Special to Nikkei Weekly

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s announcement March 15 that Japan will join negotiations to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership with the U.S. and other Pacific Basin nations won early support from the Japanese people, according to snap surveys following his statement. The decision was also welcomed in official circles in Washington, D.C., where the Obama administration has long supported Japan becoming party to the talks.

But the attitude of the American public toward what is, essentially, a free trade agreement between Japan and the U.S. remains unclear. Unlike in Japan, the TPP has received relatively little news coverage in the U.S. It is not a topic of broad public debate. And there have been no major public opinion polls that have asked Americans specifically about the negotiations since Abe’s announcement.

The American political environment surrounding the talks can only be deduced from related economic and public opinion data.

For some American industries, for organized labor and for some trade experts, scars from the U.S.-Japan trade wars of the 1980s and early 1990s remain tender. Thus, the upcoming TPP negotiations may be contentious. Yet, among the general American public, there is support for deeper integration of the two economies through greater trade. So the political context in which these talks will take place is far more supportive than ever before.

A quarter century ago ties between Washington and Tokyo were characterized by public distrust and animosity. Talk of trade wars dominated newspaper headlines. And political rhetoric often verged on “Japan Bashing.”

In 1989, 63% of Americans believed Japan practiced unfair trade. More than half, 53%, wanted to increase tariffs on products imported from Japan. In 1995, 61% of the American public approved of President Bill Clinton’s decision to impose import duties on imports of luxury Japanese cars. And by 1997, 64% still saw Tokyo as being unfair.

And American critics of Japan participating in TPP will point to the ongoing U.S. trade imbalance with Japan, especially in the automotive sector, as reason for Washington not to conclude a TPP deal with Tokyo. The U.S. ran a $76.3 billion merchandise trade deficit with Japan in 2012, up 21% from 2011. And in 2010, the last year for which there is complete data, Japan shipped 1.5 million cars and light trucks to the U.S. Japan imported 14,000 such vehicles from the U.S. And the U.S.-Japan auto trade imbalance accounted for two-thirds of the overall U.S. trade deficit with Japan that year.

Yet, despite such figures and periodic trade tensions, Americans have generally held a favorable opinion of Japan. In 1990, near the high point of the Washington-Tokyo battles over trade in autos, rice and other goods, 63% of Americans nonetheless thought well of Japan, according to a survey by the Times Mirror Corporation. (Although all such opinion is relative, that same year 77% of Americans approved of Germany.) By 2009, 67% of Americans still felt favorably disposed toward Japan, according to the Pew Research Center.

And, a generation after significant anti-Japanese sentiment among the American people, there is significant support for improving trade relations between the U.S. and Japan. According to a 2010 survey, 60% Americans now want to increase trade with Japan, compared with 58% who would like to deepen commercial ties with the European Union and only 45% who want to boost trade with China. And a 2012 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that two-thirds of the American public put a high priority on building a regional free trade area with the U.S. and East Asian countries.

So why the change? Despite the bilateral trade imbalance, U.S. exports to Japan are at a record high, up 37% from 2009. And a study by Japan’s Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry estimates that the TPP would boost the U.S. economy by 0.11 percent, with Japan accounting for about 70 percent of that benefit. While this economic lift might appear insignificant, the benefits would be roughly equivalent to the projected payoff for the U.S. from the now moribund Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. This may be why, of the 113 comments received by the U.S. government on the issue of Japan entering the TPP, 100 were supportive, only 8 were opposed, and 5 indifferent.

Another reason may be that China has replaced Japan as America’s principal trade competitor, both in fact and in the minds of the American people. In 1990, Japan accounted for 40.7% of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit. China made up just 10.3%. By 2012, Japan accounted for only 10.5% of the U.S. global imbalance. China was responsible for 43.3%.

It is little wonder then that today 41% of Americans see China as the world’s leading economic power and thus the principal challenger to American economic preeminence. And according to a recent Pew Research survey, 49% of Americans want to be tough with Beijing on economic matters. By comparison, only 6% cite Japan as an economic powerhouse today compared with 46% who thought Tokyo was the top dog in 1990.

A more positive bilateral public disposition is no assurance of success for the TPP negotiations. Washington will want openings of the Japanese rice and auto markets that Tokyo will resist. As the talks become more acrimonious, public opinion on both sides of the Pacific could sour. But clearly these negotiations begin in a public opinion environment that is far more favorable than that which existed a generation ago.

Special to CNN

What a difference a generation makes! Japan’s decision to join negotiations to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership with the United States and other Pacific nations reflects, in part, the sea change in public opinion that has transformed U.S.-Japan relations. A quarter of a century ago, ties between Washington and Tokyo were characterized by public distrust and animosity. Today, there is support for deeper integration of the two economies through greater trade. The upcoming TPP negotiations will be contentious. But the political context in which these talks will take place is far more supportive than ever before.

In the last few decades, despite periodic trade tensions, Americans have generally held a favorable overall opinion of Japan. In 1990, near the high point of  the Washington-Tokyo battles over trade in autos, rice and other goods, almost two-thirds of Americans nonetheless thought well of Japan, according to a survey by the Times Mirror Corporation. By 2009, 67 percent of Americans still felt favorably disposed toward Japan, according to the Pew Research Center.

But trade relations have long been a neuralgic irritant in bilateral relations. In 1989, 63 percent of Americans believed Japan practiced unfair trade, while a little more than half wanted to increase tariffs on products imported from Japan. In 1995, 61 percent of the American public approved of President Bill Clinton’s decision to impose import duties on imports of luxury Japanese cars.

But U.S. sentiment has shifted dramatically. According to a 2010 survey, three-in-five Americans now want to increase trade with Japan, compared with 58 percent who would like to deepen commercial ties with the European Union and only 45 percent who want to boost trade with China.

So why the change? One reason may be that China has replaced Japan as America’s principal trade competitor, both in fact and in the minds of the American people. In 1990, Japan accounted for 40.7 percent of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit. China made up just 10.3 percent. By 2012, Japan accounted for only 10.5 percent of the U.S. global imbalance. China was responsible for 43.3 percent.

It is little wonder then that today, four-in-ten Americans see China as the world’s leading economic power and thus the principal challenger to American economic preeminence. And according to a recent Pew Research survey, 49 percent of Americans want to be tough with Beijing on economic matters. By comparison, just 6 percent cite Japan as an economic powerhouse today, compared with almost half who thought Tokyo was the top dog in 1990.

The Japanese, for their part, have seen a markedly improved view of the United States. In 1993, only 37 percent of the public thought relations between Japan and the U.S. were good, according to a Yomiuri Shimbun survey. By 2002, almost three quarters had a favorable view of America, according to a Pew Research Center survey.

Japanese attitudes toward trade with the United State have also improved. In 1994, a United States Information Agency survey found that a plurality (40 percent) of Japanese thought that U.S. policies and actions were harmful to the Japanese economy. And more than half said Washington made it difficult to sell Japanese products in the American market. Today, 48 percent of Japanese think their country should participate in TPP, which is effectively a free trade agreement with the United States, according to a November 2012 Asahi Shimbun survey.

A more positive bilateral public disposition is no assurance of success for the TPP negotiations. Washington will want openings of the Japanese rice and auto markets that Tokyo will resist. As the talks become more acrimonious, public opinion on both sides of the Pacific could sour. But clearly these negotiations begin in a public opinion environment that is far more favorable than that which existed a generation ago. That, in itself, is notable.

Special to Reuters

The long-discussed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union was formally endorsed by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address to Congress. Obama asserted that “trade that is fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” A prominent presidential endorsement will not prevent a long and disputatious negotiation, but a trade pact could yield potentially huge economic rewards — and also provoke serious political opposition on both sides.

A U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has been talked about for two decades but never actively pursued. On both sides of the Atlantic, there has been fear that any such deal between the world’s two largest economies would disadvantage poorer nations. A U.S.-EU accord was deemed less desirable because greater economic benefits could be gained from a global trade agreement involving more countries. Trade experts worried that it would undermine the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization. Moreover, based on past bitter disputes over frozen chickens, bananas, genetically modified organisms and other food and agricultural products, a U.S.-European Union agreement was deemed too politically fraught and difficult.

Now, with Europe in recession, the United States unemployment rate stubbornly high and both regions groaning under public indebtedness, Brussels and Washington are looking for ways to stimulate jobs and growth without spending money. Liberalization of trade and investment is seen as one way to do that.

In addition, in the wake of the failed Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, a U.S.-EU deal is thought to pose little immediate threat to the WTO because there is no comprehensive global trade deal in the offing any time soon. Moreover, the rising competitive challenge from China has increased the incentive for both Europe and America to develop common technical and regulatory standards for a $30 trillion transatlantic market to ensure that Western-style capitalism, not Chinese state capitalism, remains the global norm.

Publics on both sides of the Atlantic appear to be receptive to the idea.

The virulent European anti-Americanism of the last decade — owing to European opposition to the Iraq war and the policies of U.S. President George W. Bush — is ancient history. More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the French had a favorable view of the United States in 2012, compared with 42 percent in 2008, the last year of the Bush administration, according to Pew Research Center surveys. Fifty-two percent of Germans held a positive opinion of America, compared with 31 percent four years earlier. And 58 percent of the Spanish were favorably disposed toward the United States, much greater than the 33 percent who held such views in 2008.

There has been a similar, if less robust, rebound in American response to the European Union. In 2012, half the country had a favorable view of the EU, compared with only 39 percent at the nadir in 2004.

Moreover, contrary to the widespread assumption that protectionist sentiments are rising in the wake of the Great Recession, 58 percent of Americans say they support increased trade with the EU. The same feeling exists across the Atlantic. Three-quarters of the Italians, nearly two-thirds of the British (65 percent) and more than half of the French (58 percent) and Germans (57 percent) believe in deepening trade and investment ties between the European Union and the United States; 63 percent of Americans agree, according to a 2007 German Marshall Fund survey.

There is also strong support for one of the thorniest challenges that lie ahead: harmonization or mutual recognition of national regulations on goods and services, everything from food standards to insurance. Overwhelmingly Italians (87 percent), British (84 percent), French (82 percent), Americans (76 percent) and Germans (71 percent) support such efforts, according to the Marshall Fund survey.

European backing may reflect a half century of experience aligning regulations while building the European Union. American enthusiasm may reflect a lack of appreciation of just how arduous that can be.

The removal of all remaining tariffs on goods traded between Europe and the United States, traditionally the core of any trade and investment agreement, has strong, if slightly less enthusiastic support, on both sides of the Atlantic. Fully 70 percent of the British and Italians, 65 percent of the Poles and 54 percent of the Germans back such an effort, according to the GMF survey. Roughly half of the French (50 percent) and Americans (48 percent) agree.

Despite this seeming goodwill, negotiating a deal in the current political environment will not be easy. Publics and their elected leaders are domestically preoccupied. In some nations, protectionism and nationalism seem to be on the rise.

Once actual trade and investment negotiations finally get under way, the bargaining is likely to be challenging. If history is any guide, inevitable frictions will erode public support as adversely affected interests complain, while those that stand to benefit are less vocal. So the ultimate public verdict on a U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement has yet to be rendered.

But on the eve of such negotiations, both Americans and Europeans seem disposed to try.

Special to CNN

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe travels to Washington this week to meet with President Barack Obama. This will be their first meeting since Abe was chosen for the second time to be prime minister and Obama secured a second term at the end of last year. But how do ties stand between the two countries?

Both leaders are riding a wave of relative popularity at home, strengthening their hands in dealing with mutual international challenges. And, unlike the Japan bashing days of the 1980s, when fear and resentment poisoned popular sentiment, Americans and Japanese actually like each other now. But public opinion on specific issues in both countries is likely to shape what Abe and Obama can and cannot accomplish.

The Obama that Abe will be meeting is in a stronger position than he was during much of his first term, enjoying a 52 percent job approval rating, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey. Among Japanese, about two-thirds back the Abe cabinet, at least according to a late January Kyodo News survey.

Meanwhile, about six in ten Americans today trust Japan, according to a Pew Research poll (the only nation they trust more is the United Kingdom, which is trusted by three quarters of Americans). And Japanese return the goodwill: 72 percent have a favorable view of the United States, one of the top favorability ratings among the 21 nations Pew Research surveyed last year. Moreover, three quarters of Japanese have confidence in Obama (compared with 25 percent who had confidence in George W. Bush in 2008).

But despite their affection for Obama, the Japanese are also disappointed in him. In 2009, just over half of Japanese expected Obama to get international approval before using military force, but only 29 percent say he has. Similarly, 58 percent thought he would be evenhanded in his handling of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, yet just 17 percent say he actually has been.

All this suggests that when the Abe-Obama discussion gets down to concrete issues, there will be agreement, but also some differences.

The Obama administration would like to see Japan join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the trade deal Washington is negotiating with 10 other Asian-Pacific nations, which the White House hopes to complete by the end of this year. The economic benefits to the United States from the agreement would increase greatly if Japan is a member. And while TPP has little name recognition among average Americans, 60 percent do believe that increasing trade with Japan would be good for the United States. But Abe is wary because less than half of Japanese support joining TPP, according to a late 2012 Asahi Shimbun poll.

Japan’s growing tensions with China in the East China Sea and its implications for the U.S.-Japan military alliance may also be high on the agenda.

Americans have somewhat hawkish views on China, and when asked which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more Americans volunteered China than name any other nation, including Iran and North Korea, in a recent Pew Research survey.

And Americans and Japanese are both similarly skeptical of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, with 94 percent of respondents in both countries saying they were opposed to Tehran doing so, according to a 2012 Pew Research survey.

But what should be done to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons? Most Americans supports tougher sanctions, and Washington has leaned heavily on Tokyo to reduce oil imports from Iran (which it has), a topic Abe may hear more about in Washington. But those Japanese opposed to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are less supportive of such economic penalties, and this difference in opinion may weigh on the Abe government’s willingness to ratchet up Iranian sanctions in the months ahead.

Japanese and Americans also differ on the use of military force to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Fully 63 percent of Americans who oppose Tehran’s nuclear ambitions would consider such action, while only 40 percent of Japanese agree.

Ultimately, the U.S.-Japan relationship has gone through numerous ups and downs in the last few decades. Americans’ fears that Japan Inc. will overwhelm them have subsided. Yet challenges remain: how to jointly deal with China, North Korea and Iran, and whether Tokyo will join with other Asian governments and Washington in creating a transpacific free trade area.

The Abe-Obama summit cannot be expected to resolve all these differences. But the Japanese and American people are more predisposed to resolve their differences than they have been for years. The summit could not be happening at a more opportune and critical time.

By Bruce Stokes, Director of Pew Global Economic Attitudes, Pew Research Center

Special to EuropeanVoice

The year ahead promises both challenges and opportunities for transatlantic relations. Afghanistan and Syria pose new tests for NATO. The looming confrontation with Iran over its nuclear weapons programme could fray the Alliance’s solidarity. But 2013 may also be the year that Washington and Brussels begin the integration of the world’s two largest economies. The next 12 months could prove to be consequential for both security and economic ties between Europe and the United States.

After two decades of talking about it, the European Union and the US may finally launch free-trade negotiations this year. More than half (58%) of the American public thinks that increased trade with the European Union would be good for the United States, according to a Pew Research Center survey, confirming earlier findings in both Europe and the US by the German Marshall Fund. And an EU-US deal would actually prove more beneficial to the US than the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement that it is currently pursuing in Asia, according to separate studies by the European Centre for International Political Economy in Brussels and the Peterson Institute in Washington.

So the politics and the economics of such an accord seem aligned. On the security side, however, there are challenges ahead.

Both Pew and GMF surveys show that Americans and Europeans continue to back NATO, but they want out of Afghanistan, currently a joint US-European military operation. How that disengagement is managed may shape future public support for NATO.

The future European and American role in the Syrian quagmire may also test transatlantic co-operation. Publics on both sides of the Atlantic are clear; they do not want their governments to get involved. More than three in five (63%) Americans say Uncle Sam has no responsibility to do anything in Syria, according to a recent Pew survey. And an earlier GMF poll found 59% of Europeans said, stay out of Syria completely. How European and American governments square their interest in stability in the region with their public’s antipathy for involvement in yet another war could prove a serious challenge.

Iran could also trouble transatlantic cohesion. Europe and the United States have worked closely in ratcheting up economic sanctions on Tehran in recent years. But the day of reckoning on the Iranian nuclear-weapons programme may come this year.

More than half (56%) of Americans want the Obama administration to take a firm stand against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, according to a recent Pew survey. And only 28% of Americans who oppose Iran’s nuclear programme are willing to accept a nuclear armed Iran. Significantly more French (48%), Germans (41%) and British (40%) would tolerate Tehran having nuclear weapons. The US president, Barack Obama, has ruled out containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The American public seems to agree; the European public is less convinced.

Complicating all these challenges are the domestic diversions facing both Europe and the US. The eurozone crisis will continue to absorb the time and energies of European leaders, while diverting public attention and complicating almost all governmental initiatives. On the other side of the Atlantic, the American public is increasingly isolationist: 83% say the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and more attention to problems at home. Such sentiment has grown by ten percentage points in the past decade.

European leaders have long fretted about Washington’s declining engagement with Brussels. But the issues confronting the transatlantic relationship in 2013 suggest a possible re-engagement on a range of issues. How those challenges get resolved and if those opportunities are realised could determine the trajectory of US-European relations for years to come.

Special to The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The 2012 U.S. presidential election was marked by the two candidates — the incumbent Democrat Barack Obama and the Republican challenger Mitt Romney — competing over who would be tougher on China if elected. What does Obama’s return to the White House portend for U.S.-China economic relations? The U.S. public wants Washington to ratchet up the pressure on Beijing, but history suggests that there are geo-political constraints to doing so.

European, U.S., and Chinese observers of the U.S.-China relationship may wonder whether commitments made in the heat of a presidential election really matter once a candidate becomes president. In general, they do. One of President Obama’s unbroken pledges in his first term was to be tougher on China than George W. Bush, and over the last four years the Obama administration has filed more trade cases against China than his predecessor.

Thus it is reasonable to assume that Obama will continue to press China on economic and trade issues, especially when buttressed by the support of the U.S. public. However, experience suggests a more cautionary conclusion. For at least the last three decades, whenever the U.S. position as the world’s economic and strategic hegemon has been threatened, U.S. presidents and presidential candidates have promised to face down the foreign challenger: first Japan and now China.

As a candidate in 1992, Bill Clinton vowed to be tougher on Japan and China than his predecessor George H.W. Bush. But in 1994, on the verge of filing a major trade case against Japanese auto policy, with the possibility such a move would destabilize financial markets, Clinton backed down. Similarly, after campaigning against the “butchers of Beijing” and withholding most favored nation trading status from China in an attempt to leverage a better human rights record, Clinton relented and eventually championed China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. His successor, George W. Bush, criticized Clinton for treating China as a “strategic partner” and then proceeded to treat China as a “responsible stakeholder.”

When campaign promises clash with the demands of governing, the latter often prevail. But this does not mean that the economic and political context of the current U.S.-China relationship can be ignored. The bilateral trade relationship remains a destabilizing factor, fostering political support for confrontational policies, with the possibility that China’s growing foreign investment in the United States could serve to either aggravate tensions or ameliorate them over time.

By more than two-to-one (65% to 29%), Americans see relations with China as good, according to a 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey. And by about four-to-one (66% to 15%), they see China as a competitor not an enemy.

But such amorphous good feelings belie underlying economic concerns. About two-thirds (68%) of Americans think China is untrustworthy and nearly three-in-five (59%) worry about Beijing’s economic strength. In its 2012 Transatlantic Trends survey, the German Marshall Fund found the concern: 59% of Americans said that they see China as an economic threat. As a result, the Pew survey showed that more Americans think it is important to get tougher on China (49%) than it is to build a stronger relationship (42%). And support for a more hard-nosed stance is up nine percentage points since March 2011.

Such sentiment grows out of Americans’ widespread concern about the trade imbalance, which accounts for 42% of the total U.S. merchandise trade deficit and is up 6.8% in the first three-quarters of 2012 over 2011. About three-in five Americans (61%) say the U.S. trade deficit with China is a very serious problem. More than seven-in-ten (71%) believe that the loss of jobs to China is very serious. And 78% think that the large amount of U.S. debt held by China, a direct consequence of the trade imbalance, is very serious.

But this is where the election might matter. Romney lost, and it was Romney supporters who were most supportive of the next president confronting China. Nearly two-thirds of Republicans backed getting tougher with Beijing, up 11 percentage points in just a year. Democrats, on the other hand, prioritized building stronger economic relations with China (53%) over getting tougher with China (39%). Democrats’ backing for confrontation was up 6 points since 2011, but it remained the minority sentiment among those in Obama’s party.

Similarly, Republicans (71%) were more worried about the trade deficit with China than Democrats (54%). Republicans were also more concerned about the loss of U.S. jobs to China, by 76% to 67%. And they were more likely to say the U.S. debt held by the Chinese was a very serious problem, by 87% to 75%.

The polling data are clear: Democrats are strongly concerned about the trade imbalance, the loss of U.S. jobs, and Chinese holding of U.S. debt. But the fact that their negative sentiments are less intense may give Obama more room to maneuver on China policy, especially if China lessens its export dependence and pursues economic growth through domestic consumption.

So what will be the pillars of the Obama administration’s economic policy toward China in its second term?

The first will likely be more complaints about Chinese subsidies and trade practices filed with the WTO, given the president’s campaign promises and his record during his first term. Washington has been relatively successful with such cases in the past, and pursuing multilateral dispute settlements has the added advantage of avoiding a direct bilateral confrontation with China.

The second will be the pursuit of trade agreements that notably do not include China. The most important of these is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement among a growing list of nations bordering the Pacific. It is the Obama administration’s avowed aim to construct a TPP with standards so high — especially rules regarding behavior by state-owned enterprises — that China could never join without transforming its economic system. This stance in part reflects the fact that two-thirds (67%) of the U.S. public believe China practices unfair trade, according to a 2012 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The likely 2013 launch of a U.S.-European Union free trade negotiation — effectively a Trans-Atlantic Partnership, a bookend for the TPP — primarily reflects majority (58%) sentiment in the United States that increased trade with Europe would be a good thing for the United States. But it can also be seen as an attempt to establish U.S.-European, rather than Chinese, technical and regulatory standards as global business norms.

The Obama administration is unlikely to label China a currency manipulator, which is something Mitt Romney promised he would do on his first day in office. In Obama’s first term, the White House had multiple opportunities to do so and declined, even though the renminbi was weaker against the dollar than it is now.

The unknowable factor in future U.S.-China economic relations is the political impact of what is expected to be growing Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States. Chinese investment flows to the United States are expected to grow significantly in the years ahead. And experience with Japan suggests that if such investment creates and preserves jobs (and recent data suggests much Chinese investment is doing just that), Chinese investment may not create significant new political frictions.

U.S.-China economic relations are driven by underlying fundamentals and geo-political realities, not U.S. campaign rhetoric. Nevertheless, U.S. elected leaders ignore public opinion at their peril. Unless and until the U.S. trade deficit shrinks (lowering the United States’ dependence on Chinese loans to fund that debt) and domestic job growth rebounds, there is likely to be public animosity toward China in the United States and bilateral economic frictions. While history suggests that these frictions are manageable, they will pose political headaches for both U.S. and Chinese leaders that could periodically adversely affect the strategic relationship.

Special to EuropeanVoice

The re-election of Barack Obama as the next president of the United States has ramifications—good, bad and indifferent—for transatlantic relations.

Whoever had emerged victorious November 6, the American pivot toward Asia was to continue because of China’s growing magnetic economic and geo-political appeal. But Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Russia, terrorism and trade are still likely to dominate the immediate transatlantic agenda. And differences in public perception on both sides of the Atlantic could pose new tests for the EU-U.S. alliance in the years ahead.

Iran is the most immediate challenge to transatlantic solidarity.

There is extremely strong American and European opposition to the Iranian nuclear weapons program, according to the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes survey in spring, 2012.

But among those who oppose Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal, Americans’ support for the use of military force to halt the Iranian efforts exceeds that in any other country. About six-in-ten (63%) Americans would support military action, compared with 51% in France and Britain and 50% in Germany. Only 24% of Russians would back such a move.

The absence of strong international backing for a strike on Iran could complicate the new president’s ability to build and hold together a united diplomatic front in any effort to deny Tehran nuclear weapons.

Washington’s likely continued offensive against terrorists poses similar, if less threatening, alliance frictions. Europeans are generally supportive of U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism. But they take a sharply negative view of the drone strikes that are likely to continue to be one of America’s principal methods of prosecuting that war. Drones have the overwhelming support of the American public (62%). But they are disapproved of by 76% of the Spanish, 63% of the French and 59% of the Germans.

Afghanistan, Syria and Russia are issues that may divide the alliance less than the campaign rhetoric in the United States presidential race might have suggested.

Obama has promised to get out of Afghanistan by 2014. Both American and European publics are clear, they want all troops out.

Obama has shown no stomach for military intervention in war-torn Syria. And neither the American nor the European publics support allied military involvement in Syria: 59% of Europeans and 55% of Americans say their governments should stay out completely, according to the 2012 German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends survey.

Obama’s promised reset of relations with Moscow was more of an ambition than a policy. Time will tell if it can be realized in his second term.

But European and American publics are clear. They don’t trust Russia: 55% of Europeans and 48% of Americans have an unfavorable view of Russia, according to the GMF survey. But they like the status quo. Half of Europeans (56%) and Americans (53%) approve of the way Obama has managed relations with Russia so far.

Trade promises to be a unifying transatlantic issue in the next administration. Later this year, the Obama administration is expected to announce plans to negotiate a free trade agreement with Europe. And Brussels is in agreement.

Overwhelming majorities on both sides of the Atlantic think trade is good for their countries, despite worries about its impact on jobs and incomes. France and American unions, both long skeptical of trade liberalization, have been largely silent about a transatlantic free trade deal, a positive sign. European and American farmers are likely to be wary. But prospects for completing such an agreement during the next U.S. administration are better than they have ever been.

Obama will continue the U.S. pivot toward Asia. Nevertheless, the European-American agenda will remain busy, with a number of issues that have to be properly managed to avoid alliance tensions. But with the re-election of Barack Obama, who is more popular across Europe than any other European leader and who most Europeans wanted to remain in the White House, there is no danger of a return of the transatlantic tensions that marked the Bush administration in the last decade.

Special to BBC News

American fears about China’s economic strength have fed into the US presidential election campaign – shaping public fears in some surprising ways, according to new research.

Foreign rivals have long been used as foils in US elections.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Japan played the role of bogeyman. Tokyo’s rising trade surplus with Washington came to symbolise fears of declining American competitiveness. And US presidential candidates vied with each other over who could be tougher on the Japanese.

In the 2012 American election, China has become the test of presidential resolve. Both President Barack Obama and his Republican challenger Mitt Romney have pledged to ratchet up the pressure on Beijing.

Romney has promised that on his first day in office he will issue an executive order branding China a currency manipulator, possibly triggering a trade war. And on 17 September, the Obama administration filed an unfair trade case at the World Trade Organization against alleged Chinese subsidies of auto parts exports.

There are substantive reasons for this. China accounts for 40% of the record US merchandise trade deficit. But the political rationale for such actions and promises is also clear.

Read the full commentary at BBC News

With China a key foreign policy issue in the 2012 presidential contest, and both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney promising to “get tough” with the Asian power, the American public expresses both positive and negative views about China and U.S. policy towards it.

Nearly two-thirds describe relations between the U.S. and China as good, and most consider China a competitor rather than an enemy. At the same time, majorities say the U.S. cannot trust China and that the Asian nation does not consider the interests of other countries when making foreign policy decisions. When it comes to dealing with China, as many say being tough with China on economic issues is a very important priority for the U.S. as say the same about building a strong bilateral relationship.

Despite generally positive assessments of U.S.-China relations, Americans are clearly concerned about China’s growing economic strength and its impact on the United States. Most consider the large amount of American debt held by China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the U.S. trade deficit with China to be very serious problems, and about half say the Asian nation’s emergence as a world power poses a major threat to America.

In contrast to the general public, American foreign affairs experts are far less concerned about China’s rising power. With the exception of retired military officers, only about three-in-ten among the experts surveyed consider China’s emergence as a world power to be a major threat. Fewer than four-in-ten experts consider the U.S. trade deficit with China to be a very serious problem, compared with about six-in-ten of the broader public; and even fewer experts express concern about the loss of U.S. jobs to China. Moreover, unlike the general public, experts are far more likely to support building a strong relationship with China than to back being tough with Beijing on economic issues.

The public and experts also offer divergent views of how assertive America should be in the world. When asked whether the U.S. should play a shared leadership role, be the single world leader, or not play any leadership role, majorities of the public and experts choose a shared leadership role. Among those who do so, 62% of the public say the U.S. should be no more or less assertive than other leading nations. In contrast, majorities of retired military officers, scholars, government officials, and business and trade leaders who favor a shared leadership role say the U.S. should be the most assertive of the leading nations; views are more mixed among members of the news media.

These are among the key findings of a survey of U.S. foreign affairs experts in government, business, academia, the military and the news media and the American public conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. The survey is part of the broader U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project, conducted in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association and the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University.

The general public survey was conducted April 30-May 13, 2012, among 1,004 adults. The elite survey was conducted March 1-May 20, 2012, among 305 foreign affairs experts, including 54 government officials in the executive and legislative branches, 52 retired military officers, 74 business and trade leaders, 93 academics, think tank experts and NGO leaders, and 32 reporters, editors and commentators. Although not representative of all U.S. foreign affairs experts, the elite survey findings are indicative of attitudes among high-ranking individuals responsible for matters related to national security or foreign policy.¹

Most See China as a Competitor, Say U.S. Can’t Trust It

The American public, as well as majorities across the five expert groups, describe China as a competitor of the United States. Few see China as either a partner or an enemy. However, the public is more likely than the experts to label China as an enemy; 15% of the public offer this negative view, compared with 3% or less among the five expert groups.

China is also largely seen as untrustworthy by both the American public and the experts. Only 26% of the public and about a third or less across the expert groups surveyed say the U.S. can trust China a great deal or a fair amount. By comparison, at least half among the public and the experts say the U.S. can trust Britain, Japan, France, Israel and India.

Moreover, just one-third of the public and even fewer among most expert groups believe China takes the interests of other countries around the world into account when making foreign policy decisions. Scholars are more likely than other foreign affairs experts to say this, but 59% in that group say China does not consider the interests of other countries. By comparison, solid majorities among the public and experts believe the U.S. considers the interests of other nations.

Views of China are generally more positive among young people. More than four-in-ten respondents younger than 30 see China as trustworthy (43%), compared with fewer than a quarter in older age groups. Younger people are also more likely than older respondents to say China takes the interest of other countries into account when making foreign policy decisions. And while about two-thirds across all age groups describe China as a competitor of the U.S., more 18- to 29-year-olds (22%) and 30- to 49-year-olds (19%) see China as a partner than do 50- to 64-year-olds (12%) and those 65 or older (7%).²

Obama’s China Policy

Nearly nine-in-ten government officials, and at least six-in-ten members of the news media, scholars, and business and trade leaders, approve of the way Obama is handling foreign policy. However, Obama receives lower marks among retired military officers, with a majority saying they disapprove of the president’s performance.

Asked to assess the Obama administration’s handling of China in particular, retired military officers also express more critical views than their counterparts. About half of retired military officers say Obama is not being tough enough with China, while 35% say his policy is about right. In contrast, majorities among the other four expert groups endorse the administration’s handling of China, including about two-thirds or more of government officials, scholars, and the news media.

Among the public, slightly more say Obama is not being tough enough with China than say his policy is about right (45% vs. 39%). Republicans are nearly twice as likely as Democrats to say the president should be tougher (65% vs. 35%); 49% of independents think Obama is not being tough enough with China.

Partisan Divisions on Views about China’s Rise

Republicans are considerably more concerned than Democrats about the impact of China’s rise. Six-in-ten Republicans believe China’s emergence as a world power poses a major threat to the U.S., compared with 48% of Democrats. Moreover, far more Republicans than Democrats see the U.S. trade deficit with China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the large amount of American debt held by the Asian nation as very serious problems.

Republicans are also far more likely to favor toughness with China on economic and trade issues, while Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say building a strong relationship with China is a top priority. About two-thirds of Republicans (68%) say it is very important for the U.S. to be tough with China, compared with 53% of Democrats; 48% of Republicans believe building a strong bilateral relationship should be a top priority, while 59% of Democrats offer this opinion.

Also of Note

• Americans view China primarily as an economic threat rather than a military one; 59% say the Asian nation’s economic strength worries them the most, while 28% say its military might is a greater concern.
• Majorities across all expert groups believe China will become more democratic as a result of economic growth.
• At least seven-in-ten Americans describe the Chinese people as hardworking (93%), competitive (89%) and inventive (73%). Most also associate these traits with the American people, but fewer say Americans are hardworking (78%) than say the same about the Chinese.
• About a quarter of the public (26%) names China as the country that represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more than volunteer any other country; 16% name Iran and 13% cite North Korea as the greatest danger. Opinions of which country represents the greatest danger vary across the five expert groups.
• Most experts would support the use of U.S. military force to defend Taiwan if China used military force against the island without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. If an attack from China followed a unilateral declaration of independence, however, half or more would oppose the use of U.S. military force to defend Taiwan.
• Majorities across the five expert groups say the world will be more stable in the long run if the U.S. remains the dominant power, but sizeable minorities, including 45% of business and trade leaders, say a balance of power between the U.S. and China would lead to more stability.

The image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office. Improvements in the U.S. image have been most pronounced in Western Europe, where favorable ratings for both the nation and the American people have soared. But opinions of America have also become more positive in key countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well.

Signs of improvement in views of America are seen even in some predominantly Muslim countries that held overwhelmingly negative views of the United States in the Bush years. The most notable increase occurred in Indonesia, where people are well aware of Obama’s family ties to the country and where favorable ratings of the U.S. nearly doubled this year. However for the most part, opinions of the U.S. among Muslims in the Middle East remain largely unfavorable, despite some positive movement in the numbers in Jordan and Egypt. Animosity toward the U.S., however, continues to run deep and unabated in Turkey, the Palestinian territories and Pakistan.

Israel stands out in the poll as the only public among the 25 surveyed where the current U.S. rating is lower than in past surveys.¹

In contrast, in Germany favorable opinion of the U.S. jumped from 31% in 2008 to 64% in the current survey. Large boosts in U.S. favorability ratings since last year are also recorded in Britain, Spain and France. In its own hemisphere, America’s image rose markedly in Canada, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. Improvements in U.S. ratings are less evident in countries where the country’s image had not declined consistently during the Bush years, including Poland, Japan and South Korea. Opinions of the U.S. remain very positive in the African nations of Kenya and Nigeria, while increasing significantly in India and China.

The new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted May 18 to June 16, finds that confidence in Barack Obama’s foreign policy judgments stands behind a resurgent U.S. image in many countries. Belief that Obama will “do the right thing in world affairs” is now nearly universal in Western countries, where lack of confidence in President Bush had been almost as prevalent for much of his time in office. In France and Germany, no fewer than nine-in-ten express confidence in the new American president, exceeding the ratings achieved by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel in their own countries.

In Asia, optimism about Obama is almost as extensive with 85% of Japanese and 81% of South Koreans expressing confidence in the American president, and only somewhat lower percentages expressing that view in India (77%) and China (64%). In Brazil, 76% have confidence in Obama, as do most Argentines (61%), despite their generally skeptical view of the U.S. as expressed in this and earlier surveys.

Even in some countries where the U.S. remains unpopular, significant percentages nonetheless say that they think Obama will do the right thing in international affairs. In Egypt and Jordan, sizable numbers have confidence in him – 42% and 31% respectively. This represents a three-fold increase compared with opinions about President Bush in 2008. But in Pakistan and the Palestinian territories, ratings of Obama are only marginally better than the abysmal ratings accorded Bush. Again, Israel stands alone as the only country where Obama does not engender more confidence than did President Bush. And only about one-in-three Russians (37%) voice confidence in the new president, although this is still a considerably better rating than Bush received in 2008 (22%).

In most countries where opinions of the U.S. have improved, many say that Obama’s election led them to have a more favorable view of the U.S. This admission is most apparent in Western Europe, Canada and Japan. In Indonesia, where opinion of America improved dramatically, no fewer than 73% say that his election bettered their opinion of the U.S. However even in countries where there was little or no upswing in the U.S.’s ratings, many people say that Obama’s election has led them to think more favorably of the U.S. For example in Egypt and Turkey, where America’s favorable ratings remain very low, as many as 38% in both countries say they have better opinions of the U.S. because of Obama. However, fewer than one-in-ten (9%) in Pakistan express that view.

More generally, analysis of the survey finds that views of the U.S. are being driven much more by personal confidence in Obama than by opinions about his specific policies. That is, opinions about Obama personally are more associated with views of the U.S. than are judgments of his policies that were tested in the poll.

Obama’s Cairo Speech

The polling in the Muslim world took place around the time of President Obama’s Cairo speech. In some countries, interviews took place both before and after the speech, providing some gauge of the effect of Obama’s remarks on his image and opinions of the U.S. more broadly. In Turkey a sufficient number of interviews were conducted before and after the speech to allow for an analysis of how much impact it had on public opinion. This analysis suggests that the speech had little measurable impact on views of the U.S. or Obama himself. However, the pre-post comparisons were rudimentary ones that could only have detected a major swing in public opinion.

In Israel and the Palestinian territories full surveys were conducted both before and after the Cairo speech. A pre-post analysis among both publics suggests that Obama’s June 4 speech had a more negative impact on attitudes toward America among Israelis than it had a positive one among Palestinians. Before the speech, 76% of Israelis questioned had a favorable view of the U.S., but after the speech that rating fell to 63%. Similarly, confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs slipped from 60% pre-speech to 49% post-speech.

Among Palestinians, in contrast, overall ratings of the U.S. and Obama improved but only marginally (+5 percentage points), a difference that is not statistically significant. However, one apparently positive consequence of the speech on Palestinian public opinion was observed in the survey. The number of Palestinians thinking that Obama would consider their country’s interests when making international policy rose from 27% to 39%, following the Cairo speech.

Obama vs. bin Laden

More generally, there is little evidence that a more positively regarded U.S. president has spurred further declines in support for terrorism in Muslim countries. Pew Global Attitudes surveys over the last few years have found many fewer Muslims than earlier in the decade saying that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. However, support for suicide bombing has not fallen further over the past year.

Opinions about Osama bin Laden have followed a similar trend line among the Muslim publics surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Views of him have been far more negative in recent years than they were mid-decade, but overall they have not declined further over the past year. However, for the first time over the course of Pew’s surveys, there is more confidence in the American president than in bin Laden in a number of countries with predominantly Muslim publics; including: Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Nigeria and Indonesia.

In 2008, most Muslim publics rated bin Laden as high, or higher than they rated President Bush. But in the current survey Obama inspires confidence in many more people than does the al Qaeda leader. However, in the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, bin Laden’s ratings still top Obama’s by sizable margins. (Lebanon is the only country in the survey where Bush’s ratings had been higher than bin Laden’s among Muslims in recent years).

Obama Runs the Table on Guantanamo and Iraq

Obama’s overall approval rating for some of his current international policies is high in most countries. This is especially so in Western Europe, where markedly more people than in the U.S. itself give a thumbs up to the new president’s foreign policy. Closing the military prison at Guantanamo and withdrawing troops from Iraq are the specific policies that engender the most public international support. Supra majorities in almost all countries favor both measures – including nearly all of the publics of predominantly Muslim countries surveyed. The one notable exception is the U.S., where the public is now divided about closing the military prison at Guantanamo.

Sending more troops to Afghanistan is the only Obama policy tested that does not engender broad global support. In fact, majorities in most countries oppose the added deployments. This includes the publics of several NATO countries – such as Britain, Germany, Spain and Canada – most of which in recent years have called for removing troops from Afghanistan. A majority of Pakistanis also oppose the call for more troops in Afghanistan, reflecting longstanding opposition to NATO operations in that country. Opinions in the U.S. and Israel are exceptional – majorities in both countries favor Obama’s request for more troops.

Afghanistan not withstanding, people around the world for the most part have high expectations for Barack Obama. Majorities of the publics of America’s traditional allies, who have thought the U.S. favors Israel too much think that Obama will be fair in his dealing with the Palestinians and Israelis. In the Mideast, however, large majorities are dubious. More than six-in-ten Jordanians (69%), Egyptians (66%) and Lebanese (63%) do not expect Obama to be even handed. In Israel, the number thinking Obama will be fair was 57% prior to the Cairo speech, but just 47% after Obama’s address. Among Palestinians, the view that the new American president will be fair rose marginally after the speech (25% to 31%).

The nearly 27,000 people questioned in the new Pew Global Attitudes survey are also generally optimistic that Obama will seek international approval before using military force and will take into account the interests of their country when making U.S. policy. Western Europeans and Canadians are especially positive in these regards. Publics around the world are also optimistic on another issue that has been a source of contention with regard to the U.S.: climate change. Majorities or pluralities of people in almost every country surveyed believe that Obama will get the U.S. to take significant measures to control climate change.

While the image of the U.S. is much improved and expectations about Obama are high, there has been only modest change in opinion of the U.S. on two key issues: multilateralism and the impact of the American global footprint. Expectations about Obama’s multilateralism not withstanding, most still say the U.S. is not considering their country when making foreign policy. Only in Germany, India, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, China and Brazil do majorities think the U.S. is taking their country’s interest into account when making foreign policy. And overwhelming numbers of people around the world continue to see the U.S. as having a big influence on their country, with the publics of most nations surveyed describing that influence as bad, rather than good. Exceptions are India and Kenya, where majorities say that the U.S. impact is positive.

Nonetheless, one concrete, positive sign for the new administration in the survey is a surge in support for U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism. The percentage favoring the U.S. effort among the nation’s allies had steadily declined from 2002 to 2007. The new survey once again finds majorities of Western Europeans and Canadians approving of the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. But increased support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts is also apparent in Poland, Russia, Brazil and Mexico. Among majority-Muslim publics, Indonesians are alone in supporting American anti-terrorism efforts. In that regard, while the image of the U.S. has improved somewhat in many predominantly Muslim countries, majorities in most continue to fear that the U.S. could pose a military threat to their country someday.

It’s Still the Economy

As in 2008, most people surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project say they are dissatisfied with conditions in their country. However, discontent increased sharply over the past year in Spain, Poland, Russia, Pakistan and Mexico. As in previous polls, an overwhelming number of Chinese (87%) say they are satisfied with conditions in their country. Majorities in Canada and India also express satisfaction with the way things were going in their countries. For India, the current recorded level of national contentment represents a major increase over 2008.

Overwhelmingly negative views of national economies underlie national discontent in most countries. Overall, ratings of national economic conditions have grown more negative in the last year. Among the 21 countries surveyed in 2008 and 2009, the median percentage rating their economy as bad is 74% this year, compared with 62% last year. Evaluations of economic conditions soured the most over the past year in Europe – specifically in Britain, Germany, Spain, Poland and Russia. But in China, India and Indonesia, where GDP has continued to grow, opinions of economic conditions have improved since 2008, especially in India.

Even though America’s image has improved markedly over the past year, majorities or pluralities in 20 of 25 publics believe that the U.S. economy is hurting their own economies. This was the prevailing view in most countries in the 2008 survey, as well. It is slightly more prevalent in the new poll – especially in Russia and Nigeria. In India most (55%) see the U.S. as having a positive effect on the economy, while the Chinese are divided about evenly on the American impact.

There is little consensus as to which of the major powers has the best plan to fix the economy. In Europe, only the French and Germans express strong confidence in the European Union. In Britain and Spain, where many favor the U.S. approach, confidence in the EU is lower. Most Americans (60%) believe the U.S. has the best approach to dealing with the global recession, though the poll does find that Obama’s economic stimulus plan is less popular in the United States than in Western Europe. As in the United States, most Chinese (60%) say their country’s approach to the global recession is best.

The 25-nation poll finds a mixed message in responses to the global recession. As in the past, majorities in most nations continue to endorse a free market economy and most people polled continue to endorse growing international trade ties. However, still more people say their governments should take steps to protect their countries economically, even if other friendly nations object. And as in previous surveys in this series, large percentages of people believe that their country needs to be protected against foreign influence and most favor greater restrictions and control on immigration.

While global recession concerns are clearly evident, huge majorities of the 25 publics questioned in the poll continue to see global warming as a serious problem. As has been the case in past years, the intensity of concern about this issue is somewhat less among the Chinese and the Americans compared with people in other major nations. But the current poll found the intensity of worry also slipping in Canada, Mexico, Britain, Spain, Poland, Russia and Turkey compared with levels in 2008. Stronger concern for global warming was recorded in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria and China. However, the Chinese continue to report far less intense worry about global warming than any of the other publics polled.

Notably, however, willingness to pay increased prices to combat climate change was much higher in China, and also India, than in other countries. Close to nine-in-ten among these two publics, both of which have seen GDP growth in the past year, agree that people should be willing to pay higher prices to address this problem. And support for higher prices to deal with climate change was also a good deal higher than average among the publics of two other major Asian economies – South Korea and Japan.

The poll found near universal awareness of swine flu among the 25 publics surveyed in late May and early June. Pakistan is the only country polled where people were largely unaware of the disease. Concern about swine flu was considerable: Majorities of those who have heard about the disease in most countries polled were very or somewhat worried about being exposed to it. Concerns were especially strong in parts of Asia, but surprisingly modest in Mexico, despite the number of deaths from swine flu that have occurred there.

Also of Note:

• Lebanese Sunnis are more confident in Obama than are either Christians or Shia. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon say they have at least some confidence in Obama, compared with 46% of Christians and just 26% of Shia Muslims.
• Brazilians increasingly view China, a fellow member of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as a partner. Nearly half of Brazilians (49%) now see China as a partner, up from 34% in 2008.
• Opinions of the European Union remain fairly tepid in Britain. In fact, more Canadians (71%) and Americans (56%) than the British (50%) express favorable opinions of the EU.
• Views of the United Nations have improved in the United States, as well as in Britain and France. Currently, 61% of Americans say they have a favorable view of the U.N., compared with 48% in 2007
• There is as much support for the free market in the Middle East as there is in Western Europe. And a higher percentage of Palestinians (82%) than any Western European public agrees that people are better off in a free market economy, even though some are rich and some are poor.