in America.

Contrary to their view of the health and future of the national economy, nearly two-in-three Indians (64%) say their personal finances are good. This level of personal contentment is higher than in 14 of the other 20 countries surveyed in 2012.

But Indians are not terribly optimistic about their children’s economic prospects. About two-thirds (66%) think it will be difficult for their kids to get a better job or become wealthier than the current generation. Such pessimism is relative, however. Among the 21 nations surveyed, people in 17 countries are even more glum about their children’s futures.

Not all Indians are downbeat. By a margin of 25 percentage points, higher-income Indians are more satisfied than lower-income Indians with their personal economic situation. Richer Indians are more likely than lower-income Indians, by 13 points, to say they are better off than they were five years ago. And by nine points, they are more likely to say that their children can do better financially than themselves.

These differences by income group are generally greater in India than those found in Brazil, China or Turkey, three other emerging market economies surveyed. And they exist at a time when roughly seven-in-ten (72%) Indians say the gap between the rich and the poor is a very big national problem.

India and the World

India’s relations with the rest of the world, especially its neighbors Pakistan, China and Iran, are increasingly important in the realm of geopolitics. But for many Indians, especially those who live in rural areas, the outside world is simply not part of their daily consciousness. Large portions of the rural population have no definite opinion about other countries, foreign leaders or international policy issues.

City dwellers are more globally aware. A 58%-majority is favorably disposed toward the United States and they see America in a more favorable light than they view other major world powers, such as Russia (48%) or the EU (38%). About seven-in-ten city dwellers (71%) who say they are following the U.S. election closely want U.S. president Barack Obama to be re-elected.

Only a third of urban Indians have a favorable view of China. And those who say that China’s growing economic influence is bad for India are more likely to describe relations between the two countries as hostile.

There is little support among urban Indians for Iran (28%), and about half (52%) oppose Tehran obtaining nuclear weapons. Among those who oppose Iran acquiring nuclear arms, a 62%-majority favors tougher economic sanctions to prevent this possibility, and 69% believe it is important to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal even if that means taking military action.

Pakistan is a neuralgic concern for Indians. Just 13% of all Indians have a positive view of their neighbor. Nevertheless, seven-in-ten overall think it is important to improve relations, including through resolution of the Kashmir dispute (77%), increased trade (64%) and further negotiations (58%).

Notably, Indians and Pakistanis share an animosity toward each other. But both want their bilateral relations to improve.

These are among the key findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in 21 countries, including India. Interviews were conducted among 26,210 respondents worldwide, including 4,018 in India, from March 17 to April 20, 2012.

Also of Note

• Indians are divided in their views of 21^st-century life: 49% like the pace of modern life, while 52% complain that their traditional way of life is getting lost. Roughly eight-in-ten (79%) want to shield their traditional culture from globalization.
• Two of every three Indians believe most people can succeed if they are willing to work hard.
• About half of Indians (53%) surveyed believe that it is more important for Indian society that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without government interference rather than the state playing an active role in guaranteeing that nobody is in need (25%).
• Roughly six-in-ten Indians (61%) think most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some are rich and some are poor.

Special to CNN

Add faith in the work ethic and in capitalism to the lengthening list of casualties from the Great Recession. Four years after the Lehman Brothers’ fiasco and the ensuing global economic downturn, the idea that effort in a competitive economy can lead to success is seriously questioned in a number of major economies, including Japan, Russia and Greece, especially among those who have suffered the most.

In eight of 21 countries recently surveyed by the Pew Research Center, fewer than half believe hard work is a guarantee of success for most people. And in 11 of the 16 nations for which there is trend data since 2007, before the financial crisis began, support for capitalism is down. A notable exception is the United States, where 77 percent of the public still thinks that effort leads to accomplishment and 67 percent have confidence in free markets.

With worries mounting about a double dip global recession, attention has rightly focused on the potential human cost of such a renewed slump. But the low levels of belief that work leads to economic success, especially in a competitive economy, could imperil the rebound from any economic slowdown.

Read the full commentary at CNN’s Global Public Square blog

The economic mood is exceedingly glum all around the world. A median of just 27 percent think their national economy is doing well, according to a survey in 21 countries by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Only in China (83%), Germany (73%), Brazil (65%) and Turkey (57%) do most people report that current national economic conditions are good.

The public mood about the economy has worsened since 2008 in eight of 15 countries for which there is comparable data, while it is essentially unchanged in four others. The Chinese are the lone exception. They have been positive about their economy for the past decade.

Less than a third of Americans (31%) say the U.S. economy is doing well. That figure is up 13 percentage points from 2011. (But it is down 19 points from 2007, the year before the financial crunch began.) A median of just 16% of Europeans surveyed think their economy is performing up to par. That includes just 2% of the Greeks and 6% of the Spanish and Italians. Among Europeans, only the Germans (73%) give their economy a thumbs up. And just 7% of Japanese believe their economy is doing well.

People are, however, generally far more positive about their personal economic condition than they are about their nation’s economic situation. A median of 52 percent in the 21 nations surveyed feel satisfied with their own circumstances. Americans are twice as likely to say their family finances are in good shape as they are to say that the national economic situation is good. There are larger differences in Britain and Japan, where those who rate their personal economic situation as good exceed the number who have positive views of the national economy by more than four-to-one. Only the Chinese are significantly more likely to say the national economy is doing better than their families’ finances.

And there is some optimism that things will improve in the next 12 months, especially in Brazil (84%), China (83%) and Tunisia (75%). Nevertheless, pessimism about young peoples’ ability to do better than their parents is rampant, particularly in Europe (a median of only 9% think it will be easy) and Japan (10%). Again, the lone exception is China, where 57% say it will be easy for their children to become wealthier or to get a better job.

There is a striking contrast between the economic outlook in four of the emerging markets surveyed – Brazil, China, India and Turkey – and the European Union and the U.S. People living in these economies are generally more likely than Americans or Europeans to say that they are doing better than their parents. They are twice as likely as Americans and more than three times as likely as Europeans to think economic conditions in their countries are good. They are three times more likely than Europeans and more than twice as likely as Americans to say that they are financially better off compared with five years ago. And, while people in emerging markets also worry about the economic mobility of their children, they are four times more optimistic about the future for their kids than the Europeans and twice as optimistic as Americans.

In contrast, economic attitudes are particularly gloomy in the four nations polled in the Arab world. Only a third of those surveyed think they are better off than their parents at the same age. A median of only 30% say they are doing well financially. And a median of only 16% believe their children will have an easy time becoming economically better off than themselves.

Tough times have undermined the work ethic in a number of countries among people who are suffering economically. Those who say their personal finances are a mess are far less likely than those who are doing well to believe that most people succeed if they work hard.

The global economic crisis has eroded support for capitalism. In 11 of the 21 nations surveyed, half or fewer now agree with the statement that people are better off in a free market economy even though some people are rich and some are poor. And such backing is down in 9 of 16 nations with comparable data since 2007, before the Great Recession began. Such disenchantment is particularly acute in Italy (where support for a free market economy is down 23 percentage points), Spain (20 points) and Poland (15 points).

These are among the key findings from a new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in 21 countries among 26,210 respondents from March 17 to April 20, 2012.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

Broad Dissatisfaction with Country Direction and Economy

As of fall 2009, seven-in-ten (70%) Czechs were dissatisfied with the way things were going in their country. Roughly eight-in-ten (81%) described the current economic situation in the Czech Republic as somewhat or very bad, with many (32%) saying very bad.

Czech economic discontent is consistent with public sentiment throughout the region: majorities in all former Eastern bloc countries polled rated their current economic situation as bad. This view was particularly widespread in Hungary (94%), Lithuania (93%) and Ukraine (91%) while least common, but still prevalent, in Russia (68%) and Poland (59%).

Support for Free Markets

Despite its recent drop in economic growth and rise in unemployment and inflation, nearly eight-in-ten (79%) Czechs approved of the change from a state-controlled to a free market economy in the post-communist period. Of the other publics surveyed in the region, only east Germans (82%) rivaled Czechs in their support for free markets.

Czech enthusiasm for free markets is only slightly less widespread now than in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism. In a 1991 Times Mirror Center (the forerunner to the Pew Research Center) survey conducted just months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 87% of Czechs approved of the change to a capitalist economic system.

Support for free markets has also barely changed since the early 1990s in Russia (-4 percentage points), East Germany (-4 points) and Slovakia (-3 points). By contrast, capitalism is far less favored now in Hungary (-34 points), Lithuania (-26 points), Bulgaria (-20 points) and Ukraine (-16 points).

Still, Czechs are divided as to whether open markets have yet to deliver benefits to the average person. When asked to consider whether the economic situation for most people today is better, worse or about the same as it was under communism, 45% of Czechs said better while 39% said worse. Even so, the Czech Republic and Poland stand apart from other former communist states in that they were the only countries in which a plurality said people are better off today economically than under communism.

In another sign of Czech support for free markets, 63% agreed that people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people may be rich while others are poor; 33% disagreed. Only the Poles (70%) registered greater enthusiasm for free markets in general, though Slovaks (56%) and Russians (52%) were not far behind.

Dissatisfaction with Democracy and Politics in Practice

When asked to assess the current state of democracy in their country, roughly half (49%) in the Czech Republic said they were satisfied with how it was working while about half (49%) said they were dissatisfied. Among publics in the region, only Poles (53%) and Slovaks (50%) were generally as satisfied with democracy in their country, while discontent dominated in Lithuania (60% dissatisfied), Russia (61%), Ukraine (70%), Bulgaria (76%) and Hungary (77%).

But Czechs also saw a gap between most of the democratic values they embrace and the political realities in their country. Nearly eight-in-ten (78%) in the Czech Republic considered it very important to live in a country “where there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way.” Solid majorities of Czechs also said it is very important to reside in a country with a free media (66%) and multiparty elections (57%), while nearly half held the same view about freedom of speech (47%) and religion (46%). Slightly more than one-third (36%) said it is very important to live in a country “where the military is under the control of civilian leaders.”

However, fewer Czechs are convinced that their country embraces these democratic elements. For example, only 5% felt that the phrase “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” described their country very well. Similarly, only 17% thought that the phrase “the media is able to report the news without government censorship” described the Czech Republic very well.

The gap between what the Czechs want and have in terms of their electoral system is smaller. More than half (57%) said that it is very important to live in a country “with honest elections that are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties;” 48% felt that this described elections in their country very well.

Faith in the electoral system does not translate into faith in politicians. Few Czechs (18%) agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think,” down from 34% in 1991. Moreover, the European Union’s Eurobarometer surveys conducted from the fall of 2001 through the fall of 2009 show only 10-15% of Czechs placed trust in political parties.

The same set of Eurobarometer surveys show that Czech distrust extended to government as well as to political parties in recent years. However, trust in government increased after the spring 2009 collapse of the Czech ruling political coalition and subsequent formation of a non-partisan-led interim government. Between June 2009 and October 2009, Eurobarometer data show Czech trust in government rising from 28% to 37%.

 Commitment to Democracy

Despite concerns about politicians and about the current state of democracy more generally, most Czechs (80%) approved of the change from a one-party to a multiparty system that took place in the early 1990s. Elsewhere in the region, support for the political changes was also strong; majorities in all of the former Eastern European publics surveyed except Ukraine embraced the move to competitive politics. But, only the east Germans (85%) edged Czechs out in support of the move to a competitive election system.

Czech approval of the change to a multiparty system is as widespread now as in 1991 when 80% embraced competitive elections. Similarly, support for the political changes slightly increased in Poland (+4 percentage points) and remained steady in Slovakia (+1 point).

Enthusiasm for these political changes has dimmed substantially in Ukraine (-42 percentage points), Bulgaria (-24 points), Lithuania (-20 points) and Hungary (-18 points) and somewhat in East Germany (-6 points) and Russia (-8 points).

The Czech public also clearly felt that a democratic government is better able to solve their country’s problems (81%) than can a strong leader (15%). Slovaks (81%) were equally as convinced, while 56% held the same view in Poland. By contrast, majorities or pluralities in Ukraine (69%), Bulgaria (68%), Russia (60%), Hungary (49%), and Lithuania (49%) said that a strong leader is better able to solve their country’s problems.

Czechs trust that a system of competitive elections gives ordinary citizens an opportunity to influence what government does. Roughly six-in-ten Czechs (61%) agreed with the statement that “voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things.” Czech faith in the ability of elections to give voice to the people is nearly as common now as it was following the fall of the Berlin Wall (64%). Among the Eastern European nations surveyed in 2009, only Bulgarians (66%) are more convinced of the capacity of elections to give people influence over government.

A Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in fall 2009 finds that members of the post-communist generation, who are now between the ages of 18 and 39, offer much more positive evaluations of the political and economic changes their countries have undergone over the past two decades than do those who were adults when the Iron Curtain fell. The younger generation is also more individualistic and more likely to endorse a free market economy than are those who are age 40 or older.

Throughout 2010, the Pew Research Center will release a series of reports that explore the values, attitudes and behavior of America’s Millennial Generation, which first came of age around the time of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and played an important role in the election of President Barack Obama. The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project’s contribution to this project focuses on a somewhat different age group: the post-communist generation in the former Eastern bloc. The older members of this generation came of age as their countries began to transition away from communism toward democracy and capitalism, and its youngest members were just being born as communism was collapsing. Their political socialization has taken place under a context that is drastically different from that of their older peers, who came of age under totalitarian regimes.The former Eastern bloc publics were surveyed as part of a Pulse of Europe study that included 13 countries in Eastern and Western Europe as well as the United States.¹

The generation gap on attitudes about democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe reflects a divide between the past, present and future. Both young and old express concerns about the way things are going in their country, especially with regard to the economic situation. But while the older generation looks back longingly, often saying that people were better off financially under communism, the younger generation expresses more confidence that democracy can solve their countries’ problems. This is a hopeful sign for the future, as the post-communist generation becomes the next leaders and decision-makers in Eastern Europe.

Change to Democracy

The post-communist generation is generally more supportive than respondents age 40 and older of their countries’ move to a multiparty system. This generation gap is especially pronounced in Russia, where overall support for the political changes is lukewarm. More than six-in-ten (64%) Russians younger than age 40 approve of their country’s shift to a multiparty system; in contrast, just 45% of older Russians approve of the change to democracy.

A similar pattern is also evident in some countries where support for the change to a multiparty system is widespread. In Poland, where seven-in-ten approve of the change, there is a double-digit generation gap — 77% of those younger than age 40 support Poland’s change to democracy, compared with 66% of those age 40 or older. In the Czech Republic, 84% of those in the younger age group favor their country’s switch from a one-party system; 76% of those 40 or older agree. And in Slovakia, about three-quarters (77%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while 68% of older respondents share that view.

In Ukraine, where opinions about the change to democracy are negative among the young and the old, the post-communist generation expresses less negative views. About a quarter (26%) of Ukrainians who experienced communism as adults say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while a solid majority (64%) disapproves. Views are somewhat more balanced among the younger generation — 37% approve and 43% disapprove of Ukraine’s switch to a multiparty system; 21% do not offer an opinion.

Change to Capitalism

In every Eastern European country surveyed, the post-communist generation is much more supportive of the move away from a state-controlled economy than are those who lived as adults under communism. As is the case with opinions about the change to democracy, the generational divide is greatest in Russia; about six-in-ten (62%) Russians younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to capitalism, compared with just 40% of those in the older age group.

A double-digit gap also exists in Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland, and a smaller gap is evident in Lithuania and Hungary. In Ukraine, where the overall level of support for the change to a market economy is lower than in any other country surveyed (36% approve of the change), nearly half (47%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of the economic changes their country has undergone; just 28% of those 40 or older share that view.

How Most Have Fared Economically

The generational differences on opinions of the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe over the past two decades are reflected in views of how most people have fared under democracy and capitalism. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia, those younger than age 40 are much more likely than the older group to say the economic situation for most people in their country is now better than it was under communism.

In Poland and the Czech Republic, majorities of those younger than age 40 offer a positive assessment of how people in their country have fared economically: 53% and 54%, respectively, say most are now better off. Among those age 40 or older, however, views are more mixed. In Poland, virtually the same number in this age group say most people are better off now (42%) as say most are worse off (43%). In the Czech Republic, slightly more say the economic situation for most people is worse (45%) than say it is better (39%).

In Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary, the generational gap reflects mostly uncertainty among the younger group. While those who experienced communism as adults are significantly more likely than the post-communist generation to say that the economic situation for most people is now worse, a large share of those who are younger than 40 do not offer a response.

Have Ordinary People Benefited?

In six of the seven countries where the question was asked, fewer than half say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the fall of communism. And in five of the seven, this sentiment is shared by fewer than three-in-ten of those younger than 40 and those in the older age group. Yet, the post-communist generation offers somewhat more positive views than do their older peers.

In the Czech Republic, where a slim 53% majority says ordinary people have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, a more robust 64% majority of those younger than 40 say that is the case. In contrast, just 45% of older Czechs say average citizens have benefited from the changes that have taken place since communism collapsed.

Younger Poles are also considerably more likely than Poles who were adults when the Iron Curtain collapsed to say that ordinary people have benefited from the changes. About half (51%) of those younger than 40 say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, but just over a third (35%) of those 40 or older agree. And while few Slovaks across age groups believe that ordinary people have benefited from the changes since the end of communism, the post-communist generation is twice as likely as the older generation to have that opinion (28% vs. 14%).

Among younger and older respondents in the seven countries where this question was asked, more say that politicians and business owners have reaped benefits from the changes since the collapse of communism than say the same about ordinary people; solid majorities across age groups say the political and business elites have benefited a great deal or a fair amount.

Satisfaction With the Current State of Democracy

When asked to assess the current state of democracy in their countries, the post-communist generation expresses more positive views than does the older generation. That is especially the case in the Czech Republic and Poland, where overall satisfaction with how democracy is working is higher than in most of the eight countries where this question was asked. About six-in-ten Poles (62%) and Czechs (60%) younger than 40 say they are satisfied with the state of democracy in their country. Among those who are 40 or older, just under half in Poland (47%) and even fewer in the Czech Republic (42%) share this view.

Younger respondents in Lithuania and Russia are also more likely than those in the older age group to say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country by double-digit margins. In both countries, however, majorities among the post-communist generation express dissatisfaction. In Lithuania, 43% of respondents who were not adults or were not yet born when communism collapsed are satisfied with the state of democracy and 54% are dissatisfied; among those who were 20 or older when the Iron Curtain came down, just 29% express satisfaction, while nearly two-thirds (64%) offer a negative assessment of democracy in their country. A similar pattern is evident in Russia.

Yet, while the post-communist generation tends to offer more positive evaluations of the state of democracy in their countries, a generational gap is not evident when respondents are presented with a list of six key democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and a fair judiciary, and asked how well each describes their country.

Individualism

The post-communist generation also differs from older generations on the issue of an individual’s relationship to the state. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” those younger than 40 in all of the former Eastern bloc countries surveyed are more likely than those 40 or older to consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In Slovakia, where the public overall is much more likely to prioritize ensuring that no one is in need over individual rights, the post-communist generation is split — 48% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need and 46% say freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference is a higher priority. Those who are 40 or older are more than twice as likely to say that the state should provide a social safety net as they are to say that freedom from state interference is more important (68% vs. 27%).

Double-digit generational divides on individualism are also evident in most of the other Eastern European countries surveyed and in the former East Germany. For example, in the Czech Republic, more than half (56%) of those who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed say freedom from state interference is more important to them; 44% say guaranteeing no one is in need is a higher priority. Among Czechs who were adults in 1989, however, opinions are reversed — 56% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in guaranteeing that nobody is in need and 40% prioritize freedom from state interference.

Views of Free Markets

There is also a significant generation gap in nearly every former communist country surveyed when respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people may be rich while others are poor. In Russia, a solid majority (62%) of those who are younger than 40 agree that people are better off in a free market economy, while just 35% disagree. Among older Russians, however, 46% favor the free market approach and about the same number (49%) rejects the idea that free markets are better.

Even in some countries where both young and old have embraced the free market approach, more in the younger age group agree that people are better off in a free market economy. In the Czech Republic, for example, 68% of those younger than 40 favor the free market model, compared with 58% of those 40 or older. And in Slovakia, where a clear majority (61%) of the post-communist generation expresses support for free markets, a slim majority (52%) of those 40 or older share that view.

Support for Key Democratic Principles

When it comes to supporting democratic institutions and freedoms, however, the post-communist generation and those who are 40 or older tend to offer similar views. Looking across the six democratic values tested — freedom of speech, honest elections, a fair judiciary, a civilian-controlled military, freedom of the press and religious freedom — the generation gap in nearly all of the former communist countries polled is small. For example, a median of 54% of Czechs younger than 40 and 52% of those in the older age group rate these features of democracy as very important to them.

Only in Poland is there a significant gap in attitudes toward key democratic principles. A median of 56% of Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed consider these democratic values to be very important. By comparison, fewer than half (a median of 49%) among those who were adults when the Berlin Wall came down share that view. About the same median percentage of younger and older Poles agree that these features of democracy are at least somewhat important (93% and 90%, respectively).

Younger and older Poles are especially divided about the value of freedom of speech. More than half (56%) of Poles younger than 40 say it is very important to them to live in a country where they can openly say what they think and can criticize the government; 45% of those 40 or older agree. Younger Poles are also more like than those in the older age group to give high priority to honest multiparty elections (a gap of 8 percentage points), freedom of the press (7 points) and a civilian-controlled military (7 points).

There is also a generational split in Poland when respondents are asked whether a democratic form of government or a strong leader is better able to solve a country’s problems. More than six-in-ten (63%) Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed place more confidence in a democratic government, while 30% say a strong leader is better; among older Poles, a slim 51% majority choose a democratic government over a strong leader (39%). And while more Poles in both age groups would choose a strong economy over a good democracy, younger Poles value a good democracy more than do those who are 40 or older (41% vs. 33%).

The post-communist generation in Lithuania is also much more likely than older generations to say that a democratic government is better able than a strong leader to solve the country’s problems. About half (48%) of Lithuanians younger than 40 would choose democracy over a strong leader (43%); among older Lithuanians, 38% prefers a democratic government, while a majority (53%) say a strong leader would be more effective in solving the country’s problems.

The generational gap is somewhat less pronounced in other countries. For example, younger and older Czechs overwhelmingly prefer a democratic government over a strong leader when it comes to solving the country’s problems (84% and 79%, respectively), while strong majorities of Bulgarians younger than 40 (65%) and those 40 or older (71%) would choose a strong leader.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, publics of former Iron Curtain countries generally look back approvingly at the collapse of communism. Majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries endorse the emergence of multiparty systems and a free market economy.

However, the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly. In many nations, majorities or pluralities say that most people were better off under communism, and there is a widespread view that the business class and political leadership have benefited from the changes more than ordinary people. Nonetheless, self reported life satisfaction has risen significantly in these societies compared with nearly two decades ago when the Times Mirror Center¹ first studied public opinion in the former Eastern bloc.

The acceptance of — and appetite for — democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism. In contrast, Eastern Europeans, especially the Czechs and those in the former East Germany, are more accepting of the economic and societal upheavals of the past two decades. East Germans, in particular, overwhelmingly approve of the reunification of Germany, as do those living in what was West Germany. However, fewer east Germans now have very positive views of reunification than in mid-1991, when the benchmark surveys were conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. And now, as then, many of those living in east Germany believe that unification happened too quickly.

One of the most positive trends in Europe since the fall of the Wall is a decline in ethnic hostilities among the people of former communist countries. In a number of nations, fewer citizens say they hold unfavorable views of ethnic minorities than did so in 1991. Nonetheless, sizable percentages of people in former communist countries continue to have unfavorable views of minority groups and neighboring nationalities. The new poll also finds Western Europeans in a number of cases are at least as hostile toward minorities as are Eastern Europeans. In particular, many in the West, especially in Italy and Spain, hold unfavorable views of Muslims.

Concern about Russia is another sentiment shared by both Eastern and Western Europeans. A majority of the French (57%) and 46% of Germans say Russia is having a bad influence on their countries; this view is shared by most Poles (59%) and sizable minorities in most other Eastern European countries. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Ukraine, where on balance Russia’s influence is seen as more positive than negative.

As for the Russians themselves, there has been an upsurge in nationalist sentiment since the early 1990s. A majority of Russians (54%) agree with the statement Russia should be for Russians; just 26% agreed with that statement in 1991. Moreover, even as they embrace free market capitalism, fully 58% of Russians agree that it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exist. And nearly half (47%) say it is natural for Russia to have an empire.”

These are among the major findings of a new, 14-nation survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project that was conducted Aug. 27 through Sept. 24 among 14,760 adults. The survey, which includes nations in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the United States, reexamines many of the key issues first explored in the 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Varied Reactions to Democracy and Free Markets

While the current polling finds a broad endorsement for the demise of communism, reactions vary widely among and within countries. In east Germany and the Czech Republic, there is considerable support for the shift to both a multiparty system and a free market economy. The Poles and Slovaks rank next in terms of acceptance. In contrast, somewhat fewer Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Lithuanians say they favor the changes to the political and economic systems they have experienced, although majorities or pluralities endorse the changes. Ukraine is the only country included in the survey where more disapprove than approve of the changes to a multiparty system and market economy.

In Hungary, there is clear frustration with the current state of democracy, despite the public’s acceptance of the shift to a multiparty system. More than three-quarters of Hungarians (77%) are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. This may be due in part to an overwhelmingly dismal national mood: About nine-in-ten think the country is on the wrong track (91%) and that the economy is in bad shape (94%). Disenchantment with political elites is especially strong in Hungary, where only 38% believe voting gives them a say in politics. And even more than other publics included in the survey, Hungarians are frustrated by the gap between what they want from democracy — such as a free press, free speech and competitive elections — and what they believe they currently have.

Across virtually all of these former communist countries, with the notable exception of the former East Germany, the patterns of acceptance of political and economic changes mirror what was evident from the very start of the political and economic upheavals of two decades ago. Younger, better educated and urban people tend to be more accepting of changes and register greater gains in life satisfaction than do older people, the less well educated and those living in rural areas.

In Russia, for example, majorities of those younger than 50 years of age approve of the changes to a multiparty system and a free market system. But older people are far less approving; among those ages 65 and older, just 27% express positive views of each of these changes. Similar disparities in acceptance are evident by education in Russia and among most of the other former communist publics surveyed.

That is not the case, however, in the former East Germany, where both older and younger people — as well as the better educated and less educated — overwhelmingly endorse the political and economic changes they have experienced. And while about as many east Germans say their former country was overwhelmed and taken by West Germany as said this in 1991, an increasing proportion of east Germans say that reunification has improved their lives. Fully 63% of those questioned now say their lives are better as a result of unification; just 48% felt that way in 1991. Moreover, about eight-in-ten of those living in the former East Germany say they favor the unification of Germany. Those in the former West Germany are equally accepting of unification.

Life Gets Better Ratings

Opinions among east Germans about the impact of unification on their lives are consistent with one of the most striking trends observed in the new survey. People in former communist countries now rate their lives markedly higher than they did in 1991, when they were still coming to grips with the massive changes then taking place. This is true even in countries where overall levels of satisfaction with life — as well as positive assessments of political and economic changes — are significantly lower than in the most upbeat of the nations surveyed.

Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and east Germans report the most satisfaction with their lives and posted the greatest gains over the past two decades. Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians also judge their personal well-being much better than they once did, and they view their lives more positively than do Hungarians and Bulgarians. However, even those two downbeat publics show improvements in self-assessments of life compared with 1991.

While the current survey finds people in former communist countries feeling better about their lives than they did in 1991, the increases in personal progress have been uneven demographically, as has been acceptance of economic and political change. There are now wide age gaps in reports of life satisfaction. In Poland, for example, half of those younger than age 30 rate their lives highly, compared with just 29% of those ages 65 and older. These gaps were not evident in 1991, when all age groups expressed comparably negative views of their lives. The same pattern is evident among all of the former communist publics surveyed.

An urban-rural gap also is evident in life satisfaction in two principal republics of the former Soviet Union included in the poll — Russia and Ukraine — as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Ukraine, for example, 30% of urban dwellers express high satisfaction with their lives, compared with just 17% of those residing in rural areas. These disparities in reports of well-being were not apparent two decades ago. Then, on average, people were less happy, but there were no significant demographic differences in their opinions.

The demographic gaps in well-being among the publics of former Iron Curtain countries were suggested by reactions to the end of communism two decades ago. It was the young, the better educated and the urban populations who were cheering. How older, less well educated and rural people would adapt was then identified as one of the principal challenges to acceptance of democracy and capitalism. This remains the case, especially in Russia and Ukraine, where people who now rate their lives well voice the strongest support for democratic values, while those less satisfied are the least disposed to the new values.

Indeed, the prevailing view in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary is that people were better off economically under communism. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do pluralities believe that most people are now better off. Furthermore, the consensus in many of these countries is that ordinary people have benefited far less than have business owners and politicians.

Nonetheless, many people in former communist countries broadly endorse the free market economy. This is particularly the case in countries where sizable numbers of people rate their lives better than they did in surveys two decades ago. But in countries where people do not register as much progress since 1991, there is much less unanimity about the benefits of the free market.

Acceptance of Democratic Values

The survey also shows substantial differences in acceptance of democratic values among people in former communist countries. While majorities in most countries approve of the transition to a multiparty system, it remains a rocky transition in many countries. The appeal of a strong leader over a democratic form of government is evident in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former East Germany do most people believe that a democratic form of government is the best way to solve the country’s problems.

The embrace of political rights and civil liberties is also varied and disparate across countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On every dimension studied, more people say they value these rights and liberties than say they enjoy them.

A fair judiciary is the value most prized in the former communist countries surveyed. And in every country in the region, large numbers say that right does not prevail. Freedom of speech, a free press and even honest elections are given somewhat lower priority in most societies, especially Russia.

Frustrations with the democratic experience are clearly evident in a number of countries. In Hungary, relatively large numbers prize the ability to criticize the state and want press freedom and honest elections, but only small percentages say these conditions prevail. In Ukraine, where support for democracy is tenuous by many standards, very few say that honest elections or a fair judicial system describe their country well.

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the poll’s results suggests that Russians express the least enthusiasm for democratic values, while the most acceptance is expressed by those in the former East Germany, closely followed by the Poles and Czechs.

Corruption, Crime Concerns Widespread

There is a good deal of agreement across former Eastern bloc publics concerning the major problems facing their countries. As might be expected, large majorities express negative views of their economies, but this also is the case for Western Europeans and Americans. In fact, of the 14 publics included in the survey, the Poles render the most positive economic report: 38% describe their country’s economy as very or somewhat good.

Beyond the economy, crime, corruption and drugs are widely seen as major problems in each of the former communist countries surveyed. The environment, the poor quality of schools, and the spread of AIDS and other infectious disease are also common concerns in all countries.

Concerns about people leaving the country are especially high in the former East Germany, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Throughout Eastern Europe, people generally express more concern about emigration than immigration. However, relatively few Russians cite emigration as a major problem. The Russians express greater concern about terrorism than any other Eastern European public.

Views of Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts

Conflict among ethnic groups is viewed as a problem in several former communist countries, especially Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These tensions are reflected in the relatively large percentages that hold unfavorable opinions of minority groups within their countries. However, in almost all nations, less hostility is expressed toward most minority groups and other nationalities than in 1991.

The Roma, or Gypsies, continue to stand out as the most widely disliked ethnic group. More than eight-in-ten Czechs (84%) hold an unfavorable view of them, as do 78% of Slovaks and 69% of Hungarians. Many of the expressed antagonisms reflect historic enmity with neighboring peoples, or long-standing dislike of religious or ethnic minorities. In Hungary, 33% have an unfavorable opinion of Romanians, and 29% say they dislike Jews. Many Poles have a negative opinion of Russians (41%), Ukrainians (35%) and Jews (29%). A sizable number of Lithuanians hold unfavorable views of Poles (21%), but many more dislike Jews (37%). More than one-in-four Slovaks (27%) express a negative opinion of Jews.

Czechs are well liked in Slovakia and vice versa. However, Czechs and Slovaks have differing views of the breakup of Czechoslovakia — on balance, Slovaks think the split was a good thing by a margin of 49% to 39%; Czechs, by a margin of 53% to 40%, mostly think it was a bad idea.

Ukrainians have an overwhelmingly positive view of Russians living in their country (84%), but many fewer like Georgians (54%). A significant number of Russians (32%) have an unfavorable view of Ukrainians residing in Russia, but even more give Georgians a negative rating (53%).

Dislike of minority groups is not limited to Eastern Europeans. Roughly a quarter of the French have an unfavorable opinion of North Africans, which is comparable to negative opinions of Muslims in Britain (27%) and Turks in Germany (30%). In the West, Italians hold the most negative views toward minority groups — 69% say they dislike Muslims and 84% have negative views of the Roma. Negative views toward these two groups run high in Spain as well — 46% have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims and 45% say this about Roma.

Concerns About Russia

Views of Russia differ widely across the surveyed countries. Many of Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe see its influence as a bad thing, perhaps reflecting concern over resurgent nationalism in Russia.

Nearly six-in-ten Poles (59%) see Russia’s influence as negative, the highest percentage of any country in the region. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, pluralities see the Russian influence on their countries as a bad thing. In contrast, more Bulgarians and Ukrainians see Russia’s impact as positive than negative. In Western Europe, the balance of opinion is that Russian influence is negative, although many in Spain and Britain have no opinion on the subject.

Wider Values Divides

The long-existing transatlantic divide in attitudes toward the role of the state in society has grown over the past two decades. In nine of the 13 European countries surveyed, fewer people today than in 1991 think that people should be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state. Only in Britain and Italy have the proportions expressing this view increased. However, Italians and the British are still more supportive of an active role for the state in society than are Americans. The least support for a laissez-faire government is in Lithuania (17%) and in Bulgaria (23%).

Similarly, while Europeans are generally less fatalistic than they were in 1991, Americans remain far more individualistic than Europeans. Fewer than a third (29%) of Americans surveyed believe success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control. Majorities in 10 of the 13 European countries surveyed think they have little control over their fate. Publics in nine of the 13 European nations surveyed are more individualistic today than they were in 1991.

Views of the EU and NATO

European opinion of the European Union is generally good, but, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there is some evidence of disgruntlement. While two-thirds of the Spanish (67%) and more than six-in-ten Germans (63%) and Poles (63%) think their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only a slim majority (54%) of the French and a plurality of the Italians (47%) agree.

Frustration with the EU is greatest in Hungary, where only one-in-five people (20%) think their country’s membership has been a good thing and about seven-in-ten (71%) say their economy has been weakened by European economic integration. A strong majority of Bulgarians (63%), as well as 55% in France, 54% in Britain, and a plurality in Italy (41%) agree that their country has been weakened economically by integration.

British wariness of the Brussels-based European Union persists and could be worsening. The British are evenly split on whether membership in the European club is a good thing. And the proportion of the British population that thinks the EU has had a good influence on the way things are going in their country is lower in 2009 than in 2002. That is also the case in France and Italy.

Since the 1991 Times Mirror Center survey, the European Union has grown from 12 nations to 27. Support for further enlargement among the publics in the 11 EU member states surveyed is mixed. Large majorities favor Iceland’s EU membership within the next decade. And backing of Croatia’s application is almost as strong. Smaller majorities or pluralities in most countries also support membership ambitions by Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.

The weakest backing and the strongest opposition is for Turkey’s long-standing effort to join the union. Notably, in Germany, the EU’s richest member and long the paymaster of EU enlargement, majorities oppose EU membership not only for Turkey but also for Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine.

NATO, the transatlantic security organization that celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, draws favorable reviews in the 12 NATO member countries surveyed.

Notably, slightly more than half of Americans (53%) express a favorable opinion of NATO — the lowest percentage among NATO countries surveyed.

Finally, while NATO is committed to eventual membership for Ukraine, majorities in only three of the 12 NATO members surveyed support such inclusion in the next 10 years. About half of Ukrainians (51%) themselves actually oppose joining. Also, majorities in both Ukraine (51%) and Russia (58%) express unfavorable opinions of NATO.

Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany caused a stir at last weekend’s European Union summit in Brussels, warning his fellow leaders that they should not allow the current economic crisis to create “a new Iron Curtain” dividing the continent. Gyurcsany is hardly alone in thinking that the financial meltdown poses a serious challenge to European solidarity, and in particular, many observers are worried about the social and political stability of Eastern European nations, several of which have been hit especially hard by the crisis.

For instance, Forbes columnist and NYU professor Nouriel Roubini — widely lauded as one of the few people who saw the worldwide financial collapse coming — warns that the economic downturn may “even call into question the economic and political model Eastern European countries have followed since the 1990s.”

Survey research shows that in recent years support for the free-market system has been on the rise in Eastern Europe, especially in countries such as Poland that have enjoyed impressive economic growth. However, compared with other regions of the world — and in particular, compared with their Western European counterparts — Eastern Europeans embrace free markets somewhat tepidly.

A 47-nation 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that, among the seven major world regions included in the study, support for free markets was lowest in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Across the six Eastern European countries surveyed — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine — a median of 56% agreed with the statement “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.”

In contrast, a median of 69% of Western Europeans agreed. Support for free-market economics was highest in the world’s poorest region, Africa, where three-in-four said people are better off under capitalism, even if it does produce inequalities.

The poll revealed that support for the free market is especially strong among young people. Eastern Europeans who have spent most of their lives in a capitalist system are more likely to believe such a system is good for society, but support is markedly lower among older people in the region.

The survey also showed that beliefs about the free market are often tied to how people feel about their own lives — those whose lives were improving under capitalism were more likely to support it. This suggests the economic crisis could have some troubling implications for public opinion in the former Eastern Bloc: If the region’s economic situation continues to deteriorate, it could dramatically affect people’s sense of personal progress, and potentially weaken their enthusiasm for the capitalist system they have come to know over the last two decades.

Poles, Ukrainians More Supportive of Free Markets

While support for free-market economics tends to be lower in Eastern Europe than in other parts of the globe, it is not uniformly low in the region. For example, in the 2007 survey, 68% of Poles endorsed free markets, up from 44% in 2002.

In 2007, roughly two-thirds (66%) backed free markets in Ukraine, a nation that has enjoyed rapid economic growth over the last few years. However, the Ukrainian economy has suffered severely in recent months, forcing the country to seek emergency funds from the IMF.

In the other four Eastern European countries surveyed, fewer than six-in-ten said most people are better off under capitalism. In Bulgaria, less than half (42%) held this view, although even this was a significant increase from 2002, when only 31% took this position. Meanwhile, France (56%) was the only Western European country surveyed in which fewer than six-in-ten said most people benefit from a free market system.

Capitalism Embraced by Younger Eastern Europeans

In five of the six Eastern European countries surveyed, support for free markets was strongest among young people. Having lived their entire adult lives in a post-communist era, people under age 35 were consistently more likely to agree that free markets are good, even if they produce inequalities. On the other hand, those age 55 and older, who were well into adulthood when the Berlin Wall fell, were generally the least likely to agree.

This pattern is clearest in Bulgaria, where 63% of 18-34 year-olds said people are better off under free markets, compared with 47% of 35-54 year-olds and just 19% of those 55 and older. Similarly, 62% of younger Slovakians back a capitalist system, compared with 54% of 35-54 year-olds and 39% of people 55 and over. The Czech Republic is the only country in the region where younger people are not more likely than others to endorse free markets.

Those Who Have Benefited Are More Supportive of Free Markets

In the four Eastern European nations where enthusiasm for free markets is lowest — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia — support is also tied to perceptions of personal progress. Respondents to the survey were asked to rate both their current lives and their lives five years earlier on a 0-10 scale. People who rated their current lives higher than their lives five years before — those who had essentially “made progress” — were more supportive of free markets than were those whose quality of life had stayed the same or lost ground.

Once again, Bulgaria is the clearest example of this pattern. Among Bulgarians whose lives had improved, 60% agreed that people are better off in a free-market system, while 35% disagreed. Bulgarians whose lives had stayed the same were divided — 42% agreed and 43% disagreed. Among those who had lost ground, only about one-third (32%) agreed, while a majority (55%) disagreed.

Similar, although less pronounced, patterns were found in the Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia. In Poland and Ukraine, the two countries in the region with the most enthusiasm for free markets, this pattern did not appear.