Special to Spiegel Online

The euro crisis has exposed a range of intra-European problems long hidden from the harsh light of day. Not the least of these is German exceptionalism. Over the last two generations one goal of the European project has been to narrow the differences between Germany and the rest of Europe. But recent economic difficulties have only amplified those dissimilarities.

The contrast between German sentiment today and that of other Europeans could not be more stark, according to a new Pew Research Center survey of eight European Union nations. Germans feel better than others about the economy (by 66 points over the EU median), about their personal finances (by 26 points), about the future (by 12 points), about the European Union (by 17 points), about European economic integration (by 28 points) and about their own leadership (by 48 points). And in some cases – in their attitudes about the economy and about the EU – these differences between German and other European sentiment are growing.

Such German exceptionalism may only complicate Europe’s efforts to deal with its current troubles because Germans have different concerns, different priorities and favor different solutions.

High Hopes for the Economy

Not surprisingly given Germany’s relatively good overall economic performance in the last year, the economy and Germans’ sentiment about economic issues is what most prominently sets them apart from other Europeans. Three-quarters (75 percent) of the German population thinks their national economy is doing well, compared with nine percent in the rest of Europe who feel good about domestic economic conditions.

Germans are also less concerned about individual economic problems than are other Europeans. Just 28 percent of Germans think the lack of employment opportunities is a very big problem compared with a median of 80 percent in other EU nations. Only 37 percent of Germans fret about public debt. Fully 71 percent of their fellow Europeans are very concerned. And 31 percent of Germans are very worried about inflation, while 68 percent of others are.

What Germans (51 percent) are most worried about is the growing gap between the rich and the poor. They want fixing this problem to be the Berlin government’s priority economic concern. No other European people place such an emphasis on reducing inequality.

Calls for a Stronger Europe

It is the growing gulf between Germans’ perception of the European Union and the sentiment of other Europeans that may pose the greatest threat to the European Project.

Belief that economic integration would strengthen national economies was the founding principle of what became the European Union. And 54 percent of Germans still hold to that belief. In no other European country does a majority now agree.

Similarly, 60 percent of Germans look favorably on the European Union as an institution. While such positive sentiment is down eight points in Germany since 2007, that decline is the smallest of any nation surveyed. Moreover, about half of the Germans (51 percent) would like to see Brussels have more decision-making power to deal with Europe’s economic woes. Nowhere else in Europe is the public so supportive of centralizing more power in the European Union.

Cultural Bias Clash

If anything, the euro crisis has only reinforced cultural stereotypes that other Europeans have about Germans and that Germans have about their fellow Europeans.

The prominent role Germany has played in Europe’s response to the euro crisis has evoked decidedly mixed emotions. In six of the eight nations surveyed people see the Germans as the least compassionate people in Europe. And publics in five of the eight countries think Germans are the most arrogant.

In the wake of the strict austerity measures imposed in Greece, which many Greeks blame on Berlin, Greek enmity toward the Germans knows little bound. Greeks consider the Germans to be the least trustworthy, the most arrogant and the least compassionate.

At the same time, in every country, except Greece, people consider Germans to be the most trustworthy. This comports with the 2012 Pew Research finding that most other Europeans thought the Germans were the hardest working and the least corrupt of Europeans.

No Room for Self-Doubts

The Germans bear their own preconceptions that separate them from their neighbors. They think the Greeks and the Italians are the least trustworthy, that the French are the most arrogant and that the British are the least compassionate.

Self-criticism is also in short supply. Germans, like every other nationality surveyed, see themselves as the most compassionate people in Europe. They also see themselves as the least arrogant and the most trustworthy.

Germany’s economic dynamism, its geographic centrality and its history have long posed problems for Europe. And now it is the exceptionalism of German public opinion that is a challenge. As Europeans struggle to jointly overcome the euro crisis, the burgeoning differences between German attitudes and those held by people in the rest of Europe complicate the quest for common ground in the face of Europe’s current existential threat.

The European Union is the new sick man of Europe. The effort over the past half century to create a more united Europe is now the principal casualty of the euro crisis. The European project now stands in disrepute across much of Europe.

Support for European economic integration – the 1957 raison d’etre for creating the European Economic Community, the European Union’s predecessor – is down over last year in five of the eight European Union countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center in 2013. Positive views of the European Union are at or near their low point in most EU nations, even among the young, the hope for the EU’s future. The favorability of the EU has fallen from a median of 60% in 2012 to 45% in 2013. And only in Germany does at least half the public back giving more power to Brussels to deal with the current economic crisis.

The sick man label – attributed originally to Russian Czar Nicholas I in his description of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-19th century – has more recently been applied at different times over the past decade and a half to Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece and France. But this fascination with the crisis country of the moment has masked a broader phenomenon: the erosion of Europeans’ faith in the animating principles that have driven so much of what they have accomplished internally.

The prolonged economic crisis has created centrifugal forces that are pulling European public opinion apart, separating the French from the Germans and the Germans from everyone else. The southern nations of Spain, Italy and Greece are becoming ever more estranged as evidenced by their frustration with Brussels, Berlin and the perceived unfairness of the economic system.

These negative sentiments are driven, in part, by the public’s generally glum mood about economic conditions and could well turn around if the European economy picks up. But Europe’s economic fortunes have worsened in the past year, and prospects for a rapid turnaround remain elusive. The International Monetary Fund expects the European Union economy to not grow at all in 2013 and to still be performing below its pre-crisis average in 2018. Nevertheless, despite the vocal political debate about austerity, a clear majority in five of eight countries surveyed still think the best way to solve their country’s economic problems is to cut government spending, not spend more money.

These are among the key findings of a new study by the Pew Research Center conducted in eight European Union nations among 7,646 respondents from March 2 to March 27, 2013.

A Dyspeptic France

No European country is becoming more dispirited and disillusioned faster than France. In just the past year, the public mood has soured dramatically across the board. The French are negative about the economy, with 91% saying it is doing badly, up 10 percentage points since 2012. They are negative about their leadership: 67% think President Francois Hollande is doing a lousy job handling the challenges posed by the economic crisis, a criticism of the president that is 24 points worse than that of his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy. The French are also beginning to doubt their commitment to the European project, with 77% believing European economic integration has made things worse for France, an increase of 14 points since last year. And 58% now have a bad impression of the European Union as an institution, up 18 points from 2012.

Even more dramatically, French attitudes have sharply diverged from German public opinion on a range of issues since the beginning of the euro crisis. Differences in opinion across the Rhine have long existed. But the French public mood is now looking less like that in Germany and more like that in the southern peripheral nations of Spain, Italy and Greece.

Positive assessment of the economy in France have fallen by more than half since before the crisis and is now comparable to that in the south. The French share similar worries about inflation and unemployment with the Spanish, the Italians and the Greeks at levels of concern not held by the Germans. Only the Greeks and Italians have less belief in the benefits of economic union than do the French. The French now have less faith in the European Union as an institution than do the Italians or the Spanish. And the French, like their southern European compatriots, have lost confidence in their elected leader.

Disillusionment with Elected Leaders

Compounding their doubts about the Brussels-based European Union, Europeans are losing faith in the capacity of their own national leaders to cope with the economy’s woes. In most countries surveyed, fewer people today than a year ago think their national executive is doing a good job dealing with the euro crisis. This includes just 25% of the public in Italy, where the sitting Prime Minister Mario Monti was voted out while this survey was being conducted. Even the Germans, who overwhelmingly back their Chancellor Angela Merkel, are slightly more judgmental of her handling of Europe’s economic challenges than they were last year. And Merkel faces the voters in an election in September 2013.

Nevertheless, Merkel remains the most popular leader in Europe, by a wide margin. She enjoys majority approval for her handling of the European economic crisis in five of the eight nations surveyed. But in Greece (88%) and Spain (57%), majorities now say she has done a bad job, as do half (50%) of those surveyed in Italy.

Economic Gloom

Most Europeans are profoundly concerned about the state of their economies. Just 1% of the Greeks, 3% of the Italians, 4% of the Spanish and 9% of the French think economic conditions are good. Only the Germans (75%) are pleased with their economy.

And the economic mood has worsened appreciably since before the euro crisis began. Positive sentiment is down 61 percentage points in Spain, 54 points in Britain, 22 points in Italy and 21 points in both the Czech Republic and France.

But despair about the economy may have bottomed out in some nations since 2012. Sentiment seems to have stabilized in the Czech Republic and Poland. And the mood can’t get much worse in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Most Europeans are almost as gloomy about the future. Just 11% of the French, 14% of the Greeks and Poles, and 15% of the Czechs think that their national economic situation will improve over the next 12 months.

A median of 78% in the eight countries surveyed say a lack of jobs is a very big problem in their country. And a median of 71% cite the public debt. Except in Germany, overwhelming majorities in many countries say unemployment, the public debt, rising prices and the gap between the rich and the poor are very important problems. Unemployment is the number one worry in seven of the eight countries. Inequality is the principle concern in Germany.

Apprehension about economic mobility and inequality is also widespread. Across the eight nations polled, a median of 66%, including 90% of the French, think children today will be worse off financially than their parents when they grow up. A median of 77% believe that the economic system generally favors the wealthy. This includes 95% of the Greeks, 89% of the Spanish and 86% of the Italians. A median of 60% think the gap between the rich and the poor is a very big problem; that sentiment is felt by 84% of the Greeks and 75% of both the Italians and the Spanish. And a median of 85% say such inequality has increased in the past five years, a concern particularly prevalent among the Spanish (90%).

Absolute economic deprivation has long been less of an issue in Europe than in some other countries, thanks to the relatively robust European social safety net. But in the wake of economic hard times, deprivation in France is on the rise, where roughly one-in-five say they could not afford food, health care or clothing at some point in the past year.

The Southern Challenge

The euro crisis has created a southern challenge for the European Union. Spain, Italy and Greece have suffered greatly during the economic downturn. And the public mood in these countries is extremely bleak in both absolute and relative terms.

More than seven-in-ten Spanish (79%) and Greeks (72%) say economic conditions are very bad. A majority of Italians (58%) say the same. This compares with a median of 28% for the rest of Europe. More than nine-in-ten in Greece (99%), Italy (97%) and Spain (94%) think the lack of employment opportunities is a very big problem (official unemployment in January 2013 was 27.2% in Greece and in March 2013 was 26.7% in Spain and 11.5% in Italy). Fully 94% of Greeks, 84% of Italians and 69% of Spanish complain that inflation also poses a very big challenge. This compares with a median of 58% elsewhere. And roughly seven-in-ten or more in all three countries fault their leader’s handing of the economic crisis.

Such economic gloom has fed disgruntlement with the European Union. In Greece, 78% now believe that economic integration has weakened the Greek economy, a sentiment about their economy shared by 75% of the Italians and 60% of the Spanish. As a result, nearly two-thirds (65%) of Greeks and about half (52%) of the Spanish have an unfavorable view of the EU. This compares with medians of 59% who question integration and 48% who take a critical view of the EU in the other five countries surveyed.

Concern about inequality is widespread throughout Europe, particularly in the south. A view that the economic system generally favors the wealthy is shared by 95% of the Greeks, 89% of the Spanish and 86% of the Italians. Such frustration exceeds the median of 72% in the other five nations surveyed. Similarly, 84% of the Greeks and 75% of the Italians and Spanish say the gap between the rich and the poor is a very big problem. That compares with a median of just 54% of the Europeans surveyed outside the region who hold such critical views.

So What to Do about the Euro Crisis?

When asked which of the economic challenges facing their countries their government should address first, people in seven of the eight nations choose the lack of employment opportunities. A median of 57% first want their elected leaders to create more jobs. And employment is a particular priority in Spain (72%), Italy (64%) and the Czech Republic (64%).

Europeans are of two minds about public debt, which has been at the center of the debate over the euro crisis since it began. A majority in six of the eight countries surveyed consider debt a very big problem. When pressed to choose between reducing public expenditures and more spending, most publics choose the former, even in Spain (67%) and Italy (59%), despite the fact that people there have already experienced cutbacks in government spending, economic contraction and record high unemployment. Across Europe a median of 59% believe that reducing public debt is the best way to solve their country’s economic problems. But a median of only 17% think debt reduction should be their government’s number one economic priority.

Some Good News

Despite rising disillusionment with the European project, the euro, the common currency for 17 of the 27 European Union members, remains in public favor. More than six-in-ten people want to keep the euro as their currency in Greece (69%), Spain (67%), Germany (66%), Italy (64%) and France (63%). And support for the euro has actually increased in Italy and Spain since last year.

Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that only 26% of the British public think being a member of the European Union has been good for their economy and just 43% hold positive views of the European Union, the British, who will hold a referendum on continued EU membership in 2017, remain evenly divided on leaving the EU: 46% say stay and 46% say go.

Differences Abound

Overall, the 2013 survey highlights more starkly than ever the differences between the views of Germans and other Europeans on a range of issues. And it underscores that, in some cases, those differences are growing. Germans feel better than others about the economy (by 66 points over the EU median), about their personal finances (by 26 points), about the future (by 12 points), about the European Union (by 17 points), about European economic integration (by 28 points) and about their own elected leadership (by 48 points).

And the survey contradicts oft-repeated narratives about the Germans: that they are paranoid about inflation, disinclined to bail out their fellow Europeans and debt-obsessed. To the contrary, Germans are among the least likely of those surveyed to see inflation as a very big problem and the most likely among the richer European nations to be willing to provide financial assistance to other European Union countries that have major financial problems. And while Germans are worried about public debt, they are more concerned about inequality and equally concerned about unemployment.

The prominent role Germans have played in Europe’s response to the euro crisis has evoked decidedly mixed emotions from their fellow Europeans. In every country except Greece, people consider Germans the most trustworthy. At the same time, in six of the eight nations surveyed, people see the Germans as the least compassionate. And in five of the eight, they are considered the most arrogant. In the wake of the strict austerity measures imposed in Greece, Greek enmity toward the Germans knows little bound. Greeks consider the Germans to be the least trustworthy, the most arrogant and the least compassionate. But the Greeks themselves do not fare that well. They are considered the least trustworthy by the French, the Germans and the Czechs.

Special to BBC News

A political, economic and demographic divide has opened up between France and Germany. And, if that were not trouble enough, a new Pew Research Center survey suggests that these two countries, which have for decades been the driving force behind European integration, increasingly see the world through different lenses.

The Franco-German alliance was based on rough equality between these two continental powers. In the 1980s, West Germany’s economy and population were slightly larger than France’s, but not overwhelmingly so, and French economic growth actually exceeded its neighbour’s.

Three decades later, this rough balance between Germany and France no longer exists. Germany’s population is now a quarter larger than that of France, the German economy is 38% bigger. And while the German economy grew at an admittedly weak 0.9% in 2012, the French economy did not grow at all.

The demographic and economic decoupling of Germany and France is now complicated by a widening gap in French and German public opinion – and a convergence of French attitudes with those in southern Europe.

Today the French and the Germans differ so greatly over the challenges facing their economies that they look as if they live on different continents, not within a single European market.

Eight out of 10 French people say unemployment is a very big problem compared with less than three out of 10 Germans. More than two-thirds of the French think inflation is a major issue, less than a third of Germans are similarly worried about rising prices. And 71% of the French are very troubled about public debt. Only 37% of the Germans share such concern.

More important for the future of the European Union, in 2009, 43% of the French were of the view that European economic integration had strengthened the French economy. At the same time, 50% of Germans thought integration had benefited Germany, a seven-percentage-point difference. Today, the figures for France and Germany are 22% and 54% respectively – a difference of a full 32 points.

The French and Germans have also parted ways in their views of the European Union as an institution. In 2007, before the euro crisis, 62% of the French and 68% of the Germans had a favourable opinion of it. In 2013, just 41% of the French still hold the EU in high regard, while 60% of the Germans do. A six-point gap in attitudes has grown to a 19-point gap in just a half dozen years.

These figures suggest that the French are now even more eurosceptic than the British, 26% of whom say European economic integration has strengthened the British economy, and 43% of whom have a favourable opinion of the EU.

Meanwhile, the French think more and more like southern Europeans.

As in France, more than three-quarters of Greeks and Italians believe economic integration has been bad for their country, and more than half of Spanish and Greeks look unfavourably on the EU.

Roughly nine out of 10 French say their economy is doing poorly, as do a similar proportion of Spanish, Italians and Greeks. Two-thirds or more of people in all four countries believe their elected leader has done a bad job handling the economic crisis.

And by all of these indicators French attitudes have worsened dramatically since 2007, much as has sentiment in Spain and Italy.

Roughly one in five French people say they could not afford food, health care or clothing at some point in the past year. And only 11% of the French think their economy will improve over the next 12 months. This makes the French among the most pessimistic of Europeans. Just 9% think their children will be better off financially than their parents, by far the gloomiest forecast for the next generation of the eight countries surveyed.

For the last generation, at least, the Franco-German alliance has been the motor driving every effort to broaden and deepen the European Union. Few observers believe that political union, or even more extensive economic integration, is possible in the absence of strong joint leadership by Paris and Berlin.

This new evidence of a dramatic divergence of public opinion across the Rhine on the problems now facing Europe and the merit of the European Union itself raises new questions about prospects for the European Project.

Special to Reuters

The long-discussed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union was formally endorsed by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address to Congress. Obama asserted that “trade that is fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” A prominent presidential endorsement will not prevent a long and disputatious negotiation, but a trade pact could yield potentially huge economic rewards — and also provoke serious political opposition on both sides.

A U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has been talked about for two decades but never actively pursued. On both sides of the Atlantic, there has been fear that any such deal between the world’s two largest economies would disadvantage poorer nations. A U.S.-EU accord was deemed less desirable because greater economic benefits could be gained from a global trade agreement involving more countries. Trade experts worried that it would undermine the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization. Moreover, based on past bitter disputes over frozen chickens, bananas, genetically modified organisms and other food and agricultural products, a U.S.-European Union agreement was deemed too politically fraught and difficult.

Now, with Europe in recession, the United States unemployment rate stubbornly high and both regions groaning under public indebtedness, Brussels and Washington are looking for ways to stimulate jobs and growth without spending money. Liberalization of trade and investment is seen as one way to do that.

In addition, in the wake of the failed Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, a U.S.-EU deal is thought to pose little immediate threat to the WTO because there is no comprehensive global trade deal in the offing any time soon. Moreover, the rising competitive challenge from China has increased the incentive for both Europe and America to develop common technical and regulatory standards for a $30 trillion transatlantic market to ensure that Western-style capitalism, not Chinese state capitalism, remains the global norm.

Publics on both sides of the Atlantic appear to be receptive to the idea.

The virulent European anti-Americanism of the last decade — owing to European opposition to the Iraq war and the policies of U.S. President George W. Bush — is ancient history. More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the French had a favorable view of the United States in 2012, compared with 42 percent in 2008, the last year of the Bush administration, according to Pew Research Center surveys. Fifty-two percent of Germans held a positive opinion of America, compared with 31 percent four years earlier. And 58 percent of the Spanish were favorably disposed toward the United States, much greater than the 33 percent who held such views in 2008.

There has been a similar, if less robust, rebound in American response to the European Union. In 2012, half the country had a favorable view of the EU, compared with only 39 percent at the nadir in 2004.

Moreover, contrary to the widespread assumption that protectionist sentiments are rising in the wake of the Great Recession, 58 percent of Americans say they support increased trade with the EU. The same feeling exists across the Atlantic. Three-quarters of the Italians, nearly two-thirds of the British (65 percent) and more than half of the French (58 percent) and Germans (57 percent) believe in deepening trade and investment ties between the European Union and the United States; 63 percent of Americans agree, according to a 2007 German Marshall Fund survey.

There is also strong support for one of the thorniest challenges that lie ahead: harmonization or mutual recognition of national regulations on goods and services, everything from food standards to insurance. Overwhelmingly Italians (87 percent), British (84 percent), French (82 percent), Americans (76 percent) and Germans (71 percent) support such efforts, according to the Marshall Fund survey.

European backing may reflect a half century of experience aligning regulations while building the European Union. American enthusiasm may reflect a lack of appreciation of just how arduous that can be.

The removal of all remaining tariffs on goods traded between Europe and the United States, traditionally the core of any trade and investment agreement, has strong, if slightly less enthusiastic support, on both sides of the Atlantic. Fully 70 percent of the British and Italians, 65 percent of the Poles and 54 percent of the Germans back such an effort, according to the GMF survey. Roughly half of the French (50 percent) and Americans (48 percent) agree.

Despite this seeming goodwill, negotiating a deal in the current political environment will not be easy. Publics and their elected leaders are domestically preoccupied. In some nations, protectionism and nationalism seem to be on the rise.

Once actual trade and investment negotiations finally get under way, the bargaining is likely to be challenging. If history is any guide, inevitable frictions will erode public support as adversely affected interests complain, while those that stand to benefit are less vocal. So the ultimate public verdict on a U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has yet to be rendered.

But on the eve of such negotiations, both Americans and Europeans seem disposed to try.

Special to New America Foundation

The recent deliberations in Washington about the fiscal cliff have triggered a national debate in the United States about the nature, extent and future sustainability of key elements of the U.S. social safety net: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, support for education, the unemployed and the poor. In the effort to tame the federal debt, cuts in spending on these social services have been a major part of the discussion – calling into question the social contract established with the American people during the Great Depression through the creation of public pensions and in the 1960s with the launching of limited government-provided health insurance.

America was a latecomer to the provision of many such social services. Germany put in place health and old age insurance in the 1880s. The United Kingdom instituted national health insurance after World War II. The benefits provided by the U.S. government cover a far smaller portion of the American population and are far less generous than those afforded to the citizens of other high-income nations.

In 2012 the United States spent an estimated 19.4% of GDP on such social expenditures, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Paris-based industrial country think tank. Denmark spent 30.5%, Sweden 28.2% and Germany 26.3%. All of these nations have a lower central government debt to GDP ratio than that of the United States.

Why the United States invests relatively less in its social safety net than many other countries and why those expenditures are even at risk in the current debate over debt reduction reflect Americans’ conflicted, partisan and often contradictory views on fairness, inequality, the role and responsibility of government and individuals in society and the efficacy of government action.

Rooted in value differences, not just policy differences, the debate over the U.S. social contract is likely to go on long after the fiscal cliff issue has been resolved.

Click here to read the full paper

By Bruce Stokes, Director of Pew Global Economic Attitudes, Pew Research Center

Special to EuropeanVoice

The year ahead promises both challenges and opportunities for transatlantic relations. Afghanistan and Syria pose new tests for NATO. The looming confrontation with Iran over its nuclear weapons programme could fray the Alliance’s solidarity. But 2013 may also be the year that Washington and Brussels begin the integration of the world’s two largest economies. The next 12 months could prove to be consequential for both security and economic ties between Europe and the United States.

After two decades of talking about it, the European Union and the US may finally launch free-trade negotiations this year. More than half (58%) of the American public thinks that increased trade with the European Union would be good for the United States, according to a Pew Research Center survey, confirming earlier findings in both Europe and the US by the German Marshall Fund. And an EU-US deal would actually prove more beneficial to the US than the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement that it is currently pursuing in Asia, according to separate studies by the European Centre for International Political Economy in Brussels and the Peterson Institute in Washington.

So the politics and the economics of such an accord seem aligned. On the security side, however, there are challenges ahead.

Both Pew and GMF surveys show that Americans and Europeans continue to back NATO, but they want out of Afghanistan, currently a joint US-European military operation. How that disengagement is managed may shape future public support for NATO.

The future European and American role in the Syrian quagmire may also test transatlantic co-operation. Publics on both sides of the Atlantic are clear; they do not want their governments to get involved. More than three in five (63%) Americans say Uncle Sam has no responsibility to do anything in Syria, according to a recent Pew survey. And an earlier GMF poll found 59% of Europeans said, stay out of Syria completely. How European and American governments square their interest in stability in the region with their public’s antipathy for involvement in yet another war could prove a serious challenge.

Iran could also trouble transatlantic cohesion. Europe and the United States have worked closely in ratcheting up economic sanctions on Tehran in recent years. But the day of reckoning on the Iranian nuclear-weapons programme may come this year.

More than half (56%) of Americans want the Obama administration to take a firm stand against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, according to a recent Pew survey. And only 28% of Americans who oppose Iran’s nuclear programme are willing to accept a nuclear armed Iran. Significantly more French (48%), Germans (41%) and British (40%) would tolerate Tehran having nuclear weapons. The US president, Barack Obama, has ruled out containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The American public seems to agree; the European public is less convinced.

Complicating all these challenges are the domestic diversions facing both Europe and the US. The eurozone crisis will continue to absorb the time and energies of European leaders, while diverting public attention and complicating almost all governmental initiatives. On the other side of the Atlantic, the American public is increasingly isolationist: 83% say the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and more attention to problems at home. Such sentiment has grown by ten percentage points in the past decade.

European leaders have long fretted about Washington’s declining engagement with Brussels. But the issues confronting the transatlantic relationship in 2013 suggest a possible re-engagement on a range of issues. How those challenges get resolved and if those opportunities are realised could determine the trajectory of US-European relations for years to come.

Europeans generally reacted to President Obama’s re-election with a mixture of excitement and relief, just as they did four years ago. For many across the Atlantic, Obama’s 2008 victory signaled the end of the Bush-era estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies, and the emergence of an America that would see the world a lot like Europeans do. However, despite Obama’s re-election at home and continued popularity in Europe, his presidency has not closed the long-running transatlantic values gap. Instead, on issues such as the use of military force, religion, and individualism, Americans and Europeans continue to disagree.

Obama has been popular in Europe since he toured the Continent as a presidential contender. Following George W. Bush’s two terms in office, Europeans immediately embraced Obama’s presidency. A stunning 93% of Germans expressed confidence in Obama in the early months of his first term, compared with just 14% for Bush during his final year in office. In Britain, France, and Spain, the new American president also received stratospheric ratings.

The result was a dramatic “Obama effect” on attitudes toward the U.S. In France, for instance, America’s favorability rating soared from 42% in 2008 to 75% in 2009. And importantly, support for American policies grew, especially support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The enthusiasm that greeted Obama’s election has waned a bit over time, even in Europe, but vestiges of “Obamamania” remain. The 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found at least eight-in-ten expressing confidence in the U.S. president in Germany, France, and Britain.

However, while the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded, the “values gap” between Americans and Europeans is alive and well. Polls consistently find a transatlantic divide when it comes to fundamental beliefs on a variety of political and cultural issues. Americans and Europeans view each other with less hostility today, but they still don’t see the world in the same way.

Take the issue of military force. Americans remain more inclined than Europeans to say it’s necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Meanwhile, they are significantly less likely than Europeans to believe that getting UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with international threats. America’s willingness to “go it alone” in world affairs has become an ingrained piece of the country’s international image – and it hasn’t changed much in the Obama years. Majorities across Europe continue to see the U.S. as acting unilaterally, not taking into account the interests of other nations when making foreign policy.

The Obama administration’s use of drone strikes illustrates the divide over hard power. About six-in-ten Americans – including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents – approve of U.S. drone attacks against extremist leaders and organizations in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But in seven of the eight EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2012, more than half oppose these strikes, including nine-in-ten Greeks and 76% in Spain. The lone exception is the British, who are almost evenly divided on this issue.

Religion is another topic where Americans and Europeans hold very different views. In largely secular Western European nations such as Spain, Germany, Britain, and France, less than a quarter consider religion very important to their lives. Even in Poland, where Catholicism still plays an important role in public life, only 27% say religion is very important. By contrast, fully half of Americans hold this view. Similarly, solid majorities in the six EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2011 said you do not have to believe in God to be a moral person, but only 46% of Americans felt this way.

The same 2011 poll asked Christians from the U.S. and eight European nations whether they identify first with their nationality or their religion. Americans were evenly split: 46% said they think of themselves first as Americans and 46% as Christians. In seven of the eight European countries, a majority of Christians identified primarily with their nationality. Only 8% of French Christians, for example, said they thought of themselves first as Christians.

Individualism also continues to differentiate Americans and Europeans. Most Americans believe individuals largely control their own fate – just 36% agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” However, half or more in Germany, France, and Spain agree with this statement.

Europeans also believe in a very different relationship between the individual and the state. When asked which is more important, that everyone be free to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, 58% of Americans choose the former. Majorities across Western and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, say making sure no one is in need should be a bigger priority.

Of course, even on fundamental values like these, opinions can and do shift over time, and on a few key issues, the values gap is shrinking. For instance, Americans are not as convinced as they used to be about their own cultural superiority – in 2002, six-in-ten agreed with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior.” By 2011, just 49% held this view, much closer to the levels typically registered in Europe.

Public opinion on homosexuality has also shifted dramatically. The percentage of Americans saying society should accept homosexuality rose from 49% in 2007 to 60% just four years later. This is still much lower than the high levels of acceptance witnessed in Europe – more than eight-in-ten in Spain, Germany, France, and Britain believe homosexuality should be accepted – but the gap is clearly closing. The recent passage of marriage equality ballot initiatives in four U.S. states highlights how quickly public opinion on this issue is changing.

Moreover, young Americans increasingly look like their cohorts across the Atlantic on these questions. Nearly seven-in-ten Americans under age 30 say homosexuality should be accepted and only 37% think their culture is superior to others. Young people are also much more likely than older Americans to believe the government should make sure no one is in need. If these trends continue and expand to other topics, the transatlantic values gap could someday vanish. But for the foreseeable future, the divide will likely persist, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Special to New York Times

The Kremlin’s demand that the U.S. Agency for International Development cease its activities in Russia follows months of accusations by Vladimir Putin that recent anti-government protests in Russia are the result of meddling by the U.S. and other Western governments. However, many Russians may not be convinced that such meddling is a fact.

In the wake of the Russian presidential vote this past spring, a Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 58 percent of Russians believed the election protests were home-grown, rather than the result of Western governments attempting to destabilize Russia. Only 25 percent thought foreign powers were behind the protests. Moreover, 56 percent supported the protests for free elections, and fully 64 percent agreed that attending demonstrations gave people like themselves an opportunity to express their opinion.

Read the full commentary at New York Times

In Europe, what started out four years ago as a sovereign debt crisis, morphed into a euro currency crisis and led to the fall of several European governments, has now triggered a full-blown crisis of public confidence: in the economy, in the future, in the benefits of European economic integration, in membership in the European Union, in the euro and in the free market system. The public is very worried about joblessness, inflation and public debt, and those fears are fueling much of this uncertainty and negativity.

Europeans largely oppose further fiscal austerity to deal with the crisis. They are divided on bailing out indebted nations. They oppose Brussels’ impending oversight of national budgets. At the same time, Europeans who now use the euro have no desire to abandon it and return to their former currency. And anti-German sentiment is largely contained to Greece, at least for the moment.

The crisis has exposed sharp differences between some Europeans. Germany is the most admired nation in the EU and its leader the most respected. The Germans are judged to be Europe’s most hardworking people. And the Germans are the strongest supporters of both European economic integration and the European Union.

Greece is the polar opposite. None of its fellow EU members surveyed see it in a positive light. In turn, Greeks are among the most disparaging of European economic integration and the harshest critics of the European Union. And they see themselves as Europe’s most hardworking people.

These are among the key findings from a new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in eight EU nations and the United States among 9,108 respondents from March 17 to April 16.

European Unity in Trouble

The European project, which began with the creation of a small Common Market in 1957, grew to a larger Single Market in 1992 and then created a single currency in 2002, is a major casualty of the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis.

Across the eight European Union member countries surveyed, a median of only 34% think that European economic integration has strengthened their country’s economy. Indeed, majorities or near majorities in most nations now believe that the economic integration of Europe has actually weakened their economies. This is the opinion in Greece (70%), France (63%), Britain (61%), Italy (61%), the Czech Republic (59%) and Spain (50%). Only in Germany (59%) do most people say that their country has been well served by European integration.

Among the five euro area nations surveyed, a median of only 37% believes having the euro as their currency has been a good thing. This includes just 30% of the Italians and 31% of the French. At the same time, the three non-euro zone countries surveyed are quite happy they have kept their own currencies, including nearly three-quarters of the British (73%).

A median of about four-in-ten Europeans (39%) surveyed think favorably of the European Central Bank, the institution at the center of the debate over how to deal with the euro crisis. That includes just 15% of the Greeks, 25% of the Spanish and only 40% of the Germans.

Moreover, as public criticism of European unity grows, faith in its benefits and institutions erodes. Since 2009, belief that European economic integration, the raison d’être of the European Union, has weakened their national economy has grown by 22 percentage points in the Czech Republic, 20 points in Italy, and 18 points in Spain. And, since 2007, the favorability of the European Union as an organization has fallen 20 points in Spain and the Czech Republic, 19 points in Italy and 14 points in Poland.

Among the Europeans surveyed, only in Germany is there a growing majority that believes that integration has been an economic boon for the nation and a strong majority that says EU membership has been good. And only in Poland, a non-euro zone country that is also not a member of the European Central Bank, does more than half have a favorable opinion of that institution.

Nevertheless, the symbols of a united Europe retain public support. Despite the falloff in EU favorability, most Europeans surveyed still see the European Union in a positive light, including 69% of the Poles, 68% of the Germans and 60% of the French and Spanish. And more than half in all five euro area countries surveyed – including 71% of the Greeks, 69% of the French and 66% of the Germans – would like to keep the euro as their currency and not return to the drachma, the franc, the mark or other national currencies.

The euro crisis has also undermined support for free market capitalism. Solid majorities in only three of the eight countries surveyed – Germany 69%, Britain 61%, and France 58% – still believe that people are better off in a free market system. Moreover, since 2007, before the global financial crisis began, belief in capitalism is down 23 percentage points in Italy, 20 points in Spain, 15 points in Poland, 11 points in Britain, and nine points in the Czech Republic. In comparison, over that same time frame backing for the free market has remained relatively unchanged in the United States.

Deepening Gloom

As might be expected in a time of turmoil, Europeans are profoundly dissatisfied with the direction their countries are taking. This is nothing new. Europeans have been consistently downbeat about the state of their nations for the entire 11 years the Pew Global Attitudes Project has been surveying in Europe. But this year the mood is particularly grim. Miniscule numbers of Greeks (2%), Spanish (10%) and Italians (11%) say their country is on the right course. And satisfaction is down a whopping 41 percentage points in Spain since 2007, before the crisis began. The Germans, however, see things quite differently. More than half (53%) are satisfied with Germany’s trajectory. And such sentiment has brightened by 20 points in the last five years.

Dissatisfaction with their country’s direction tracks Europeans’ bleak assessment of their national economies. A median of just 16% of Europeans surveyed think their economy is performing well. The Greeks (2%), the Spanish (6%) and the Italians (6%) are particularly despairing. Again the Germans differ – 73% give strong marks to their economy. Europeans’ economic assessments have not changed that much since 2011. But there has been a profound negative turn in economic sentiment since 2007. Positive views of the economy have fallen 59 points in Spain and 54 points in Britain in the last five years. Again the Germans are the outliers. They are 10 points happier about the state of their economy than they were in 2007.

This concern about the economy is helping fuel frustration with the creation of a unified Europe. In a number of countries, strong majorities of those who think their economy is in bad shape also believe that European integration has been bad for their country, including two-thirds of the French (67%) and the Germans (67%) who are concerned about the economy and nearly that many Czechs (65%) and British (64%). Similarly, among those Germans who think the economy is doing poorly, 54% think that having the euro as their currency has been bad for Germany. A plurality (44%) of the French who are worried about their economy also are critical of the euro.

Europeans are divided over who is to blame for their economic woes. Among those who say their economy is bad, the Greeks (87%), Italians (84%), Poles (90%) and Czechs (91%) complain that their own governments are responsible for current economic distress. The French (74%), and Spanish (78%) fault the banks and other major financial institutions. The British and the Germans blame both. Such sentiments have not changed much in the last year. Notably, Europeans do not blame the United States.

A Bleak Future

Most Europeans have little hope for their economy’s future and do not think their children will have an easy time improving their lot, yet they acknowledge that, for all their current and possible future troubles, today’s generation is better off than their parents.

Across the board, Europeans expect the adverse effects of the euro crisis to continue for the immediate future. A median of 22% of those surveyed see the economy improving over the next year. The least optimistic are the Greeks (9%). The most optimistic are the British, but still only a third (32%) have a positive outlook. By comparison, Americans (52%) are 30 points more upbeat about the trajectory of the economy than are Europeans.

Among the EU nations surveyed, a median of 47% seriously doubt that their children will be able to climb the economic ladder. Such generational pessimism is particularly profound in those societies most hard hit by the euro crisis. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the Greeks, 69% of the Spanish and 62% of the Italians worry it will be very difficult for young people in their countries to get a better job and to become wealthier than their parents. Notably, Germans are less pessimistic about economic mobility than are Americans.

Despite their glum assessment of current economic conditions and their doubt about economic prospects for their country and their children, Europeans do consider themselves better off than the previous generation. A median of nearly six-in-ten (59%) says their standard of living is superior to that of their parents. This is comparable to Americans’ (60%) view. Only in France (48%) does less than a majority see themselves as better off.

Pervasive Worry

Despondent about the economy, pessimistic about their economy’s prospects and worried about their children’s futures, Europeans see economic threats on all sides. Nearly nine-in-ten Europeans (88%) surveyed say unemployment poses a major threat to their economic well-being. This includes almost all the Spanish (97%) and all the Greeks (97%). Eight-in-ten (81%) think their country’s national debt is a threat, including again 97% of Greeks. And three-in-four (74%) Europeans surveyed believe rising prices could undermine their well-being. Inflation is particularly a concern in Greece (93%) and Italy (89%).

Greek and Spanish concern about joblessness is hardly surprising. The Greek unemployment rate was 21.7% in the months prior to the Pew Global survey. And in Spain it was 24.1% the month of the poll. But 70% of Germans are also worried about the lack of jobs even though Germany has a jobless rate of 5.6%, the lowest among the eight European countries surveyed. Similarly, Greek (97%) and Italian (81%) concern about the size of their national debt is in line with the 160.8% debt-to-GDP ratio in Greece and the 120.1% debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy. But 82% of the Czechs are also worried about their public indebtedness even though their debt to GDP ratio is only 41.5%. Most strikingly, 93% of the Greeks are concerned about rising prices even though their inflation rate is only 2.4%.

Americans also fret about all of these economic challenges. But they are markedly less worried than Europeans about both the national debt (71% concerned compared with 81% in Europe) and inflation (64% worried compared with 74% in Europe).

Little Faith in Leaders or Policies

Europeans have little faith in the ability of most of their leaders to deal with current economic challenges. Nor do they put much stock in many of the economic policy options now being pursued.

At the time the survey was taken in late March and early April, only minorities of the public in Spain (45% for Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy), Greece (32% for Prime Minister Lucas Papademos), Poland (25% for Prime Minister Donald Tusk) and the Czech Republic (25% for Prime Minister Petr Necas) thought their country’s leader was doing a good job handling the European economic crisis. About half of the British (51%) gave Prime Minister David Cameron good marks on this issue, while 48% of Italians said the same about Prime Minister Mario Monti. But weeks before he lost his bid for reelection, French President Nicolas Sarkozy still enjoyed the confidence of 56% of the French public for his management of the crisis.

In stark contrast, 80% of Germans thought Chancellor Angela Merkel had done a good job as an economic manager. Such appreciation for her acumen extends across most of the European countries surveyed. Strong majorities in six of the other seven nations said she was doing a fine job. Only the Greeks demurred. Just 14% gave her good marks.

Despite their widespread concern about national debt, Europeans evidence little support for further fiscal austerity in their ongoing debate about government spending. In five of seven nations, clear majorities say fiscal belt tightening is about right or has gone too far. This is particularly true in Spain (73%) and Britain (71%).

But Europeans are divided on the question of whether financial assistance should be provided to EU countries that run into major financial difficulties. In richer EU member countries – Britain (62%), France (56%) and Germany (48%) – close to half or more of the population opposes their government providing bailouts. As might be expected, in poorer EU nations, most say other EU governments should provide assistance to struggling nations.

There is general resistance to the recent decision to grant the European Union the authority to exercise limited oversight of national budgets. Three-quarters of the British (75%), Greeks (75%) and Czechs (73%) oppose this loss of national sovereignty.

A Europe Divided?

At a time when it faces its most serious economic challenge since its creation, the European Union is, in some ways, fractured into multiple, often discordant, elements. But these divisions do not always cut along presumed lines. Germans stand alone in their perceptions of their recent experience, their attitudes toward European unity and, in the eyes of their fellow Europeans, in terms of their character traits. But, contrary to their popular portrayal, the Germans do not differ markedly from other Europeans on policy issues. On many counts, it is the Greeks who are the most isolated in Europe. Meanwhile, a north-south split within Europe is far from clear cut.

The public mood in Germany is considerably more positive than elsewhere in Europe. They are the only Europeans surveyed who are satisfied with the direction of their country and who think their economy is doing well. Germany is the only country where a majority of the population currently thinks that European economic integration has strengthened the national economy. Germans are most likely, by far, to say that EU membership has been a good thing. They are the least concerned about the lack of jobs, rising prices and the power of unions. Germany is the most admired country in the EU and its chancellor the most respected leader. The Germans are seen by others as the most hard-working of Europeans and as the least corrupt.

But in public policy debates – over austerity, bailouts and budgetary sovereignty – German attitudes do not differ greatly from those of other Europeans.

Anti-German sentiment is most prevalent in Greece, where a majority (78%) has an unfavorable opinion of Germany, with nearly half (49%) of the population saying they have a very unfavorable view. Greece is the only country where a majority (84%) thinks German Chancellor Angela Merkel is doing a bad job dealing with the economic crisis. And they are intensely critical: 57% say she is doing a very bad job. The Greeks are, by far, the most likely to think that the power wielded over their economy by Germany and other European Union countries poses a major threat to their economy. And the Greeks are the least likely among Europeans surveyed to say the Germans are hardworking.

Their anti-German sentiment is only one measure of how Greeks and their country are isolated within Europe. None of Greece’s fellow EU members hold a positive view of the Aegean nation. And, since 2010, favorable views of Greece have fallen by 28 points in Poland, 20 points in France, 16 points in Spain, 13 points in Germany and 12 points in Britain.

The Greeks are the least happy with the direction of their country and the most upset about the state of their national economy among the European populations surveyed. They are the least optimistic about the economy and the most pessimistic about economic mobility. They are among the most fearful about unemployment, debt and inflation and the least supportive of the free market system. Greeks are the most critical of European economic integration and the European Central Bank. They are the most supportive of bailouts and among the most opposed to outsiders looking over their shoulder as they prepare their national budget. At the same time, seven-in-ten Greeks (71%) have a favorable view of their own country. Only the Germans (82%) and the British (78%) are more nationalistic. And 60% of the Greeks see themselves as the most hardworking people in Europe.

The north-south divide in Europe, a topic of great concern in policy circles in Brussels, is by no means uniform. No country in northern Europe has a positive view of Greece. But Britain, France and Germany still hold positive views of Italy and Spain.

Southern Europeans are more dissatisfied than northerners with the direction of their countries, more worried about the state of their economy and the most worried about economic mobility. But southerners share with northerners their disenchantment with the results of European integration.

There is no north-south divide on coping with the crisis. As might be expected, wealthy northern countries are less supportive of financial bailouts than poorer southern nations. But there is no clear-cut division of opinion on austerity or EU oversight of national budgets. Finally, with regard to the perception of the national character of the residents of southern European countries, the British, French and Germans judge the Greeks, Italians and Spanish to be the laziest people in Europe and among the most corrupt. However, Italians and Spaniards largely share this negative image of themselves and their southern counterparts.