On the eve of President Barack Obama’s visit to Mexico, the United States is enjoying a resurgence of good will among the Mexican public, with a clear majority favorably inclined toward their northern neighbor and more now expressing confidence in Obama.

A national opinion survey of Mexico by the Pew Research Center, conducted March 4-17 among 1,000 adults, finds that roughly two-thirds (66%) of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. – up from 56% a year ago and dramatically higher than it was following the passage of Arizona’s restrictive immigration law in 2010, when favorable Mexican attitudes toward the United States slipped to 44%.

Obama also receives higher ratings than he did in recent years. About half (49%) of Mexicans express confidence in the American president to do the right thing when it comes to world affairs, compared with 42% who said the same in 2012 and 38% in 2011. Still, Mexicans’ confidence in Obama has yet to return to the level in his first days in office in 2009, when 55% gave him a high rating.

Mexicans are also now more of the view that the U.S. takes their country’s interests into account when deciding international policy. About half (51%) say Washington considers their country’s interests, while 45% say it does not. In 2012, opinion leaned in the opposite direction – 56% said the U.S. did not consider Mexico’s interests, compared with 40% who said it did.

Bilateral issues, particularly the deepening of economic and commercial relations between the U.S. and Mexico, are expected to be among the key items on the agenda when Obama meets with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto this week. The survey finds that, overall, 70% of Mexicans consider the deep economic ties between the two countries to be good for Mexico, down slightly from 76% in 2009, when Pew Research last asked this question.

When asked specifically about the influence the U.S. is currently having on economic conditions in their country, views are more mixed. One-third of Mexicans say the U.S. is having a positive impact on national economic conditions in Mexico, while 28% think the U.S. is having a bad impact on their country’s economy.

Views on Immigration

More than 11 million Mexicans live in the U.S., including about 6 million who are in the country illegally.¹ Mexicans are divided on whether this is good or bad for their country; 44% say it is good for Mexico that many of its citizens live in the U.S., and an equal share say this is bad for Mexico.

About six-in-ten Mexicans (61%) say they would not move to the U.S. even if they had the means and opportunity to do so. However, a sizable minority (35%) say they would move to the U.S. if they could, including 20% who say they would emigrate without authorization.

Mexicans are less likely than they were a year ago to say that people from their country who move to the U.S. have a better life there; 47% say life is better in the U.S., compared with 53% in 2012. About one-in-five (18%) say Mexicans have a worse life in the U.S., while 29% say it is neither better nor worse. However, among those who have close friends or relatives living in the U.S., 70% say these friends or relatives have achieved their goals, while just 25% believe they have been disappointed.

Three-in-ten Mexicans say they personally know someone who went to the U.S. but returned to Mexico because the person could not find work. About a quarter (27%) know someone who has been deported or detained by the U.S. government for immigration reasons in the last 12 months.

Fewer See Progress on Drug War

Less often than a year ago, Mexicans say their government is making progress in its campaign against drug traffickers; 37% say this is the case, compared with 47% in 2012. An additional 29% now say the government is losing ground against the cartels, and 30% see no change in the way things are going. As in the past, Mexicans overwhelmingly support the use of the Mexican army to fight drug traffickers; 85% are in favor of this approach.

There is also support for some cooperation from the U.S. in the fight against Mexican drug cartels. About three-quarters (74%) would welcome U.S. assistance in training Mexican police and military personnel. A majority (55%) would also approve of the U.S. providing money and weapons to the country’s police and military, although this position has lost some support in recent years; 61% backed this form of U.S. assistance in 2012 and 64% did so in 2011. However, there is little enthusiasm for the deployment of U.S. troops to Mexico to fight drug traffickers; just 34% of Mexicans would welcome this approach, while 59% would oppose it.

Most Mexicans (56%) blame both the U.S. and their own country for the drug violence in Mexico; 20% say the U.S. is mostly to blame and 17% blame Mexico. When Pew Research first asked this question in 2009, far more blamed the U.S. (25%) than blamed Mexico (15%), while about half (51%) said the countries shared responsibility.

Mixed Ratings for Peña Nieto on Key Issues

Peña Nieto, whose election as president in 2012 marked the return to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after 12 years in the opposition, is generally viewed positively in Mexico; 57% say he is having a good influence on the way things are going in the country, while 38% see his influence as bad.

However, Mexicans expressed mixed views of Peña Nieto’s handling of some key issues. In particular, the same share approves as disapproves of the way the president is dealing with the economy (46%). Similarly, 47% approve of his handling of organized crime and drug traffickers, while 45% disapprove. And when it comes to dealing with corruption, 44% approve of Peña Nieto’s approach and 48% disapprove.

Not surprisingly, on all three issues, those who are affiliated with the PRI offer more positive ratings of the president than do those who are affiliated with Felipe Calderón’s National Action Party (PAN). At least six-in-ten supporters of the PRI approve of the president’s handling of the economy (68%), organized crime and drug traffickers (62%) and corruption (62%). In contrast, 46% of PAN supporters approve of the way he is dealing with the economy and corruption, and 51% give him high marks for his handling of drug cartels.

Special to New America Foundation

The recent deliberations in Washington about the fiscal cliff have triggered a national debate in the United States about the nature, extent and future sustainability of key elements of the U.S. social safety net: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, support for education, the unemployed and the poor. In the effort to tame the federal debt, cuts in spending on these social services have been a major part of the discussion – calling into question the social contract established with the American people during the Great Depression through the creation of public pensions and in the 1960s with the launching of limited government-provided health insurance.

America was a latecomer to the provision of many such social services. Germany put in place health and old age insurance in the 1880s. The United Kingdom instituted national health insurance after World War II. The benefits provided by the U.S. government cover a far smaller portion of the American population and are far less generous than those afforded to the citizens of other high-income nations.

In 2012 the United States spent an estimated 19.4% of GDP on such social expenditures, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Paris-based industrial country think tank. Denmark spent 30.5%, Sweden 28.2% and Germany 26.3%. All of these nations have a lower central government debt to GDP ratio than that of the United States.

Why the United States invests relatively less in its social safety net than many other countries and why those expenditures are even at risk in the current debate over debt reduction reflect Americans’ conflicted, partisan and often contradictory views on fairness, inequality, the role and responsibility of government and individuals in society and the efficacy of government action.

Rooted in value differences, not just policy differences, the debate over the U.S. social contract is likely to go on long after the fiscal cliff issue has been resolved.

Click here to read the full paper

Survey Report

As has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many important ways. Most notably, Americans are more individualistic and are less supportive of a strong safety net than are the publics of Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Americans are also considerably more religious than Western Europeans, and are more socially conservative with respect to homosexuality.

Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Moreover, Americans more often than their Western European allies believe that obtaining UN approval before their country uses military force would make it too difficult to deal with an international threat. And Americans are less inclined than the Western Europeans, with the exception of the French, to help other nations.

These differences between Americans and Western Europeans echo findings from previous surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. However, the current polling shows the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to that of other nations. Today, only about half of Americans believe their culture is superior to others, compared with six-in-ten in 2002. And the polling finds younger Americans less apt than their elders to hold American exceptionalist attitudes.

These are among the findings from a survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Spain from March 21 to April 14 as part of the broader 23-nation poll in spring 2011.

Use of Military Force

Three-quarters of Americans agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world; this view is shared by seven-in-ten in Britain and narrower majorities in France and Spain (62% each). Germans are evenly divided, with half saying the use of force is sometimes necessary and half saying it is not.

Germans are more supportive of the use of military force than they have been in recent years. For example, in 2007, just about four-in-ten (41%) Germans agreed that it was sometimes necessary, while 58% disagreed. Opinions have been more stable in the U.S., Britain and France.

For the most part, opinions about the use of force do not vary considerably across demographic groups. In Germany and Spain, however, support for the use of military force is far more widespread among men than among women. Six-in-ten German men agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world, compared with just 40% of women. And while majorities across gender groups in Spain believe the use of force may be necessary, more Spanish men than Spanish women say this is the case (68% vs. 56%).

In Britain, France, Spain and the U.S., conservatives, or those on the political right, are more likely than liberals, or those on the left, to agree that the use of force is sometimes necessary to maintain world order. However, in the four countries, majorities across ideological groups express this view.¹

When asked whether their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with international threats, American opinion differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Americans are almost evenly divided on the question, with 45% saying that the U.S. should have UN approval while 44% say this would make it too difficult to deal with threats; in contrast, solid majorities in the four Western European nations surveyed, including about three-quarters in Spain (74%) and Germany (76%) say their country should have UN approval before it takes military action.

In Western Europe, those with a college degree are more likely than those with less education to say their country should have UN approval before using military force, although majorities across both groups share this view. For example, in Spain, 84% of those who graduated from college say UN approval should be obtained, compared with 70% of those who do not have a college degree. Double-digit differences are also evident in Britain (15 percentage points), Germany (11 points) and France (10 points). This is not the case in the U.S., where respondents across education groups offer nearly identical views.

In Germany, gender differences are also notable; even though German men are more likely than women to say the use of military force is sometimes necessary, more men than women say their country should have UN approval before using force (83% vs. 70%).

The view that their country should have UN approval before using military force to deal with threats is far more prevalent among American liberals than among conservatives. Close to six-in-ten (57%) liberals favor obtaining UN approval, while 33% say this would make it too difficult for the U.S. to deal with threats; in contrast, most conservatives (52%) say getting UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with threats, while 38% say this is an important step. Political moderates fall between the other two groups, with 49% saying the U.S. should seek the approval of the UN before using military force and 42% saying this would make it too difficult to deal with threats. The same ideological difference is generally not evident in Western Europe.

Views on International Engagement

About four-in-ten (39%) Americans say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems, while a narrow majority (52%) says the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems as best they can. In this regard, Americans are not drastically different from respondents in France, where 43% believe their country should help other countries and 57% say it should focus on its own problems.

The British are nearly evenly divided; 45% say their country should help other countries deal with their problems and about the same number (48%) believe Britain should deal with its own problems.

Compared with the U.S., France and Britain, Spain and Germany stand out as the only countries where majorities favor international engagement: 55% and 54%, respectively, say their countries should provide assistance to others, while 40% in Spain and 43% in Germany take the more isolationist view.

Opinions about international engagement have changed somewhat in the U.S., France and Spain since last year, but while publics in the two Western European countries are now more in favor of helping others than they were in 2010, more Americans currently take an isolationist position. Last year, about the same number of Americans said their country should help other countries (45%) as said it should let other countries deal with their own problems (46%). Similarly, the Spanish were nearly evenly divided, with 49% favoring engagement and 47% taking an isolationist approach. In France, where a majority continues to take an isolationist view, even more (65%) did so a year ago.

In the U.S. as well as in the four Western European countries surveyed, those with a college degree are far more likely than those with less education to offer an internationalist view. This is especially the case in Germany, where about three-quarters (73%) of those who graduated from college believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems, compared with a narrow majority (52%) of those without a college degree.

Political ideology is also a factor in Germany, France and Spain. In these three countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to take the isolationist view when it comes to international engagement. For example, while about half (48%) of left-wing French say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, about six-in-ten (59%) on the right offer this opinion.

Cultural Superiority

About half of Americans (49%) and Germans (47%) agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;” 44% in Spain share this view. In Britain and France, only about a third or fewer (32% and 27%, respectively) think their culture is better than others.

While opinions about cultural superiority have remained relatively stable over the years in the four Western European countries surveyed, Americans are now far less likely to say that their culture is better than others; six-in-ten Americans held this belief in 2002 and 55% did so in 2007. Belief in cultural superiority has declined among Americans across age, gender and education groups.

As in past surveys, older Americans remain far more inclined than younger ones to believe that their culture is better than others. Six-in-ten Americans ages 50 or older share this view, while 34% disagree; those younger than 30 hold the opposite view, with just 37% saying American culture is superior and 61% saying it is not. Opinions are more divided among those ages 30 to 49; 44% in this group see American culture as superior and 50% do not.

Similar age gaps are not as common in the Western European countries surveyed, with the exception of Spain, where majorities of older respondents, but not among younger ones, also think their culture is better than others; 55% of those ages 50 or older say this is the case, compared with 34% of those ages 30 to 49 and 39% of those younger than 30.

As is the case on other measures, opinions about cultural superiority vary considerably by educational attainment. In the four Western European countries and in the U.S., those who did not graduate from college are more likely than those who did to agree that their culture is superior, even if their people are not perfect. For example, Germans with less education are about twice as likely as those with a college degree to believe their culture is superior (49% vs. 25%); double-digit differences are also present in France (20 percentage points), Spain (18 points) and Britain (11 points), while a less pronounced gap is evident in the U.S. (9 points).

Finally, among Americans and Germans, political conservative are especially likely to believe their culture is superior to others. In the U.S., 63% of conservatives take this view, compared with 45% of moderates and just 34% of liberals. Similarly, a majority (54%) of right-wing Germans see their culture as superior, while 47% of moderates and 33% of those on the political left agree.

Individualism and the Role of the State

American opinions continue to differ considerably from those of Western Europeans when it comes to views of individualism and the role of the state. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) Americans believe it is more important for everyone to be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state, while just 35% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need.

In contrast, at least six-in-ten in Spain (67%), France (64%) and Germany (62%) and 55% in Britain say the state should ensure that nobody is in need; about four-in-ten or fewer consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In the U.S., Britain, France and Germany, views of the role of the state divide significantly across ideological lines. For example, three-quarters of American conservatives say individuals should be free to pursue their goals without interference from the state, while 21% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need; among liberals in the U.S., half would like the state to play an active role to help the needy, while 42% prefer a more limited role for the state.

Those on the political right in Britain, France and Germany are also more likely than those on the left in these countries to prioritize freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference. Unlike in the U.S., however, majorities of those on the right in France (57%) and Germany (56%) favor an active role for the state, as do more than four-in-ten (45%) conservatives in Britain.

American opinions about the role of the state also vary considerably across age groups. About half (47%) of those younger than 30 prioritize the freedom to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state and a similar percentage (46%) say it is more important for the state to ensure that nobody is in need; among older Americans, however, about six-in-ten consider being free a higher priority, with just about three-in-ten saying the state should play an active role so that nobody is in need. No such age difference is evident in the four Western European countries surveyed.

Asked if they agree that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” Americans again offer more individualistic views than those expressed by Western Europeans. Only 36% of Americans believe they have little control over their fate, compared with 50% in Spain, 57% in France and 72% in Germany; Britain is the only Western European country surveyed where fewer than half (41%) share this view.

In the U.S. and in Western Europe, those without a college degree are less individualistic than those who have graduated from college; this is especially the case in the U.S. and Germany. About three-quarters (74%) of Germans in the less educated group believe that success in life is largely determined by forces beyond one’s control, compared with 55% of college graduates. Among Americans, 41% of those without a college degree say they have little control over their fate, while just 22% of college graduates share this view.

Religion More Important to Americans

Americans also distinguish themselves from Western Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.

Moreover, Americans are far more inclined than Western Europeans to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 53% say this is the case in the U.S., compared with just one-third in Germany, 20% in Britain, 19% in Spain and 15% in France.

In the U.S., women and older respondents place more importance on religion and are more likely than men and younger people to say that faith in God is a necessary foundation for morality and good values. About six-in-ten (59%) American women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41% of men; and while a majority (56%) of Americans ages 50 and older say religion is very important to them, 48% of those ages 30 to 49 and 41% of those younger than 30 place similar importance on religion.

Similarly, while a majority of American women (58%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, men are nearly evenly divided, with 47% saying belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality and 51% saying it is not. Among Americans ages 50 and older, 58% say one must believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; 50% of those ages 30 to 49 and 46% of those younger than 30 share this view.

Education also plays a role in views of religion in the U.S., to some extent. Although Americans with a college degree are about as likely as those without to say religion is very important to them (47% and 51%, respectively), the less educated are far more inclined to say that one must believe in God in order to be moral; 59% of those without a college degree say this, compared with 37% of those who have graduated from college.

Views of religion and whether belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality vary little, if at all, across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed. In Spain, however, respondents ages 50 and older place more importance on religion than do younger people, although relatively few in this age group say it is very important to them; 33% say this is the case, compared with 16% of those ages 30 to 49 and 11% of those younger than 30.

Politically, conservatives in the U.S., Spain and Germany are more likely than liberals to say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, but while solid majorities of conservatives in the U.S. (66%) take this position, fewer than half of conservatives in Spain (31%) and Germany (46%) share this view. Meanwhile, just 26% of liberals in the U.S., 11% in Spain and 19% in Germany say belief in God is a necessary foundation for morality. Conservatives in the U.S. are also far more likely than liberals to consider religion very important in their lives (67% vs. 29%); in Western Europe, few across ideological groups place high importance on religion.

Religious vs. National Identity

American Christians are more likely than their Western European counterparts to think of themselves first in terms of their religion rather than their nationality; 46% of Christians in the U.S. see themselves primarily as Christians and the same number consider themselves Americans first. In contrast, majorities of Christians in France (90%), Germany (70%), Britain (63%) and Spain (53%) identify primarily with their nationality rather than their religion.

In Britain, France and Germany, more Christians now see themselves in terms of their nationality than did so five years ago, when national identification was already widespread in these countries. This change is especially notable in Germany, where the percentage seeing themselves first as Germans is up 11 percentage points, from 59% in 2006.

Among Christians in the U.S., white evangelicals are especially inclined to identify first with their faith; 70% in this group see themselves first as Christians rather than as Americans, while 22% say they are primarily American. Among other American Christians, more identify with their nationality (55%) than with their religion (38%).

Homosexuality

Tolerance for homosexuality is widespread in the U.S. and Western Europe, but far more Western Europeans than Americans say homosexuality should be accepted by society; at least eight-in-ten in Spain (91%), Germany (87%), France (86%) and Britain (81%), compared with 60% in the U.S.

Acceptance of homosexuality has increased in recent years, and the shift is especially notable in the U.S., where only slightly more said it should be accepted (49%) than said it should be rejected (41%) in 2007. Today, more Americans accept homosexuality than reject it by a 27-percentage point margin.

While there are some differences in opinions of homosexuality across demographic groups in the Western European countries surveyed, overwhelming majorities across age, education and gender groups believe homosexuality should be accepted by society. In the U.S., however, these differences are somewhat more pronounced. For example, while 67% of American women believe homosexuality should be accepted, a much narrower majority of men (54%) share that view. Among Americans with college degrees, 71% accept homosexuality, compared with 56% of those with less education. Finally, about two-thirds (68%) of Americans younger than 30 say homosexuality should be accepted by society; 61% of those ages 30 to 40 and 55% of those ages 50 and older share this view.

In addition to demographic differences, an ideological divide on views of homosexuality is also notable in the U.S., where more than eight-in-ten (85%) liberals and 65% of moderates express tolerant views, compared with 44% of conservatives. In the four Western European countries surveyed, at least three-quarters across ideological groups say homosexuality should be accepted by society.

In this paper, we use comparative international data to analyze a broad array of issues relating to the global gender gap: Are women “doves” and men “hawks” when it comes to foreign policy and security matters? Do men and women have different beliefs on religion and morality? Is it possible to identify regional patterns in gender differences? And specifically, what are the major fault lines in opinions among men and women in predominantly Muslim countries?

To find the answers to these and other questions, we used the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a series of worldwide public opinion surveys administered by local organizations under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. To date, the Project has interviewed over 74,000 people in 50 populations (49 countries and the Palestinian Authority).

A commentary released by the Project last October addressed some of the general questions about the way men and women view their lives and increasing global interconnectedness. Here are the primary conclusions (Some copies of the release are available at the conference or on the Pew Research Center’s website at people-press.org):

• On the whole, women are happier with their lives and say they’ve made personal progress more than men.
• Within regions, men and women agree on almost every issue addressed, from personal progress to social issues, such as the acceptability of homosexuality.
• Men are more optimistic about the lives of their children and the future than are women.
• When asked about modern electronics and technological advances that are so much a part of the globalizing world, both men and women agree that having these available is a change for the better. But in 37 of 44 countries, “boys” like their high-tech “toys” much more than women.
• Birth control is popular among both the sexes, but in two-thirds of the countries surveyed, women are more likely to think having the ability to control reproduction is a change for the better.

Most people around the world are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country, but women are most dissatisfied. The difference is greatest in France where 39% of men and only 26% of women are satisfied with national conditions, and in the U.S., where 47% of men are satisfied but only 36% of women agree.This paper builds upon this initial analysis and looks specifically at the opinions of Muslim men and women on issues ranging from religion to social and political values. It also compares these views with those of men and women worldwide. It concludes with a look at how the sexes view current foreign policy issues and terrorism. Several primary conclusions can be drawn from this work:

• Few gender gaps exist among Muslims regarding the role of Islam in political life, and when gender differences do surface, it is within specific countries and not part of a broader pattern.
• Muslim men are more likely to favor more traditional roles for their female counterparts, while more women express a desire to bring gender equality into the workplace and into their marriages.
• Women, particularly in the Muslim world, decline to answer polling questions or say they don’t know at a much higher rate than men. Yet there is a pronounced pattern to their DK/Refusal response, suggesting that it is the type of question that determines whether or not women offer an opinion.
• When attitudes are measured only among those who respond to questions, men and women share similar opinions about the role of Islam in their society, women in the workplace and a host of political and personal issues.
• Suicide bombings and violent acts of killing are not just supported by men. As many women as men in several predominantly Muslim countries say such activities are justified.
• In the most recent survey taken in March 2004, men and women within their own countries in Muslim nations share common views on foreign policy issues and the war in Iraq, suggesting that national identity is more important than gender differences in these cases.
• Among Muslims, there is little difference between the genders on foreign policy issues, the war in Iraq and favorability of world leaders in the U.S. and Europe. However, women are somewhat less likely to express an opinion on these issues.

Muslim Surveys

In the 44-nation survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 14 countries where Muslims are either the overwhelming majority or prominent minorities were asked a series of questions pertaining specifically to the role of Islam and governance. In smaller, subsequent surveys, additional populations were surveyed. Those populations noted as “predominantly Muslim” are Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal and Uzbekistan. Smaller surveys incorporated the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Kuwait. Muslims surveyed in countries where they are a minority of their country’s population are Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. In three cases where there are Muslim minorities — Ivory Coast, Ghana and Uganda — gender breakouts are not reported due to small sample size.

Islam and Politics

Majorities in over half of the Muslim nations surveyed say Islam currently plays a large role in the governance of their society and just as many say it should play that role. Overall, men and women share the same views within their countries in nearly every nation surveyed. Only in Uzbekistan and Jordan are there significant gaps in opinion between the sexes. A 12-point gap exists in Uzbekistan with 48% of Uzbek men and 60% of women saying Islam currently plays a large role; in Jordan, more men than women say the role of Islam is significant (58% to 48%).

When asked of the role Islam should play in the governance of their countries, opinions correspond with the respondent’s beliefs in the role Islam currently plays. Majorities of Muslims in 9 of the original 14 nations surveyed said Islam should play a large role. In four others (Lebanon, Turkey, Senegal and Uzbekistan), respondents are split on this issue and only in Tanzania do Muslims say Islam should play a small role in the politics of their country. Again, men and women view the political role of their religion in roughly the same way.

In Nigeria, a country grappling with the issue of Sharia law, it may be surprising to find that women express a stronger belief that Islam should play a large role in the governance of their country. Although more than eight-in-ten respondents of both genders agree that Islam currently plays a large role, only 66% of Nigerian men say they think it should play a large role while 79% of women hold such views. Jordanian men and women hold differing opinions on many issues, the role of Islam being one. Men in Jordan say they want Islam to play a large role in politics much more than women and women are more likely to say that their religion currently plays less of a role in politics than men.

Democracy Can Work Here

Majorities of Muslims surveyed by Pew say that “Western style democracy” can work in their own country, with Indonesia a notable exception. Few Muslims say that democracy is “a Western way of doing things that would not work here.” The latter view is expressed by a majority of Indonesians (53%), and sizable minorities in Turkey and the Palestinian Authority both at 37%.

The belief that democracy can work in their country is shared fairly equally by both men and women. The exception is Bangladesh; 76% of Bangladeshi men and just 42% of Bangladeshi women say democracy can work here. Even after accounting for the higher non-response rate among women, Bangladeshi men believe more strongly than women in the democratic prospects for their countries.

However, the most significant change in the idea of “Western-style democracy” from 2002 to 2003 is the number of women who express an opinion. Perhaps because of the Iraq war and the increased international discussion of regime change in the Middle East, only a quarter of the women in Pakistan did not offer an opinion in 2003, whereas 57% did not do so in 2002. Less dramatically, yet still significantly, the number of men who did not respond decreased 17 points, from 21% in 2002 to 4% in 2003.

Interestingly, since 2002, Turkish respondents (both men and women) have increased their belief that Western-style democracy can work there. While 43% of men and 44% of women held such views in 2002, fully 51% of men and 49% of women said democracy could work in Turkey in 2003.

Democratic Aspirations

In addition to large numbers of both genders saying that democracy could work in their country, many Muslim men and women register high levels of support for the key democratic principles. Majorities in six countries, (Turkey, Mali, Bangladesh, Senegal, Nigeria and Lebanon) say it is very important to be able to live in a country where you can openly say what you think and criticize the government, have freedom of the press, and open and honest elections. Men and women within those countries have nearly identical views about these key freedoms yet women tend to give an opinion much less often than men. This is particularly the case in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey and to a lesser degree elsewhere. Women who do register an opinion place equal importance on these democratic aspirations.

The DK/Refusal Effect

The discrepancy in the way men and women register opinions on various issues mentioned above shows that women, particularly in Muslim countries, respond “don’t know” or “refused” to questions with much more regularity than men. But, interestingly, the kind of question makes a big difference. Two spheres exist, the personal, home sphere dealing directly with women’s roles and personal lives, and a worldly sphere relating to opinions about the government, international problems, and political views. When asked about government policy or whether or not democracy can work in their country, fully 60% of women in Pakistan, (21% of men) 42% of Bangladeshi women (18% of men) and 18% of Turkish women (10% of men) do not register a response. The same is true when asked about the role of Islam in politics. Pakistani men register opinions at a much higher rate than women.

Yet, when asked about personal issues that deal directly with them, women are much more likely to offer a response. For example, when asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “women should have the right to decide if they wear a veil,” only 5% of Pakistani women did not respond, all Bangladeshi women gave a response and only 3% of Turkish women (equal their male counterparts) failed to respond. The dk/refusal rates are nearly identical when asked a series of questions about women’s role in the workplace and religious education.

After accounting for this difference by repercentaging the results between men and women, the findings are striking— the gender gap shrinks to near irrelevance. For example, 68% of Pakistani men said religious leaders should play a larger role in politics, whereas only 57% of women held that view. After accounting for the dk/refusal effect by basing the total on those who registered a response, the percentage of women believing religious leaders should play a larger role in politics was actually greater than men. Fully 84% of women and 74% of men who responded took that view.

The Role of Women in the Workplace

Women may not register opinions at a fairly high rate when asked about politics or government, but it is clear that they willingly share them regarding their roles in the social structure of their country and their personal values. This is especially true when Muslim men and women are asked about women’s roles in society.

In many countries, there is a significant gender gap among Muslims over whether women should be permitted to work outside the home. In Bangladesh, 57% of women completely agree that they should be allowed to work, compared with 36% of men. The gap is nearly as wide in Pakistan, where 41% of women strongly agree with that statement, compared with roughly a quarter of men (24%). Even in countries where Muslims broadly support women’s right to work outside the home, such as Lebanon and Turkey, differences between men and women are sizable.

Indonesia and Jordan are notable exceptions to this pattern. In those countries, support for women working is equally weak among members of both sexes. Just 24% of Muslim women in Indonesia, and 20% of men, strongly agree that women should work outside the home, and support is even lower in Jordan (16% to 13% respectively).

There is less of a gender gap over restrictions against men and women being employed in the same workplace. In most cases, women are as supportive of these restrictions as are men. While women in Bangladesh are much more likely than men to strongly favor the right of women to hold jobs, they also are more supportive of separating men and women in the workplace. More than a third of Muslim women in Bangladesh (36%) completely agree that such restrictions are appropriate, compared with 20% of Muslim men.

Type of Marriage

Questions on the role of women in the workplace were not only asked of Muslims. In the Global Attitudes Project inaugural survey in 2002, publics around the world were asked to identify the type of marriage that was most appealing to them. Majorities throughout Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa expressed the desire for both spouses to have jobs and share in household and child care duties. A majority of Americans agree, but to a lesser degree than many Africans and Turks, with 58% of the total U.S. population surveyed supporting both spouses working and 37% disagreeing. There is a large difference of opinion among predominantly Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan, which are the sole countries to favor the more traditional role of women, where the man provides the income and the woman takes care of the household and children.

Homosexuality, Religion and Morality

The Global Attitudes Project reported a gaping transatlantic divide on social issues from the acceptability of homosexuality to social welfare between the U.S. and Europe. While the two regions are divided, another transatlantic gender gap also exists. Women in the U.S. are more accepting of homosexuality than American men, as are nearly all western European women.

Even among Muslims in regions as diverse as Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh and Lebanon, women express views of acceptance for homosexuality more than their male counterparts. The outlaying exceptions are Italy where both genders register almost equally large endorsements for homosexual acceptability (73% of men and 71% of women), and among Muslims in Uzbekistan, Indonesia and Jordan where an equally insignificant difference between the genders opposes homosexuality.

Women around the world say religion is more important to them than men in every region, in highly religious countries such as those in Latin America and in more secular societies such as Canada and Europe. Only in Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia, where nearly everyone expressed the importance of religion in their lives, were there few gaps between genders. On the question of whether or not you have to believe in God to be a moral person, women in 34 of 39 countries (question not permitted in China, Vietnam, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt) say that belief in God is tantamount to personal morality. Where men hold this opinion more than women, it is only by a slim margin—for example in France 16% of men and 10% of women hold this opinion and in Nigeria the margin is 86% to 84% respectively.

With women expressing greater importance of religion in their lives, how do Muslim women feel about religious education for their children? The Muslim world is divided over whether schools should focus more on ‘practical’ subjects and less on religious education. Half of the countries surveyed, including Turkey and Uzbekistan, support putting greater emphasis on practical education and several other countries, notably Indonesia, Pakistan and Jordan strongly oppose this idea. Yet despite the difference in male and female attitudes toward religion in Muslim societies, there is no large gap between the genders on religious education. The greatest difference is found in Nigeria where 26% of men completely agree that practical education should be given precedent with only 18% of women saying the same thing. Elsewhere, in Turkey, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, men and women mirror each other’s response.

Muslim men and women are also in agreement within their own countries on whether their religion should tolerate diverse interpretations of Islam’s teachings or if there is only one true interpretation of those teachings. The only significant gender gap is in Pakistan where 39% of women who offered a response favor diversity with 27% of men agreeing.

Threats to Islam

The perception that there are serious threats to Islam is widespread and growing in the Muslim world. This is most pronounced in Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority, where over two thirds of respondents in each country see Islam threatened. But this view is not limited to that region alone. Since the war in Iraq, over half of Indonesians (59%), Pakistanis (64%) and half of Turks feel major threats to their religion. These proportions are all up considerably since the Pew survey began polling in 2002, before the war in Iraq. Even in Nigeria, respondents saying Islam is seriously threatened have doubled since 2002, from 21% to 42%.

Men in most places feel threat more intensely than women, with the exception of Uzbekistan where women site serious threats to Islam by 4 percentage points over men. The biggest gender gap in opinion exists in Senegal where 71% of men see Islam threatened, but only 45% of women and Bangladesh (59% and 33% respectively). But the largest shift in opinion from 2002 to 2003 was in Pakistan. In the span of one year, men seeing a threat jumped 17 percentage points while women perceiving threats to Islam skyrocketed from 19% to 70%.

But what are these serious threats? Polling in 2002, prior to the US-led war in Iraq, found that people were not primarily worried about external, political, military or cultural threats. Instead most cited internal threats within their own country, such as government interference with religion, a diminishing commitment to Muslim teachings and schools among the young, or a lack of Islamic unity and moral decline.

Men and women express very different views of threats to Islam. Men list “terrorism” more often than women and also say that the U.S. and the West pose larger threats to Islam than their female counterparts. This is particularly prominent in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Women see local government and politics as larger threats to their religion, especially in Indonesia and Turkey. Women around the Muslim world agree that internal religious issues and the direction of Muslim education within their countries pose large problems for Islam. This is particularly distinct in Turkey where twice as many women than men say religious issues within Islam are the main threat to their faith.

Lebanon and Jordan are exceptional in that both sexes cite external threats to Islam more often than internal threats, a departure from any other country surveyed. There, terrorism and U.S./Western threats and even the influence of other religions far outweigh any internal threats to their religion. In addition, men and women share in this opinion equally, with nearly identical emphasis placed on those threats outside their country.

Similarly, the genders in Uzbekistan have few discrepancies in their responses on this issue, each saying that people within their own country (specifically Vakhabists, or religious fundamentalists) posed the largest threat to their religion. The threat of terrorism was also of primary concern to Uzbek men and women and they agreed to equal degree that the problem threatened their religion.

In sum, women in the Muslim world are more focused on internal threats to Islam, whereas men are more threatened by the other religions and the U.S./Western war on terrorism.

Suicide bombings

In the 14 Muslim countries surveyed in the inaugural 2002 poll, men were more likely to say suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets is justifiable than women. However, the gaps between the sexes are not large, with two contrasting exceptions. In Nigeria, a majority of men say suicide bombing is justifiable (56%) and only 36% of women say so. But 4,500 miles to the east in Pakistan, a majority of women who gave a response say such violence is justifiable much more than men. The re-percentaged ratio shows that 55% of women compared with 37% of men believed suicide bombing could be justified.

In an era where women are themselves joining the ranks of suicide bombers in the Middle East, it may come as little surprise that nearly three quarters (72%) of Lebanese women agree with their male counterparts that such actions are justifiable. In Jordan, the number of women sharing that view slightly outnumbers men, 45% to 41%.

Two additional questions regarding suicide bombing were asked in 2004 using specific scenarios. One asked about the justifiability of suicide bombing carried out by Palestinians against Israeli citizens and the other asked about such acts carried out against American and other Westerners in Iraq. When presented with these two cases, the number of people in all four countries saying that violence is justified, increased, and, in Turkey, increased considerably.

But the most astonishing figures come from Muslim women in Jordan and Morocco. There, more women than men say suicide bombings against Israeli citizens are justified, with fully 89% of Jordanian women and 77% of Moroccan women saying so compared with 85% and 71% of their male counterparts respectively. In Pakistan and Turkey, more Muslim men than women say such acts of violence are justified, yet still 33% of Pakistani women say so compared with 31% of Turkish men and 17% of Turkish women.

The same pattern holds when asked about suicide bombing of Americans and other westerners in Iraq. Again, Jordanian and Moroccan women believe these acts are justifiable by a slight margin over men in their country, whereas it is the men in Pakistan and Turkey who say this.

Foreign Policy and the War in Iraq

This paper has focused primarily on Muslim views but it is worth noting that men and women within their countries have very similar views of foreign policy issues. A nine country survey March 2004 examined the war in Iraq one year after it began and revisited some of the same questions about the America’s image in the world and U.S.-European relations that the inaugural survey examined. A few key points are worth mentioning. Overall, there is little difference in the views of men and women on most foreign policy questions, issues dealing with the Iraq war and use of force within their own countries. In addition, no clear regional patterns emerge.

One interesting finding from the new survey supports Pew’s original analysis– that men in all countries except Britain express more optimism about their lives and those of their children. In 2004 men believe people from their country who move to the United States have a better life more than women. This is especially true in Jordan where 38% of men believe immigrants to America are better off, but only 25% of women agree. In Britain women are only slightly more hopeful of the lives of British immigrants with 43% believing them better off and men just behind at 40%.

What is apparent is that the DK/Refusal effect both widens and narrows the gender gap with regard to foreign policy questions. As noted previously, women in all parts of the world are less likely to give an opinion on political issues than men, but taking that into account only muddies the picture and highlights the importance of intra-country differences.

After accounting for the higher rats of opinion giving, Pakistani men and women tend to fall further apart on most questions, yet in most other nations, the gap narrows. Three examples exemplify this finding: When asked to rate the United Nations, men in six of nine countries surveyed have a more favorable view of the world institution than women. Yet, due to the DK/Refused effect, women in six of nine countries rate the U.N better than men and the gap is narrowed in all of the remaining three. Smaller differences in view on foreign policy questions such as the relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe and pre-emption, show the same pattern, where, after accounting for opinion registry women and men the gender gaps narrow.

Conclusion

This analysis fails to detect any systematic difference between the genders when it comes to issues of governance, foreign policy and current international conflicts. Only on specific domestic issues of particular immediacy to men and women do the genders differ in their views. The data suggest the historic gender gap has diminished and one’s sex does not appear to predict opinion on a variety of issues the way it once did. The findings outlined here are only a first step, not the definitive work measuring opinion differences. Future in-depth analysis of other important cleavages such as age and education will be crucial to our understanding of ways in which men and women voice their opinions and which issues gender differences will surface in the future. For in the end, we may find we are not so different after all.