Special to New America Foundation

The recent deliberations in Washington about the fiscal cliff have triggered a national debate in the United States about the nature, extent and future sustainability of key elements of the U.S. social safety net: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, support for education, the unemployed and the poor. In the effort to tame the federal debt, cuts in spending on these social services have been a major part of the discussion – calling into question the social contract established with the American people during the Great Depression through the creation of public pensions and in the 1960s with the launching of limited government-provided health insurance.

America was a latecomer to the provision of many such social services. Germany put in place health and old age insurance in the 1880s. The United Kingdom instituted national health insurance after World War II. The benefits provided by the U.S. government cover a far smaller portion of the American population and are far less generous than those afforded to the citizens of other high-income nations.

In 2012 the United States spent an estimated 19.4% of GDP on such social expenditures, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Paris-based industrial country think tank. Denmark spent 30.5%, Sweden 28.2% and Germany 26.3%. All of these nations have a lower central government debt to GDP ratio than that of the United States.

Why the United States invests relatively less in its social safety net than many other countries and why those expenditures are even at risk in the current debate over debt reduction reflect Americans’ conflicted, partisan and often contradictory views on fairness, inequality, the role and responsibility of government and individuals in society and the efficacy of government action.

Rooted in value differences, not just policy differences, the debate over the U.S. social contract is likely to go on long after the fiscal cliff issue has been resolved.

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Special to CNN

Add faith in the work ethic and in capitalism to the lengthening list of casualties from the Great Recession. Four years after the Lehman Brothers’ fiasco and the ensuing global economic downturn, the idea that effort in a competitive economy can lead to success is seriously questioned in a number of major economies, including Japan, Russia and Greece, especially among those who have suffered the most.

In eight of 21 countries recently surveyed by the Pew Research Center, fewer than half believe hard work is a guarantee of success for most people. And in 11 of the 16 nations for which there is trend data since 2007, before the financial crisis began, support for capitalism is down. A notable exception is the United States, where 77 percent of the public still thinks that effort leads to accomplishment and 67 percent have confidence in free markets.

With worries mounting about a double dip global recession, attention has rightly focused on the potential human cost of such a renewed slump. But the low levels of belief that work leads to economic success, especially in a competitive economy, could imperil the rebound from any economic slowdown.

Read the full commentary at CNN’s Global Public Square blog

The economic mood is exceedingly glum all around the world. A median of just 27 percent think their national economy is doing well, according to a survey in 21 countries by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Only in China (83%), Germany (73%), Brazil (65%) and Turkey (57%) do most people report that current national economic conditions are good.

The public mood about the economy has worsened since 2008 in eight of 15 countries for which there is comparable data, while it is essentially unchanged in four others. The Chinese are the lone exception. They have been positive about their economy for the past decade.

Less than a third of Americans (31%) say the U.S. economy is doing well. That figure is up 13 percentage points from 2011. (But it is down 19 points from 2007, the year before the financial crunch began.) A median of just 16% of Europeans surveyed think their economy is performing up to par. That includes just 2% of the Greeks and 6% of the Spanish and Italians. Among Europeans, only the Germans (73%) give their economy a thumbs up. And just 7% of Japanese believe their economy is doing well.

People are, however, generally far more positive about their personal economic condition than they are about their nation’s economic situation. A median of 52 percent in the 21 nations surveyed feel satisfied with their own circumstances. Americans are twice as likely to say their family finances are in good shape as they are to say that the national economic situation is good. There are larger differences in Britain and Japan, where those who rate their personal economic situation as good exceed the number who have positive views of the national economy by more than four-to-one. Only the Chinese are significantly more likely to say the national economy is doing better than their families’ finances.

And there is some optimism that things will improve in the next 12 months, especially in Brazil (84%), China (83%) and Tunisia (75%). Nevertheless, pessimism about young peoples’ ability to do better than their parents is rampant, particularly in Europe (a median of only 9% think it will be easy) and Japan (10%). Again, the lone exception is China, where 57% say it will be easy for their children to become wealthier or to get a better job.

There is a striking contrast between the economic outlook in four of the emerging markets surveyed – Brazil, China, India and Turkey – and the European Union and the U.S. People living in these economies are generally more likely than Americans or Europeans to say that they are doing better than their parents. They are twice as likely as Americans and more than three times as likely as Europeans to think economic conditions in their countries are good. They are three times more likely than Europeans and more than twice as likely as Americans to say that they are financially better off compared with five years ago. And, while people in emerging markets also worry about the economic mobility of their children, they are four times more optimistic about the future for their kids than the Europeans and twice as optimistic as Americans.

In contrast, economic attitudes are particularly gloomy in the four nations polled in the Arab world. Only a third of those surveyed think they are better off than their parents at the same age. A median of only 30% say they are doing well financially. And a median of only 16% believe their children will have an easy time becoming economically better off than themselves.

Tough times have undermined the work ethic in a number of countries among people who are suffering economically. Those who say their personal finances are a mess are far less likely than those who are doing well to believe that most people succeed if they work hard.

The global economic crisis has eroded support for capitalism. In 11 of the 21 nations surveyed, half or fewer now agree with the statement that people are better off in a free market economy even though some people are rich and some are poor. And such backing is down in 9 of 16 nations with comparable data since 2007, before the Great Recession began. Such disenchantment is particularly acute in Italy (where support for a free market economy is down 23 percentage points), Spain (20 points) and Poland (15 points).

These are among the key findings from a new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in 21 countries among 26,210 respondents from March 17 to April 20, 2012.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

In contrast to today’s grim mood, optimism was relatively high in the spring of 1991, when the Times Mirror Center surveyed Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. At that time all three were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991).¹ Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

As was the case two decades ago, the shift towards democracy tends to be more popular among those who are perhaps best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided by an open society. In all three countries, young people, the well-educated and urban dwellers express the most support for their country’s move to a multiparty system.

People in these former Soviet republics are much less confident that democracy can solve their country’s problems than they were in 1991. When asked whether they should rely on a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand to solve their national problems, only about three-in-ten Russians and Ukrainians choose democracy, down significantly from 1991. Roughly half (52%) say this in Lithuania, a 27-percentage-point decline from the level recorded two decades ago.

When asked about the current state of democracy in their country, big majorities in all three former republics say they are dissatisfied. Moreover, in Lithuania and Ukraine, dissatisfaction has increased in just the last two years. A fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 60% of Lithuanians said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working; today 72% say so. In Ukraine, unhappiness with the state of democracy has risen from 70% to 81%.

These are among the major findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania from March 21 to April 7 as part of a broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011. The survey reexamines a number of issues first explored in a spring 1991 survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center, the predecessor of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. This report also presents a number of key findings from a fall 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in these three nations, as well as in 10 other European countries and the United States. (See “ End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations ,” released November 2, 2009.)

Changes Have Helped Elites

Large majorities in all three nations believe that elites have prospered over the last two decades, while average citizens have not. In Ukraine, for instance, 95% think politicians have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the changes since 1991, and 76% say this about business owners. However, just 11% believe ordinary people have benefited.

The fall 2009 survey further highlighted the extent to which these publics are disillusioned with their political leadership. Few believed politicians listened to them or that politicians governed with the interests of the people in mind.

Just 26% of Russians, 23% of Ukrainians, and 15% of Lithuanians agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think.” And only 37% in Russia, 23% in Lithuania, and 20% in Ukraine agreed that “generally, the state is run for the benefit of all the people.”

A Democracy Gap

As the findings of the 2009 survey make clear, there is a considerable gap between the democratic aspirations of Eastern Europeans and their perceptions of how democracy actually works in the former Eastern bloc.

In all three former Soviet republics surveyed, the 2009 poll found widespread support for specific features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary, honest elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free speech and civilian control of the military.

Majorities consistently said it was important to live in a country that had these key democratic institutions and values, and large numbers believed most of these features were very important. However, considerably fewer thought their countries actually had these democratic institutions and freedoms.

Less Confidence in Free Markets

Just as views about democracy have soured over the past two decades, so have attitudes toward capitalism. In 1991, 76% of Lithuanians approved of switching to a market economy; now, only 45% approve. Among Ukrainians, approval fell from 52% in 1991 to 34% today. Meanwhile, 42% of Russians currently endorse the free market approach, a 12-percentage-point drop since 1991, eight points of which occurred in just the last two years. In all three nations, young people and the college educated are more likely to embrace free markets.

Waning confidence in capitalism may be tied at least in part to frustration with the current economic situation. Only 29% of Russians say their economy is in good shape, while Lithuanians and Ukrainians offer even bleaker assessments. Among the 23 nations from regions around the world included in the spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Lithuanians (9% good) and Ukrainians (6%) give their economies the lowest ratings. (For more, see “ China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower ,” released July 13, 2011.)

Moreover, optimism about the economic future is in short supply. More than four-in-ten Ukrainians (44%) expect their economy to worsen over the next 12 months, while 36% believe it will stay about the same, and just 15% think it will improve. Optimism is also sparse in Lithuania, with 31% saying things will worsen, 43% saying things will stay the same, and 21% suggesting the situation will improve. Russians see things a bit more positively: 18% worsen, 46% remain the same, 28% improve.

Negative Impacts on Society

Many in these three nations believe the enormous transformations that have taken place since the demise of the Soviet Union have had negative consequences for their societies. In particular, majorities in all three say the changes since 1991 have had a bad influence on the standard of living, the way people in society treat one another, law and order, and public morality.

Overall, Lithuanians are less negative than Ukrainians and Russians about the impact of the post-Soviet era. For example, majorities in the latter two nations say the changes have negatively affected national pride, while only 30% of Lithuanians hold this view.

Even so, Lithuanians are generally more negative about the impact of these changes today than they were in 1991, when the Times Mirror Center survey asked about the dramatic shifts that were underway. Conversely, Russians and Ukrainians have actually become slightly less negative since 1991, when they were even more likely than they are today to believe the changes were having a bad impact on their societies.

Lithuanian Individualism

Lithuanians also stand apart when it comes to questions about individualism and the locus of responsibility for success in life. Most Lithuanians (55%) believe that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition, compared with only 38% of Russians and 32% of Ukrainians.

Similarly, 58% in Lithuania think that most people who do not succeed in life fail because of their own individual shortcomings, rather than because of society’s failures. Just 47% of Russians and 40% of Ukrainians express this opinion.

Still, there is consensus across all three nations that the state’s role in guaranteeing individual freedom should not trump its responsibility for providing a social safety net. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” more than two-thirds choose the latter in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, the belief that the state must ensure that no one is in need has become significantly more common since 1991 in all three nations.

Russian Nationalism

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, roughly half of Russians (48%) believe it is natural for their country to have an empire, while just 33% disagree with this idea. By contrast, in 1991, during the final months of the USSR, significantly fewer (37%) thought it was natural for Russia to have an empire, while 43% disagreed.

Half of Russians also agree with the statement “it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists;” 36% disagree. This is a slight decline from 2009, when 58% agreed and 38% disagreed. Russians ages 50 and older tend to express more nostalgia for the Soviet era than do those under 50.

Despite widespread nationalist sentiments, Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians and Lithuanians in their country are largely positive – 80% express a favorable view of the Ukrainians and 62% give a positive rating to Lithuanians.

For their part, Ukrainians express overwhelmingly positive views about Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians in their country. Similarly, in Lithuania, attitudes toward Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are all generally positive.

Looking West or East?

Attitudes toward the European Union and NATO are overwhelming positive in Lithuania, which joined both organizations in 2004. In fact, Lithuanians give the EU its highest rating among the 23 countries included in the spring 2011 poll. Even so, just about half of Lithuanians view their country’s EU membership positively – 49% believe it is a good thing, 31% say it is neither good nor bad, and 8% say it is bad.

Lithuanians give the United States largely positive marks – 73% have a favorable opinion of the U.S. Attitudes toward Russia are also positive on balance (53% favorable, 42% unfavorable), but not as positive as for the EU, NATO, and U.S.

Most Ukrainians express favorable opinions of the EU (72%) and U.S. (60%), but NATO is not viewed as warmly (34%). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) have a positive view of Russia.

As is the case in Ukraine, most Russians give the EU (64%) and U.S. (56%) positive reviews, but not NATO (37%).

Also of Note

• When asked which is more important, a good democracy or a strong economy, more than seven-in-ten Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians say a strong economy.
• In Ukraine, a 46%-plurality believes it is natural for Russia to have an empire.
• The belief that ability and ambition determine success in life is consistently more common among young people in these three former Soviet republics.
• Attitudes toward NATO vary significantly by region in Ukraine. About six-in-ten (59%) have a positive view of NATO in the Western region of the country. However, those in the Central (38%), South (21%) and East (18%) regions are much less likely to express a favorable opinion of the security alliance.

Survey Report

As has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many important ways. Most notably, Americans are more individualistic and are less supportive of a strong safety net than are the publics of Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Americans are also considerably more religious than Western Europeans, and are more socially conservative with respect to homosexuality.

Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Moreover, Americans more often than their Western European allies believe that obtaining UN approval before their country uses military force would make it too difficult to deal with an international threat. And Americans are less inclined than the Western Europeans, with the exception of the French, to help other nations.

These differences between Americans and Western Europeans echo findings from previous surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. However, the current polling shows the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to that of other nations. Today, only about half of Americans believe their culture is superior to others, compared with six-in-ten in 2002. And the polling finds younger Americans less apt than their elders to hold American exceptionalist attitudes.

These are among the findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Spain from March 21 to April 14 as part of the broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011.

Use of Military Force

Three-quarters of Americans agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world; this view is shared by seven-in-ten in Britain and narrower majorities in France and Spain (62% each). Germans are evenly divided, with half saying the use of force is sometimes necessary and half saying it is not.

Germans are more supportive of the use of military force than they have been in recent years. For example, in 2007, just about four-in-ten (41%) Germans agreed that it was sometimes necessary, while 58% disagreed. Opinions have been more stable in the U.S., Britain and France.

For the most part, opinions about the use of force do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Germany and Spain, however, support for the use of military force is far more widespread among men than among women. Six-in-ten German men agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world, compared with just 40% of women. And while majorities across gender groups in Spain believe the use of force may be necessary, more Spanish men than Spanish women say this is the case (68% vs. 56%).

In Britain, France, Spain and the U.S., conservatives, or those on the political right, are more likely than liberals, or those on the left, to agree that the use of force is sometimes necessary to maintain world order. However, in the four countries, majorities across ideological groups express this view.¹

When asked whether their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with international threats, American opinion differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Americans are almost evenly divided on the question, with 45% saying that the U.S. should have UN approval while 44% say this would make it too difficult to deal with threats; in contrast, solid majorities in the four Western European nations surveyed, including about three-quarters in Spain (74%) and Germany (76%) say their country should have UN approval before it takes military action.

In Western Europe, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say their country should have UN approval before using military force, although majorities across both groups share this view. For example, in Spain, 84% of those who graduated from college say UN approval should be obtained, compared with 70% of those who do not have a college degree. Double-digit differences are also evident in Britain (15 percentage points), Germany (11 points) and France (10 points). This is not the case in the U.S., where respondents across education groups offer nearly identical views.

In Germany, gender differences are also notable; even though German men are more likely than women to say the use of military force is sometimes necessary, more men than women say their country should have UN approval before using force (83% vs. 70%).

The view that their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with threats is far more prevalent among American liberals than among conservatives. Close to six-in-ten (57%) liberals favor obtaining UN approval, while 33% say this would make it too difficult for the U.S. to deal with threats; in contrast, most conservatives (52%) say getting UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with threats, while 38% say this is an important step. Political moderates fall between the other two groups, with 49% saying the U.S. should seek the approval of the UN before using military force and 42% saying this would make it too difficult to deal with threats. The same ideological difference is generally not evident in Western Europe.

Views on International Engagement

About four-in-ten (39%) Americans say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems, while a narrow majority (52%) says the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems as best they can. In this regard, Americans are not drastically different from respondents in France, where 43% believe their country should help other countries and 57% say it should focus on its own problems.

The British are nearly evenly divided; 45% say their country should help other countries deal with their problems and about the same number (48%) believe Britain should deal with its own problems.

Compared with the U.S., France and Britain, Spain and Germany stand out as the only countries where majorities favor international engagement: 55% and 54%, respectively, say their countries should provide assistance to others, while 40% in Spain and 43% in Germany take the more isolationist view.

Opinions about international engagement have changed somewhat in the U.S., France and Spain since last year, but while publics in the two Western European countries are now more in favor of helping others than they were in 2010, more Americans currently take an isolationist position. Last year, about the same number of Americans said their country should help other countries (45%) as said it should let other countries deal with their own problems (46%). Similarly, the Spanish were nearly evenly divided, with 49% favoring engagement and 47% taking an isolationist approach. In France, where a majority continues to take an isolationist view, even more (65%) did so a year ago.

In the U.S. as well as in the four Western European countries surveyed, those with a college degree are far more likely than those with less education to offer an internationalist view. This is especially the case in Germany, where about three-quarters (73%) of those who graduated from college believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems, compared with a narrow majority (52%) of those without a college degree.

Political ideology is also a factor in Germany, France and Spain. In these three countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to take the isolationist view when it comes to international engagement. For example, while about half (48%) of left-wing French say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, about six-in-ten (59%) on the right offer this opinion.

Cultural Superiority

About half of Americans (49%) and Germans (47%) agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;” 44% in Spain share this view. In Britain and France, only about a third or fewer (32% and 27%, respectively) think their culture is better than others.

While opinions about cultural superiority have remained relatively stable over the years in the four Western European countries surveyed, Americans are now far less likely to say that their culture is better than others; six-in-ten Americans held this belief in 2002 and 55% did so in 2007. Belief in cultural superiority has declined among Americans across age, gender and education groups.

As in past surveys, older Americans remain far more inclined than younger ones to believe that their culture is better than others. Six-in-ten Americans ages 50 or older share this view, while 34% disagree; those younger than 30 hold the opposite view, with just 37% saying American culture is superior and 61% saying it is not. Opinions are more divided among those ages 30 to 49; 44% in this group see American culture as superior and 50% do not.

Similar age gaps are not as common in the Western European countries surveyed, with the exception of Spain, where majorities of older respondents, but not among younger ones, also think their culture is better than others; 55% of those ages 50 or older say this is the case, compared with 34% of those ages 30 to 49 and 39% of those younger than 30.

As is the case on other measures, opinions about cultural superiority vary considerably by educational attainment. In the four Western European countries and in the U.S., those who did not graduate from college are more likely than those who did to agree that their culture is superior, even if their people are not perfect. For example, Germans with less education are about twice as likely as those with a college degree to believe their culture is superior (49% vs. 25%); double-digit differences are also present in France (20 percentage points), Spain (18 points) and Britain (11 points), while a less pronounced gap is evident in the U.S. (9 points).

Finally, among Americans and Germans, political conservative are especially likely to believe their culture is superior to others. In the U.S., 63% of conservatives take this view, compared with 45% of moderates and just 34% of liberals. Similarly, a majority (54%) of right-wing Germans see their culture as superior, while 47% of moderates and 33% of those on the political left agree.

Individualism and the Role of the State

American opinions continue to differ considerably from those of Western Europeans when it comes to views of individualism and the role of the state. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) Americans believe it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state, while just 35% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need.

In contrast, at least six-in-ten in Spain (67%), France (64%) and Germany (62%) and 55% in Britain say the state should ensure that nobody is in need; about four-in-ten or fewer consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In the U.S., Britain, France and Germany, views of the role of the state divide significantly across ideological lines. For example, three-quarters of American conservatives say individuals should be free to pursue their goals without interference from the state, while 21% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need; among liberals in the U.S., half would like the state to play an active role to help the needy, while 42% prefer a more limited role for the state.

Those on the political right in Britain, France and Germany are also more likely than those on the left in these countries to prioritize freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference. Unlike in the U.S., however, majorities of those on the right in France (57%) and Germany (56%) favor an active role for the state, as do more than four-in-ten (45%) conservatives in Britain.

American opinions about the role of the state also vary considerably across age groups. About half (47%) of those younger than 30 prioritize the freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state and a similar percentage (46%) say it is more important for the state to ensure that nobody is in need; among older Americans, however, about six-in-ten consider being free a higher priority, with just about three-in-ten saying the state should play an active role so that nobody is in need. No such age difference is evident in the four Western European countries surveyed.

Asked if they agree that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” Americans again offer more individualistic views than those expressed by Western Europeans. Only 36% of Americans believe they have little control over their fate, compared with 50% in Spain, 57% in France and 72% in Germany; Britain is the only Western European country surveyed where fewer than half (41%) share this view.

In the U.S. and in Western Europe, those without a college degree are less individualistic than those who have graduated from college; this is especially the case in the U.S. and Germany. About three-quarters (74%) of Germans in the less educated group believe that success in life is largely determined by forces beyond one’s control, compared with 55% of college graduates. Among Americans, 41% of those without a college degree say they have little control over their fate, while just 22% of college graduates share this view.

Religion More Important to Americans

Americans also distinguish themselves from Western Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.

Moreover, Americans are far more inclined than Western Europeans to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 53% say this is the case in the U.S., compared with just one-third in Germany, 20% in Britain, 19% in Spain and 15% in France.

In the U.S., women and older respondents place more importance on religion and are more likely than men and younger people to say that faith in God is a necessary foundation for morality and good values. About six-in-ten (59%) American women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41% of men; and while a majority (56%) of Americans ages 50 and older say religion is very important to them, 48% of those ages 30 to 49 and 41% of those younger than 30 place similar importance on religion.

Similarly, while a majority of American women (58%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, men are nearly evenly divided, with 47% saying belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality and 51% saying it is not. Among Americans ages 50 and older, 58% say one must believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 50% of those ages 30 to 49 and 46% of those younger than 30 share this view.

Education also plays a role in views of religion in the U.S., to some extent. Although Americans with a college degree are about as likely as those without to say religion is very important to them (47% and 51%, respectively), the less educated are far more inclined to say that one must believe in God in order to be moral; 59% of those without a college degree say this, compared with 37% of those who have graduated from college.

Views of religion and whether belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality vary little, if at all, across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed. In Spain, however, respondents ages 50 and older place more importance on religion than do younger people, although relatively few in this age group say it is very important to them; 33% say this is the case, compared with 16% of those ages 30 to 49 and 11% of those younger than 30.

Politically, conservatives in the U.S., Spain and Germany are more likely than liberals to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, but while solid majorities of conservatives in the U.S. (66%) take this position, fewer than half of conservatives in Spain (31%) and Germany (46%) share this view. Meanwhile, just 26% of liberals in the U.S., 11% in Spain and 19% in Germany say belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality. Conservatives in the U.S. are also far more likely than liberals to consider religion very important in their lives (67% vs. 29%); in Western Europe, few across ideological groups place high importance on religion.

Religious vs. National Identity

American Christians are more likely than their Western European counterparts to think of themselves first in terms of their religion rather than their nationality; 46% of Christians in the U.S. see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In contrast, majorities of Christians in France (90%), Germany (70%), Britain (63%) and Spain (53%) identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

In Britain, France and Germany, more Christians now see themselves in terms of their nationality than did so five years ago, when national identification was already widespread in these countries. This change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

Among Christians in the U.S., white evangelicals are especially inclined to identify first with their faith; 70% in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among other American Christians, more identify with their nationality (55%) than with their religion (38%).

Homosexuality

Tolerance for homosexuality is widespread in the U.S. and Western Europe, but far more Western Europeans than Americans say homosexuality should be accepted by society; at least eight-in-ten in Spain (91%), Germany (87%), France (86%) and Britain (81%), compared with 60% in the U.S.

Acceptance of homosexuality has increased in recent years, and the shift is especially notable in the U.S., where only slightly more said it should be accepted (49%) than said it should be rejected (41%) in 2007. Today, more Americans accept homosexuality than reject it by a 27-percentage point margin.

While there are some differences in opinions of homosexuality across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed, overwhelming majorities across age, education and gender groups believe homosexuality should be accepted by society. In the U.S., however, these differences are somewhat more pronounced. For example, while 67% of American women believe homosexuality should be accepted, a much narrower majority of men (54%) share that view. Among Americans with college degrees, 71% accept homosexuality, compared with 56% of those with less education. Finally, about two-thirds (68%) of Americans younger than 30 say homosexuality should be accepted by society; 61% of those ages 30 to 40 and 55% of those ages 50 and older share this view.

In addition to demographic differences, an ideological divide on views of homosexuality is also notable in the U.S., where more than eight-in-ten (85%) liberals and 65% of moderates express tolerant views, compared with 44% of conservatives. In the four Western European countries surveyed, at least three-quarters across ideological groups say homosexuality should be accepted by society.

Ample data and analysis paint a portrait of America as a nation unified and exceptional in its optimism, individualism, patriotism, religiosity, and faith in technology. But is this a fair representation of the opinions and values of a large, very heterogeneous country. Is there another America of substantial size and importance ignored in this depiction? Perhaps one peopled by cadres of closet Europhiles?

Quite so, contends the British academic and columnist Timothy Garton Ash. In his most recent book, Free World, Garton Ash argues that there are in fact “two Americas,” whose borders track the “red-blue” divide now familiar from election-night TV maps. Moreover, he maintains that “blue” America — those more liberal states, primarily on the two coasts — often turn out to be a “quite European shade of pink.”¹

In a similar vein, political scientists Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia assert that “the real gap across the Atlantic is between American conservatives and the European mainstream.” Analyzing findings from a 2004 survey sponsored by the German Marshall Fund, they trace the source of this gap to different attitudes on key international issues: the importance of NATO and the United Nations; the use of force as a foreign policy tool; and the impact of the invasion of Iraq on the terrorism threat.²

No doubt, political divisions between Americans have sharpened in recent years, with national security issues emerging as a major focal point of partisan differences. Pew Research Center polls have demonstrated the rapid dissipation of the spirit of unity that prevailed in the country — and indeed across much of the world — in the wake of the September 11 attacks. By some measures, the gaps between American political parties on issues such as the war on terror and the use of military force are greater than in any earlier period covered by systematic polling. The most that can be concluded from the Pew data is that the views of Democrats, and to a lesser degree independents, are somewhat closer to the French, Germans, Italians, and, especially, the British than they are to Republicans with respect to select national security issues — though not with respect to the use of force. Partisan divisions are also clear with regard to the efficacy of government and the breadth and depth of the social safety net. Still, after American opinions are sliced and diced and compared to European views, the data do not support the notion that either members of the Democratic Party or residents of the coastal regions of the country would feel more at home on the other side of the Atlantic.

Core Values

Alan Wolfe had it right, by and large, when he concluded that Americans are One Nation, After All, as he titled his 1998 book. The well known sociologist spent two years conducting lengthy interviews with 200 middle-class Americans in eight communities spread across every region of the country. His sample was small but his findings are remarkably in tune with those that emerge from Pew’s large surveys.³

Yes, there are value differences, Wolfe found, between policemen and firemen in Massachusetts, retirees in a gated West Coast retirement community, African Americans in Georgia, Latinos and Asians in California, and southern whites in the Bible Belt. Views on family structures, women in the workplace, immigration, race, and welfare do vary, but the differences are more of degree than of kind, and both are further from the cultural elites of the left or the right than they are from each other. The same is true in comparing these diverse Americans to Europeans.

Among the most striking findings is Americans’ bipartisan consensus on personal optimism. Americans virtually lead the world as the most satisfied wealthy people. There is no significant difference between Republicans and Democrats in expressed contentment with their lives. On an index of progress keyed to per capita income, in which respondents rated their lives five years in the past, at the present, and five years into the future, Americans lead all peoples by a wide margin. In this case, Democrats are even more optimistic than Republicans. (Chart 10.1)

Americans from both political parties are also strongly individualistic. Personal independence has long been the cornerstone of the American character. In the early 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville noted in a trenchant and enduring observation that Americans’ “complete independence, which they constantly enjoy in regard to their equals and in the intercourse of private life, tends to make them look upon all authority with a jealous eye, and speedily suggests to them the notion and the love of political freedom.” True to these sentiments, Americans consider themselves among the freest people in the world. Fully 24% say that they have a great deal of freedom, according to the World Values Survey. By contrast, only 13% of Germans, 12% of Britons, and 9% of Spaniards and Italians consider themselves very free.⁴

With this sense of independence comes a uniquely American sense of personal empowerment and responsibility. Two in three Americans reject the idea that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” Americans’ belief that they control their own destiny has actually increased slightly over the last decade and a half. Republicans are somewhat more likely than Democrats, by a margin of 78% to 61%, to hold individuals primarily accountable for their lives. But the proportion of Republicans and Democrats with this view exceeds the proportion of respondents in all European countries surveyed, with the closest correspondence among Britons (48%) and Germans and Italians (both 31%).

Americans’ religiosity also distinguishes them from Europeans, regardless of party affiliation. In a survey conducted in 2002, more than six-in-ten Republicans and virtually the same proportion of Democrats agreed that belief in God is necessary in order “to be moral and have good values.” More recently, a 2004 survey found somewhat smaller numbers, with about half of both Republicans and Democrats subscribing to this view, and in both surveys, slightly fewer than half of independents equated religion and morals. But even this proportion was far higher than in much of Europe, where in 2002 only one-in-three Germans and a mere one-in-eight of the French said they saw belief in God and morality as inextricably linked. The Americans who thought most like these secular Europeans were highly-educated Democrats and independents with a college degree or better. Only three in ten among these groups saw a necessary tie between religious faith and morals.⁵

On the question of the importance of religion “in your own life,” Republicans were, by and large, more religious than Democrats, while independents were the most secular. However, all three groups scored well above the European averages, with 66% of Republicans, 55% of Democrats, and 48% of independents saying that religion is very important in their lives. The numbers of Europeans rating religion of high personal importance in the same 2004 survey ranged downward from 33% of the British to 11% of the French. Within the U.S. political parties, the only important regional variation in religiosity is among Southern Democrats, 71% of whom believe religion is very important. The relatively large numbers of African Americans remaining in the Democratic Party in the South may explain this figure.⁶

Views on homosexuality do reflect a considerable partisan divide among Americans, but also a substantial disagreement with Europe. Democrats and independents were significantly more likely than Republicans (59% and 52%, versus 38%) to agree that “homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society.” But these rates are still well below European acceptance levels, which ranged from 72% in Italy to a high of 83% in Germany. (Chart 10.2)

Some regional variance in Americans’ attitudes toward homosexuality exists along the “red/blue” divide. Two-thirds of Democrats in the Northeast, and slightly more in the West, believed society should accept homosexuality, levels which approached European views. In the Midwest and South, significantly fewer Democrats agreed (57% and 50%, respectively). Education is also a factor influencing Democrats’ attitudes: 83% of those with a post-graduate degree took a tolerant view of homosexuality, which was quite near the rate of acceptance among highly educated French and Germans. Republicans, on the other hand, whatever their educational level, differed little in their views about homosexuality.⁷

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2005

Views on Government and the Social Safety Net

Rugged individualism is a much prized and storied virtue In the United States, bound up with both Americans’ self-image and foreigners’ perception of the American character. With such a go-it-alone heritage, it should come as no surprise that eight-in-ten Americans believed that if people don’t succeed in life it is because of their own individual failures.

On this issue, the views of Democrats and independents are indeed closer to those of Europeans than they are to those of Republicans. In 2002, barely one-in-ten Republicans blamed society for the plight of poor people, while nearly three-in-ten Democrats and one-in-four independents put the primary onus on society. The French agreed with the Democrats, as did one-in-five Germans and Britons. While divisions on this question show little regional variation and so do not map along the “red-blue” divide, 45% of Democrats with a college degree or more said society is at fault for people’s poverty — in this case a much greater tendency to blame society than prevails in Europe.⁸

Note: Question was worded, “Now I’m going to read you a list of issues facing people in our society today. For each, please tell me if it is something you think people like you should feel entirely responsible for, or if it is something people like you should expect the government to help with.”

Other “quasi-European” tendencies among Democrats were identified in an exploration of intergenerational attitudes toward Social Security and the safety net conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates in 1997. Democrats were somewhat closer to Europeans in assigning government the responsibility for seeing that individuals save enough to maintain their standard of living in retirement, for ensuring that old people do not retire into poverty and, especially, for ensuring that “no one lives in poverty.” But when respondents were asked whether “people like you” should feel “entirely responsible” for providing food, clothing, and housing for their children under age 18, Democrats were far closer to Republicans on average (79% and 89% agreed, respectively) than to Europeans (57% agreed). The level at which independents agreed was precisely the average for Americans as a whole: 82%. A more recent poll in 2005 backed these findings. Indeed, it is noteworthy that on nearly every question regarding social issues, independents — who are the controlling center of American politics — stand squarely between the two parties and thus also to the right of Europeans.⁹

The National Security Divide

As mentioned earlier, a number of commentators see a widening gap on national security between “red” state Republicans and “blue” state Democrats. For example, Asmus, Everts and Isernia argue that “[t]he real gap across the Atlantic is between American conservatives and the European mainstream.” They point to “the existence of a strong ‘hawk’ minority centered in the Republican Party that believes that military power is more important than economic power and that war is, at times, necessary to obtain justice.” Pew’s data support this analysis to a large degree. All Americans are certainly more willing to use force than most Europeans, and significant partisan differences are found on these issues.¹⁰

In 2004, almost nine-in-ten Republicans agreed that “the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism.” Independents were more skeptical, with two-thirds agreeing. Democrats, however, were doubtful, with barely more than half accepting the war as sincere. In Europe, British views were very close to those of Democrats, but the continent was more dubious, with only one-third of the French and three-in-ten Germans agreeing. Most striking was that the gap between Republicans and Democrats was double that between Democrats and Germans: a 36-percentage-point “red-blue” spread versus a 17-percentage-point trans-Atlantic difference.¹¹

Republicans also took a far dimmer view of the United Nations than did Democrats. Merely 21% agreed that the United States “should have UN approval before it uses military forces to deal with an international threat” compared with 57% of Democrats, 64% of the British, 63% of the French, and 80% of Germans. Again, the gap between the American partisans is much greater than that between Democrats and Europeans. Republicans, as well as independents, also held a less favorable view of the United Nations overall than did Democrats, with the Democrats supporting the international body at virtually the same rate as the Germans and the French.

Republicans were also more inclined than Democrats to use military force “to deal with threats to world peace.” In this case, however, the partisan gap was not nearly so great. In a 2002 survey, 92% of Republicans said they completely or mostly agreed with military intervention in such situations, compared with 77% of Democrats. Here Democratic views were closest to those in Great Britain, where 81% of the public supported the use of military force, but far more bellicose than those in Germany, where only 54% of those surveyed supported military force. Even among Democrats in the Northeast, the putative hotbed of liberal pacifism, support for military action against threats to world peace was 72%.¹²

On the Middle East, a sensitive issue in U.S. politics, Democrats fell midway between Republicans and Europeans on sympathy for Israel. Six-in-ten Republicans, compared with slightly more than four-in-ten Democrats and independents, said they sympathize more with Israelis than with Palestinians. Only two-in-ten Europeans agreed.

Republicans, once the major isolationist party in the United States, have in general become more internationally minded and activist since September 11. However, relatively few members of either party believe that the nation should be “the single world leader.” The proportion of Republicans holding that view actually declined slightly in the past few years, from 19% in pre-attack September 2001 to 14% in 2004. But Republicans were more likely to agree in 2004 that the United States should be the “most active of the leading nations” in the world: 40% supported this role for the country, compared with 26% three years earlier. (By contrast only 22% of both Democrats and independents subscribed to that view in 2004, down from 28% among Democrats in 2001; the view among independents was unchanged between those years.)

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2004

Along the same line, Republicans are now less likely than Democrats to believe that America “should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.” Fully 55% of Republicans in 2004 still favored focusing more on the home front, but that response level was markedly lower than the 75% of Democrats who favored a domestic focus. Significant differences on this question were found within both parties according to educational level. The internationalist outlook was supported by fewer than three-in-ten Republicans with a high school education or less compared with more than half of both Republicans and Democrats with college or post-graduate degrees.

Republicans were also far more inclined than Democrats, by a 19-percentage-point margin, to believe the United States “takes into account the interests of other countries around the world” (85% versus 56% in 2004). But even here, where the partisan division was sharp, the American outlook was significantly different from the viewpoint in Europe, where as few as 32% of respondents believed that the United States is mindful of other national interests. Only Democrats with post-graduate degrees were as dubious as Europeans about American concerns for other countries.¹³

Still, it is easy to overstate the durability of the “red-blue” divide even on the international issues that have become so contentious in recent political debates. Foreign policy differences between American political parties have often been influenced by perceptions of the man in the White House. During Bill Clinton’s tenure, Republicans were inclined to criticize American interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia. With Republicans in firm control of both the presidency and Congress, the U.S. government took a tougher line on foreign policy even before the September 11 attacks. Whether it will endure if there is a change in Republican political fortunes is not certain.

Moreover, there are many other international issues on which partisan differences are slight. On the matter of “promoting democracy in other nations,” a building block of Bush administration foreign policy, Republicans were only slightly more likely to rate it as a top priority than were Democrats or Independents in an August 2004 Pew survey. When respondents were examined by party, region, and education, the group that recorded the highest level of support for promoting democracy was, surprisingly, Democrats with a high school education.

Moreover, more than 80% of both Democrats and Republicans believed it would be “a good thing…if the European Union becomes as powerful as the U.S.” Such support for a stronger Europe registered not far below the 90%-and-upward recorded in European countries. And little separates Republicans and Democrats on the question of whether “the U.S. and Europe should remain as close” as in the past on diplomatic and security affairs: 51% of Republicans and 61% of Democrats agreed. In comparison, only 40% of Britons, 36% of Germans, and a mere 21% of the French favored remaining as closely tied to America.¹⁴

So even as partisan differences have escalated in the United States in recent years, the divisions among Americans are not great enough to contend that there is no coherent American point of view on many issues. Certainly with respect to core personal values, the differences in the United States are minimal across partisan, regional, and class lines when compared against European views. Democrats, as members of America’s left-of-center party, stand closer than Republicans to the publics of the social democracies of Western Europe when it comes to the role of government in society and the extent of the social safety net. Nevertheless, Democrats as a whole are more conservative than Europeans. The same is true with respect to the national security issues that have been so polarizing in the United States during the Bush years.

In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that the divide between Republicans and Democrats on the use of force to protect the country revolves around how to use force, not whether to use it. The gap between parties on America’s leadership role in the world is not huge. And despite their loyalty to President Bush, Republicans endorse his call for promoting democracy around the world only marginally more than do Democrats. Members of both parties agree that it would be a nice thing to spread democracy, but both give it very low priority relative to other international objectives for the United States.

These attitudes reflect the skepticism and pragmatic realism that are important qualities in the American character. The United States is, at heart, a nation of realistic centrists, with the important caveat that the middle of the American national road runs considerably to the right of the European mainstream. Most Americans are wary of ideologues of the left or of the right, and rarely inclined to impose their personal beliefs upon others even when their moral and religious beliefs are strongly held. In the end, Americans are far more alike than different from each other, and still exceptional in being distinct from Europeans by most measures.

The speed of the war in Iraq and the prevailing belief that the Iraqi people are better off as a result have modestly improved the image of America. But in most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era — the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance.

These are the principal findings from the latest survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted over the past month in 20 countries and the Palestinian Authority. It is being released together with a broader survey of 44 nations conducted in 2002, which covers attitudes on globalization, democratization and the role of Islam in governance and society.

While the postwar poll paints a mostly negative picture of the image of America, its people and policies, the broader Pew Global Attitudes survey shows wide support for the fundamental economic and political values that the U.S. has long promoted. Globalization, the free market model and democratic ideals are accepted in all corners of the world. Most notably, the 44-nation survey found strong democratic aspirations in most of the Muslim publics surveyed. The postwar update confirms that these aspirations remain intact despite the war and its attendant controversies.

The new survey shows, however, that public confidence in the United Nations is a major victim of the conflict in Iraq. Positive ratings for the world body have tumbled in nearly every country for which benchmark measures are available. Majorities or pluralities in most countries believe that the war in Iraq showed the U.N. to be not so important any more. The idea that the U.N. is less relevant is much more prevalent now than it was just before the war, and is shared by people in countries that backed the war, the U.S. and Great Britain, as well as in nations that opposed it, notably France and Germany.

In addition, majorities in five of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the U.S. on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76%), and solid majorities in Turkey (62%), Spain (62%), Italy (61%) and Germany (57%) believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past.¹

The British and Americans disagree — narrow majorities in both countries want the partnership between the U.S. and Western Europe to remain as close as ever. But the percentage of Americans favoring continued close ties with Western Europe has fallen — from 62% before the war to 53% in the current survey. In fact, the American people have cooled on France and Germany as much as the French and Germans have cooled on the U.S.

In Western Europe, negative views of America have declined somewhat since just prior to the war in Iraq, when anti-war sentiment peaked. But since last summer, favorable opinions of the U.S have slipped in nearly every country for which trend measures are available. Views of the American people, while still largely favorable, have fallen as well. The belief that the U.S. pursues a unilateralist foreign policy, which had been extensive last summer, has only grown in the war’s aftermath.

In Great Britain and Italy, positive opinions of the U.S. increased considerably since just before the war (see Chapter 1). Of the 21 publics surveyed in the new poll, overall support for the United States is greatest by far in Israel, where 79% view the U.S. favorably. Israelis also express near-universal support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, with 85% favoring the fight against terrorism. Majorities in Western Europe and Australia also back the war on terrorism, but support has slipped since last summer in both France and Germany (15 points in France, 10 points in Germany).

In addition, the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread to Muslim populations in Indonesia and Nigeria. Since last summer, favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Muslims in Nigeria.

In the wake of the war, a growing percentage of Muslims see serious threats to Islam. Specifically, majorities in seven of eight Muslim populations surveyed express worries that the U.S. might become a military threat to their countries. Even in Kuwait, where people have a generally favorable view of the United States, 53% voice at least some concern that the U.S. could someday pose a threat.

Support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has fallen in most Muslim publics. Equally significant, solid majorities in the Palestinian Authority, Indonesia and Jordan — and nearly half of those in Morocco and Pakistan — say they have at least some confidence in Osama bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” Fully 71% of Palestinians say they have confidence in bin Laden in this regard.

More generally, the postwar update survey of 16,000 respondents finds, in most countries that are friendly to the United States, only modest percentages have confidence that President Bush will do the right thing in international affairs. People in most countries rate Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroeder, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair more highly than they do Bush. The president also ranks slightly behind Blair in the United States, mostly due to political partisanship. Nearly all Republicans (95%) express confidence in Bush, compared with 64% of Democrats.

War Views Entrenched

The war itself did little to change opinions about the merits of using force in Iraq. In countries where there was strong opposition to the war, people overwhelmingly believe their governments made the right decision to stay out of the conflict. In countries that backed the war, with the notable exception of Spain, publics believe their governments made the right decision. In Great Britain, support for the war has grown following its successful outcome. A majority of Turks oppose even the limited help their government offered the U.S. during the war, while Kuwaitis largely approve of their government’s support for the military effort.

Opinion about the war is strongly related to perceptions of how the U.S. and its allies conducted the war and are managing its aftermath. In countries opposed to the war, there is a widespread belief the coalition did not try hard enough to avoid civilian casualties. By contrast, solid majorities in most of the coalition countries, as well as Israel, believe the U.S. and its allies did make a serious attempt to spare civilians. Eight-in-ten Americans (82%) feel that way, the highest percentage of any population surveyed.

A somewhat different pattern is apparent in attitudes toward the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. Americans generally believe the allies are taking the needs of the Iraqi people into account. But there is less support for that point of view elsewhere, even in Great Britain, Australia and Israel. Muslim publics generally believe the United States and its allies are doing only a fair or poor job in addressing the needs of the Iraqi people in the postwar reconstruction.

There also is widespread disappointment among Muslims that Iraq did not put up more of a fight against the U.S. and its allies. Overwhelming majorities in Morocco (93%), Jordan (91%), Lebanon (82%), Turkey (82%), Indonesia (82%), and the Palestinian Authority (81%) say they are disappointed the Iraqi military put up so little resistance. Many others around the world share that view, including people in South Korea (58%), Brazil (50%) and Russia (45%).

Still, even in countries that staunchly opposed the war many people believe that Iraqis will be better off now that Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. Solid majorities in Western Europe believe the Iraqi people will be better off, as do eight-in-ten Kuwaitis and half of the Lebanese. But substantial majorities elsewhere, notably in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, say Iraqis will be worse off now that Hussein has been deposed.

The postwar update shows limited optimism for a surge of democratic reform in the Middle East. Substantial minorities of Muslims in many countries say the region will become somewhat more democratic, but only in Kuwait do as many as half predict the Middle East will become much more democratic. Expectations of major political changes in the Middle East are modest in countries that participated in the war. Just 16% in Great Britain, 14% in the U.S. and 10% in Australia think that the Middle East will become much more democratic.

U.S. Favors Israel

U.S. policies toward the Middle East come under considerable criticism in the new poll. In 20 of 21 populations surveyed — Americans are the only exception — pluralities or majorities believe the United States favors Israel over the Palestinians too much. This opinion is shared in Israel; 47% of Israelis believe that the U.S. favors Israel too much, while 38% say the policy is fair and 11% think the U.S. favors the Palestinians too much.

But Israel is the only country, aside from the U.S., in which a majority says that U.S. policies lead to more stability in the region. Most Muslim populations think U.S. policies bring less stability to the Middle East, while people elsewhere are divided in their evaluations of the impact of U.S. policies.

More broadly, the postwar survey asked people their views on the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. By wide margins, most Muslim populations doubt that a way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of the Palestinian people are met. Eight-in-ten residents of the Palestinian Authority express this opinion. But Arabs in Israel, who voice the same criticisms of U.S. policy in the Middle East as do other Muslims, generally believe that a way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that Palestinian rights and needs are addressed. In fact, Arabs in Israel are nearly as likely as Jews to hold that opinion (62% of Arabs, 68% of Jews).

Outside of the Muslim world, there is general agreement that there is a way to ensure Israel’s existence and meet the needs of Palestinians. This view is widely shared in North America and Western Europe.

As people around the world contemplate emerging security threats, countries in the Middle East — Iran and Syria — are viewed as less of a danger than North Korea. Majorities in most countries see North Korea as at least a moderate threat to Asian stability and world peace, while nearly four-in-ten in Australia (39%), the U.S. (38%) and Germany (37%) view North Korea as a great danger. However, just 28% of South Koreans agree that North Korea presents a major threat to regional stability. Israelis have a different sense of potential threats than do people elsewhere. More than half of Israelis (54%) say Iran presents a great threat to the Middle East, twice the proportion in the next closest country (U.S. at 26%).

Democracy Can Work Here

Despite soaring anti-Americanism and substantial support for Osama bin Laden, there is considerable appetite in the Muslim world for democratic freedoms. The broader, 44-nation survey shows that people in Muslim countries place a high value on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, multi-party systems and equal treatment under the law. This includes people living in kingdoms such as Jordan and Kuwait, as well as those in authoritarian states like Uzbekistan and Pakistan. In fact, many of the Muslim publics polled expressed a stronger desire for democratic freedoms than the publics in some nations of Eastern Europe, notably Russia and Bulgaria.

The postwar update finds that in most Muslim populations, large majorities continue to believe that Western-style democracy can work in their countries. This is the case in predominantly Muslim countries like Kuwait (83%) and Bangladesh (57%), but also in religiously diverse countries like Nigeria (75%). There are no substantive differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in Nigeria on this point. Only in Indonesia and Turkey do substantial percentages say democracy is a Western way of doing things that would not work in their countries (53%, 37%).

At the same time, most Muslims also support a prominent — and in some cases expanding — role for Islam and religious leaders in the political life of their countries. Yet that opinion does not diminish Muslim support for a system of governance that ensures the same civil liberties and political rights enjoyed by democracies.

In religiously diverse countries, Muslims generally favor keeping religion a private matter at the same rates as non-Muslims. In Nigeria, for example, six-in-ten Muslims and the same proportion of non-Muslims completely agree that religion should be kept separate from government policy. In Lebanon, there are only modest differences on this point between Muslims and non-Muslims.

U.S. Ideals Backed — Mostly

The broad desire for democracy in Muslim countries and elsewhere is but one indication of the global acceptance of ideas and principles espoused by the United States. The major survey also shows that the free market model has been embraced by people almost everywhere, whether in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. Majorities in 33 of the 44 nations surveyed feel that people are better off in a free-market economy, even if that leads to disparities in wealth and income. Despite the protests in recent years against globalization and America’s role in fostering it, people are surprisingly accepting of the increased interconnectedness that defines globalization.

This is not to say that they accept democracy and capitalism without qualification, or that they are not concerned about many of the problems of modern life. By and large, however, the people of the world accept the concepts and values that underlie the American approach to governance and business.

Yet there are profound differences in the way Americans and people in other countries — especially Western Europeans — view such fundamental issues as the limits of personal freedom and the role of government in helping the poor. Americans are more individualistic and favor a less compassionate government than do Europeans and others. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) believe success is not outside of their control. Except for Canadians (63%), most of the world disagrees. Among 44 nations surveyed, the U.S. has one of the highest percentages of people who think that most people who fail in life have themselves to blame, rather than society.

Accordingly, Americans care more about personal freedom than government assurances of social justice. Fully 58% of Americans say it is more important to have the freedom to pursue personal goals without government interference, while just 34% say it is more important for government to guarantee that no one is in need. In most other nations, majorities embrace the opposite view. And while most Americans support a social safety net, they are less strongly committed than other peoples to their government taking care of citizens who cannot take care of themselves.

Many Want Democracy, Fewer Have It

People everywhere are united by their desire for honest multiparty elections, freedom of speech and religion and an impartial judiciary. A fair judiciary is seen as especially important; in most countries it is more highly valued than free elections.

Yet there is a widespread sense that these democratic aspirations are not being fulfilled. In Eastern Europe, only in the Czech Republic does a majority (58%) say they have honest, multiparty elections. In Russia and Ukraine, only small minorities feel they have free elections (15% in Russia, 21% in Ukraine). Skepticism about honest elections and freedom of expression are the norm for almost all of the democratizing countries of the world, but this is especially the case in Muslim countries.

Perceptions of repression in some predominantly Muslim countries — notably Turkey and Lebanon — are as widespread as anywhere in the world. Solid majorities in both Turkey and Lebanon say their nations lack several fundamental rights: freedom of speech, a free press, fair elections and an impartial judiciary.

Soviet Hangover

In much of Eastern Europe, there is now greater acceptance of post-communist political changes compared with Pulse of Europe surveys conducted by the then-Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press in 1991, as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Even so, the legacy of communism is apparent in the attitudes of many Eastern European publics. Only about half of those in Ukraine and Russia approve of the political changes that have occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

More generally, Russians and Ukrainians, as well as most other Eastern European publics, say a leader with a “strong hand” could solve national problems better than a democratic government. Only Czechs and Slovaks favor democracy over a strong leader. In most of Latin America and Africa, there is more of a preference for democracy.

There is, however, a large generation gap on views of democracy in Eastern Europe. In most Eastern European countries surveyed, people age 60 and older are much more likely to disapprove of post-communist political changes than are people under the age of 35.

“Yes” to a Smaller World

Beyond their common desire for democracy and free markets, people in emerging nations also generally acknowledge and accept globalization. People worldwide have become aware of the impact of increasing interconnectedness on their countries and their own lives. Majorities in 41 of 44 countries surveyed say that international trade and business contacts have increased in the past 5 years.

The survey finds broad acceptance of the increasing interconnectedness of the world. Three-quarters or more of those interviewed in almost every country think children need to learn English to succeed in the world today. People generally view the growth in foreign trade, global communication and international popular culture as good for them and their families as well as their countries. For most of the world’s people, however, this approval is guarded. Increased trade and business ties and other changes are viewed as somewhat positive, not very positive.

Despite the widespread support for the globalization process, people around the world think many aspects of their lives — including some affected by globalization — are getting worse. Majorities in 34 of 44 countries surveyed say the availability of good-paying jobs has gotten worse compared with five years ago. They also see the gap between rich and poor, the affordability of health care and the ability to save for one’s old age as getting worse. But people do not blame a more interconnected world for these problems — they mostly point to domestic factors. This is especially true in economically faltering countries in Africa and Latin America, such as Kenya and Argentina.

People around the world are more inclined to credit globalization for conditions they see as improving, such as increased availability of food in stores and more modern medicines and treatments.

While anti-globalization forces have not convinced the public that globalization is the root cause of their economic struggles, the public does share the critics’ concerns about eroding national sovereignty and a loss of cultural identity. Large majorities in 42 of 44 countries believe that their traditional way of life is getting lost and most people feel that their way of life has to be protected against foreign influence. There is less agreement that consumerism and commercialism represent a threat to one’s culture. However, that point of view is prevalent in Western Europe and Latin America.

The polling finds, however, that the idea of “global” forces is something of a red flag to people around the world. “Global economy” is seen as more threatening than “trade with other countries.” People worry about the impact of global trade on themselves and their families even though they believe that global trade is probably a good thing for their country as a whole.

Globalization Foes Fail to Get Through

People around the world generally have a positive view of the symbols of globalization. Large corporations from other countries get a favorable review in much of the world, as do international organizations.

In Africa, people express highly favorable opinions of foreign corporations, while the Middle East is more divided. Dislike of foreign firms is mostly limited to people in the major advanced economies of Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada. Even in these countries, however, positive evaluations of multinationals outweigh negative assessments.

Similarly, the impact of international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organization is seen as much more positive than negative in most parts of the world. This is overwhelmingly the case in Africa. Argentina, Brazil, Jordan and Turkey stand out for their highly critical view of these institutions.

In contrast, people generally have a negative view of anti-globalization protesters. The French give higher ratings to multinational corporations than to the protesters. And in Italy, site of a major clash in 2001 between police and anti-globalization forces in Genoa, the public by nearly two-to-one (51%-27%) says the protesters are having a bad influence on the country. It should be noted that majorities in many countries declined to give an opinion of anti-globalization protesters. This is mostly the case in developing countries, but also in more advanced nations like South Korea (61%) and Japan (55%).

But “Foreign” Still a Negative

Most people in the world feel their way of life needs protection from foreign influence, and majorities in nearly every country surveyed favor tougher restrictions on people entering their countries. Overwhelming majorities in the Western European countries surveyed support tighter borders. In fact, Western Europeans expressed as much support for such restrictions as they did in the Pulse of Europe survey 12 years ago, when Europe was less unified. Eastern Europeans also have become much more wary of porous borders than when the Cold War was ending, a time when many people were more concerned with getting out of their countries than with keeping others from getting in.

In that context, Western Europeans take a much dimmer view of foreign workers from Eastern Europe, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, than they do of foreign workers from other European Union countries. This is especially the case in Germany, where 59% say Middle Easterners and North Africans who come to work in Germany are bad for the country; 53% say that about foreign workers from Eastern Europe.

This European concern about foreign influence and sovereignty also is seen in other ways. There are still sizable minorities of people in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy who think that there are parts of other countries that really belong to them. This sentiment has not diminished — and in some cases has risen dramatically — since the end of the Cold War. Fully 63% of Russians believe that “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Russia.” In 1991, just 22% agreed with that statement. Broad majorities in the Philippines, India, Lebanon, South Africa, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Korea and Turkey also feel that parts of other nations rightfully belong to their country.

As was the case in 1991, the American public has a more favorable view of ethnic and racial minorities than do Western European publics. African Americans and Hispanics are viewed much more positively in the U.S. than are Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, and Albanians in Italy.

Modern Times

People around the world are struggling with some elements of modern life, while easily accepting others. Many people say that they do not like the pace of modern life. Yet they broadly endorse the things that make life go fast, especially cell phones and the Internet.

There is significant opposition to modern commercial culture in advanced countries, where opinions about the pace of life and such modern conveniences as fast food and television are more mixed than they are in the developing world. Western Europeans and Latin Americans are most likely to express the view that commercialism represents a threat to their cultures.

Underscoring the conflicted views many people have of the modern world, people in Africa are the most likely to express the concern that their traditional way of life is being lost. Yet they also are the most enthusiastic about modern conveniences and fast food.

There also is a significant global generation gap on views of modern life. Younger and better-educated people are more comfortable with the pace of modern life. Younger people also have a better opinion of fast food and television than do their elders.

Globally, people have a broadly favorable view of birth control and family planning, with the notable exception of populations in aging industrial nations, such as Italy, Japan and Germany. Only about three-in-ten Japanese (32%) and fewer than half in Italy and Germany (41%, 47%, respectively), view birth control as a positive change. In most of the developing nations of Africa and Asia, 70% or more say birth control and family planning have changed things for the better.

Divided Over Religion, Homosexuality

Homosexuality and the centrality of religion to personal morality divide the peoples of the world. Majorities in most countries say it is necessary to believe in God to be a moral person. But Canadians and Europeans — both in the West and the East — take the secular view that it is possible to be moral without believing in God. Opinion in the United States is closer to that in most developing countries, where agreement is nearly universal that personal morality is linked to belief in God.

Acceptance of homosexuality divides the publics of the world in a similar way. People in Africa and the Middle East strongly object to societal acceptance of homosexuality. But there is far greater tolerance for homosexuality in major Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil. Opinion in Europe is split between West and East. Majorities in every Western European nation surveyed say homosexuality should be accepted by society, while most Russians, Poles and Ukrainians disagree. Americans are divided — a thin majority (51%) believes homosexuality should be accepted, while 42% disagree.

Women’s increasing role in the workplace is broadly supported around the world. Large majorities in 41 of 44 countries believe the more satisfying way of life is when both spouses work and share the burdens of childcare. Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan are the only countries in which majorities believe it is better for women to stay home and take care of the children while the husband provides for the family.